I consider myself a copperhead, and I would say that the U.S.Civil War was lost for the South on September 18th 1862. Up until that point I believe victory was possible, but never probable.
Meade had a shorter logistical tail than Lee. He could've replenished much easier and quicker.
Longstreet would have needed an attack force two to three times the size of what he had available to have any realistic chance of breaching and holding the Union line.
Yeah, not convincing me in the least. Seems you are more focused on blaming Longstreet and not finding fault with Lee, than you are in dealing realistically with the facts.
If you are betting your whole campaign in a single attack, you better be on the ground to make sure it's carried out. That Alexander failed to silence Union batteries should have been enough to cancel the attack
Lee was acting under the assumption that the Day 2 attack plan would have succeeded had it been properly supported by elements of Hill and Ewell's Corps. Consequently, with some variations in units and attack focal point, Lee chose to make another attempt on Day 3 at breaching the federal line and carrying Cemetery Hill. But Lee's operational plan still suffered from the same deficiencies that doomed the assault on Day 2. Insufficient manpower, a renewed concentration of federal defenders, Ewell's uncoordinated and unsuccessful assault at the Confederate far left flank, a troubled lack of command and control between Longstreet and Hills' Corps, an unrealistic belief in the power of an offensive artillery bombardment, and lack of proper support by Lang and Wilcox's brigades on the right flank were all flawed components that could have been anticipated. To fault Longstreet for not carrying out Lee's "plan" as ordered is simply an attempt to deflect blame from Lee himself.
Well to be fair their are eyewitness accounts of Longstreet's shall we say tardiness in the field on day 3 , For a start Ewell had orders to attack at 10am which he did and we know that Pickets division was in place by 9am and according to Freemantle at this point Longstreet is relaxing if at this point Lee had delayed Longstreet's attack why is Ewell still attacking? The whole point of Ewells attack is to make sure Meade does not support his centre and yet Picketts attack does not step off till 1400 that's one big delay?.
It wasn't so much that Ewell attacked early as the Twelfth Corps attacked him at first light. This was very much a continuation of the fighting from the previous evening and would result in the longest sustained fighting of the battle (about 7 hours on July 3). Regardless of what Lee had planned (and I'm not convinced he had any plan beyond keep up the pressure on the flanks), the Yankees took the decision making out of his hands very early on. It wasn't until about noon that Lee realized that he had to come up with something else as Ewell had been repulsed pretty decisively.
All we really know on the point of the timing is that Longstreet claims he never received any orders for an early attack, and all of his actions tend to support this contention. Lee did note in his report, though, that he had expected an attack earlier. But Lee and Longstreet did not meet after the end of the second day's fight, so it seems there were a lot of operational details that needed to worked out in person (such was what troops were to participate in the attack) that did not occur until the 3rd. If Lee seriously expected Hoods and McLaws divisions to spearhead the attack, with the addition of Pickett, then he truly was asking way too much of his troops. I have to believe after the severe fighting on the second, and the immense casualties they suffered, that to ask them to attack a fortified position again the very next day was just insanity. As it was, the troops from Hill who had been in the first days fight probably was a poor choice to attack on the third, they had a full days rest! Would love to know what Lee thought was going to happen early on the third, but as we know the plan changed dramatically after Longstreet and Lee met.
I'm also very struck by a quote from E.P. Alexander about this attack. In Fighting for the Confederacy he makes clear that the point of attack selected was perhaps the worst possible choice. Pickett was aimed at the shank of the fish hook, and this could be enfiladed along the whole line from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top. The logical point of attack was at the bend of the fish hook, so that troops approaching would not be subject to being enfiladed, and would have the cover of the town in their approach. Also, being in the center of the CSA arc, the point could be subject to a massive cross fire from batteries from the Second and Third Corps, all converging on a central point from multiple directions.
To make matters worse, Lee's managerial style was to set forth the "big picture" and let his subordinate corps commanders figure out how to accomplish it. That only goes so far; when command, control, and coordination were always major issues during the CW, an army commander should have been more communicative and assertive in ensuring that attack plans were totally understood, able to be accomplished, and were carried out.
Bringing the