Lee Doesn't Order Pickett's Charge

[rpkennedy]

How Scales brigade was even considered for the assault makes little sense, in fact Scales and Lane's brigades were the hardest hit on day 1, and for some reason they get earmarked for the assault.

Lane escaped much of the fighting on July 1. His line extended far beyond the Union left on Seminary Ridge and was mainly held up by some skillful cavalry actions. Scales and Perrin took the brunt of that particular assault.

Ryan

 

[wausaubob]

It is a fascinating thread. 160 years later, the idea that tactical brilliance was going to overcome the US industrial war machine still lives on. The US Civil War was proceeding on a very advantageous basis for the US by July 1863. In just a few weeks Rosecrans' force was going to reach Chattanooga without a bloody fight. The US advantage in naval forces and in industrial output could not be reversed by any result in Pennsylvania. However the thread does demonstrate how tactical victories could be used to hide a crumbling strategic situation.
The reality is that it was a continental war, with naval extensions in the seven oceans. Virginia was not dominant. It wasn't the 18th century any longer.

 

[wausaubob]

As the speculation continues, a person might ponder why did General Lee chose to fight at Gettysburg? Why didn't he proceed to Harrisburg or try to reach Philadelphia? He knew his logistical capacity was very limited and his escape route back to Virginia was already extended. The US army, in contrast, could reconnect to the railroad network at numerous locations.

 

[Stryker65]

As the speculation continues, a person might ponder why did General Lee chose to fight at Gettysburg? Why didn't he proceed to Harrisburg or try to reach Philadelphia? He knew his logistical capacity was very limited and his escape route back to Virginia was already extended. The US army, in contrast, could reconnect to the railroad network at numerous locations.

Slightly off topic, but I sometimes like to imagine what would have happened if Lee won at Gettysburg, stayed in the area, and somehow the remnants of John Hunt Morgan's command met up with him. Would have been interesting for TWO glory-seeking cavalrymen to be in the same army.

 

[JerryD]

Or he was fighting George B. McClellan , PS I actually think Antietam was Lee's finest battle by rights he should have been crushed but managed to utilize his whole army and was able to extract them with skill.


I can see what your getting at here but I can assure you Lee was the finest battle commander of the whole war to do what he did with limited resources & manpower was not pure luck because he did it over and over again something the AoT could only dream of but of course luck does play a role unless your Grant and have to create your own.

You could argue at Gettysburg that it was lucky for the Union that Ewell chose not to attack Culps Hill or that Sickles decided to move out of line Prompting the placement of Troops on Little Round top , It was lucky for the Union that faulty fuses had been supplied that made Lee's cannonade less effective.

Two critical things happened at Gettysburg that swayed the battle the Wounding of Dorsey Pender and Uncle Dan's decision to move forward out of line both of which had huge consequence's for Lee's army had both of these not happened I think Meade would have lost and as https://civilwartalk.com/members/jeffbrooks.2349/ said people would have been calling Lee's victory at Gettysburg both bold and audacious.

Dont get me wrong, I think Lee is an excellent general. I am just not one of those who slobber over his feet and think he never made a mistake. News flash: Lee was human. Not saying you are one of those by the way, but they certainly exist here. Lee had to take long risks since he was dealt inferior cards. All that being said, Antietam never should have happened. The risks he took (complete destruction of his army) was not worth the benefit of winning the battle.

I guess you don't like Grant, but I put him at least as Lee's equal, but then its hard to compare them given the different circumstances they faced. Hard to say how Lee would have done in Grant's shoes, or Grant's in Lee's. But in terms of results, Grant was by far the most successful general of the war. Granted he advantages Lee did not, but at the end of the day war is about winning, not "putting up a good fight and losing in the end valiantly".

 

[Scott1967]

I guess you don't like Grant, but I put him at least as Lee's equal, but then its hard to compare them given the different circumstances they faced. Hard to say how Lee would have done in Grant's shoes, or Grant's in Lee's. But in terms of results, Grant was by far the most successful general of the war. Granted he advantages Lee did not, but at the end of the day war is about winning, not "putting up a good fight and losing in the end valiantly".

I love Grant I think Grant was the best strategic General of the war but as a battlefield commander I rank Lee higher.

Like I said in another thread I would have Grant as head of my armies and Lee to fight my battles.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Dont get me wrong, I think Lee is an excellent general. I am just not one of those who slobber over his feet and think he never made a mistake. News flash: Lee was human. Not saying you are one of those by the way, but they certainly exist here. Lee had to take long risks since he was dealt inferior cards. All that being said, Antietam never should have happened. The risks he took (complete destruction of his army) was not worth the benefit of winning the battle.

I guess you don't like Grant, but I put him at least as Lee's equal, but then its hard to compare them given the different circumstances they faced. Hard to say how Lee would have done in Grant's shoes, or Grant's in Lee's. But in terms of results, Grant was by far the most successful general of the war. Granted he advantages Lee did not, but at the end of the day war is about winning, not "putting up a good fight and losing in the end valiantly".

Agree with much of this. I find Lee and Grant to be near the top of generalship during the war. I honestly find how they dealt with their mistakes is what sets them apart.

 

[jackt62]

Longstreet seemed the only corps commander capable of ensuring that the troops he was told to attack with actually made the attack

Very true. Ironically, Longstreet, who was probably the most able Confederate commander at Gettysburg, has been unfairly pilloried for 150 years since the CW.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Very true. Ironically, Longstreet, who was probably the most able Confederate commander at Gettysburg, has been unfairly pilloried for 150 years since the CW.

I think that was maybe true during reconstruction and after. I'm not saying he's universally beloved. But he's consistently ranked as one of the 3-4 best corps commanders on either side during the war. I think tactically and from an executive perspective he was the best. He wasn't as good in independent command though I don't think he was horrible either.

 

[jackt62]

I think that was maybe true during reconstruction and after.

Too long after. It was only towards the end of the 20th century that Longstreet even got a statue at Gettysburg.

 

[jackt62]

As the speculation continues, a person might ponder why did General Lee chose to fight at Gettysburg? Why didn't he proceed to Harrisburg or try to reach Philadelphia? He knew his logistical capacity was very limited and his escape route back to Virginia was already extended. The US army, in contrast, could reconnect to the railroad network at numerous locations.

Lee did not choose to fight at Gettysburg, it was a battle that was thrust upon him and the ANV. Largely due to the absence of Stuart and his cavalry, Lee was blindsided far too late as to the whereabouts of the AotP and its quickly concentrating corps. Ewell had already reached Harrisburg's vicinity but was quickly recalled. And contrary to Lee's instructions, AP Hills' rash insistence allowed Heth to venture into Gettysburg without being aware of the presence of Reynolds' I Corps.

 

[jackt62]

the thread does demonstrate how tactical victories could be used to hide a crumbling strategic situation.
The reality is that it was a continental war, with naval extensions in the seven oceans. Virginia was not dominant. It wasn't the 18th century any longer.

Yes, a Lee victory at Gettysburg would still not discount Grant's significant capture of Vicksburg and its garrison force a few days later. The federal industrial and managerial juggernaut was well on its way to overwhelming the southland and rolling over any Confederate tactical victory. And yet, the whims of public opinion could have been dramatically affected by a devastating defeat of the AotP on northern soil. But we will never know what and whether any such impacts would have made a difference.

 

[wausaubob]

Lee did not choose to fight at Gettysburg, it was a battle that was thrust upon him and the ANV. Largely due to the absence of Stuart and his cavalry, Lee was blindsided far too late as to the whereabouts of the AotP and its quickly concentrating corps. Ewell had already reached Harrisburg's vicinity but was quickly recalled. And contrary to Lee's instructions, AP Hills' rash insistence allowed Heth to venture into Gettysburg without being aware of the presence of Reynolds' I Corps.

He chose to fight. He had proposed that a major victory could counterbalance the crumbling situation in the west and the far west, and the tightening of the blockade. Waiting and maneuvering wasn't going to accomplish what he had proposed.

 

[Generic Username]

Very true. Ironically, Longstreet, who was probably the most able Confederate commander at Gettysburg, has been unfairly pilloried for 150 years since the CW.

I do think there are valid grounds for criticisms as it relates to Day 3 and Pickett's Charge. Lee's plan of operations for the operation were quiet sound, and it seems quiet clear Longstreet-due to disagreeing with the plan-failed to properly carry it out as ordered. Some years ago 67th Tigers made some great points on this:

Lee's orders for day (an oblique attack against Cemetary Hill with all 9 divisions) got watered down a lot, and we ended up with Pickett's Charge.

However, in Lee's original concept of operations Hood's and McLaws' Divisions would also step off moving NE up the Emmitsburg Road (as they were ordered to on the 2nd, before Hood was hit and C&C broke down, leading to the attack drifting onto the Round Tops, ground with no significance). Pickett to their left was also to advance NEE. The Heth/Pender composite division was to advance roughly E (hitting where they historically did hit), Rodes' to the SE, Johnson's to the S, Early's the the SWW while Stuart's cavalry "closed the box". Anderson's division was shifted to Longstreet as a reserve, since 1st Corps had the hardest task.

If successful it would have enveloped the Union Right (11th and 12th Corps) and Centre (1st and 2nd), leaving the left (3rd, 5th and 6th) isolated and on poor ground.

Great plan, poorly executed....

"Breaking the line" wasn't the objective; it was the means to an end. The objective was to gain Cemetary Hill, which is the Key Terrain in that area. The first stage of this was to be a rupture of the Federal line by Pickett, into which the reserve (RH Anderson) was on hand to have been thrown.

Longstreet altered the sequencing on his flank, due to concerns about his flank security, especially due to a Federal Cavalry Division which he was worried would descend on his exposed flank (in fact they did, and were stopped at South Cavalry Field). Longstreet left 4 brigades of Hood's and McLaws' Divisions to screen the right (essentially one brigade face each of the three Federal Corps, and another refused to front the possible cavalry attack), and pulled the rest back to act as part of his reserve for Pickett. The rest of the reserve was 2 brigades of RH Anderson's, while the other two (Wilcox's Demi-Division) replaced McLaws' and Hood's in the battle plan.

Since he wrote that, Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University conducted a simulation that found that indeed, Lee's plan of operations was sound and could've worked had Longstreet devoted more resources to it:

Objective. We model Pickett's Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg to see whether the Confederates could have achieved victory by committing more infantry, executing a better barrage, or facing a weaker defense. Methods. Our mathematical modeling is based on Lanchester equations, calibrated using historical army strengths. We weight the Union artillery and infantry two different ways using two sources of data, and so have four versions of the model. Results. The models estimate that a successful Confederate charge would have required at least 1 to 3 additional brigades. An improved artillery barrage would have reduced these needs by about 1 brigade. A weaker Union defense could have allowed the charge to succeed as executed. Conclusions. The Confederates plausibly had enough troops to take the Union position and alter the battle's outcome, but likely too few to further exploit such a success.

Even accounting for the threat at South Cavalry Field, Longstreet could've plausibly fielded the necessary brigades without compromising flank security too much:

The Confederate assault did not occur in a vacuum; additional units stood by ready, though many had seen high casualties in the previous days of the battle and thus were not assigned to the initial attack. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox and David Lang were in support on the right and actually advanced later to reinforce the assault, bringing an additional 1400- 1600 men towards the Union line (Stewart, 1959: 172-3 & Sears, 2003: 454). They went in too late to properly support the assault, however, and suffered 360 casualties from Union artillery fire before retreating (Sears, 2003: 454-55).

According to Sears, three additional brigades from Anderson's division under Wright, Posey and Mahone were "loosely designated" as support on the left for the attack, but never engaged. They contained approximately 3350 men (Sears, 2003: 392). Stewart notes that at least Wright's brigade was briefly moved forward, but Longstreet recalled it to defend against a potential counterattack (1959: 237). The remainder of Longstreet's corps also stood in the area, and thus Coddington notes that Lee "anticipated throwing another 10,000 or so infantry into the breach he expected to be made by the assaulting column" (Coddington, 1983: 462).

Likewise, Longstreet failed to properly oversee the conduct of the artillery barrage that preceded the attack:

Alexander had originally intended to fire a longer initial barrage, and also make use of several guns from the army's artillery reserve. Unfortunately, General Pendleton, the Confederate Chief of Artillery, repositioned both the reserve and the ammunition train during the barrage (Sears, 2003: 407), making them unavailable. In his memoirs, Alexander remembers Longstreet's dismay when told that the barrage would be shorter than planned, even going so far as to suggest that it was doomed to fail as a result (Gallagher, 1989: 261)

Given all of this, I do think it is valid to attack Longstreet for his conduct on the third day. While the study notes Lee wouldn't have been able to exploit it in full, the loss of two Corps and the cutting of one of the two roads under his control would've forced Meade to retreat, granting a clear and favorable victory to Lee.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I do think there are valid grounds for criticisms as it relates to Day 3 and Pickett's Charge. Lee's plan of operations for the operation were quiet sound, and it seems quiet clear Longstreet-due to disagreeing with the plan-failed to properly carry it out as ordered. Some years ago 67th Tigers made some great points on this:




Since he wrote that, Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University conducted a simulation that found that indeed, Lee's plan of operations was sound and could've worked had Longstreet devoted more resources to it:



Even accounting for the threat at South Cavalry Field, Longstreet could've plausibly fielded the necessary brigades without compromising flank security too much:


Likewise, Longstreet failed to properly oversee the conduct of the artillery barrage that preceded the attack:



Given all of this, I do think it is valid to attack Longstreet for his conduct on the third day. While the study notes Lee wouldn't have been able to exploit it in full, the loss of two Corps and the cutting of one of the two roads under his control would've forced Meade to retreat, granting a clear and favorable victory to Lee.

What woukd be interesting is if Longstreet stacked his column similarly to what he did at Chickamauga. Say for instance something like:

Left flank: Penders Division: Lane, Thomas, and Perrin
Attack Column:
First Rank - Kemper, Garnett
Second Rank - Armistead
Third Rank - Marshall, Fry
Fourth Rank - Davis
Fifth Rank - Mahone and Posey
Right Flank - Wilcox, Wright

Armistead penetrative the angle, but then was pushed off. A big reason Armistead kept cohesion is he was the second line and he took less Artillery damage than Kemper and Garnett.

Here you have have 5 more brigades behind Amristead who would have also had more cohesion. They possible wiukd if been able to push left and right and opened up a gap in the line.

Longstreet seems to have learned from Gettysburg because both his Chickamauga and Wilderness assaults are made with depth behind them.

 

[rbasin]

If the result at Gettysburg were as you suggest, Grant comes east immediately. Grant insists on a coordinated land and sea attack on Mobile. The army keeps a much tighter hold on Rosecrans once he reaches Chattanooga. The army would order him to fortify Chattanooga and resupply. Regardless of what happens in Pennsylvania, the combined effort at Charleston forces the Confederates to vacate battery Wagner. The result their would have resembled the fall of Fort Pulaski, accept the garrison might have been spared. There were reinforcements available from Mississippi once Vicksburg fell. In the scenario you have created, Grant almost certainly takes over immediately and the US advantage in combined arms would be fully exploited. Fun question though.

Yes and no. Grant could have been moved east as a military division commander (along the lines of what Halleck's plan was in 1862). I can't imagine Lincoln promoting him above Halleck without the Chattanooga victory.

 

[rbasin]

I do think there are valid grounds for criticisms as it relates to Day 3 and Pickett's Charge. Lee's plan of operations for the operation were quiet sound, and it seems quiet clear Longstreet-due to disagreeing with the plan-failed to properly carry it out as ordered. Some years ago 67th Tigers made some great points on this:




Since he wrote that, Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University conducted a simulation that found that indeed, Lee's plan of operations was sound and could've worked had Longstreet devoted more resources to it:



Even accounting for the threat at South Cavalry Field, Longstreet could've plausibly fielded the necessary brigades without compromising flank security too much:


Likewise, Longstreet failed to properly oversee the conduct of the artillery barrage that preceded the attack:



Given all of this, I do think it is valid to attack Longstreet for his conduct on the third day. While the study notes Lee wouldn't have been able to exploit it in full, the loss of two Corps and the cutting of one of the two roads under his control would've forced Meade to retreat, granting a clear and favorable victory to Lee.

But, you keep shifting blame into Longstreet. It was Lee's army and his responsibility to ensure, regardless of who he placed in charge of the actual attack, that the resources were there.

 

[JerryD]

I do think there are valid grounds for criticisms as it relates to Day 3 and Pickett's Charge. Lee's plan of operations for the operation were quiet sound, and it seems quiet clear Longstreet-due to disagreeing with the plan-failed to properly carry it out as ordered. Some years ago 67th Tigers made some great points on this:




Since he wrote that, Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University conducted a simulation that found that indeed, Lee's plan of operations was sound and could've worked had Longstreet devoted more resources to it:



Even accounting for the threat at South Cavalry Field, Longstreet could've plausibly fielded the necessary brigades without compromising flank security too much:


Likewise, Longstreet failed to properly oversee the conduct of the artillery barrage that preceded the attack:



Given all of this, I do think it is valid to attack Longstreet for his conduct on the third day. While the study notes Lee wouldn't have been able to exploit it in full, the loss of two Corps and the cutting of one of the two roads under his control would've forced Meade to retreat, granting a clear and favorable victory to Lee.

Color me skeptical. I tend to think more troops just means more casualties. The truth is, the AOP was in a fairly compact situation, so any initial breach would just run into more and more troops as it moved deeper. Reinforcements to repair a breach were close at hand.

I also tend to seriously discount this whole analysis if the first section is intended to make us think Lee did not agree to hold back Hood's and McLaws' divisions. Its well documented under the final plan they were not expected to attack, but to maintain their positions. If Longstreet, on his own and without Lee's permission, held back two divisions, I find it hard to believe Lee would not have mentioned this in his report, and continued to have great confidence in Longstreet's abilities.

 

[Scott1967]

I do think there are valid grounds for criticisms as it relates to Day 3 and Pickett's Charge. Lee's plan of operations for the operation were quiet sound, and it seems quiet clear Longstreet-due to disagreeing with the plan-failed to properly carry it out as ordered.

If you don't know Matt Atkinson I suggest you watch this video Matt explains everything about Picketts Charge , Its very long but absolutely worth it.

 

[jackt62]

He chose to fight. He had proposed that a major victory could counterbalance the crumbling situation in the west and the far west, and the tightening of the blockade. Waiting and maneuvering wasn't going to accomplish what he had proposed.

Well, let's just say that the genesis of the Pennsylvania incursion was indeed predicated on confronting and defeating the federal army on its soil. But the time and place of the actual encounter at Gettysburg was thrust upon Lee by circumstance, not necessarily by his choosing.