He did in fact receive something of one -- the Army of East Tennessee from October, 1863 to February, 1864. He received the nickname "Peter The Slow" for his, well, slowness in moving about.
Why do you think that? The idea that Longstreet had some defensive only mindset is very inaccurate. At Chickamauga he was very much behind attacking the Union and at Knoxville when in independent commander he had no qualms launching attacks. I don't think he is very much like Johnston at all.
I agree that if fault is found with Longstreet it's that he never really pushed his soldiers hard in the march.
Longstreet could arrange powerful attacks, but clearly preferred force preservation. That's not to say that that was the wrong mindset for a corps commander to have, but he did not like to arrange attacks without preparing every minute advantage in his favor and generally took as much time to prepare as he felt necessary to do so. None of these are bad qualities to have, and I don't really fault Johnston for having a similar mindset, but exhausting the North with a long grinding war was not going to be ultimately successful as a strategy. People of good faith can disagree as to whether any series of strategies at all could have been successful, but Lee's pursuit of a Cannae like destruction of a northern field army seems to me like a more complete goal than keeping as much of an army together and hoping to contest as many river lines as possible ultimately seems to have been.
I just disagree that he "clearly preferred force preservation." At Chickamauga after launching a devastating attack, he banged his head against Horseshoe Ridge, clearly not worried about force preservation. At Knoxville he does the same thing. At the Wilderness, he he launches a devastating frontal assault against Hancock, followed by a flanking attack. Clearly not worried about force preservation.
I didn't say you said Longstreet was a bad corps commander, I'm merely saying I myself don't think he was. I also don't think it's that far off to say Lee's disappointment in Lee's own performances in 1862 and 1863 were that he wasn't able to destroy a federal army in the field. I'm sure I could open another can of worms by saying 2nd Manassas possibly shows an example where Longstreet launching his assault a day later missed an opportunity for that attack to be done in concert with the rest of the army.
Was it Wilcox? I think it's in Foote's part 2
I used to think the same thing about 2nd Manassas, but reality is that Porter's Corps was Southeast of Longstreet's flank, if Longstreet launches the offensive on the 29th any earlier, his flank could have been caved in. It was actually smart that they didn't attack earlier.
I wasn't trying to present an all-time list. Nor do I think Longstreet was perfect or that he didn't have his warts, just that the presentation of Longstreet as a defensive general that was more concerned with preserving his troops is not such a black and white issue. Reality is that during the war, Longstreet was responsible for 4 of the most hard-hitting and devastating attacks of the war, 2nd Manassas, Gettysburg day 2, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness. That isn't the evidence of someone husbanding his forces. Nor is it anything close to someone like Joe Johnston, who really has no major successful attacks to his name, or really any major offensives of any repute. I do agree that Longstreet personally liked and respected Johnston, and was maybe closer to him personally than Lee, though that is also debatable imo!
My Vol. 2 of Foote's trilogy is loaned out to a friend. I'm about to check Sears' "Gettysburg."
I did a search that says it twas Lee but that doesn't sound right.
The quote I was thinking of was made by Longstreet (according to Sears, "Gettysburg," p.357). On the morning of July 3, 1864 Longstreet said to General Lee, "General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position." Then he pointed to Cemetery Hill.
That sounds right. It was in the movie.
Exactly right, @jackt62.
You are correct that this is not a "black and white" issue. Longstreet believed that the tactical defensive usually offered a superior outcome. But Longstreet cannot be defined strictly as a defensive" commander. In fact, under his leadership, he was responsible for conducting some of the most outstanding offensive attacks. Amongst those are 2nd Manassas, Chickamauga, the assault on the Union salient at Gettysburg, and the Wilderness. While those assaults were all offensive in nature, they were not (with the exception perhaps of the attack on Fort Sanders at Knoxville), forlorn attempts to simply hurl manpower against a fixed enemy, located behind solid entrenchments as was the case at Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, and Day 3 at Gettysburg. Longstreet's assaults utilized a combination of tactical methods and consideration of terrain features, including flanking, concentration in columns, and counter-attack under positive conditions. Did he always succeed? Absolutely not, as his overall experience in Tennessee showed. But I would agree that he was one of the top Corps commanders of either side.
Speaking of Lee, that was precisely his fatal flaw at Gettysburg. Useful intelligence that would normally have been provided by Stuart was sorely lacking in this case; unlike his previous experience, Lee was forced to give up the initiative, which led to the blunders encountered on the battlefield.
Lee had already decided to concentrate his Army at Gettysburg regardless of Stuart.
Too late. Lee was in the dark until June 29th when Longstreet's spy Harrison provided info on the AotP's whereabouts. Lee was able to concentrate much of the army and in particular recall Ewell from Harrisburg and vicinity, which gave him an advantage on Day 1. But because of his lack of useful intelligence all along, Lee lost the initiative and never regained it.
Yes and no. Leaving slack to his corps commanders was Lee's modus operandi and to a certain extent, is a useful and necessary way for an army commander to manage his subordinates. But Lee was remiss in not providing greater supervision over his 2 most recent Corps commanders, Ewell, and in particular Hill. Ewell actually performed capably from the start of the Gettysburg campaign until the end of Day 1. At the very least, there was a lack of communication between Lee and his Corps commanders that exacerbated coordination along an already lengthy exterior line.
Bringing the