Lee Doesn't Order Pickett's Charge

[rpkennedy]

I'm also very struck by a quote from E.P. Alexander about this attack. In Fighting for the Confederacy he makes clear that the point of attack selected was perhaps the worst possible choice. Pickett was aimed at the shank of the fish hook, and this could be enfiladed along the whole line from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top. The logical point of attack was at the bend of the fish hook, so that troops approaching would not be subject to being enfiladed, and would have the cover of the town in their approach. Also, being in the center of the CSA arc, the point could be subject to a massive cross fire from batteries from the Second and Third Corps, all converging on a central point from multiple directions.

While I understand Alexander's arguments, I generally disagree with them due to the circumstances.

1. Cover of the town. The issue here was how close the town was to the Union position. Any attacking force would have to form their lines after passing through the town otherwise Gettysburg would break up their formation. And there is A LOT of artillery on Cemetery Hill without counting the riflemen. The Confederates would be shot apart at close range before they could even step off. The only reason that Early was able to get Hays and Avery into the attack was that they deployed when it was dark. The Yankees didn't know they were coming until they were almost on top of them.

2. Artillery crossfire. On the arc running northeast to northwest of Cemetery Hill, there were no good artillery positions from which to fire at the Union position. The best one was Benner's Hill and that turned into a nightmare for Major Latimer and his battalion on July 2. In addition, Cemetery Hill dominates all of the geography on that side of the battlefield. Confederate guns would be firing uphill at many more and heavier Union batteries. That's a very difficult ask.

On this subject, Alexander in theory is correct but the practicalities on the ground at Gettysburg were decidedly against the theory.

Ryan

 

[wausaubob]

Coordinating large scale attacks with multiple corps involved seems to have been exceptionally difficult the whole war. Lee kept trying to make it work well into 1863 with pretty mixed success and a lot of his successes in 1864 can be attributed to allowing his opponents to fail at the same thing.

A good example of that would be Spotsylvania. The US divisions breached the Confederate lines, but the support from the Fifth and Sixth Corp was inadequate. Burnside's Ninth Corp was probably in position to get in the rear of the Confederates. However getting that information to headquarters in time to co-ordinate with the attack was not achieved.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Meade had cut himself off from his supply lines in order to get to Gettysburg faster; IIRC, his supply wagons didn't catch up until July 5th or 6th. In the event Lee succeeds in breaching his lines, the Pipe Creek order stipulated they'd abandon Gettysburg and fall back on the aforementioned position. Personally, I think at that stage Lee would also cut his losses and withdraw back into Virginia since he's succeeded in most of his goals.



The study argues he could've done it if reinforced by 1-3 additional brigades, which I think is sound when considering the state of the Federals at that time. As noted earlier the Union artillery was already low on munitions and the only non-deployed brigades left to Meade were Grant and Russell's on the extreme south of the battlefield guarding the flank. By the time they could arrive to counter-attack, the deed would long since be done.

Who knows? You may indeed be right, @Generic Username. I vaguely recall a quote by one of the Confederate generals to the effect that no army in the history of the world could have taken/held the Union center at Gettysburg. (I'll see if I can find it because I could be wrong - too much CW reading during the past 7 decades.)

 

[jackt62]

As Attack Commander, virtually all of these faults you cite were under Longstreet's direct purview.

Uncertainty with the respective responsibilities of Longstreet, Lee, and the other Corps Commanders has given rise to much disagreement over the faulty performance of the ANV at Gettysburg. It is no secret that Longstreet disagreed with much of Lee's operational plans; however, I do not agree that his reluctance of those plans prevented him from carrying out his orders to the best of his ability. On Day 2, Longstreet's Divisions (Hood and McLaws), conducted one of the most masterful assaults of a federal position notwithstanding the fact that the original plans were based on faulty intelligence. Longstreet has gotten much grief for what nominally were the responsibilities of Hill and Ewell, not to mention Lee himself.

 

[jackt62]

I vaguely recall a quote by one of the Confederate generals to the effect that no army in the history of the world could have taken/held the Union center at Gettysburg.

I haven't heard that particular quote, but it is very well said. Of course, if the ANV had twice the manpower, had conducted proper intelligence and terrain observation, and had Meade not been as resourceful a commander in shifting resources to threatened locations, the situation might have been much different.

 

[wausaubob]

Great thread. But he was going to order the July 3 assault. He could anticipate that the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg would surrender soon. The logical move for the US after that happened was to bring some of that army and some of those commanders to the east. The match up at Gettysburg, though not advantageous, could easily be seen as the best match up he was ever going to get. He had good weather, adequate commissary supplies, and about as large a force as he ever was going to have. Essentially, though he never admitted it, he was going to win on July 3, 1863, or prove to himself that could not be done. The only scenario in which he does not order the assault would be one in which he surveys the field and obtains an order of battle for the US and decides the opposing force is too large to dislodge. The problem with that suggestion is that the improvement in US artillery, and the improvement in shoulder weapons was not yet obvious. The fighting at Chancellorsville had been at close range closed in by vegetation. The casualties likely to occur on more open terrain were not predictable.

 

[wausaubob]

As for Longstreet's doubts about the attack on the final day, it doesn't seem that it would have based on the terrain. It could have been based on his experience by that point that a frontal attack was very unlikely to dislodge a stationary force. And he might have been disappointed that the federal army under General Meade behaved tactically like the army under General McClellan. The US army was much kept denser by Meade, with units capable of supporting each other. He may have recognized that as well as things were going on July 2, the US army was able to respond to the emergency.

 

[jackt62]

It could have been based on his experience by that point that a frontal attack was very unlikely to dislodge a stationary force.

Longstreet was very much influenced by the ANV's experience at Fredericksburg the previous December. He understood the power of the defensive in an entrenched location and the utter futility of an enemy directly assaulting that position. Going forward, his tactical belief was based on maneuvering the AotP into a similar situation in which the ANV in a defensive position would be able to deliver a similar defeat against a frontal attack. He argued this point with Lee but to no avail. Consequently, Longstreet clearly could foresee the devastating results of the Confederate assault on Day 3 at Gettysburg.

 

[121st PA Vols]

I've always felt that Lee was lucky to get away at Antietam. Choosing to fight a vastly superior force with a river to your back is not good generalship. He got away with it, but that does not mean he was bold or audacious. It means he was lucky.

Right. And maybe he knew his opponent and wasn't impressed how Mac managed troops at the Seven Days Battle!
Lee's positioning the ANV with the river at his rear always reminded me of the story of Cortez burning his ships before going against the Aztecs. More recent research says he scuttled them but it is still a great story and makes a point.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Longstreet was very much influenced by the ANV's experience at Fredericksburg the previous December. He understood the power of the defensive in an entrenched location and the utter futility of an enemy directly assaulting that position. Going forward, his tactical belief was based on maneuvering the AotP into a similar situation in which the ANV in a defensive position would be able to deliver a similar defeat against a frontal attack. He argued this point with Lee but to no avail. Consequently, Longstreet clearly could foresee the devastating results of the Confederate assault on Day 3 at Gettysburg.

And yet Longstreet had no qualms launching frontal attacks at Chickamauga, Knoxville, and the Wilderness. I think we make this issue to black and white. I don't think he had any qualms about frontal assaults in general. I think the bigger issue is that he had it in his head that the battle was going to be fought one way and when it wasn't I think that soured him on much of the planning for the fighting.

As someone who rates Longstreet as the best corps commander of the war, I feel like i'm pretty fair with him. His day 2 performance is somewhat mixed. His march to get his men into place, was not the best planned. For whatever reason sulking, lack of imagination, ect., he didn't follow the artillery path, and therefore had to backtrack the two divisions which cost the confederacy anywhere from 1-1.5 hours. The delay would have negative effects later in the attack, as it cost the northern end of the echelon attack daylight.

Once he arrived in position though and with the change in plans the new intel on the shift of Sickles corps in their front, and with the arrival of Lee on the scene, the attack was changed from a simultaneous attack up the Emmitsburg road by both divisions to an echelon attack starting with Hood and moving northward to envelop the Union position, OR to force the Union to overcommit reserves to the southern sector and therefore weaken their center. Longstreet masterfully employs his two divsions to devastating effect. In fact they inflict more casualties in their attacks than they receive.

On day 3, I wouldn't say he enthusiastically deployed his troops, but at the end of the day he ensured that all the troops in the initial wave made their assault, though I don't find him utilizing the depth that he would use in his two later attacks. For instance at Chickamagua he employs 5 lines of 8 brigades and at the Wilderness in his initial attack to throw back Hancock's corps he employs again 8 brigades in a four column deep formation.

I'm of the opinion that Pickett's charge could have succeeded IF they employed 2-3 more brigades, and ensured that the artillery on the flanks protected their flanks from counter attack. The failure of the attack must be shared by Lee, Longstreet, and Pendleton. I do agree that Lee envisioned his artillyer supporting the attack after it commenced in some way, what that was specifically I'm not sure. I do think more batteries on the flanks with proper ammunition to fire on any union troops that tried to move and flank the assault column would have been benefiicial. If the attack width was lowered but the depth was increased I think that would have been beneficial as well. For instance if Pettigrews only moved forward in a support role to protect the flanks, and Wilcox and Posey do the same thing, but the center of the attack consisted of something like:

Garnett, Kemper
Armistead,
Lane, Thomas
Perrin
Mahone, Posey
Wright

You'd could of possibly pealed of a third or fourth wave to protect the flanks on top of the support divisions, and still had 3-4 brigades following up Armistead in the center. We also know that the Federal ammunition was also running low, so more troops doesn't necessarily mean more casualties from Artillyer, more likely those casualties are either still primarily in the front lines of Garnett and Kemper, OR they're more spread out.

The Union has also placed almost all of its troops on the front lines. The amount of time to move Sedgwick from South of Little Round tops, march it to the center and counter-attack would take quite some time. I assume Meade being cautious would simply withdraw to Pipe Creek in that situation. Lee would be way to beat up to follow. Politically this would have greatly benefitted Lee, attritionally he probably comes out about the same. More casualties on day 3, but less likely of a hard Federal pursuit, so less casualties on the retreat back to Virginia. Lee probably gets an extra day or 2 to move out his wounded, so less captured on the CSA side as well.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Something like this makes much more sense to me. Again hindsight is 20/20, and Longstreet adjusted most of his assaults after this.

 

[RedRover]

The failure of the attack must be shared by Lee, Longstreet, and Pendleton. I do agree that Lee envisioned his artillyer supporting the attack after it commenced in some way, what that was specifically I'm not sure.

The intention of General Lee, apparently, was that the infantry advance be conducted under the tremendous bombardment of the friendly artillery. General Lee stated the guns were to support the infantry attack, and cover its flanks...

"A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions, which it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely."


But due to the protracted nature of the preliminary firing, before the infantry was called to advance, the guns were out of enough ammo. to continue firing once the infantry advanced. General Longstreet officially reported:

"I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen."

As the heavy smoke from the tremendous firing lifted, as the Confederate guns did not reopen fire after the infantry advanced past them, etc., the federal line could see the Confederate infantry somewhat more or less clearly when about half-way to the federal line.

General Lee reported the artillery support for the attack he had intended was not delivered due to the protracted firing before the infantry advanced... Consequently the "necessary support" of the artillery was not rendered as intended.


"His [the Union] batteries reopened as soon as [Longstreets' attacking troops] appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advanced works, and capturing some of his artillery was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back with heavy loss."

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

The intention of General Lee, apparently, was that the infantry advance be conducted under the tremendous bombardment of the friendly artillery. General Lee stated the guns were to support the infantry attack, and cover its flanks...

"A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions, which it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely."


But due to the protracted nature of the preliminary firing, before the infantry was called to advance, the guns were out of enough ammo. to continue firing once the infantry advanced. General Longstreet officially reported:

"I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen."

As the heavy smoke from the tremendous firing lifted, as the Confederate guns did not reopen fire after the infantry advanced past them, etc., the federal line could see the Confederate infantry somewhat more or less clearly when about half-way to the federal line.

General Lee reported the artillery support for the attack he had intended was not delivered due to the protracted firing before the infantry advanced... Consequently the "necessary support" of the artillery was not rendered as intended.


"His [the Union] batteries reopened as soon as [Longstreets' attacking troops] appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advanced works, and capturing some of his artillery was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back with heavy loss."

I know you and a couple of other posters have gone back and forth on whether it was feasible because of fuses and such to keep firing over the heads of your own soldiers. Having said that and not willing to come down on either side of that debate, as I don't feel knowledgeable enough on it, I still think that the batteries not directly behind the assault column were expected to keep up a rate of fire, that most likely they couldn't because of Pendleton carelessness in moving the long-range ammunition to far back to replenish the batteries.

 

[JerryD]

Right. And maybe he knew his opponent and wasn't impressed how Mac managed troops at the Seven Days Battle!
Lee's positioning the ANV with the river at his rear always reminded me of the story of Cortez burning his ships before going against the Aztecs. More recent research says he scuttled them but it is still a great story and makes a point.

The problem with that whole "he relied on Mac's timidity" argument ignores the fact that the next day Mac fought one of the hardest fought battles of the war, and but for AP Hill's timely arrival, Lee probably would have been routed and pushed into the river. So no, not buying that argument. And if he did rely on that, history and the fighting on the 17th shows he guessed wrong.

 

[RedRover]

I know you and a couple of other posters have gone back and forth on whether it was feasible because of fuses and such to keep firing over the heads of your own soldiers. Having said that and not willing to come down on either side of that debate, as I don't feel knowledgeable enough on it, I still think that the batteries not directly behind the assault column were expected to keep up a rate of fire, that most likely they couldn't because of Pendleton carelessness in moving the long-range ammunition to far back to replenish the batteries.

Yes, General Pendleton is given criticism in the matters in moving back the reserve ammunition train from the federal fire, etc.

Then there was the howitzers Pendleton moved that Alexander intended to advance at the head of the infantry attack. When the infantry advanced Alexander couldn't find them. From a letter by General Pickett on the subject...

Otherwise, the standing orders were for the artillery to keep firing generally, supporting the infantry advance (after it passed the line of guns) And as the infantry "progressed" (per Lee), for as many guns as possible, to displace forward to continue the fire... Longstreet to Alexander...

General Longstreet later explained the purpose:

When the infantry did advance, the artillery generally was out of suitable ammo for the reasons explained by General Longstreet and Alexander, so in the event Alexander only advanced a handful of guns with a few shells each... (not enough to continue pounding the federal position that Pickett etc. were approaching with the "necessary" supporting fire)... Alexander:

However, there was evidently SOME firing in support of the attack, from the artillery line, immediately after the infantry passed it; and over the infantry's heads. But it apparently ceased quickly as the ammo ran out, and Alexander ordered the few guns with any left to advance. Jennings C. Wise observed in his history of Lee's artillery, that after the infantry advanced in front a couple hundred yards downslope, they reopened their supporting fire for a short time, over their heads as planned...

Captain Poindexter of the 38th Virginia, Armistead's brigade, notes this friendly supporting fire reopened over their heads after passing down the slope...

But this supporting fire quickly ceased, as the guns immediately ran out of ammunition...

Major Eshleman observed in his report of the handful of guns of his line that advanced with the progress of the charging infantry...

Many of the guns advanced were smashed up by the federal's fire.


A soldier of Wright's Georgia brigade watching the action from their position, wrote of the cessation of the artillery's fire generally during the infantry's advance...

It is accounted for from General Lee down, that the the supporting artillery fire was not delivered as the guns generally ran out of ammunition as a result of the "protracted" nature of the cannonade before the infantry advanced. Col. Alexander states that he understood the infantry was to advance between 15 but nor more than 30 minutes after the cannonade commenced at 1 PM. He and Gen. Longstreet explain in their reports and accounts why it was that the infantry advanced an hour or so after it commenced instead, when the ammo. was mostly shot off.

General Lee reported not being aware of the lack of ammunition, etc. for the necessary supporting and flanking fire of artillery when the attack was given, and in the aftermath of the battle offered his resignation, etc. But General Lee's staff officers think it was some error on the part of General Longstreet to neglect informing the commanding general the necessary supporting fires could not be delivered at the point at which the infantry advanced.. that Lee might have cancelled the attack.

But as General Lee observed, there was a general "want of concert" among his army at Gettysburg, for which he assumed responsibility.

 

[JerryD]

For whatever reason sulking, lack of imagination, ect., he didn't follow the artillery path, and therefore had to backtrack the two divisions which cost the confederacy anywhere from 1-1.5 hours.

I suggest you read "In the Shadow of the Round Tops", which pretty definitively explodes the whole "Longstreet didn't follow the artillery path" argument. The author does an excellent job of recreating the march and provides what seems to be pretty convincing evidence that the rise Longstreet came to was not the same rise that Alexander avoided.

Amazon.com

 

[wausaubob]

Longstreet was very much influenced by the ANV's experience at Fredericksburg the previous December. He understood the power of the defensive in an entrenched location and the utter futility of an enemy directly assaulting that position. Going forward, his tactical belief was based on maneuvering the AotP into a similar situation in which the ANV in a defensive position would be able to deliver a similar defeat against a frontal attack. He argued this point with Lee but to no avail. Consequently, Longstreet clearly could foresee the devastating results of the Confederate assault on Day 3 at Gettysburg.

I think that by that point it was clear that if movement did not produce a tactical advantage. Longstreet did not know it, but Grant, Sherman, McClerndan and McPherson had attempted something similar at Vicksburg, with much better numerical odds and completely failed. The added range of the rifles, even if it was only 50-75 yards was enough to drive any attack to the ground.

 

[wausaubob]

Longstreet was very much influenced by the ANV's experience at Fredericksburg the previous December. He understood the power of the defensive in an entrenched location and the utter futility of an enemy directly assaulting that position. Going forward, his tactical belief was based on maneuvering the AotP into a similar situation in which the ANV in a defensive position would be able to deliver a similar defeat against a frontal attack. He argued this point with Lee but to no avail. Consequently, Longstreet clearly could foresee the devastating results of the Confederate assault on Day 3 at Gettysburg.

The shoulder weapons had improved. But the accuracy of artillery at a much greater range pushed by the preparation area several hundred yards. Unless there was cover or darkness, the extra distance was deadly.

 

[jackt62]

I still think that the batteries not directly behind the assault column were expected to keep up a rate of fire, that most likely they couldn't because of Pendleton carelessness in moving the long-range ammunition to far back to replenish the batteries.

Pendleton's mishaps in moving ammunition and howitzers, problems with Confederate fuzes, and the difficulty in artillery support of an advancing attack column were all contributing factors to Alexander's artillery barrage on Day 3. On top of which, it was almost impossible to ascertain the effect of Confederate artillery fire because of the resultant thick plume of smoke along the federal line. Given those conditions, it is no surprise that Alexander was unable to do that much more.

 

[fyrd]

I wonder sometimes if Longstreet had received a long term independent army command whether or not he'd have gotten the same criticisms Johnston gets.