Lee Doesn't Order Pickett's Charge

[Wizard of Cozz]

There was some thought given by Lee to shift Ewell's Corps from the far left and bring it into closer alignment with Hill and Longstreet's Corps at Seminary Ridge. This would have the advantage of reducing the ANV's fragile outer lines and providing more combat power along a shorter front. This move didn't happen of course, as Lee remained committed to threatening the federal right flank in the hope of pinning down Slocum's Corp while the ANV's planned main assault occurred along the Emmitsburg Road. But in the end, Ewell's uncoordinated assaults at Culps and East Cemetary Hills did not produce the desired result.

Longstreet seemed the only corps commander capable of ensuring that the troops he was told to attack with actually made the attack. On day 2, both his divisions make a determined attack, and on day 3, the three divisions under his direct command, while failing to take the position all at least get sent in. Hill was a non-entity through much of Gettysburg. His corps makes piecemeal attacks instead of Pender and Heth attacking collectively, then on day 2, the echelon attack breaks down in Anderson's division, while Pender's division never goes in, and there is little evidence Hill did anything to try and rectify it as it was happening. On day 3, Hill's troops are given to Longstreet. Ewell, does solid fighting on day 1, but on day 2, when the echelon attack moves his direction, Early makes a spirited assault, but Rodes troops don't support, and Johnson doesn't time his attack with Earlys, and so you have one division not going in and the other two aren't coordinated. On day 3, most of the fresher brigades are transferred to Johnson for assault on Culp's Hill that has little chance of success.

 

[JerryD]

There was some thought given by Lee to shift Ewell's Corps from the far left and bring it into closer alignment with Hill and Longstreet's Corps at Seminary Ridge. This would have the advantage of reducing the ANV's fragile outer lines and providing more combat power along a shorter front. This move didn't happen of course, as Lee remained committed to threatening the federal right flank in the hope of pinning down Slocum's Corp while the ANV's planned main assault occurred along the Emmitsburg Road. But in the end, Ewell's uncoordinated assaults at Culps and East Cemetary Hills did not produce the desired result.

I remember reading Fuller on this point, who in military terms found it astounding that Lee, with an inferior force, chose to fight with extended, exterior lines, against a numerically superior foe who had the benefit of compact, interior lines. Meade could easily transfer troops from one end of his line to the other, while Lee could not possibly reinforce the left from the right, or vice versa. If I remember correctly Fuller thought it showed the level of misguided contempt Lee had for the Union army at this time.

 

[Scott1967]

I remember reading Fuller on this point, who in military terms found it astounding that Lee, with an inferior force, chose to fight with extended, exterior lines, against a numerically superior foe who had the benefit of compact, interior lines. Meade could easily transfer troops from one end of his line to the other, while Lee could not possibly reinforce the left from the right, or vice versa. If I remember correctly Fuller thought it showed the level of misguided contempt Lee had for the Union army at this time.

Fuller had the benefit of Hindsight , Lee Didn't to be fair.

Lee's biggest mistake at Gettysburg was his over confidence in his troops and subordinates and while his troops performed really well he was let down by both Ewell & Hill who were lacklustre to say the least.

The problem here is that Lee does not fight the third day well that's not going to happen Lee has to fight the third day because if he re-positions or retreats the Union have won regardless due to Lee leaving the field of battle thus making the whole invasion of Pennsylvania a mute point.

 

[Scott1967]

Then why did Britain defeat France again and again throughout the 1600s and 1700s? France had a much vaster population than England did.

And if your first thought was about naval power, that just proves my point. Britain was only able to maintain its naval power vis-a-vis France because its financial institutions - a national bank, an effective bond market, limited liability corporations, and so forth - were so much more advanced than those of France.

Well the Netherlands were the richest nation by far and yes both Britain and the Netherlands had extensive Navies that secured trade however its pretty hard to fight the British when you have the English Channel as Napoleon found out.

Also I'm confused Jeff do you mean the 18th & 19th centuries? The act of Union came about in 1707 so the time zone you reference it would have been England.

 

[JerryD]

Fuller had the benefit of Hindsight , Lee Didn't to be fair.

Nortmally I would agree, but in this instance Lee did not need hindsight to realize his line was stretched thin over exterior lines. Any first year at West Point could have told him that. Avoiding exterior lines is just basic military doctrine. Fuller's point, I think (its been awhile since I have read him) was that Lee did realize he was on exterior lines, and didnt care.

 

[wausaubob]

True. But why should Grant come to the east and take a losing theater when he can remain in the west. In the hypothetical suggested, the best lineup for the US is Sherman in Mississippi, Thomas in Tennessee, Rosecrans replacing all the amateurs in the Shenandoah Valley and Grant in command of the Potomac Army. I think in the hypothetical of a Lee victory Congress gets panicky and Grant gets promoted.

 

[wausaubob]

Nortmally I would agree, but in this instance Lee did not need hindsight to realize his line was stretched thin over exterior lines. Any first year at West Point could have told him that. Avoiding exterior lines is just basic military doctrine. Fuller's point, I think (its been awhile since I have read him) was that Lee did realize he was on exterior lines, and didnt care.

It was an acceptable situation for the Confederates until there had been a big battle and several thousand casualties. I don't think the quartermaster situation was going to be fixed through capture of munitions at that stage of the war.

 

[Scott1967]

Nortmally I would agree, but in this instance Lee did not need hindsight to realize his line was stretched thin over exterior lines. Any first year at West Point could have told him that. Avoiding exterior lines is just basic military doctrine. Fuller's point, I think (its been awhile since I have read him) was that Lee did realize he was on exterior lines, and didnt care.

Lee's biggest mistake at Gettysburg was his over confidence in his troops and subordinates

Over confidence? See my point above Jerry.

 

[wausaubob]

Over confidence? See my point above Jerry.

The whole thing was a desperate gamble which began to unravel as soon as Stuart's connection to the rest of the army broke down because the US army was moving.

 

[JerryD]

Over confidence? See my point above Jerry.

Definitely agree with you that Lee was overconfident. But overconfidence does not lose battles. He made mistakes (some due to his overconfidence, granted). And yes, he did ask more from his troops than was realistic to expect. That was prompted by his overconfidence, and he is on record as acknowledging this.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Nortmally I would agree, but in this instance Lee did not need hindsight to realize his line was stretched thin over exterior lines. Any first year at West Point could have told him that. Avoiding exterior lines is just basic military doctrine. Fuller's point, I think (its been awhile since I have read him) was that Lee did realize he was on exterior lines, and didnt care.

Absolutely JerryD. It has always been puzzling to any of us who live there or know the terrain and battle how profoundly Lee was disadvantaged because of it. And none of us went to West Point!

The point that has been accepted down through the years is the one Scott1967 mentioned on overconfidence. It is about the only one that makes sense on just how highly Lee felt of Southern infantry prowess; that they could in fact overcome such terrain. Battle results of Day-2 support as much and show this confidence was to a high degree well placed.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Definitely agree with you that Lee was overconfident. But overconfidence does not lose battles. He made mistakes (some due to his overconfidence, granted). And yes, he did ask more from his troops than was realistic to expect. That was prompted by his overconfidence, and he is on record as acknowledging this.

It's only "overconfidence" if you lose. Otherwise, it's "boldness". If Pope had adequately blocked Thoroughfare Gap in August of 1862, blocking Longstreet from linking up with Jackson, Lee would have gone down in history as a stupidly reckless and overconfident commander. Likewise, if Pickett's Charge had somehow succeeded against the odds and forced the Union army to retreat, Lee's victory at Gettysburg would be celebrated for its boldness and daring.

 

[Scott1967]

Definitely agree with you that Lee was overconfident. But overconfidence does not lose battles. He made mistakes (some due to his overconfidence, granted). And yes, he did ask more from his troops than was realistic to expect. That was prompted by his overconfidence, and he is on record as acknowledging this.

Overconfidence has lost many a fine general a battle or campaign , Personally I think Lee conducted the battle as best he could but he did make one critical error and that was to get back to the subject at hand not committing enough troops to the Third days assault.

The age old question is should Lee have attacked on the Third day? And the answer is he had no choice to give up meant admitting defeat so he rolled the dice yet again this time he lost.

My opinion of course.

 

[Scott1967]

It's only "overconfidence" if you lose. Otherwise, it's "boldness". If Pope had adequately blocked Thoroughfare Gap in August of 1862, blocking Longstreet from linking up with Jackson, Lee would have gone down in history as a stupidly reckless and overconfident commander. Likewise, if Pickett's Charge had somehow succeeded against the odds and forced the Union army to retreat, Lee's victory at Gettysburg would be celebrated for its boldness and daring.

Yeah that's a good point Jeff.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Overconfidence has lost many a fine general a battle or campaign , Personally I think Lee conducted the battle as best he could but he did make one critical error and that was to get back to the subject at hand not committing enough troops to the Third days assault.

The age old question is should Lee have attacked on the Third day? And the answer is he had no choice to give up meant admitting defeat so he rolled the dice yet again this time he lost.

My opinion of course.

It's always an interesting question for day 3 on why the troops who were chosen for the assault were chosen? Hill must have been completely non-existent, how Heth's division gets chosen for the assault makes little sense. How Scales brigade was even considered for the assault makes little sense, in fact Scales and Lane's brigades were the hardest hit on day 1, and for some reason they get earmarked for the assault. Mahone, Posey, Perrin, and Thomas make much more sense in the assault column. The fact that the troops were given to Longstreet, tells me Hill was sick, and offered no advice on what units to send to Longstreet, their was a major breakdown somewhere.

 

[JerryD]

It's only "overconfidence" if you lose. Otherwise, it's "boldness". If Pope had adequately blocked Thoroughfare Gap in August of 1862, blocking Longstreet from linking up with Jackson, Lee would have gone down in history as a stupidly reckless and overconfident commander. Likewise, if Pickett's Charge had somehow succeeded against the odds and forced the Union army to retreat, Lee's victory at Gettysburg would be celebrated for its boldness and daring.

I'm gonna have to disagree on that. History is full of examples of generals making poor risky decisions, but by pure luck getting away with it. Just because they got away with it does not mean it was good generalship. While the grade school level analysis may ignore the details, historians who actually critically assess generalship will see the truth.

 

[Stryker65]

I'm gonna have to disagree on that. History is full of examples of generals making poor risky decisions, but by pure luck getting away with it. Just because they got away with it does not mean it was good generalship. While the grade school level analysis may ignore the details, historians who actually critically assess generalship will see the truth.

I agree. Luck played a large role in many battles. Harpers Ferry, for instance, there were many factors that caused the garrison to surrender when it did. A few days more and the 6th Corps could have arrived.

 

[steve59p]

Then why did Britain defeat France again and again throughout the 1600s and 1700s? France had a much vaster population than England did.

And if your first thought was about naval power, that just proves my point. Britain was only able to maintain its naval power vis-a-vis France because its financial institutions - a national bank, an effective bond market, limited liability corporations, and so forth - were so much more advanced than those of France.

Both our security as an island backed by naval power most of the timer, a stronger social system and we had allies. We managed to provide the money and often the equipment but they frequently supplied a lot of the manpower and additional fronts that tied down the French resources. The biggest defeat Britain suffered in those two centuries was in the 1770's when bad diplomacy on our part and an intent on fighting only a colonial war on the French part meant that Britain faced not only the rebels in the colonies but also France, Spain and the Netherlands.

The south needed to either get powerful allies - which nearly happened with the Trent Incident - or win the political war in the north by exhausting support for Lincoln's determination to suppress it by force. As long as Lincoln had that support and the south had no powerful allies - or more accurately the north had no powerful other opponents - it was only a matter of time as long as the north was willing to take the costs and be brutal enough to suppress the rebellion.

 

[JerryD]

I agree. Luck played a large role in many battles. Harpers Ferry, for instance, there were many factors that caused the garrison to surrender when it did. A few days more and the 6th Corps could have arrived.

I've always felt that Lee was lucky to get away at Antietam. Choosing to fight a vastly superior force with a river to your back is not good generalship. He got away with it, but that does not mean he was bold or audacious. It means he was lucky.

 

[Scott1967]

I've always felt that Lee was lucky to get away at Antietam. Choosing to fight a vastly superior force with a river to your back is not good generalship. He got away with it, but that does not mean he was bold or audacious. It means he was lucky.

Or he was fighting George B. McClellan , PS I actually think Antietam was Lee's finest battle by rights he should have been crushed but managed to utilize his whole army and was able to extract them with skill.

I'm gonna have to disagree on that. History is full of examples of generals making poor risky decisions, but by pure luck getting away with it. Just because they got away with it does not mean it was good generalship. While the grade school level analysis may ignore the details, historians who actually critically assess generalship will see the truth.

I can see what your getting at here but I can assure you Lee was the finest battle commander of the whole war to do what he did with limited resources & manpower was not pure luck because he did it over and over again something the AoT could only dream of but of course luck does play a role unless your Grant and have to create your own.

You could argue at Gettysburg that it was lucky for the Union that Ewell chose not to attack Culps Hill or that Sickles decided to move out of line Prompting the placement of Troops on Little Round top , It was lucky for the Union that faulty fuses had been supplied that made Lee's cannonade less effective.

Two critical things happened at Gettysburg that swayed the battle the Wounding of Dorsey Pender and Uncle Dan's decision to move forward out of line both of which had huge consequence's for Lee's army had both of these not happened I think Meade would have lost and as https://civilwartalk.com/members/jeffbrooks.2349/ said people would have been calling Lee's victory at Gettysburg both bold and audacious.