Random Thoughts on Iuka

Because there was not sufficient time. The U.S. Army was rapidly approaching, Do you not understand what it is like trying to cross a river in daylight with the enemy on top of you? It is the same problem which Lee faced at Antietam in September 18th. Beyond this, Price fully intended to evacuate Iuka regardless. That is well established and explicit in the record. I went over all of this with you already.
You're not making any sense. If Price was determined to flee as soon as he felt the federals were concentrating against him, he would have fled before the Battle of Iuka, as soon as he received reports of a southern federal force approaching.

A two or three hour head start essentially cripples a federal pursuit. At least if it's on good roads, like the Fulton Road. Price had absolutely no desire to head directly east from Iuka into the "difficult bottom" of Bear Creek with any federal pursuit behind him.
 
I don't think Price would have evacuated.

Price went to Iuka looking for a fight. He wasn't enroute to Bragg. He was in that area because he hoped to find Rosecrans' army and defeat it before it could be reinforced. When he didn't find Rosecrans' army at Iuka, Price began messaging Van Dorn so they could link up and defeat Rosecrans. In the couple days before the battle, Price had no intention of going east. He was trying to find a way to engage Rosecrans.

In the evening, after the battle, Price was even planning on resuming the battle in the morning. He wasn't planning on evacuating. He knew there were federals on the road towards Burnsville, but he thought he could delay them while he finished off Rosecrans. Maury had to convince him of the danger of the situation, and of the need to escape. And this was after the battle had occurred!

So if Rosecrans had posted his forces at Barnetts and Cartersville late in the day on the 19th, and resumed the march north on both roads just before dawn, I think Price would have still been in Iuka.

If for some reason Price got spooked and felt the need to escape, he definitely wouldn't have attempted a night march east through the Bear Creek bottom. He would have tried to break through on one of the roads south. He may have escaped by pushing through, but then it basically turns out the same as it did in real life so it doesn't make much of a difference.

The only way for the pincer to work was to cover both roads. If covering both roads meant delaying the battle until the morning, then it should have been delayed.
By not reporting that he would leave the Fulton Road uncovered Rosecrans deprived Grant of precisely this kind of decision making. Because of the difficulty in communicating I didn't give it much significance, but it's an important fact that shouldn't have been omitted. I do wonder at the reason for not reporting that.
 
You're not making any sense. If Price was determined to flee as soon as he felt the federals were concentrating against him, he would have fled before the Battle of Iuka, as soon as he received reports of a southern federal force approaching.

A two or three hour head start essentially cripples a federal pursuit.
They had to cross a river with the enemy rapidly closing in. See Post #212 please, so that I don't need to cover that ground again.

I am going to preempt the comment to the effect that the Fulton road was open and they could have just pulled out via the Fulton road during the day. First, there still wasn't enough time. Second, there is no way that they could have known that yet. Third, the rapidly developing threat had to be met as it closed in on them.

We want to know the relevant facts in order to understand events and the decisions which were made. I am really only interested in having serious discussions on this.
 
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By not reporting that he would leave the Fulton Road uncovered Rosecrans deprived Grant of precisely this kind of decision making. Because of the difficulty in communicating I didn't give it much significance, but it's an important fact that shouldn't have been omitted. I do wonder at the reason for not reporting that.
It's one of the mysteries of this battle.
 
I'll find it odd if Rosey gets digitized when to this day there has never been a comprehensive publishing in any medium of Lee's papers, thus being the only major figure without an unabridged reprinting of his letters like Lincoln, Davis and Grant.

I can't imagine Rosecrans would say much to interest your average "farb" except scholars, Rosecrans fans or the Iuka/Corinth and Chickamauga people.
i think there's interest for this. We don't all need to be Rosy partisans to be interested in what he wrote. I'd love it if some Rosecrans admirer undertook this project, or even a publication of a selection of his letters and documents, similar to Sherman's War. I think there would be interest on that. What I suspect is that perhaps he's not as graceful a writer as let's say John Pope, whose memoirs are very readable even though he disappeared from the civil war after the second Bull Run. Rosecrans had a bigger role than Pope…
 
i think there's interest for this. We don't all need to be Rosy partisans to be interested in what he wrote. I'd love it if some Rosecrans admirer undertook this project, or even a publication of a selection of his letters and documents, similar to Sherman's War. I think there would be interest on that. What I suspect is that perhaps he's not as graceful a writer as let's say John Pope, whose memoirs are very readable even though he disappeared from the civil war after the second Bull Run. Rosecrans had a bigger role than Pope…
Pope's Memoirs are great. I just read it for the first time not too long ago, all memoirs should be used with extreme care, but nonetheless, Pope's are very enjoyable to read.
 
There was originally a plan for a coordinated attack in the morning of the 19th. But when Rosecrans fell behind schedule, the timetable was thrown up in the air.

Rosecrans sent messages that he would be in place by 2:00 in the afternoon. Grant looked at a map and thought that ETA was impossible, and so he told Ord to hold up until he heard a battle. The reason Grant thought that it was impossible is that he expected Rosecrans would be coming in on both roads.

Rosecrans was able to arrive and initiate the battle about 4:00 because he came in on the shortest route on one road, while leaving the other road open. He did not notify Grant that he was doing this.

So, in striving to have the battle before dark, Rosecrans decided to leave an escape route open.

I realize other posters have different theories on why Rosecrans left the Fulton road open for the confederates to escape, but my opinion it that he left it open because he was running so late and he was trying to make up time by coming in the shorter route. He thought wrongly that he could detach a force to the Fulton road once he got close to Iuka.
This is my version of the inexplicable.

I think it was indeed too risky to attack with two columns. Rosecrans panicked big time before noon when Sanborn had a squirmish with rebel cavalry. Before deciding to abandon Cartersville he had ordered it held at all hazards with instructions to find a strong defensive position. At the time he still thought to proceed with divided forces but he was crapping himself.

Castel is of the theory that the most important element Rosecrans needed to be successful was surprise. In fact he thought without surprise Rosecrans' plan would fail to trap Price. Ord's role was to attack first in order to facilitate that surprise. Getting as close as possible by night was also to enable the surprise. When Rosy was discovered before noon, that put the biggest wedge on his plans than anything else. He's not going to admit that however. He must blame someone else if all goes to **** and we'll cue the scapegoats.

Why all the ballyhoo and brouhaha about everything else? Denying the Dickey and Lagow change in orders is classic "The Mistakes of Grant" distortion of reality that Rosecrans is capable of. In order to defend himself for his mistakes he would distort the truth, reframe things, outright lie, and pin the malfeasance on Grant. What point is there for Grant to send Rosy not one, but two staff officers to give him pointless advice to hurry up? Rosecrans already knew he was running late and didn't need to be reminded. That's not the reason D&L we're there. They were there to make sure orders were obeyed. Also, what point was there to send D&L to Ord at 10:00 am with a change in orders and not send that same change to Rosecrans immediately after? The whole thing strains credibility and doesn't make sense. Then there's the Dickey letter to his wife.

Rosecrans lied about all that because he had to pin that failure on someone else, and when he testified in Congress he hated Grant. Castel is disregarding that entire absurdity that Grant didn't send Rosecrans a change in orders and so am I. Could that have been the reason Rosecrans decided to consolidate his columns like @tony_gunter theorized and not the fact he was found out so early in the day? Sure, because Rosecrans was already crapping himself, D&L telling him that he now had to open the festivities would just add on to the doubts he was already having. He would comply with orders because he had to, but not in the way Grant thought with columns divided.

What about the map inaccuracies and Col. Milzner? This is the classic case of when it rains, it pours. As if Rosecrans wasn't already in a jam, his route calculations were wrong. Maybe they wouldn't have mattered at all had he been on time and moved in by night with Ord drawing the tough assignment of being bait, allowing him to spring the trap, but if he had to attack Price straight up? Specially when the latter was expecting it? Then the distance was insurmountable, too risky to separate the columns, etc

These things happened almost concurrently, and sequentially they were like a cascade of failures. Cozzens is of the opinion that Rosecrans had already decided to consolidate his columns before D&L even got into the picture. That could very well be because he eas already in panic mode after being discovered, and the roads and distances were longer and farther apart than thought. It's pretty much irrelevant in terms of final effect as all these things just add on to each other, o complicate an already panicky situation.

I am writing this in disorganized fashion but it could very carefully be reconstructed to show the record sequence of events. One thing just adds on to another like a cascade failure.

Why didn't Rosecrans notify Grant?

This is really the speculation, but I'll give you my opinion. That was common sense old school variety, CYA. By not leaving a paper trail, in this case he could still salvage his reputation, his narrative, and be able to fashion afterwards a positive report for himself depending on how things developed. This is a tactic of the old army game. If he left a written trail, it would be a written admission of his mistakes, they would show up on reports, and get magnified even. Everything that went wrong thereafter would get blamed on his delay and his leaving one road uncovered (rightfully, but notice how by not leaving a written account of that he was indeed able to spin things around to suit his purpose,) Besides, he was still hoping against hope that he could salvage the situation, by using the road connecting Jacinto to Fulton to still capture Price. He'd write to his wife within two days that if he got cooperation from Ord he would have been able to capture Price. He might have been mistaken but that's what he thought, so he would indeed have thought against reason the plan was still salvageable. Then why leave such an admission of errors at 12:40 pm that his maps were wrong that he couldn't cover both roads, etc?

I don't have anything to comment about delays, the roads, etc. that part I have to catch up on.

I'll revise this if shown incorrect as this is my working impression.
 
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I've enjoyed reading them as well. I suspect Rosecrans writing is not the same quality but unless someone undertakes to publish a selection of his best and most relevant civil war stuff we don't know — well I don't know.
Rosecrans was actually in the process of writing his Memoirs when he passed away. It is unpublished and is housed in his papers in California.
 
You're not making any sense. If Price was determined to flee as soon as he felt the federals were concentrating against him, he would have fled before the Battle of Iuka, as soon as he received reports of a southern federal force approaching.

A two or three hour head start essentially cripples a federal pursuit. At least if it's on good roads, like the Fulton Road. Price had absolutely no desire to head directly east from Iuka into the "difficult bottom" of Bear Creek with any federal pursuit behind him.
This was addressed in Post #212 and in surrounding posts. The argument which you are attempting to make here is quite silly.
The problem is that you are evaluating what did happen while I am evaluating what was supposed to happen. On the 19th if everything that was planned happened Price was screwed. Your suppositions fail to take into account all the relevant information.
The road you think was there possibly didn't even exist then. Every historian that has look at this scenario has reached the same conclusion if the federal commanders had acted in unison, as planned, Price would have been in big trouble in Iuka.
Please see Post #256 and then read Posts #185, #186, #195, #210 and #212.
 
i think there's interest for this. We don't all need to be Rosy partisans to be interested in what he wrote. I'd love it if some Rosecrans admirer undertook this project, or even a publication of a selection of his letters and documents, similar to Sherman's War. I think there would be interest on that. What I suspect is that perhaps he's not as graceful a writer as let's say John Pope, whose memoirs are very readable even though he disappeared from the civil war after the second Bull Run. Rosecrans had a bigger role than Pope…
@David Moore Interested? :wink:
 
To be useful, it would have to be done by a professional historian, specially if it's a selection of documents like Sherman's War,
which is an editorial job, where the editor selected the best material instead of just a publication of absolutely everything the individual wrote which would be pointless as it would include irrelevant content.

Someone who didn't undertake an editorial task like that in a scholarly fashion could just edit things out to censure things that are unfavorable to Rosy, etc. and I suspect there would be documents that would show his personality in an unfavorable light like McClellan. He already has some documents out there that present him in a negative light like "the Mistakes of Grant." Who knows what else is lying around out there in California?
 
To be useful, it would have to be done by a professional historian, specially if it's a selection of documents like Sherman's War,
which is an editorial job, where the editor selected the best material instead of just a publication of absolutely everything the individual wrote which would be pointless as it would include irrelevant content.

Someone who didn't undertake an editorial task like that in a scholarly fashion could just edit things out to censure things that are unfavorable to Rosy, etc. and I suspect there would be documents that would show his personality in an unfavorable light like McClellan. He already has some documents out there that present him in a negative light like "the Mistakes of Grant." Who knows what else is lying around out there in California?
I think that it would be a good thing for @David Moore to do.

It just would not going be productive if he came and joined in on this thread.
 
That offer's still open.

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I have put up some valuable content which you may be interested in going through on here.
It might be more valuable if it did not conflict with what we know actually happened. Price refused an order to withdraw form Iuka on the 18th stating he knew an attack was coming from the Burnsville Road northwest if Iuka. He actually responded to a surrender request from Ord by saying such a request "would only move him and his soldiers to greater exertions in behalf of their country."
 
It might be more valuable if it did not conflict with what we know actually happened. Price refused an order to withdraw form Iuka on the 18th stating he knew an attack was coming from the Burnsville Road northwest if Iuka. He actually responded to a surrender request from Ord by saying such a request "would only move him and his soldiers to greater exertions in behalf of their country."
Please produce the correspondence showing a refusal to obey Van Dorn's order to pull out of Iuka on September 18th. My understanding is that the order was received in the morning of the 19th.

See T.C. Snead, "With Price," 732.

I know a little bit about this subject. I am not sure what you are referring to there.
 
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To be useful, it would have to be done by a professional historian, specially if it's a selection of documents like Sherman's War,
which is an editorial job, where the editor selected the best material instead of just a publication of absolutely everything the individual wrote which would be pointless as it would include irrelevant content.

Someone who didn't undertake an editorial task like that in a scholarly fashion could just edit things out to censure things that are unfavorable to Rosy, etc. and I suspect there would be documents that would show his personality in an unfavorable light like McClellan. He already has some documents out there that present him in a negative light like "the Mistakes of Grant." Who knows what else is lying around out there in California?
I agree. If the person just went through and only used the positive, or only used the negative, then it wouldn't be very helpful.

I doubt if David Moore could be objective.
 

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