Random Thoughts on Iuka

[tony_gunter]

Re-reading through Cadwallader and Wilson has been an exercise in culling information from propaganda and now I'm wondering some things about Iuka.

1) The letter from Missouri soldier William S Stewart claiming that Grant was "dead drunk" preceded a similar letter to his parents. He tells them to look out for "an article" he has written for the Cincinnati Commercial. Why is a Missouri soldier writing of his experience to a Cincinnati paper? Why does he write for the paper first before his family, and why does he identify his writing as "an article?"

2) Rosecrans reaches the crossroads and meets Dickey and Lagow, who Rosecrans claims never told him that the plan had changed (later, Rosecrans changes his story to the duo offered it as a suggestion … laughable, but … ok). It is at this precise moment that Rosecrans changes his plans to concentrate his entire force on the Jacinto Road and leave the Fulton Road uncovered. That's a wild coincidence.

 

[bdtex]

I visited Iuka in 2020 and bought a small book about the battle at the Courthouse Museum. I hope to read that book some day.

 

[DanSBHawk]

2) Rosecrans reaches the crossroads and meets Dickey and Lagow, who he claims never told him that the plan had changed (later, he changes his story to they offered it as a suggestion … laughable, but … ok). It is at this precise moment that Rosecrans changes his plans to concentrate his entire force on the Jacinto Road and leave the Fulton Road uncovered. That's a wild coincidence.

So you believe they are connected? How so?

 

[tony_gunter]

So you believe they are connected? How so?

Rosecrans has two divisions, Hamilton with 9 infantry regiments and Stanley with 8. Henry Little has ~19 regiments. If Rosecrans knows the plan has changed and he is to pitch headlong into Price, he needs all 17 regiments on hand.

Or it could just be the wildest coincidence ever.

 

[SSVilla]

I am currently reading the Iuka and Corinth book by Peter Cozzens. Although he keeps things interesting focusing on the command dramas on both sides, he can get so detailed with troop movements, that it can be dense as well. Anyway, he's pretty critical of everyone, which is fine by me.

Here's what Cozzens wrote about the message from Dickey and Lagow, and what was going on with Rosecrans at the time.

—————
Basically, as I understand it, when he reached Barrnett's Crossroads and after poring over maps, Rosecrans realized for the first time that the distance between Jacinto and Fulton was five miles, more than twice the distance he thought and that he'd have to advance in a single column, not having enough men to split his forces safely (because they would be so far away.)

He didn't inform Grant that he was doing this, which changed the plan. Dickey and Lagow gave him a message to attack or told him to do so, depending on whether the reader credits Rosecrans or not. I tend to think he knew it was an order to attack. Buy he wasn't of a mind to attack apparently preferring that Ord do so first, so that he could spring the trap from behind, but any arguments between them would be interrupted when the encounter started.

———-

I find Cozzens in this book a little difficult to difficult to follow. He jumps back and forth between confederates and Union and between what's going on at different points and with different people. There's a lot of detail and doesn't make for easy reading.

 

[General JJ]

One observation I have of Cozzens is, he seems to be more critical of officers than some other authors. Or rather, he goes no holds barred.

Same with units too. I remember it hurt my state pride when he called the 15th Michigan's performance "pathetic". And he also is hard on Davies' division for its hasty retreat on October 4th.

 

[SSVilla]

One observation I have of Cozzens is, he seems to be more critical of officers than some other authors. Or rather, he goes no holds barred.

Same with units too. I remember it hurt my state pride when he called the 15th Michigan's performance "pathetic". And he also is hard on Davies' division for its hasty retreat on October 4th.

This is interesting. Thanks for sharing, can you imagine what it was like for the soldiers themselves to read in newspapers that they were pathetic, skedaddling and things like that?

It's my understanding that part of the feud from Grant with Rosecrans was Rosy's favorable press disparaging the performance of troops that were not from his army…

 

[General JJ]

This is interesting. Thanks for sharing, can you imagine what it was like for the soldiers themselves to read in newspapers that they were pathetic, skedaddling and things like that?

It's my understanding that part of the feud from Grant with Rosecrans was Rosy's favorable press disparaging the performance of troops that were not from his army…

Yeah, that's essentially correct. The two Army of the Mississippi divisions, particularly Stanley's, were praised, and Davies' division was criticized (Unfairly one might say).

 

[DanSBHawk]

I find Cozzens in this book a little difficult to difficult to follow. He jumps back and forth between confederates and Union and between what's going on at different points and with different people. There's a lot of detail and doesn't make for easy reading.

I thought the same thing about that book. I had to read some paragraphs over more than once, and still wasn't completely clear on what he meant. It's too bad that Tim Smith didn't go into detail on Iuka in his Corinth book. Smith's writing always seems very clear to me.

 

[tony_gunter]

I am currently reading the Iuka and Corinth book by Peter Cozzens. Although he keeps things interesting focusing on the command dramas on both sides, he can get so detailed with troop movements, that it can be dense as well. Anyway, he's pretty critical of everyone, which is fine by me.

Here's what Cozzens wrote about the message from Dickey and Lagow, and what was going on with Rosecrans at the time.

View attachment 518657
View attachment 518659View attachment 518660
—————
Basically, as I understand it, when he reached Barrnett's Crossroads and after poring over maps, Rosecrans realized for the first time that the distance between Jacinto and Fulton was five miles, more than twice the distance he thought and that he'd have to advance in a single column, not having enough men to split his forces safely (because they would be so far away.)

He didn't inform Grant that he was doing this, which changed the plan. Dickey and Lagow gave him a message to attack or told him to do so, depending on whether the reader credits Rosecrans or not. I tend to think he knew it was an order to attack. Buy he wasn't of a mind to attack apparently preferring that Ord do so first, so that he could spring the trap from behind, but any arguments between them would be interrupted when the encounter started.

———-

I find Cozzens in this book a little difficult to difficult to follow. He jumps back and forth between confederates and Union and between what's going on at different points and with different people. There's a lot of detail and doesn't make for easy reading.

What is his source for this assertion:

It seems rather odd that Rosecrans would pull out the maps at this stage for no particular reason and have second thoughts about distances. It was, after all, his plan.

Occam's razor would lead us to believe that Dickey and Lagow handed him the dispatch and the realization that he would be leading the attack led him to pull out the maps to reconsider splitting his forces.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Occam's razor would lead us to believe that Dickey and Lagow handed him the dispatch and the realization that he would be leading the attack led him to pull out the maps to reconsider splitting his forces.

That does make sense.

 

[1SGDan]

Iuka - Victory as Failure | South & Western Theaters

Introduction In a recent thread another poster posed the question of why the battle of Iuka was considered a Union victory. Before responding I decided to review the battle in an effort to justify or dispel the outcome as a Union victory. What I discovered was actually a surprising mix of...

civilwartalk.com

 

[Lubliner]

Why is a Missouri soldier writing of his experience to a Cincinnati paper? Why does he write for the paper first before his family, and why does he identify his writing as "an article?"

May I suggest the Cincinnati newspaper had a wider circulation than any paper in Missouri. This may also have lessened the trouble his "dead drunk" comment would make among his family's peers at home. It also sounds as though, like any young man attempting to journalize, he wanted the support of his family back home. Pure pride.
Lubliner.

 

[DanSBHawk]

May I suggest the Cincinnati newspaper had a wider circulation than any paper in Missouri. This may also have lessened the trouble his "dead drunk" comment would make among his family's peers at home. It also sounds as though, like any young man attempting to journalize, he wanted the support of his family back home. Pure pride.
Lubliner.

Another key to the mystery is that a journalist from that specific Cincinnati paper, and a part-owner of the paper by some accounts, was present in Rosecrans' HQ at the time. This Cincinnati journalist named Bickham was acknowledged by other journalists (such as Henry Villard), as being a "puffer" or mouthpiece for Rosecrans.

In other words.. the "dead drunk" allegation, which came from a soldier in the column of Rosecrans' army, who was nowhere near Grant during this time, wrote an article or "private letter" accusing Grant of being drunk, which was subsequently published by the newspaper of the same pet reporter hanging out with Rosecrans.

Nothing at all suspicious about that.

 

[Lubliner]

Another key to the mystery is that a journalist from that specific Cincinnati paper, and a part-owner of the paper by some accounts, was present in Rosecrans' HQ at the time. This Cincinnati journalist named Bickham was acknowledged by other journalists (such as Henry Villard), as being a "puffer" or mouthpiece for Rosecrans.

In other words.. the "dead drunk" allegation, which came from a soldier in the column of Rosecrans' army, who was nowhere near Grant during this time, wrote an article or "private letter" accusing Grant of being drunk, which was subsequently published by the newspaper of the same pet reporter hanging out with Rosecrans.

Nothing at all suspicious about that.

Funny how he turned up in Cincinatti to oversee the Department of Missouri after Chickamauga. Just a really odd coincidence.
Lubliner.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Bickham wrote the first book on the Murfreesboro campaign, which has a lot of value.

There is another book on the Iuka operation, as well.

 

[SSVilla]

What is his source for this assertion:

View attachment 518730
It seems rather odd that Rosecrans would pull out the maps at this stage for no particular reason and have second thoughts about distances. It was, after all, his plan.

Occam's razor would lead us to believe that Dickey and Lagow handed him the dispatch and the realization that he would be leading the attack led him to pull out the maps to reconsider splitting his forces.

At the end of a long paragraph that includes your quote and the conversation between Rosecrans, Dickie and Lagow, there's this:

————
Col. Mizner was Rosecrans cavalry commander. He'd gotten off early to screen for the army.

A map probably helps at this point.

The next time Col. Mizner appears in the narrative is at Barnett's Crossroads, where Rosecrans had planned to divide his army. By then, squirmishes had erupted on Hamilton's front as his cavalry pushed towards Cartersville (per original plans).

Hamilton and Sanborn assumed this order to pause at Cartersville was simply a matter of aligning all ducks in a row and proceeding in a coordinated fashion. However an order to "hold that crossing at all hazards" raises questions about whether there was some kind of panic. It wasn't a crossing that was necessary for a retreat, or even the only approach to the enemy, but it was essential for the pincers move. One has to assume Rosecrans still intended the pincers move at that point but was panicking about its prospects for success because he was discovered this early.

Rosecrans then settled down to see what to do. How or why Col. Mizner waited for this moment to rectify map errors we don't know. Assuming nothing ominous it could have been simply that Rosecrans didn't know his map was off until consulting with his cavalry chief about the problems Hamilton and Sanborn encountered and possibly as he calculated how long it would take to get them in place, etc.

Dickie and Lagow showing up at that moment, is already twice the coincidence. I don't even understand the argument with Dickie and Lagow if Rosecrans had already decided to move in a single column. Rather, I think Rosecrans would have had much more of an objection to Dickie and Lagow's change of plans per Grant, if he was still intent on moving his second column to the Fulton Road. If that were the case, I could understand his pleas with Dickey and Lagow that he needed additional time to get that second column in place and that he needed Ord to take the risk of engaging the entirety of Price's force unaided, for him to be able to safely move to the Fulton Road. Otherwise his quibbling with Dickie and Lagow sounds hollow, like we are missing something. I mean look at this reconstruction of the argument per Rosy:

Notice how even this controversial account has Rosecrans still mentioning the desire to get the "roads" in Price's rear. (Him stating that he still hoped for a surprise there is one of many questions I have about the veracity of the statement.)

He wasn't going to admit that inadequate reconnaissance and wrong maps were the reasons for his failure to block both roads, because that's a miscalculation and error attributable to himself and his staff.

The inaccuracy of maps and lack of prior reconnaissance was a problem.

————
One has to wonder whether Rosy would still have presented his original plan if he'd known the actual distances, and his maps were the correct scale.

Or are you suggesting this issue with the inaccuracies of maps is made up after the fact?

If it were, I'd say that the fact Hamilton and Sanborn were discovered as they were moving on Cartersville was already problematic for Rosecrans as he showed in that panicked order to hold that crossroads at all hazards. A crossroads which he abandoned not too long after. The whole surprise he thought to deliver was over and done with by then. He had been seen approaching at Cartersville and maybe just that exposed that column to attack and defeat in detail. He could have even known the distance and the difficulties of the Fulton road previously, but he couldn't deliver the element of surprise due to his tardiness. He also wasn't going to admit to that mistake and error.

If anything I am not damning Rosecrans, but he had proposed an ambitious plan that was too difficult to execute and coordinate in civil war conditions, even for his side of the equation. Just considering his own difficulties, he was already off piste.

 

[SSVilla]

I have something interesting to thicken this plot. Albert Castel, RIP, in Victors in Blue, places in doubt this quote you have doubts about from Cozzens.

He completely credits Lagow and Dickie as informing Rosecrans that Ord would indeed not attack unless he did so first, and then has his own reasons for why Rosecrans changed his plan. The third reason I have serious doubts about whether it existed at the moment or was something made up afterwards, but at any rate, submitting it as is:

Citation 16, very revealing:

 

[DanSBHawk]

I have something interesting to thicken this plot. Albert Castel, RIP, in Victors in Blue, places in doubt this quote you have doubts about from Cozzens.

He completely credits Lagow and Dickie as informing Rosecrans that Ord would indeed not attack unless he did so first, and then has his own reasons for why Rosecrans changed his plan. The third reason I have serious doubts about whether it existed at the moment or was something made up afterwards, but at any rate, submitting it as is:

View attachment 518861
Citation 16, very revealing:
View attachment 518862
View attachment 518863

What does Castel mean that Cozzens source on the Rosecrans/Dickey/Lagow is "dubious?" It's based on Rosecrans's testimony to the Joint Committee. It's Rosecrans's own words.

Rosecrans's version of the meeting doesn't make sense, but I wouldn't call using Rosecrans as a source is "dubious." Am I misunderstanding Castel?

 

[SSVilla]

I

Bickham wrote the first book on the Murfreesboro campaign, which has a lot of value.

There is another book on the Iuka operation, as well.

View attachment 518755

Do you want to share what he wrote about this particular spot in time? The midday conference where Rosecrans changed his march plan and the Lagow/Dickie conference? Is the writer easy to follow?