Random Thoughts on Iuka

[Nathan Towne]

Some quick info on Stanley. Cozzens described him as capable but petulant (pg 34).
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Stanley's division was the cause of delay twice. It had been raining heavily on September 17, 1862 which delayed his rendezvous with Hamilton. Rosecrans reassured Grant that he'd still push past the original point set for the following day. (Cozzens pg 68). On September 18, Stanley again was the cause for delay. "Whether from treachery or by accident" Stanley's guide led him down a wrong road. This should have raised the alarm because Stanley reached Jacinto at 9:00 pm. Instead Rosecrans sent another reassuring message to Grant indicating he'd still get to Iuka on September 19 by 2:00 pm and would endeavor to do it strongly… That started a cascade of failures which he have recounted here.

I could not find anything about this specifically on a quick search of Cozzens book, but I looked at maps of the battle shared in this thread and there are several minor roads unnamed. I assume Rosecrans was looking for a way to flank Price and didn't find it because the latter had ordered trees felled to cover his flanks and funnel Rosecrans exactly to where he wanted him. Credit and points to Price.

I include this map taken from the official atlas, which I had already shared, because there is an "inside road," — not the Fulton road, or even the perpendicular road that connects the Fulton and Jacinto roads — nor is it the Mill road. It's drawn with a pattern of connected dots and unnamed. It may be incorrectly drawn, but there was an additional road. This map would lead one to believe that road would have led to flanking Price.

View attachment 522040
Here's a different map, shared by @DanSBHawk, much earlier in this thread from the Comte de Paris. It shows some unnamed "interior roads" in the shape of a trident.

View attachment 522054

There's this other map provided by @Nathan Towne. I don't know anything about its origin. This one doesn't show any interior roads, but marks Stanley with an arrow directed to the Mill Road.

View attachment 522052

Yeah, the best maps available are the maps in Cozzens' book, in my view.

I am very familiar with the felled trees blocking the road, yes. There are multiple accounts on that subject.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I think that if Rosecrans covered both exit roads as planned, but he didn't get into position on both roads until after sundown, it would have left Price with some hard decisions.

I don't see Price trying to navigate the difficult terrain to the east as an escape route, especially at night. Perhaps he would have tried to fight his way out on the Fulton Road at dawn on the 20th.

At any rate, once the battle was brought on with the Fulton Road left uncovered, there doesn't seem to be any way of salvaging the plan. It was pretty much a complete failure at that point.

It is entirely fine for that to be your perception, for sure.

It doesn't change the plan as it was actually conceived and formulated though, which is really not in doubt based on the record and is fundamental in understanding the decisions which were made and the course of events.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It is entirely fine for that to be your perception, for sure. It doesn't change the plan as it was actually conceived and formulated though, which is really not in doubt based on the record and is fundamental in understanding the decisions which were made and the course of events.

I'm confident that I understand the basic concept of the plan just fine.

The "course of events" was that the plan completely fell apart. It fell apart because Rosecrans was unable to keep with the schedule and because he failed to cover the Fulton Road before bringing on the battle.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm confident that I understand the basic concept of the plan just fine.

The "course of events" was that the plan completely fell apart. It fell apart because Rosecrans was unable to keep with the schedule and because he failed to cover the Fulton Road before bringing on the battle.

That is unfortunately obviously incorrect on the basis that it has been well established that the whole conception of the plan was to pitch into the Army of the Wrst in order to deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east, meaning that the Jacinto and Fulton roads would need to be covered, but also that the attack would then have to deprive the Army of the West of the ability to pull back to the east. That is just simply what the contemporary correspondence explicitly states and hence is not something in which there can really be any honest controversy on when seriously analyzed.

There isn't much point in going around and around on that non-issue any longer that way. That much is essentially just the case.

As for my estimation then regarding the plan failing, i would then state that it essentially failed because Rosecrans was not able to get into position in which all of the central objectives/necessities could be satisfied by 19th. In addition, even if they were able to, Ord's forces may not have been able to hear the ongoing fighting and hence may not have then provided the necessary support, regardless, although that is not a clear point that way.

 

[1SGDan]

whole conception of the plan was to pitch into the Army of the Wrst in order to deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east, meaning that the Jacinto and Fulton roads would need to be covered,

I continue to misunderstand your disagreement here. We have both said that both roads needed to be covered. Retreat to the east was more difficult due to the existing road network at the time. Any movement in that direction would be cross country down the railroad line if BOTH ROADS WERE SEALED.

 

[1SGDan]

i would then state that it essentially failed because Rosecrans was not able to get into position in which all of the central objectives/necessities could be satisfied by 19th.

So you agree with us.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I continue to misunderstand your disagreement here. We have both said that both roads needed to be covered. Retreat to the east was more difficult due to the existing road network at the time. Any movement in that direction would be cross country down the railroad line if BOTH ROADS WERE SEALED.

No, there were roads which ran east out of Iuka.

By in position, I mean from where both the Jacinto and Fulton roads were covered and the attack was launched, crushing in the Confederate left depriving them of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek that night.

 

[1SGDan]

The maps in posts #297 and #298 show exactly one road heading east from Iuka. Had the Fulton Road been interdicted that too may have become a non option and the rail line as well. The truth of the matter is had the Union moves gone as planned Price was in serious trouble.

 

[Nathan Towne]

These are maps which show the relevant road network, Below are accurate and detailed maps. Circled in red is the Fulton road. The roads moving east are highlighted below in green.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The maps in posts #297 and #298 show exactly one road heading east from Iuka. Had the Fulton Road been interdicted that too may have become a non option and the rail line as well. The truth of the matter is had the Union moves gone as planned Price was in serious trouble.

You unfortunately may not seem be familiar with the road network. Please see above.

Yes, if the operation had succeeded the Army of the West would have been in serious trouble. As shown in Post #305, which I think that you may have still not yet read, the operation, as it was actually formulated at the time, entailed quite a bit more than what you make out in your short pieces on it in the other thread.

 

[1SGDan]

You unfortunately do not seem to be familiar with the road network.

The maps I mentioned show all that needs to be known. What you have highlighted shows one road leaving Iuka to the east and then splitting some distance away from the town into two roads. Yes there was one road leaving the town to the east.

 

[SSVilla]

It's true that I tend to look at the start of the "rift" as when Grant's attitude towards Rosecrans noticeably soured. It would be interesting to know more about what Rosecrans wrote at the time about Iuka. I believe the largest archive of Rosecrans papers is in California and has not been digitized and put online yet. That will make for some lively discussions when it's accessible.

One thing Henry Villard noted about spending time with Rosecrans is that he routinely spoke badly of his superiors. If that's the case, it might be hard to distinguish the start of the "rift" from his standpoint. He might have just been engaged in his usual bad-mouthing of a superior.

I'll ask you sometime about this Dan. I am really interested in that topic. If I haven't asked you about it before it's because I want to get into the nitty gritty of this battle first before moving on to that topic because I feel I'll otherwise get very confused. That's just my process. But if you have posted in some thread about it, I'll be happy to read that so as not to burden you. I know you share sources you have found in your research.

I currently have marked two threads mentioned here to catchup on. I have already read bits and pieces, but not whole:

Grant - The Mistakes of Grant by W.S. Rosecrans | Famous People of the Late Unpleasantness

Rosecrans was not an unpopular officer overall. That's not my point. There have been other posts telling us that the most reliable source for assessment of Rosecrans' performance and who was to blame for this or that failure is the accounts by rank and file troops under his command. I've...

civilwartalk.com

William S Rosecrans and the Union Victory by David Moore | Wartime Politics, & Debates

The after action reports from the lead elements of Rosecrans force at Iuka place the start of the battle at some time after 5pm. See OR 1, Vol 17 part 1 pages 96-113. Sanborn, with the lead brigade, had cavalry out front skirmishing in the morning, at 1pm several cos from the 5th IA took over...

civilwartalk.com

Despite me not being a Rosecrans fan I still find him a very interesting subject. Sometimes it's like that, someone is such a perplexing combination of talent and questionable temperament that it just makes them a compelling subject of study. I am constantly trying to understand Rosecrans, even when what I find doesn't make me like him, like the below thread — but I don't hate him.

Grant - The Mistakes of Grant by W.S. Rosecrans | Famous People of the Late Unpleasantness

Federals pushed 32k troops to Grant at Chattanooga. Recon that might have given Grant some advantage. The Federals/Halleck failed to consolidate force during Rosecrans push to Chattanooga After the Tullahoma Campaign. Had Armies idol in VA and MS. Something the Confederates did do. Federals...

civilwartalk.com

Cozzens made some questionable statements about Rosecrans, like this:

I wonder about the mendacity thing because I think Rosecrans lied quite a lot in that "The Mistakes of Grant" article and it's not the only case, it's just really easy to find and point to.

Anyways, I'll leave it at that and try to get through the rest of this thread to catch up on what's been going on.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The maps I mentioned show all that needs to be known.

The above which I just posted are detailed maps of the relevant road network.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'll ask you sometime about this Dan. I am really interested in that topic. If I haven't asked you about it before it's because I want to get into the nitty gritty of this battle first before moving on to that topic because I feel I'll otherwise get very confused. That's just my process. But if you have posted in some thread about it, I'll be happy to read that so as not to burden you. I know you share sources you have found in your research.

I currently have marked two threads mentioned here to catchup on. I have already read bits and pieces, but not whole:

Grant - The Mistakes of Grant by W.S. Rosecrans | Famous People of the Late Unpleasantness

Rosecrans was not an unpopular officer overall. That's not my point. There have been other posts telling us that the most reliable source for assessment of Rosecrans' performance and who was to blame for this or that failure is the accounts by rank and file troops under his command. I've...

civilwartalk.com

William S Rosecrans and the Union Victory by David Moore | Wartime Politics, & Debates

The after action reports from the lead elements of Rosecrans force at Iuka place the start of the battle at some time after 5pm. See OR 1, Vol 17 part 1 pages 96-113. Sanborn, with the lead brigade, had cavalry out front skirmishing in the morning, at 1pm several cos from the 5th IA took over...

civilwartalk.com

Despite me not being a Rosecrans fan I still find him a very interesting subject. Sometimes it's like that, someone is such a perplexing combination of talent and questionable temperament that it just makes them a compelling subject of study. I am constantly trying to understand Rosecrans, even when what I find doesn't make me like him, like the below thread — but I don't hate him.

Grant - The Mistakes of Grant by W.S. Rosecrans | Famous People of the Late Unpleasantness

Federals pushed 32k troops to Grant at Chattanooga. Recon that might have given Grant some advantage. The Federals/Halleck failed to consolidate force during Rosecrans push to Chattanooga After the Tullahoma Campaign. Had Armies idol in VA and MS. Something the Confederates did do. Federals...

civilwartalk.com

Cozzens made some questionable statements about Rosecrans, like this:

View attachment 522122

I wonder about the mendacity thing because I think Rosecrans lied quite a lot in that "The Mistakes of Grant" article and it's not the only case, it's just really easy to find and point to.

Anyways, I'll leave it at that and try to get through the rest of this thread to catch up on what's been going on.

I wouldn't bother with the Mistakes of Grant thread, to be honest. It was mostly one misstatement after another from people.

If you are going to catch up on this thread, I would recommend reading Post #305, or the earlier post which it was copied from and then operating from there.

 

[1SGDan]

The above which I just posted are detailed maps of the relevant road network.

Which show exactly one road out of the town proper to the east. What happens to that road miles away is irrelevant.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Which show exactly one road out of the town proper to the east. What happens to that road miles away is irrelevant.

Two primary roads moving to the east, as shown above.

 

[1SGDan]

See the map

 

[Nathan Towne]

See the map

Doesn't load for me. Could you post a picture? The maps which I posted above are nineteenth century maps which were accurate.

 

[1SGDan]

Doesn't load for me. Could you post a picture? The maps which I posted above are nineteenth century maps which were accurate.

Yes and as I said before one raod led out of the town proper to the east and diverged some miles from town into two

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yes and as I said before one raod led out of the town proper to the east and diverged some miles from town into two

That has no bearing at all on the larger points above.