Random Thoughts on Iuka

[1SGDan]

Try this

 

[1SGDan]

That has no bearing at all on the larger points above.

It has everything to do with the subject at hand. If Price was fighting for survival on the 19th on Burnsville Road, Jacinta Road, and Fulton Road there wouldn't be anyone left to use the this supposed escape route.

 

[Nathan Towne]

It has everything to do with the subject at hand. If Price was fighting for survival on the 19th on Burnsville Road, Jacinta Road, and Fulton Road there wouldn't be anyone left to use the this supposed escape route.

That is not a detailed map. Please see the maps which I posted above.

 

[1SGDan]

That is not a detailed map. See my maps above.

I have looked at your highlighted map and see nothing different.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The above which I just posted are detailed maps of the relevant road network.

Maps from 50 years after the battle.

 

[1SGDan]

That is not a detailed map. Please see the maps which I posted above.

I have pulled my copy of Cozzen's Darkest Days of the War and on page 69 the map presented does not even show the road in question. I am not in the habit of questioning a well respected Civil War historian.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That is unfortunately obviously incorrect on the basis that it has been well established that the whole conception of the plan was to pitch into the Army of the Wrst in order to deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east, meaning that the Jacinto and Fulton roads would need to be covered, but also that the attack would then have to deprive the Army of the West of the ability to pull back to the east. That is just simply what the contemporary correspondence explicitly states and hence is not something in which there can really be any honest controversy on when seriously analyzed.

There isn't much point in going around and around on that non-issue any longer that way. That much is essentially just the case.

You're right. There isn't much point. So give it a rest.

My opinion of the plan aligns with what both Grant and Rosecrans wrote, and testified, close to the time of the battle. It also aligns with every historian that has written about the battle. I simply don't buy your revisionist take on the battle. You've posted your opinion and the evidence which you believe supports your opinion. Let people decide for themselves. I've decided for myself, and my decision is that you're wrong.

 

[SSVilla]

So, here's the broader map to show Rosecrans' objective point. The battlefield is at the bottom left, the Fulton Road runs the length of the right side of the map, and the heights commanding the Fulton Road are in the center, the ridge labeled 618 . Basically, just inside the city of Iuka. Under the approach Rosecrans chose, he has to literally capture Iuka to prevent Price from escaping Iuka.

View attachment 519346

I don't know anything about reading topographical maps therefore this is a rough drawing for me to understand. It does appear on that one that to cross the from the Jacinto to the Fulton road one would have to get much closer to Iuka, basically inside as you say, than other maps appear to show. The one used in Rosecrans report, which I use for reference personally has that connecting road drawn further out.

 

[DanSBHawk]

You unfortunately may not seem be familiar with the road network. Please see above.

One of the "roads" you highlighted in green on the map appears to be the railroad.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I have pulled my copy of Cozzen's Darkest Days of the War and on page 69 the map presented does not even show the road in question. I am not in the habit of questioning a well respected Civil War historian.

He doesn't have detailed maps of the roads in this area. He has detailed maps of the areas where the main fighting occurred.

You're right. There isn't much point. So give it a rest.

My opinion of the plan aligns with what both Grant and Rosecrans wrote, and testified, close to the time of the battle. It also aligns with every historian that has written about the battle. I simply don't buy your revisionist take on the battle. You've posted your opinion and the evidence which you believe supports your opinion. Let people decide for themselves. I've decided for myself, and my decision is that you're wrong.

Your above post is pathetic. I base my views on the record, rather than on conjecture and cherry-picked evidence, as you do. The insults (and misinformation) are typical coming from you. As far as the plan is concerned, it just is what it is based on what was explicitly stated in the correspondence. That just is. How one operates from there is then the next issue.

Maps from 50 years after the battle.

No, the maps are relevant. This was discussed earlier in the thread already.

 

[1SGDan]

He has detailed maps of the areas where the main fighting occurred.

That IS significantly important. One, two, three miles down the road is irrelevant when your fighting for your life on three others.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That IS significantly important. One, two, three miles down the road is irrelevant when your fighting for your life on three others.

They would pull back across Bear Creek that night. It would really be preferable if you read the relevant correspondence on this subject and the posts which I have put up in this thread already. I don't want to cover alll of the same ground again.

 

[SSVilla]

I wouldn't bother with the Mistakes of Grant thread, to be honest. It was mostly one misstatement after another from people.

If you are going to catch up on this thread, I would recommend reading Post #305, or the earlier post which it was copied from and then operating from there.

I think it's important to read it if one wants to get to know Rosecrans tbh. It's like if I were to tell someone "I wouldn't bother reading with Grants memoirs" tbh. Certainly, I don't recommend that anyone read just that and nothing else, or that they take it as a complete picture, or even truthful on all accounts, but if someone wanted to get a feel for his personality, and get to know him personally, definitely read what he wrote. The PUSG are even better in terms of getting to know him, but for sure read what he wrote.

Read what Lincoln wrote as well, to get a sense for him, his personal letters, his exchanges with his generals, to understand him and his character. That's also the reason for reading McClellan. I don't read McClellan to find an accurate account of all his campaigns, but to get to know him as a character, better yet to read some of his correspondence, etc.

Why not read that article? It definitely conveys his personality as much as anything else. I have read Sherman's letters and his memoirs. I have read Meade's. I have read a bunch of things written by interesting figures just to get a sense for the personality. Certainly it's not a complete picture, but it's something the person wrote that they thought important.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I think it's important to read it if one wants to get to know Rosecrans tbh. It's like if I were to tell someone "I wouldn't bother reading with Grants memoirs" tbh. Certainly, I don't recommend that anyone read just that and nothing else, or that they take it as a complete picture, or even truthful on all accounts, but if someone wanted to get a feel for his personality, and get to know him personally, definitely read what he wrote. The PUSG are even better in terms of getting to know him, but for sure read what he wrote.

Read what Lincoln wrote as well, to get a sense for him, his personal letters, his exchanges with his generals, to understand him and his character. That's also the reason for reading McClellan. I don't read McClellan to find an accurate account of all his campaigns, but to get to know him as a character, better yet to eadchis correspondence, etc.

Why not read that article? It definitely conveys his personality as much as anything else. I have read Sherman's letters and his memoirs. I have read a bunch of things written by interesting figures just to get a sense for the personality. Certainly it's not a complete picture, but it's something the person wrote that they thought important.

I meant reading that thread which you posted the link to.

 

[SSVilla]

I meant reading that thread which you posted the link to.

I see. Well, I am now in this thread. The others are on my list. There's other topics beyond the battle that I am interested in but I don't want to bring them up here to keep on topic, so I'll leave that for a different one.

 

[DanSBHawk]

They would pull back across Bear Creek that night.

There is really no way to know that. It would have been very difficult route at night, and even after fighting the battle Price had to be convinced to evacuate. There's certainly no way to know for sure that the confederates would have tried to leave before dawn on the 20th.

It occurs to me that, really, this is all about trying to come up with an exculpatory story for Rosecrans dropping the ball. It's not about determining the actual history. It's all about making excuses for Rosecrans.

 

[1SGDan]

They would pull back across Bear Creek that night. It would really be preferable if you read the relevant correspondence on this subject and the posts which I have put up in this thread already. I don't want to cover alll of the same ground again.

The problem is that you are evaluating what did happen while I am evaluating what was supposed to happen. On the 19th if everything that was planned happened Price was screwed. Your suppositions fail to take into account all the relevant information.
The road you think was there possibly didn't even exist then. Every historian that has look at this scenario has reached the same conclusion if the federal commanders had acted in unison, as planned, Price would have been in big trouble in Iuka.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There is really no way to know that. It would have been very difficult route at night, and even after fighting the battle Price had to be convinced to evacuate. There's certainly no way to know for sure that the confederates would have tried to leave before dawn on the 20th.

It occurs to me that, really, this is all about trying to come up with an exculpatory story for Rosecrans dropping the ball. It's not about determining the actual history. It's all about making excuses for Rosecrans.

Price had no intention of fighting a combined Federal force. We have been over that extensively.

It is about serious people trying to seriously understand events, rather than intentionally ignoring the relevant record in order to intentionally remain ignorant.

The problem is that you are evaluating what did happen while I am evaluating what was supposed to happen. On the 19th if everything that was planned happened Price was screwed. Your suppositions fail to take into account all the relevant information.
The road you think was there possibly didn't even exist then. Every historian that has look at this scenario has reached the same conclusion if the federal commanders had acted in unison, as planned, Price would have been in big trouble in Iuka.

I have done no such thing. I have outlined the situation extensively in this thread. You should begin by reading such so that I don't have to go over it all again.

The roads which have been highlighted, existed. They have been taken from multiple nineteenth century sources. The other user obfuscates and misleads intentionally when they don't want to address things in a serious or honest way. It is a frequent tactic from and it is very exhausting.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Price had no intention of fighting a combined Federal force. We have been over that extensively.

And yet Price did not evacuate at 2:00 pm on the 19th when he learned Rosecrans was approaching from the south. Price obviously already knew of the federal force on the Burnsville road at this time. And yet he did not evacuate.

You are simply making assumptions in order to make your revisionist defense of Rosecrans seem plausible.

 

[Nathan Towne]

And yet Price did not evacuate at 2:00 pm on the 19th when he learned Rosecrans was approaching from the south. Price obviously already knew of the federal force on the Burnsville road at this time. And yet he did not evacuate.

You are simply making assumptions in order to make your revisionist defense of Rosecrans seem plausible.

Because there was not sufficient time. The U.S. Army was rapidly approaching, Do you not understand what it is like trying to cross a river in daylight with the enemy on top of you? It is the same problem which Lee faced at Antietam in September 18th. Beyond this, Price fully intended to evacuate Iuka regardless. That is well established and explicit in the record. I went over all of this with you already.