Random Thoughts on Iuka

[DanSBHawk]

This was addressed in Post #212 and in surrounding posts. The argument which you are attempting to make here is quite silly.

Obviously it was not addressed in any way that settled it. Likewise, your argument doesn't impress me.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Obviously it was not addressed in any way that settled it. Likewise, your argument doesn't impress me.

I am not sure what argument you refer to? Are you referring to that the conception of the plan was to trap the Army of the West before they could pull back either to the south or to the east via Bear Creek? That just is. It is the inevitable conclusion from reading the contemporary correspondence, essentially.

If you refer to my arguments pertaining to what Rosecrans should have done as the situation developed, it is all a debatable, but we must operate from an honest underlying basis before then attempting to assess his actions that way, which comes about via reading the contemporary correspondence first and foremost.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I am not sure what argument you refer to? Are you referring to that the conception of the plan was to trap the Army of the West before they could pull back either to the south or to the east via Bear Creek? That just is. It is the inevitable conclusion from reading the contemporary correspondence, essentially.

If you refer to my arguments pertaining to what Rosecrans should have done as the situation developed, it is all a debatable, but we must operate from an honest underlying basis before then attempting to assess his actions that way, which comes about via reading the contemporary correspondence first and foremost.

There's nothing inevitable about your conclusion. It's based on the faulty interpretation that anytime anyone mentioned Bear Creek in correspondence, that they must be talking about a route leading directly east from Iuka. It's a bizarre conclusion that is contradicted by Grant and Rosecrans and every historian that has written about the battle.

The plan was to trap Price between Ord on the Burnsville road and Rosecrans' columns on the two southern roads. That was the plan.

 

[1SGDan]

Please produce the correspondence showing a refusal to obey Van Dorn's order to pull out of Iuka on September 18th. My understanding is that the order was received in the morning of the 19th.

See T.C. Snead, "With Price," 732.

I know a little bit about this subject. I am not sure what you are referring to there.

The order was issued on the 18th but did not reach Price until the 19th.

Cozzens, The Darkest Days of the war- The Battles of Iuka and Corinth, page 67
Initially Price agreed
He answered Van Dorn decisively at dawn on September 19th "I will make the movement proposed in your dispatch ... Enemy concentrating against me."

"by noon Price doubted he could get away without a fight."
Instead he sent BG Henry Little's division to extend the line on the Burnsville road.

Later as the threat on the Jacinto road was discovered he sent Hebert's division to do battle there. Deploying the bulk of his force to do battle is a far cry from retreating as ordered.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There's nothing inevitable about your conclusion. It's based on the faulty interpretation that anytime anyone mentioned Bear Creek in correspondence, that they must be talking about a route leading directly east from Iuka. It's a bizarre conclusion that is contradicted by Grant and Rosecrans and every historian that has written about the battle.

The plan was to trap Price between Ord on the Burnsville road and Rosecrans' columns on the two southern roads. That was the plan.

It is not contradicted by Rosecrans, is not directly contradicted by Grant until much, much later (time is a fundamental condition on accuracy of any account) and is shown via the contemporary correspondence and is simply what the record clearly shows. Your statement that the Confederate force must move south first in order to then move east is most certainly a bizarre one though. I would fully concur that that is quite a bizarre statement.

The order was issued on the 18th but did not reach Price until the 19th.

Cozzens, The Darkest Days of the war- The Battles of Iuka and Corinth, page 67
Initially Price agreed
He answered Van Dorn decisively at dawn on September 19th "I will make the movement proposed in your dispatch ... Enemy concentrating against me."

"by noon Price doubted he could get away without a fight."
Instead he sent BG Henry Little's division to extend the line on the Burnsville road.

Later as the threat on the Jacinto road was discovered he sent Hebert's division to do battle there. Deploying the bulk of his force to do battle is a far cry from retreating as ordered.

Right. As discussed by me before on this thread. See Post #212. That was a vital error there on your part there.

The U.S. Army was rapidly closing in by noon on the 19th. See again Post #212.

By the way, the order was issued on September 16th, not September 18th, if I recall correctly.

 

[1SGDan]

By the way, the order was issued on September 16th, not September 18th, if I recall correctly.

The order issued on the 16th told Price to consolidate his forces for a strike on Corinth but failed to mention that he had been assigned command. The faulty order did not arrive until early morning on the 19th. Feeling (correctly) that he knew more about his tactical situation (and possibly not understanding the status of the command chain) Price simply ignored/disobeyed it. He didn't order the wagons loaded until the 19th. Had he left when he had the oppurtunity he would have been free to go. The two men hated each other and so cooperation was always going to be difficult to get. Price instead decided to stay and fight.

 

[Nathan Towne]

If it was issued on the 16th all the more reason to feel that Price simply ignored/disobeyed it. Had he left then he would have been free to go. If it was issued on the 16th why did it take Price 2-3 days to respond? The two men hated each other and so cooperation was always going to be difficult to get.

It didn't reach Price until the morning of the 19th………….

 

[DanSBHawk]

It is not contradicted by Rosecrans, is not directly contradicted by Grant until much, much later (time is a fundamental condition on accuracy of any account) and is shown via the contemporary correspondence and is simply what the record clearly shows. Your statement that the Confederate force must move south first in order to then move east is most certainly a bizarre one though. I would fully concur that that is quite a bizarre statement.

False. It is contradicted by Grant in his official report in 1862.

"This is the first I knew of the Fulton Road being left open to the enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast, with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out."

If you think there was only one route across Bear Creek, then you obviously haven't studied the road network.

 

[Nathan Towne]

False. It is contradicted by Grant in his official report in 1862.

"This is the first I knew of the Fulton Road being left open to the enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast, with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out."

If you think there was only one route across Bear Creek, then you obviously haven't studied the road network.

Not false. I had a feeling that you were going to erroneously state that though.

I never said anything about there being only one route to the east. Where you got that from, one can only guess.

Thanks for the laugh.

 

[1SGDan]

It didn't reach Price until the morning of the 19th………….

I know that is what I said. Where the hell are you trying to go with this?

 

[Nathan Towne]

I know that is what I said. Where the hell are you trying to go with this?

Was responding to the below:

 

[DanSBHawk]

Not false. I had a feeling that you were going to erroneously state that though.

I never said anything about there being only one route to the east. Where you got that from, one can only guess.

Thanks for the laugh.

Grant's report is a primary source, and was written contemporaneously. There's nothing erroneous about it.

The "one route" fallacy comes from your interpreting every mention of crossing Bear Creek as necessarily referring to a route heading directly east out of Iuka.

You're welcome for the laugh. It has certainly been a laughable thread.

 

[1SGDan]

Was responding to the below:

View attachment 522199

So?

 

[Nathan Towne]

The order issued on the 16th told Price to consolidate his forces for a strike on Corinth but failed to mention that he had been assigned command. The faulty order did not arrive until early morning on the 19th. Feeling (correctly) that he knew more about his tactical situation (and possibly not understanding the status of the command chain) Price simply ignored/disobeyed it. He didn't order the wagons loaded until the 19th. Had he left when he had the oppurtunity he would have been free to go. The two men hated each other and so cooperation was always going to be difficult to get. Price instead decided to stay and fight.

No, he didn't ignore it. He didn't receive it until the morning of the 19th. Lol. U.S. forces were rapidly bearing down on him, by early that afternoon, when he could have been implementing it.

 

[Nathan Towne]

So?

I didn't know that you hadn't finished your comment yet/were still amending it.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Grant's report is a primary source, and was written contemporaneously. There's nothing erroneous about it.

The "one route" fallacy comes from your interpreting every mention of crossing Bear Creek as necessarily referring to a route heading directly east out of Iuka.

You're welcome for the laugh. It has certainly been a laughable thread.

I never made any claim of "one route." That is a product solely of your imagination.

As far as the thread is concerned, my content was valuable and instructive. Hopefully, people will be able to read it and learn and think about the subject seriously. Tony put up a couple of useful things. I would agree that it can maybe be construed as ending there, unfortunately.

 

[1SGDan]

No, he didn't ignore it. He didn't receive it until the morning of the 19th.

At dawn on the 19th action on the Burnsville road was nothing more than some light skirmishing and the movement on the Jacinto Road had not yet been reported. There was time for Price to at least begin a withdrawal. Instead he deployed his forces for combat. If that is not disobeying/ignoring orders than what is?
You continue to argue against the facts that the key participants noted, well respected historians have concurred on and formulated some design of movement on a road that may not have even existed at the time. Give it up.

 

[Nathan Towne]

At dawn on the 19th action on the Burnsville road was nothing more than some light skirmishing and the movement on the Jacinto Road had not yet been reported. There was time for Price to at least begin a withdrawal. Instead he deployed his forces for combat. If that is not disobeying/ignoring orders than what is?
You continue to argue against the facts that the key participants noted, well respected historians have concurred on and formulated some design of movement on a road that may not have even existed at the time. Give it up.

Please go back and read my earlier posts where all of this was extensively addressed.

 

[1SGDan]

Please go back and read my earlier posts where all of this was extensively addressed.

I don't read fictional characterizations of history any more than I have to.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I don't read fictional characterizations of history any more than I have to.

I appreciate the insult.

Unlike you and your friend, I actually know the facts, which you didn't, have studied the operation extensively and thought about it in depth that way. You don't even know the facts, like your friend and have deliberately decided to ignore what I have actually written in order that I go in circles with you on the same things which have been extensively covered already, so there isn't much else to do with that.