"Here is a Paper . . ."

[Belfoured]

The notions of pitching into the confederate center at Crampton's gap while attacking Longstreet/Hill at Turner's Gap are not mutually exclusive. Rather, McClellan meant them to be complimentary. He also reserved the right to change plans as Confederate resistance dictated. To that end, at 6:20 p.m. on Sept. 13, he wrote the following, after summarizing the positions of Confederate forces described in Special Orders No. 191:

"If you find this pass (i.e., Crampton's Gap) held by the enemy in large force, make all your dispositions for the attack, and commence it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command and relieve Colonel Miles. ... My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail."

Notice he said nothing about Franklin turning north to face Longstreet.

McClellan then added this at 2:00 on Sept. 14, so after the battle at Fox's Gap had been going on for 6 hours: "carry Burkittsville at any cost. We shall have strong opposition at both passes. As fast as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in readiness to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at any of these passes, let me know at once, and amuse them as best you can, so as to retain them there. In that event I will probably throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here."

In short, McClellan tried to retain as much flexibility as possible so he could direct troops where they were most needed. Remember, he did not know the strength of Lee's army. He also assumed it was stronger than his own. This required that he keep a reserve in place to send to whatever point in the line needed it most. I hope this clarifies things a bit.

He also assumed it was stronger than his own.

A lot of good points - but this one is the problem. A recurring one, as we well know.

 

[jackt62]

I do recommend Hartwig's new book on why McClellan had ample ways of knowing what he faced on September 17-18 and his opponent's condition.

I'm eager to get my hands on his latest book.

 

[GilbertFarney]

A lot of good points - but this one is the problem. A recurring one, as we well know.

True. I'm not in the business of excusing, just explaining.

 

[Belfoured]

True. I'm not in the business of excusing, just explaining.

Sounds like the role of a historian ....

 

[Jantzen64]

The notions of pitching into the confederate center at Crampton's gap while attacking Longstreet/Hill at Turner's Gap are not mutually exclusive. Rather, McClellan meant them to be complimentary. He also reserved the right to change plans as Confederate resistance dictated. To that end, at 6:20 p.m. on Sept. 13, he wrote the following, after summarizing the positions of Confederate forces described in Special Orders No. 191:

"If you find this pass (i.e., Crampton's Gap) held by the enemy in large force, make all your dispositions for the attack, and commence it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command and relieve Colonel Miles. ... My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail."

Notice he said nothing about Franklin turning north to face Longstreet.

McClellan then added this at 2:00 on Sept. 14, so after the battle at Fox's Gap had been going on for 6 hours: "carry Burkittsville at any cost. We shall have strong opposition at both passes. As fast as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in readiness to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at any of these passes, let me know at once, and amuse them as best you can, so as to retain them there. In that event I will probably throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here."

In short, McClellan tried to retain as much flexibility as possible so he could direct troops where they were most needed. Remember, he did not know the strength of Lee's army. He also assumed it was stronger than his own. This required that he keep a reserve in place to send to whatever point in the line needed it most. I hope this clarifies things a bit.

Many thanks for this, but I'm still struggling with a couple points about McClellan's intent and battle-plan.

I originally asked about the conversation with Gibbon, because I was curious if there is some "consensus" (in this case, more than one data point), that McClellan's goal was indeed to pitch into Lee's center and cut him in two. That concept appears in both his 6:20 message and the conversation with Gibbon, both occurring on the evening of the 13th. While I agree with your notion that pitching into Lee's center is not exclusive of an attack on Lee's left, it does raise significant issues of force structure, mission and leadership.

If the idea is to split your opponent in two, it just makes common sense to put your maximum effort there in terms of force and attention, relegating other efforts to holding actions Yet Franklin was only given his corp (admittedly the biggest) with an additional division to go up against McLaws and Anderson. Given how Little Mac estimated the size of Confederate forces, that seems like he is pulling his punch. And, I disagree that the 6:20 telegram says nothing about Franklin turning North. It instructs Franklin - upon relieving HF - to "return by Rohrersville on the direct road to Boonsborough if the main column has not succeeded in its attack . . . " . Whether Franklin was up to that task is a different question, but it was clearly within McClellan's mind that Franklin could serve to flank the force at Fox/Turners if needed. And, Belfoured's point about McClellan's view of Franklin's lack of energy and initiative has to factor in as well. I absolutely agree with other posts that one must "make do" with the talent that is available, but some type of more active oversight was needed beyond the "give it your best" exhortation in the 6:20 message, especially given McClellan's acknowledged concerns about Franklin.

In terms of reserves/flexibility to support either/both efforts, McClellan's 6:20 message indicates that Sumner, Sykes and Banks were following Burnside's command "upon Boonsborough, to carry that position." It seems like he was committing his reserve to the Turner/Fox effort, rather than piercing the center.

These points are not focused on the timeline per se, but rather upon the extent to which McClellan capitalized on the opportunity presented by the Lost Order. It seems to me that McClellan either lost sight of pitching into the center, or was more of the view - contrary to his statements to his lieutenants - that an attack on Lee's left would be more advantageous.

 

[GilbertFarney]

Sounds like the role of a historian .

Many thanks for this, but I'm still struggling with a couple points about McClellan's intent and battle-plan.

I originally asked about the conversation with Gibbon, because I was curious if there is some "consensus" (in this case, more than one data point), that McClellan's goal was indeed to pitch into Lee's center and cut him in two. That concept appears in both his 6:20 message and the conversation with Gibbon, both occurring on the evening of the 13th. While I agree with your notion that pitching into Lee's center is not exclusive of an attack on Lee's left, it does raise significant issues of force structure, mission and leadership.

If the idea is to split your opponent in two, it just makes common sense to put your maximum effort there in terms of force and attention, relegating other efforts to holding actions Yet Franklin was only given his corp (admittedly the biggest) with an additional division to go up against McLaws and Anderson. Given how Little Mac estimated the size of Confederate forces, that seems like he is pulling his punch. And, I disagree that the 6:20 telegram says nothing about Franklin turning North. It instructs Franklin - upon relieving HF - to "return by Rohrersville on the direct road to Boonsborough if the main column has not succeeded in its attack . . . " . Whether Franklin was up to that task is a different question, but it was clearly within McClellan's mind that Franklin could serve to flank the force at Fox/Turners if needed. And, Belfoured's point about McClellan's view of Franklin's lack of energy and initiative has to factor in as well. I absolutely agree with other posts that one must "make do" with the talent that is available, but some type of more active oversight was needed beyond the "give it your best" exhortation in the 6:20 message, especially given McClellan's acknowledged concerns about Franklin.

In terms of reserves/flexibility to support either/both efforts, McClellan's 6:20 message indicates that Sumner, Sykes and Banks were following Burnside's command "upon Boonsborough, to carry that position." It seems like he was committing his reserve to the Turner/Fox effort, rather than piercing the center.

These points are not focused on the timeline per se, but rather upon the extent to which McClellan capitalized on the opportunity presented by the Lost Order. It seems to me that McClellan either lost sight of pitching into the center, or was more of the view - contrary to his statements to his lieutenants - that an attack on Lee's left would be more advantageous.

Sound observations. You have the same sources I have, so there isn't anything I would add.

 

[Peace Society]

Regarding - Uncertainty in sources

April 12, 1863
W. D. B, of the Commercial, Major McDowell, of Rousseau's staff, and Lieutenant Porter, called this afternoon. My report of the operations of my brigade at Stone river was referred to. Bickham thought it did not do justice to my command, and I have no doubt it is a sorry affair, compared with the elaborate reports of many others. The historian who accepts these reports as reliable, and permits himself to be guided by then through all the windings of a five-days' battle, with the expectation of finally allotting to each one of forty brigades the proper credit, will probably not be successful. My report was called for late one evening, written hastily, without having before me the reports of my regimental commanders, and is incomplete, unsatisfactory to me, and unjust to my brigade.

July 20, 1863
Received a public document, in which I find all the reports of the battle of Stone river, and, I am sorry to say, my report is the poorest and most unsatisfactory of the whole lot. The printer, as if for the purpose of aggravating me beyond endurance, has, by an error of punctuation, transformed what I considered a very considerable and creditable action, into an inconsiderable skirmish. The report should read:
"On the second and third days my brigade was in front, a portion of the time skirmishing. On the night of January 3d, two regiments, led by myself, drove the enemy from their breastworks in the edge of the woods."
This appears in the volume as follows:
"On the second and third days my brigade was in front a portion of the time. Skirmishing on the night of January 3d, two regiments, led my myself, drove the enemy from the breastworks in the edge of the woods."
Thus, by taking the last word of one sentence and making it the first word of another, the intelligent compositor belittles a night fight for which I thought my command deserved no inconsiderable credit. I regret now that I did not take the time to make an elaborate report of the operations of my brigade, describing all the terrible situations in which it had been placed, and dwelling with special emphasis on the courage and splendid fighting of the men. In contrast with my stupidly modest report, is that of Brigadier-General Spears. He does not hesitate to claim for his troops all the credit of the night engagement referred to; and yet while my men stormed the barricade of logs, and cleaned out the woods, his were lying on their faces fully two hundred yards in the rear, and I should never have known that they were even that near the enemy if his raw soldiers had not fired an occasional shot into us from behind. If General Spears was with his men, he must have known that his report of their action on the occasion was utterly untruthful. If, however, as I apprehend, he was behind the rifle pits, six hundred yards in the rear, he might, like thousands of others, who were distant spectators of the scene, have honestly conceived that his troops were doing the fighting. General Rousseau's report contradicts his statements, and in a meager way accords the credit to my regiments.
Officers are more selfish, dishonest, and grasping in their struggle for notoriety than the miser for gold. they lay claim to every thing within reach, whether it belongs to them or not. I know absolutely that many of the reports in the volume before me are base exaggeration - romances, founded upon the smallest conceivable amount of fact. They are simply elaborate essays, which seek to show that the author was a little braver, a little more skillful in the management of his men, and a little worthier than anybody else. I know of one officer who has great credit, in official reports and in the newspapers, for a battle in which he did not participate at all. In fact, he did not reach the field until after the enemy had not only been repulsed, but retired out of sight; and yet he has not the manliness to correct the error, and give the honor to whom it is due.

John Beatty
The Citizen-Soldier: The Memoirs of a Civil War Volunteer, 1879
Available from Bison Books, U of NE Press, Lincoln, 1998



Jan. 1863
Louisiana
The story ran in our brigade that this sensible plan [racing by foot up the valley of the Teche instead of taking the MS River, in order to attack Mouton] originated in the head of our own commandant, Weitzel. I believed it then, and I have learned no better since, although I can affirm nothing. The reader will please to remember that there is a great deal of uncertainty in war, not only before but after.

Capt. John William De Forest, 2 CT
Article entitled "Forced Marches" in Galaxy, June, 1868

Also available as: A Volunteer's Adventures
Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1946, 1974
Also available from: James H. Croushore, ed., 1996, p. 86
Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge

 

[Jantzen64]

Regarding - Uncertainty in sources

April 12, 1863
W. D. B, of the Commercial, Major McDowell, of Rousseau's staff, and Lieutenant Porter, called this afternoon. My report of the operations of my brigade at Stone river was referred to. Bickham thought it did not do justice to my command, and I have no doubt it is a sorry affair, compared with the elaborate reports of many others. The historian who accepts these reports as reliable, and permits himself to be guided by then through all the windings of a five-days' battle, with the expectation of finally allotting to each one of forty brigades the proper credit, will probably not be successful. My report was called for late one evening, written hastily, without having before me the reports of my regimental commanders, and is incomplete, unsatisfactory to me, and unjust to my brigade.

July 20, 1863
Received a public document, in which I find all the reports of the battle of Stone river, and, I am sorry to say, my report is the poorest and most unsatisfactory of the whole lot. The printer, as if for the purpose of aggravating me beyond endurance, has, by an error of punctuation, transformed what I considered a very considerable and creditable action, into an inconsiderable skirmish. The report should read:
"On the second and third days my brigade was in front, a portion of the time skirmishing. On the night of January 3d, two regiments, led by myself, drove the enemy from their breastworks in the edge of the woods."
This appears in the volume as follows:
"On the second and third days my brigade was in front a portion of the time. Skirmishing on the night of January 3d, two regiments, led my myself, drove the enemy from the breastworks in the edge of the woods."
Thus, by taking the last word of one sentence and making it the first word of another, the intelligent compositor belittles a night fight for which I thought my command deserved no inconsiderable credit. I regret now that I did not take the time to make an elaborate report of the operations of my brigade, describing all the terrible situations in which it had been placed, and dwelling with special emphasis on the courage and splendid fighting of the men. In contrast with my stupidly modest report, is that of Brigadier-General Spears. He does not hesitate to claim for his troops all the credit of the night engagement referred to; and yet while my men stormed the barricade of logs, and cleaned out the woods, his were lying on their faces fully two hundred yards in the rear, and I should never have known that they were even that near the enemy if his raw soldiers had not fired an occasional shot into us from behind. If General Spears was with his men, he must have known that his report of their action on the occasion was utterly untruthful. If, however, as I apprehend, he was behind the rifle pits, six hundred yards in the rear, he might, like thousands of others, who were distant spectators of the scene, have honestly conceived that his troops were doing the fighting. General Rousseau's report contradicts his statements, and in a meager way accords the credit to my regiments.
Officers are more selfish, dishonest, and grasping in their struggle for notoriety than the miser for gold. they lay claim to every thing within reach, whether it belongs to them or not. I know absolutely that many of the reports in the volume before me are base exaggeration - romances, founded upon the smallest conceivable amount of fact. They are simply elaborate essays, which seek to show that the author was a little braver, a little more skillful in the management of his men, and a little worthier than anybody else. I know of one officer who has great credit, in official reports and in the newspapers, for a battle in which he did not participate at all. In fact, he did not reach the field until after the enemy had not only been repulsed, but retired out of sight; and yet he has not the manliness to correct the error, and give the honor to whom it is due.

John Beatty
The Citizen-Soldier: The Memoirs of a Civil War Volunteer, 1879
Available from Bison Books, U of NE Press, Lincoln, 1998



Jan. 1863
Louisiana
The story ran in our brigade that this sensible plan [racing by foot up the valley of the Teche instead of taking the MS River, in order to attack Mouton] originated in the head of our own commandant, Weitzel. I believed it then, and I have learned no better since, although I can affirm nothing. The reader will please to remember that there is a great deal of uncertainty in war, not only before but after.

Capt. John William De Forest, 2 CT
Article entitled "Forced Marches" in Galaxy, June, 1868

Also available as: A Volunteer's Adventures
Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1946, 1974
Also available from: James H. Croushore, ed., 1996, p. 86
Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge

An appropriate cautionary for all would be historians. But, while we should always approach these accounts with some skepticism - and be willing to challenge them if circumstances warrant - they do represent a significant bedrock of the historic record and a good starting point for trying to recreate what happened.

 

[Belfoured]

I just returned from listening to Scott speak at the Antietam Battlefield. Sixty percent of his talk dealt with McClellan's flawed generalship at Antietam, including the fact that he consistently overestimated the strength of Lee's force. It was a good thing for Lee that he did, because the Army of Northern Virginia was in seriously bad shape when the battle took place.

By the way, Harry Smelzer just put up a good author interview on his site:

Interview: Hartwig, “I Dread the Thought of the Place”

It’s been a long wait for D. Scott Hartwig’s follow up to To Antietam Creek, but so far, I Dread the Thought of the Place, The Battle of Antietam and the End of the Maryland Campaign ha…

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