"Here is a Paper . . ."

[Jantzen64]

In mid-September, my mind always tends to wander to the Maryland Campaign. I am in the process of listening to "The Tale Untwisted" after seeing it discussed here on the Board; I find it intriguing, thought I am withholding judgment until I finish . . . . That the telegram to Lincoln was sent at 12 midnight, not 12 noon (meridian) seems pretty compelling (though I recognize this is not "new").

Given it is September 13th - the anniversary of the finding of the Lost Order - I wanted to raise one question about something that seems to get lost in all the back and forth. Gibbon recounts a conversation with Little Mac where he claimed Little Mac said:

"Here is a paper with which, if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go home. I will not show the writing-here is the signature, and it gives the movement of every division of Lee's army. Tomorrow we will pitch into his center, and if you people will only do two good, hard days' marching I will put Lee in a position he will find it hard to get out of."

Gibbon also recalls McClellan comparing the situation to Napoleon's victory at Castiglione.

With all of the relatively recent scholarship surrounding the finding of the Order and McClellan's reaction to it, has anyone credibly challenged Gibbon's recounting of this particular conversation? Did it occur as Gibbon recollects? Any reason to think it didn't occur on the evening of September 13th (as Gibbon recollects, IIRC)?

This being about Little Mac, the Lost Order and Antietam, I expect the thread may go in many different directions, but I'm really interested in the veracity of this recollection and what it says about Little Mac's state of mind on the evening of September 13.

 

[WScott]

At the time of the Maryland Campaign and the Battles of South Mountain and Antietam John Gibbon was a Brigadier General of Volunteers. He commanded the 4th Brigade (the Iron Brigade) of the 1st Division (Abner Doubleday) of the 1st Corps (Joeph Hooker).

I have little doubt that McClellan claimed he had Bobby Lee right where he wanted him after getting the copy of Order 191. I do wonder why Gibbon would have been close enough to have heard McClellan make such a claim? Why would a Brigade Commander have been near the Commander of the Army and not attending to his troops on the move? Gibbon was an outstanding soldier and a quality commander but I think he may have told a little white lie.

 

[Jantzen64]

At the time of the Maryland Campaign and the Battles of South Mountain and Antietam John Gibbon was a Brigadier General of Volunteers. He commanded the 4th Brigade (the Iron Brigade) of the 1st Division (Abner Doubleday) of the 1st Corps (Joeph Hooker).

I have little doubt that McClellan claimed he had Bobby Lee right where he wanted him after getting the copy of Order 191. I do wonder why Gibbon would have been close enough to have heard McClellan make such a claim? Why would a Brigade Commander have been near the Commander of the Army and not attending to his troops on the move? Gibbon was an outstanding soldier and a quality commander but I think he may have told a little white lie.

Yeah, I haven't read Gibbon's Personal Recollections, but I didn't think Gibbon was a close confidante of McClellan or in McClellan's inner circle. So, it's kind of weird that the commanding general would be interacting this way with a brigade commander.

Still, the tone of the recalled conversation fairly matches the tone of the midnight telegraph to Lincoln, and the general plan matches what he told Franklin in his 6:20 message.

Hmmmmm . . . . . .

 

[Belfoured]

Yeah, I haven't read Gibbon's Personal Recollections, but I didn't think Gibbon was a close confidante of McClellan or in McClellan's inner circle. So, it's kind of weird that the commanding general would be interacting this way with a brigade commander.

Still, the tone of the recalled conversation fairly matches the tone of the midnight telegraph to Lincoln, and the general plan matches what he told Franklin in his 6:20 message.

Hmmmmm . . . . . .

An interesting follow up question is why McClellan put Franklin at the forefront of the pursuit when he knew that time was of the essence. It seems pretty clear based on recent scholarship that McClellan acted much more expeditiously once he received the "LO" than was long assumed. So he then commits the pursuit to a guy he had complained about in a letter to his wife a few weeks earlier (August 22) as "slow" and "inefficient"? I haven't seen a good explanation for that decision, at least without detailing a staff officer with authority to "ride herd" on Franklin.

 

[TallTallMan]

I distrust these types of stories. It is common in memoirs to try and paint your former bosses as fools for whatever reason, either audience expectation/fan service or bone-picking.

 

[Jantzen64]

I distrust these types of stories. It is common in memoirs to try and paint your former bosses as fools for whatever reason, either audience expectation/fan service or bone-picking.

I tend to be skeptical for the reasons you noted, but it does fit even with the revised timeline, and the tone of some of the other communications. Also, I forgot that McClellan was clearly aware of Gibbon's brigade among his other troops (he later gave it it's signature name), so its possible that, for whatever reason, Gibbon would have been present at headquarters when the conversation occurred.

 

[Jantzen64]

An interesting follow up question is why McClellan put Franklin at the forefront of the pursuit when he knew that time was of the essence. It seems pretty clear based on recent scholarship that McClellan acted much more expeditiously once he received the "LO" than was long assumed. So he then commits the pursuit to a guy he had complained about in a letter to his wife a few weeks earlier (August 22) as "slow" and "inefficient"? I haven't seen a good explanation for that decision, at least without detailing a staff officer with authority to "ride herd" on Franklin.

I appreciate the work done to set the historic record straight about the "midnight telegram", but I agree with you that even that correction doesn't absolve McClellan for how the battle of South Mountain unfolded. McClellan clearly understood the importance of saving Harpers Ferry, and his communications to Franklin, to Halleck, to Lincoln and (if believed) to Gibbon, collectively establish that McClellan understood the opportunity that the LO presented to him. So, as you point out, why does he delegate the key task of pitching into Lee's center to Franklin, with minimal (if any) supervision and only Couch's division as support? And why not order Franklin to march immediately to Burkittsville so he can attack in the morning instead of the afternoon? ( I recognize night marches are risky, but we are told by those who have worked so hard to correct the timeline that Pleasonton had confirmed, just that afternoon, the general veracity of the LO regarding location of confederate troops).

 

[Belfoured]

I tend to be skeptical for the reasons you noted, but it does fit even with the revised timeline, and the tone of some of the other communications. Also, I forgot that McClellan was clearly aware of Gibbon's brigade among his other troops (he later gave it it's signature name), so its possible that, for whatever reason, Gibbon would have been present at headquarters when the conversation occurred.

It's not inconsistent with the tone of the message that McClellan sent to Lincoln about possessing the LO. And Gibbon, so far as I know, did not have the reputation for post-war "embellishment" that others had, such as Gordon and Chamberlain.

 

[Belfoured]

I appreciate the work done to set the historic record straight about the "midnight telegram", but I agree with you that even that correction doesn't absolve McClellan for how the battle of South Mountain unfolded. McClellan clearly understood the importance of saving Harpers Ferry, and his communications to Franklin, to Halleck, to Lincoln and (if believed) to Gibbon, collectively establish that McClellan understood the opportunity that the LO presented to him. So, as you point out, why does he delegate the key task of pitching into Lee's center to Franklin, with minimal (if any) supervision and only Couch's division as support? And why not order Franklin to march immediately to Burkittsville so he can attack in the morning instead of the afternoon? ( I recognize night marches are risky, but we are told by those who have worked so hard to correct the timeline that Pleasonton had confirmed, just that afternoon, the general veracity of the LO regarding location of confederate troops).

I generally agree. Leaving Franklin to execute this mission expeditiously has always struck me as bizarre given what McClellan said about Franklin in the August 22 letter. Brings to mind that colloquial definition of insanity. Given that Franklin was one of those that McClellan had pushed for corps command in May, I suspect an element of not wanting to publicly "eat crow".

 

[Belfoured]

I distrust these types of stories. It is common in memoirs to try and paint your former bosses as fools for whatever reason, either audience expectation/fan service or bone-picking.

I think you're ignoring the fact that Gibbon and McClellan were originally classmates at the USMA (he had to repeat a year so he actually graduated 1847) and Gibbon (a good friend of Meade) was the opposite of an anti-McClellan/pro-Administration malcontent. His Personal Recollections at 96-99 (where he included his contemporaneous reaction to McClellan's firing) are favorable to McClellan.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Interesting, in my studies of the War and readings on the discussions on the battle on this board, I do not remember any discussions on the veracity of Gibbon. Through the years on this board, we have had many debates between McClellan's admirers and detractors and I do not remember any discussion on this particular matter.

I tend to agree with those that the historical evidence seems to indicate that it could very easily have happened as Gibbon remembered, but even if not, I would agree with those who believe it would not seem that fact would materially affect the arguments concerning McClellan's generalship(or lack of it) during his Md. Campaign.

To me the important fact to historian's is the Lost Order and what it says. Gibbon's memory merely indicates what any professional officer should have known when reading the LO. Anyway, even if Gibbon did not know, McClellan should have anyway

 

[jackt62]

An interesting follow up question is why McClellan put Franklin at the forefront of the pursuit when he knew that time was of the essence. It seems pretty clear based on recent scholarship that McClellan acted much more expeditiously once he received the "LO" than was long assumed. So he then commits the pursuit to a guy he had complained about in a letter to his wife a few weeks earlier (August 22) as "slow" and "inefficient"? I haven't seen a good explanation for that decision, at least without detailing a staff officer with authority to "ride herd" on Franklin.

Might an explanation for committing Franklin's Corps at the forefront and assigning him responsibility for seizing Crampton's Gap and relieving Harpers Ferry be that his wing was positioned left in line of march and was therefore the closest?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I distrust these types of stories. It is common in memoirs to try and paint your former bosses as fools for whatever reason, either audience expectation/fan service or bone-picking.

Gibbon also claims that, late July 2, Meade told Gibbon that Lee would attack Gibbon on July 3, which proved an accurate prediction.

However, the consensus is Gibbon has some of the most honest and accurate memoirs so his claims on the McClellan and Meade statements are not doubted.

If Gibbon was friends with both McClellan and Meade, as other posters have noted, then it makes the coincidence of witnessing these two pronouncements especially plausible.

 

[Belfoured]

Might an explanation for committing Franklin's Corps at the forefront and assigning him responsibility for seizing Crampton's Gap and relieving Harpers Ferry be that his wing was positioned left in line of march and was therefore the closest?

That possibility is why I built in the option of assigning somebody to "ride herd" on Franklin. In other words, even if there were a logistical reason for having Franklin take the lead, you take measures to eliminate/minimize the problem you've already identified. Maybe you even head over there yourself and personally kick some [ ] at the outset. It's not like Franklin was somewhere in Tennessee. Simply trusting Franklin to be "fast" and "efficient" is that definition of insanity.

 

[Jantzen64]

In The Gleam of Bayonets, Murfin notes that there are two versions of the 6:20 communication - the first reads more like a peremptory order; the second adds in some discretionary language allowing Franklin to deviate if he feels it is keeping with the spirit of the objective. Murfin surmises McClellan updated the order. I have not examined the OR to see if this is the case, but if true, it really begs the question on the "riding herd" issue. When you know what needs to get done, why give your subordinate more discretion, especially if you believe he is slow and inefficient.

 

[Ashintully57]

I would like to address Alan Pinkerton's role in the persistent disinformation he constantly supplied to McClellan in 1862, concerning Confederate troop strength and movement. Was Pinkerton incompetent, a traitor or just plain stupid.

 

[Belfoured]

In The Gleam of Bayonets, Murfin notes that there are two versions of the 6:20 communication - the first reads more like a peremptory order; the second adds in some discretionary language allowing Franklin to deviate if he feels it is keeping with the spirit of the objective. Murfin surmises McClellan updated the order. I have not examined the OR to see if this is the case, but if true, it really begs the question on the "riding herd" issue. When you know what needs to get done, why give your subordinate more discretion, especially if you believe he is slow and inefficient.

This is from the version he used in his report and that therefore got used in Own Story:

"Without waiting for the whole of that division [Couch] to join, you will move at daybreak in the morning by Jefferson and Burkittsville upon the road to Rohrersville. I have reliable information that the mountain-pass by this road is practicable for artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occupied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as practicable, and debouch upon Rohrersville in order to cut off the retreat of or destroy McLaws's command. If you find this pass held by the enemy in large force, make all your dispositions for the attack and commence it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown pike, where the main body will attack. ... I ask of you, at this important moment, all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise."

Sort of like telling a guy who you've told your wife can't stop chasing breaking pitches "I ask of you not to chase those sweepers/sliders."

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I would like to address Alan Pinkerton's role in the persistent disinformation he constantly supplied to McClellan in 1862, concerning Confederate troop strength and movement. Was Pinkerton incompetent, a traitor or just plain stupid.

Pinkerton simply wasn't good at his job.

 

[rbasin]

I would like to address Alan Pinkerton's role in the persistent disinformation he constantly supplied to McClellan in 1862, concerning Confederate troop strength and movement. Was Pinkerton incompetent, a traitor or just plain stupid.

I assume he figured out what McClellan wanted to hear.

 

[rpkennedy]

I assume he figured out what McClellan wanted to hear.

That's it. He was working with McClellan's preconceived notions and made the data fit those notions. Although, in fairness, McClellan then went on to massage the data further.

Ryan