"Here is a Paper . . ."

[rbasin]

That's it. He was working with McClellan's preconceived notions and made the data fit those notions. Although, in fairness, McClellan then went on to massage the data further.

Ryan

I'm sure. Was it for his own ego, or what he perceived as threats that Lincoln didn't or wouldn't see.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I'm sure. Was it for his own ego, or what he perceived as threats that Lincoln didn't or wouldn't see.

Massaging the numbers was not the problem, it was McClellan's ending up in believing them.

 

[Belfoured]

That's it. He was working with McClellan's preconceived notions and made the data fit those notions. Although, in fairness, McClellan then went on to massage the data further.

Ryan

Hartwig's just-released study of Antietam, I Dread the Thought of the Place, has an interesting analysis of McClellan's failure to use obvious and available intelligence gathering methods that would have exposed his overestimation of Lee's forces at the battle. (In March 1863 McClellan gave absurd testimony before the JCCW that on the 17th he had 70,000 - 75,000 troops against the ANV's 100,000).

 

[rbasin]

Hartwig's just-released study of Antietam, I Dread the Thought of the Place, has an interesting analysis of McClellan's failure to use obvious and available intelligence gathering methods that would have exposed his overestimation of Lee's forces at the battle. (In March 1863 McClellan gave absurd testimony before the JCCW that on the 17th he had 70,000 - 75,000 troops against the ANV's 100,000).

General Thomas said something to the effect that McClellan's major mistake was not having his troops skirmish with the enemy instead of drill.

I don't know enough about McClellan to render an accurate judgement. I did read his autobiography, and it's a decent read. I liked it better than Grant's or Sherman's, even with the same faults. It's a good read.

 

[Belfoured]

General Thomas said something to the effect that McClellan's major mistake was not having his troops skirmish with the enemy instead of drill.

I don't know enough about McClellan to render an accurate judgement. I did read his autobiography, and it's a decent read. I liked it better than Grant's or Sherman's, even with the same faults. It's a good read.

Hartwig makes the point that McClellan could have used some of the technique later developed and used successfully by the BMI under Hooker. Reading everything he wrote regarding his estimates of enemy strength from August 1861 until he was removed, you get the impression that he wanted to believe some of the more ridiculous numbers.

Own Story is in a way "apples and oranges" in comparison with memoirs such as Grant's, Sherman's, Longstreet's, etc. because it is not a complete memoir. McClellan's original manuscript was destroyed in a fire in the 1870's. Own Story is a rewritten version that he started in 1881 but never completed. He got only to Hanover Court House which was fought on May 27, 1862, meaning that we don't have his memoirs about Seven Pines, the Seven Days, the Second BR campaign, the Maryland campaign, or his removal. The rest was compiled by his literary executor Prime, working with his widow and his daughter. It's mostly a reprinting of his August 3, 1863 official report and the extracts from letters to his wife that he had put together in a notebook. Nobody has ever seen the originals of those letters for the period 1861-1862. (The letters to Ellen in Sears' compilation of his Civil War papers are from those extracts).

 

[rpkennedy]

Hartwig makes the point that McClellan could have used some of the technique later developed and used successfully by the BMI under Hooker. Reading everything he wrote regarding his estimates of enemy strength from August 1861 until he was removed, you get the impression that he wanted to believe some of the more ridiculous numbers.

The BMI was probably one of Hooker's greatest contributions to the AotP. The difference between the information that the army commander was receiving in June 1862 and June 1863 is remarkable.

Ryan

 

[Belfoured]

The BMI was probably one of Hooker's greatest contributions to the AotP. The difference between the information that the army commander was receiving in June 1862 and June 1863 is remarkable.

Ryan

Agree. And it took a CO who cared to figure it out, rather than feeding delusions as to the overwhelming strength of the opposition. Anybody still claiming six months after the battle that Lee had "100,000" at Antietam and outnumbered him by 25-30,000 had a white-knuckled grip on that.

 

[GilbertFarney]

In mid-September, my mind always tends to wander to the Maryland Campaign. I am in the process of listening to "The Tale Untwisted" after seeing it discussed here on the Board; I find it intriguing, thought I am withholding judgment until I finish . . . . That the telegram to Lincoln was sent at 12 midnight, not 12 noon (meridian) seems pretty compelling (though I recognize this is not "new").

Given it is September 13th - the anniversary of the finding of the Lost Order - I wanted to raise one question about something that seems to get lost in all the back and forth. Gibbon recounts a conversation with Little Mac where he claimed Little Mac said:

"Here is a paper with which, if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go home. I will not show the writing-here is the signature, and it gives the movement of every division of Lee's army. Tomorrow we will pitch into his center, and if you people will only do two good, hard days' marching I will put Lee in a position he will find it hard to get out of."

Gibbon also recalls McClellan comparing the situation to Napoleon's victory at Castiglione.

With all of the relatively recent scholarship surrounding the finding of the Order and McClellan's reaction to it, has anyone credibly challenged Gibbon's recounting of this particular conversation? Did it occur as Gibbon recollects? Any reason to think it didn't occur on the evening of September 13th (as Gibbon recollects, IIRC)?

This being about Little Mac, the Lost Order and Antietam, I expect the thread may go in many different directions, but I'm really interested in the veracity of this recollection and what it says about Little Mac's state of mind on the evening of September 13.

Thank you for reading our book. We appreciate it! You've asked a good question. In my opinion, the recollection is authentic and does a good job of illustrating the optimism that McClellan felt upon receiving the Lost Orders. Gibbon is the only person who visited army HQ on the evening of Sept. 13, or who wrote about McClellan possessing the orders. The lack of other sources is a real head scratcher.

 

[GilbertFarney]

I appreciate the work done to set the historic record straight about the "midnight telegram", but I agree with you that even that correction doesn't absolve McClellan for how the battle of South Mountain unfolded. McClellan clearly understood the importance of saving Harpers Ferry, and his communications to Franklin, to Halleck, to Lincoln and (if believed) to Gibbon, collectively establish that McClellan understood the opportunity that the LO presented to him. So, as you point out, why does he delegate the key task of pitching into Lee's center to Franklin, with minimal (if any) supervision and only Couch's division as support? And why not order Franklin to march immediately to Burkittsville so he can attack in the morning instead of the afternoon? ( I recognize night marches are risky, but we are told by those who have worked so hard to correct the timeline that Pleasonton had confirmed, just that afternoon, the general veracity of the LO regarding location of confederate troops).

Franklin's was the corps closest to Crampton's Gap, so it makes sense for McClellan to have ordered it to attack that spot. Remember as well, that McClellan intended Franklin's attack to step off after the fighting at Turner's Gap had begun. The less discussed part of McClellan's plan is his belief from the orders that Longstreet's wing of the army was at Boonsboro with D. H. Hill. McClellan therefore intended the heavier blow to fall at Turner's Gap in order to pin the larger Confederate force there and enable Franklin to break through. To this end, Franklin did not need to march overnight. Rather, his attack could come later the next day, after the fighting had already begun around Turner's Gap. As an aside, Franklin also ended Sept. 13 with one brigade in Middletown Valley (i.e., west of the Catoctin Mountains). Those men advanced after dark and took Jefferson before midnight.

 

[GilbertFarney]

I generally agree. Leaving Franklin to execute this mission expeditiously has always struck me as bizarre given what McClellan said about Franklin in the August 22 letter. Brings to mind that colloquial definition of insanity. Given that Franklin was one of those that McClellan had pushed for corps command in May, I suspect an element of not wanting to publicly "eat crow".

To quote A. Lincoln, "we must use the tools we have."

 

[GilbertFarney]

Hartwig's just-released study of Antietam, I Dread the Thought of the Place, has an interesting analysis of McClellan's failure to use obvious and available intelligence gathering methods that would have exposed his overestimation of Lee's forces at the battle. (In March 1863 McClellan gave absurd testimony before the JCCW that on the 17th he had 70,000 - 75,000 troops against the ANV's 100,000).

I just returned from listening to Scott speak at the Antietam Battlefield. Sixty percent of his talk dealt with McClellan's flawed generalship at Antietam, including the fact that he consistently overestimated the strength of Lee's force. It was a good thing for Lee that he did, because the Army of Northern Virginia was in seriously bad shape when the battle took place.

 

[Belfoured]

To quote A. Lincoln, "we must use the tools we have."

Of course, Franklin was a "tool" gifted to Lincoln by McClellan in May - or, to again quote A. Lincoln, one of the "pets". After Mac assessed Franklin as "slow' and "inefficient" in his August 22 letter to Ellen, it might have made sense to pay a personal "visit" to emphasize speed, or send an authorized "passenger" to accompany/prod Franklin.

 

[Belfoured]

I just returned from listening to Scott speak at the Antietam Battlefield. Sixty percent of his talk dealt with McClellan's flawed generalship at Antietam, including the fact that he consistently overestimated the strength of Lee's force. It was a good thing for Lee that he did, because the Army of Northern Virginia was in seriously bad shape when the battle took place.

Sounds like a worthwhile event. I find his analysis of that issue in the book and his view that McClellan had information sitting in his hands that would have allowed him to get a better fix during the battle itself to be pretty convincing. That testimony McClellan gave to the JCCW in March 1863 is laughable.

 

[GilbertFarney]

Of course, Franklin was a "tool" gifted to Lincoln by McClellan in May - or, to again quote A. Lincoln, one of the "pets". After Mac assessed Franklin as "slow' and "inefficient" in his August 22 letter to Ellen, it might have made sense to pay a personal "visit" to emphasize speed, or send an authorized "passenger" to accompany/prod Franklin.

A swift kick in the hindquarters certainly could not have hurt.

 

[Jantzen64]

The BMI was probably one of Hooker's greatest contributions to the AotP. The difference between the information that the army commander was receiving in June 1862 and June 1863 is remarkable.

Ryan

I don't know whether there was any organization - like the BMI - that provided intel for all theaters. But you would think just having the results of the 1860 census, and doing some statistical extrapolation, would have disciplined McClellan's concner that the AoNVa had 120,000 men. Regardless, it is difficult for me to reconcile the McClellan who says that Lee outnumbers him by 25 - 50 % with the McClellan that is claiming on September 13 that he would "severely punish" Lee and send Lincoln trophies.

 

[Jantzen64]

Thank you for reading our book. We appreciate it! You've asked a good question. In my opinion, the recollection is authentic and does a good job of illustrating the optimism that McClellan felt upon receiving the Lost Orders. Gibbon is the only person who visited army HQ on the evening of Sept. 13, or who wrote about McClellan possessing the orders. The lack of other sources is a real head scratcher.

I will be very interested in discussing more with you when I'm done. (Still waiitng on a hard copy, as only an audiobook was available).

 

[Jantzen64]

Franklin's was the corps closest to Crampton's Gap, so it makes sense for McClellan to have ordered it to attack that spot. Remember as well, that McClellan intended Franklin's attack to step off after the fighting at Turner's Gap had begun. The less discussed part of McClellan's plan is his belief from the orders that Longstreet's wing of the army was at Boonsboro with D. H. Hill. McClellan therefore intended the heavier blow to fall at Turner's Gap in order to pin the larger Confederate force there and enable Franklin to break through. To this end, Franklin did not need to march overnight. Rather, his attack could come later the next day, after the fighting had already begun around Turner's Gap. As an aside, Franklin also ended Sept. 13 with one brigade in Middletown Valley (i.e., west of the Catoctin Mountains). Those men advanced after dark and took Jefferson before midnight.

Understood about Franklin being closest, but as Belfoured pointed out, McClellan's comments about Franklin's prior performance underscore the need to "ride herd" over him instead of giving him discretion. Also, could you please clarify your view of McClellan's overall battle plan? Haven't gotten quite there in your book, and need to go back and review Sears and Murfin. I thought that the whole idea was to pitch into Lee's "center", which would have been in the Crampton's Gap area, right? This would have served the dual purpose of being in a position to relieve HF and/or march north against Longstreet/Hill. Moreover, doesn't it make sense - if your goal is to get acroos the mountain - to put your biggest effort where the eneny is weakest instead of where you think he's the strongest?

 

[Belfoured]

I will be very interested in discussing more with you when I'm done. (Still waiitng on a hard copy, as only an audiobook was available).

It's excellent. I'd use the word "definitive" on the issue of when McClellan saw the LO and his response.

 

[Belfoured]

I don't know whether there was any organization - like the BMI - that provided intel for all theaters. But you would think just having the results of the 1860 census, and doing some statistical extrapolation, would have disciplined McClellan's concner that the AoNVa had 120,000 men. Regardless, it is difficult for me to reconcile the McClellan who says that Lee outnumbers him by 25 - 50 % with the McClellan that is claiming on September 13 that he would "severely punish" Lee and send Lincoln trophies.

Completely agree. I do recommend Hartwig's new book on why McClellan had ample ways of knowing what he faced on September 17-18 and his opponent's condition.

 

[GilbertFarney]

Understood about Franklin being closest, but as Belfoured pointed out, McClellan's comments about Franklin's prior performance underscore the need to "ride herd" over him instead of giving him discretion. Also, could you please clarify your view of McClellan's overall battle plan? Haven't gotten quite there in your book, and need to go back and review Sears and Murfin. I thought that the whole idea was to pitch into Lee's "center", which would have been in the Crampton's Gap area, right? This would have served the dual purpose of being in a position to relieve HF and/or march north against Longstreet/Hill. Moreover, doesn't it make sense - if your goal is to get acroos the mountain - to put your biggest effort where the eneny is weakest instead of where you think he's the strongest?

The notions of pitching into the confederate center at Crampton's gap while attacking Longstreet/Hill at Turner's Gap are not mutually exclusive. Rather, McClellan meant them to be complimentary. He also reserved the right to change plans as Confederate resistance dictated. To that end, at 6:20 p.m. on Sept. 13, he wrote the following, after summarizing the positions of Confederate forces described in Special Orders No. 191:

"If you find this pass (i.e., Crampton's Gap) held by the enemy in large force, make all your dispositions for the attack, and commence it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command and relieve Colonel Miles. ... My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail."

Notice he said nothing about Franklin turning north to face Longstreet.

McClellan then added this at 2:00 on Sept. 14, so after the battle at Fox's Gap had been going on for 6 hours: "carry Burkittsville at any cost. We shall have strong opposition at both passes. As fast as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in readiness to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at any of these passes, let me know at once, and amuse them as best you can, so as to retain them there. In that event I will probably throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here."

In short, McClellan tried to retain as much flexibility as possible so he could direct troops where they were most needed. Remember, he did not know the strength of Lee's army. He also assumed it was stronger than his own. This required that he keep a reserve in place to send to whatever point in the line needed it most. I hope this clarifies things a bit.