William S. Rosecrans

[wausaubob]

Some perspective on Rosecrans is in order. There was no operation in the Civil War that rises to the complexity, execution & strategic success of the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. All of Middle Tennessee & the gate to the Deep South, Chattanooga came under Union control without a large loss of life. The Army of the Cumberland was supported by a logistical complex stretching up river to Cincinnati OH. The Department of the Cumberland, that Rosecrans also commanded, had (+/-) 240,000 men. The massive logistical operation that Rosecrans created made everything that followed possible. That in & of itself was a stroke of strategic genius.

Contemporaneously, Lee had no logistical support a mere 41 miles north of the of the Potomac.

Once established in Chattanooga, Rosecrans faced a daunting tactical & strategic challenge. If you have never been there, wadding up a piece of stiff paper & loosely flattening out will give you an idea of what the area looks like. Complicating things, there were no accurate maps.

The A of the C's topographers were arguably the best at that time. Using a solar powered copy machine (+/-) 20,000 multicolored fully updated maps had been copied & distributed during the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. The area between Chattanooga & Atlanta was not properly mapped. Sherman said that without accurate maps, he would not have attempted the Atlanta Campaign. Unlike him, Rosecrans could not wait for, "…Sgt. Finegan & his motley crew to finish their work."

The challenge Rosecrans faced can be imagined via the currier line between Thomas' HQ & Rosecrans in Chattanooga. By mounted courier, it took 14 hours each way to transmit a message & receive an answer. The "should-done-this or Should-a-done that" experts never take that into account. One unfortunate courier stumbled upon an HQ after 36 hours in the wilderness & handed his dispatch bag regardless of which HQ it was. Logically, the only thing an army commander wanted to do was to get south of there where topological sanity returned. Logical engineer that he was, it probably did not cross Rosecrans' well ordered mind that Bragg would come north & fight a battle there. What Rosecrans' strategic vision for an Atlanta campaign are unknowable.

To my mind there was no best strategist. Grant fought a river war in the Mississippi valley. Rosecrans fought a rail road war. There was a littoral war. The march back & forth a dozen times war in Virginia was a singular strategic challenge. The only General who commanded armies & created a strategy across all of the distinct operating areas was Grant. He adopted Lincoln's insightful phrase, " If you can't skin, you can hold a leg." to describe his strategy for ending the war. Every Union army was ordered to maintain maximum pressure so as to leave no space for CSA forces to maneuver & support each other. As each was defeated, It freed forces up to contribute to the next operation. E.g., an entire corps was escorted to New Orleans from Muscle Shoals by 40 tin clads after Hood's defeat.

Nobody exercised a command like Grant did.

Note: Wittenberg's Tullahoma Campaign book is one everyone should have on their book shelf.

Good post. I don't think Rosecrans ever contributed at the strategic level. But his operational plans in western Virginia and in Tennessee were well thought out. He was probably one of the best intelligence officers in the US army, until he underestimated the problems in northern Georgia.
As I posted before, he needed to be more politically savy in standing up to Sec'y of War Stanton. Lincoln liked Rosecrans that General Rosecrans had made it to Chattanooga with his force intact. I have to agree with Grant's thinking. Once Rosecrans had occupied Chattanooga he should fortified it further and insisted on restoring the bridge over the Tennessee.

 

[wausaubob]

The original force division may have been the best way to maneuver Bragg out of Chattanooga, but continuing the force division after Chattanooga was captured was what got him into trouble. He should have concentrated his army immediately after capturing Chattanooga. I think that's IrishTom's point as well.

He should have made Stanton recall him immediately after his army occupied Chattanooga. I think Lincoln would have backed Rosecrans and maybe someone would have recognized the potential of the Tennessee/Georgia theater. But a railroad operation west of the Appalachians was a McClellan idea, and that was a problem for the administration.

 

[wausaubob]

I think Rosecrans never got the logistical support he deserved. Things didn't move until Meigs went to Chattanooga, McCallum took over the railroad and Robert Allen took over the quartermaster duties in Louisville.

 

[wausaubob]

Most people acknowledged during the Civil War that Rosecrans had a brilliant creative mind.

 

[wausaubob]

At the operational level, Rosecrans was as good as anyone. The strategic thinker in the US Civil War was Grant. And his thinking was never very original. But he became adept at implementing the strategic ideas that others had created. At the tactical level, directing forces in contact with the enemy, it was the three Virginians, Lee, Jackson and Thomas. George Thomas saved many lives and a good deal of money for the US when he remained loyal to the US constitution.
Rosecrans had a brilliant mind, but he may not have been suited to direct combat tactics. My guess is that tactical control is difficult and not everyone is cut out for it.

 

[wausaubob]

At the operational level one should keep in mind the naval officers, David Farragut from Tennessee and Samuel Lee from presumably Virginia. Farragut's sailors overcame many barriers to capture the Confederacy's best port. Lee turned the blockade into a business worthy of respect even from the British.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Just because Rosecrans spent an overly long time planning it doesn't necessarily make it a distinct campaign tho ... and if we do consider it a campaign designed to push forward 50 miles in order to better situate a second campaign, we need to consider Grant's 100 mile push from Grand Junction, TN to Grenada, MS to be a distinct campaign, equally brilliant.

When compared with the results of Lee's 41 miles into PA, the planning that ultimately led to securing the Cumberland Gap / Knoxville /Sequachie Valley/ Chattanooga/ Bridgeport line was just right.

 

[wausaubob]

When compared with the results of Lee's 41 miles into PA, the planning that ultimately led to securing the Cumberland Gap / Knoxville /Sequachie Valley/ Chattanooga/ Bridgeport line was just right.

Rosecrans and Thomas made it to Chattanooga. And they put enough pressure on the Confederates that Burnside made it across the Cumberland gap to the vicinity of Knoxville. The administration should have been pleased with that. I suppose it looked like the Confederacy was crumbling. The people in Washington were deceived.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Rosecrans and Thomas made it to Chattanooga. And they put enough pressure on the Confederates that Burnside made it across the Cumberland gap to the vicinity of Knoxville. The administration should have been pleased with that. I suppose it looked like the Confederacy was crumbling. The people in Washington were deceived.

It wasn't crumbling, it was being strangled. The capture of the Sequachie Valley & Knoxville cut off the direct rail route from the Dalton Depot & Virginia. The only source of copper in the CSA was at Copper Hill & the only copper rolling mill was at Cleveland. Both were lost. By holding Cumberland Gap any trade or incursion into Kentucky was blocked.

The loss of Chattanooga & Middle Tennessee meant that access to the mules, horses, corn, hogs, smoked sweet potato production clear up to Missouri was cut off.

In the West, when the CSA lost control of an area, soldiers quit & went home. All they had to do was cross into Union lines, swallow the dog & go home. There was very little loyalty to the CSA & its incompetent leadership. Entire companies of the A of TN deserted en mass. Officers were shot for looking the other way or actively encouraging their men to desert. As was said of Admiral Bing, it was done in order to encourage the others.

The line running from Cumberland Gap to Chattanooga to Vicksburg to New Orleans was the very embodiment of Scot's anaconda squeezing the life out of the CSA.

 

[tony_gunter]

It wasn't crumbling, it was being strangled. The capture of the Sequachie Valley & Knoxville cut off the direct rail route from the Dalton Depot & Virginia. The only source of copper in the CSA was at Copper Hill & the only copper rolling mill was at Cleveland. Both were lost. By holding Cumberland Gap any trade or incursion into Kentucky was blocked.

The loss of Chattanooga & Middle Tennessee meant that access to the mules, horses, corn, hogs, smoked sweet potato production clear up to Missouri was cut off.

In the West, when the CSA lost control of an area, soldiers quit & went home. All they had to do was cross into Union lines, swallow the dog & go home. There was very little loyalty to the CSA & its incompetent leadership. Entire companies of the A of TN deserted en mass. Officers were shot for looking the other way or actively encouraging their men to desert. As was said of Admiral Bing, it was done in order to encourage the others.

The line running from Cumberland Gap to Chattanooga to Vicksburg to New Orleans was the very embodiment of Scot's anaconda squeezing the life out of the CSA.

Is this true? It was my impression that copper (as well as lead and iron/sulfur) was being mined in the Shenandoah Valley.

 

[wausaubob]

It wasn't crumbling, it was being strangled. The capture of the Sequachie Valley & Knoxville cut off the direct rail route from the Dalton Depot & Virginia. The only source of copper in the CSA was at Copper Hill & the only copper rolling mill was at Cleveland. Both were lost. By holding Cumberland Gap any trade or incursion into Kentucky was blocked.

The loss of Chattanooga & Middle Tennessee meant that access to the mules, horses, corn, hogs, smoked sweet potato production clear up to Missouri was cut off.

In the West, when the CSA lost control of an area, soldiers quit & went home. All they had to do was cross into Union lines, swallow the dog & go home. There was very little loyalty to the CSA & its incompetent leadership. Entire companies of the A of TN deserted en mass. Officers were shot for looking the other way or actively encouraging their men to desert. As was said of Admiral Bing, it was done in order to encourage the others.

The line running from Cumberland Gap to Chattanooga to Vicksburg to New Orleans was the very embodiment of Scot's anaconda squeezing the life out of the CSA.

It went a long way to convincing Confederate soldiers they could never win and that there was an acceptable way of life waiting for them under federal rule. Some men were never going to be convinced as to the second requirement.

 

[wausaubob]

Is this true? It was my impression that copper (as well as lead and iron/sulfur) was being mined in the Shenandoah Valley.

I am pretty sure that the only copper mine in the Confederacy was near Cleveland, TN. It was owned by a German/American who closed the mine and left for Cincinnati.
After the mine was collapsed the Confederacy was mainly dependent on the blockade runners for percussion caps. After Wilmington fell into US hands that source was gone too. I have to wonder how many Confederate soldiers at Five Forks and thereafter ran out of percussion caps and threw down their rifles. The idea that the Confederates never ran short of arms and munitions is not necessarily so.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Is this true? It was my impression that copper (as well as lead and iron/sulfur) was being mined in the Shenandoah Valley.

There was almost no copper industry outside of the UP of Michigan. A singular deposit of metallurgical copper existed 8' below ground. The deposit was the world's largest at that time. It was worked until after WWII.

Because of the obvious, copper works of all kinds were established near the source. At the outset of the Civil War there was no store of telegraph wire anywhere in the CSA. There was no reason to warehouse an abundant & readily available product. It was only the providential grounding wreck of a freighter laden with telegraph wire that formed the CSA 's store of copper wire.

There were (+/-) a dozen copper works at Copper Hill near Chattanooga. The South's only copper rolling mill was at Cleveland TN up the Sequachie valley.

One of Grant's first orders in Chattanooga was to send cavalry to disable the rolling mill. Sheets of rolled copper were essential for stamping out primers.

Millions of primers had to be imported via blockade runners. Rolled copper was a common blockade cargo. In contrast, on July 23, 1863 at the start of the Tullahoma Campaign the Army of the Cumberland had (+/-) 100 miles of telegraph wire loaded & ready to be deployed.

Copper from the U.P. was traded all over the Americas for millennia.

I have never heard of a commercially important copper industry in Virginia.

 

[Rhea Cole]

It went a long way to convincing Confederate soldiers they could never win and that there was an acceptable way of life waiting for them under federal rule. Some men were never going to be convinced as to the second requirement.

I keep meeting folks from East TN whose relations left CSA service & joined the Union.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Was William S Rosecrans arguably the most talented strategist of all Union generals?

The various strategic challenges that were too singular to make valid " the best" comparisons possible.

The entire operating area of the A of the Potomac & A of NV is the size of a postage stamp on an 8 1/2" X 11" map of the Western Theater.

The strategic & tactical challenges of the Army of the TN & the Army of the Cumberland could hardly been more different. One was riverine, the other a railroad war.

McClellan, Rosecrans, Grant, Joseph Johnston, & Lee stood up armies to meet the strategic challenges as they perceived them. What possible criteria could be used to declare one "great" & not the others?

 

[tony_gunter]

There was almost no copper industry outside of the UP of Michigan. A singular deposit of metallurgical copper existed 8' below ground. The deposit was the world's largest at that time. It was worked until after WWII.

Because of the obvious, copper works of all kinds were established near the source. At the outset of the Civil War there was no store of telegraph wire anywhere in the CSA. There was no reason to warehouse an abundant & readily available product. It was only the providential grounding wreck of a freighter laden with telegraph wire that formed the CSA 's store of copper wire.

There were (+/-) a dozen copper works at Copper Hill near Chattanooga. The South's only copper rolling mill was at Cleveland TN up the Sequachie valley.

One of Grant's first orders in Chattanooga was to send cavalry to disable the rolling mill. Sheets of rolled copper were essential for stamping out primers.

Millions of primers had to be imported via blockade runners. Rolled copper was a common blockade cargo. In contrast, on July 23, 1863 at the start of the Tullahoma Campaign the Army of the Cumberland had (+/-) 100 miles of telegraph wire loaded & ready to be deployed.

Copper from the U.P. was traded all over the Americas for millennia.

I have never heard of a commercially important copper industry in Virginia.

There were working copper mines in the Shenandoah / SW Virginia, but the copper was more difficult to extract. Additionally, there were working mines in the Akrlatex region. But the copper sources in East Tennessee were sufficient for war production so these other sources were considered reserves.

I'm curious, what is involved in setting up a rolling facility?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Essentially a rolling mill consists of two opposed rollers that reduce the thickness of a substance. You may have seen the roller used to make sheets of pasta. Repeated passes reduce the thickness to the desired dimension. A metal rolling mill works exactly the same way.

Cold rolling & hot rolling metal produces products with very different characteristics. This is due to the crystalline nature of copper.

Copper work hardens. If you have ever wiggled a copper wire until it broke, you have rearranged the crystals in the metal. Worked to a certain point it becomes brittle & breaks. The lesson being, rolling copper is both simple & very complex.

Until the 1790's rolling copper was a closely guarded British technology. Paul Revere figured out the process & opened a mill in the early 1800's. The building still exists.

Setting up a rolling mill required a lot of money & a lot of very heavy equipment. After the capture of Copper Hill & Cleveland no attempt to establish a mill occurred until after the war.


If you have ever gone white water rafting on the Ocoee River near Ducktown, you have been to the Copper Hill area.

 

[wausaubob]

I tend to believe that the cavalry raid on Cleveland, TN was another one of Rosencrans' excellent ideas. Grant had to put together the small force that conducted the raid. And he probably had to advise Long to do as much damage and as little fighting as possible. But Rosencrans had plenty of German/American officers and I believe he would have well informed about the Cleveland mines and mills.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I tend to believe that the cavalry raid on Cleveland, TN was another one of Rosencrans' excellent ideas. Grant had to put together the small force that conducted the raid. And he probably had to advise Long to do as much damage and as little fighting as possible. But Rosencrans had plenty of German/American officers and I believe he would have well informed about the Cleveland mines and mills.

Grant gives Rosecrans full credit for his analysis & planning for offensive actions at Chattanooga. What was lacking was setting them in motion.

Thomas had to talk Grant out of an immediate attack. My personal conclusion is that Rosecrans was the right man until Chattanooga was captured. Grant was the man to manage the multifaceted Cumberland Gap / Knoxville / Chattanooga campaign to a victorious conclusion.

Reading Dana's signals leaves no question as to pressure Washington was putting on Grant to hold The Gap & Knoxville. Grant sent Dana to Knoxville to report on what was going on there. Grant's focus was anything but a myopic fixation on Chattanooga.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Here is a heads up. We don't have to speculate on what Grant was up to. Just read Dana's com log. That was how Grant spoke to Lincoln outside the army chain of command.

Lincoln had a habit of reading Dana's coms out loud to select individuals. Think on that… Grant's message given directly to the president & to the most influential people in the government.

Dana had his own cypher, his own logbook at Military Telegraph Station Washington, what we would call eyes only access.

Grant sent Dana to Knoxville to access the situation. You can know what Grant knew. It is revelatory.

I like reading the original at the Huntington Library. The handwriting reflects the football game like excitement as Missionary Ridge unfolded.

If you want to know what Grant wanted Lincoln to know, read on.