William S. Rosecrans

[Nathan Towne]

I'm curious about the timing of the Tullahoma Campaign. It started June 24, right? What was in place June 24th that wasn't in place 2 weeks earlier? 4 weeks? 8 weeks?

If the ultimate goal was the occupation of Chattanooga, the timing seems curious because it places Rosecrans at the doorstep of Chattanooga right as the two other theaters of the war were concluding massive operations, opening up reinforcements for Chattanooga from both the east and the west.

That is a great question and one which I covered pretty extensively with Ned Baldwin in another thread.

A little bit of it can be found here:

Was Lincoln thinking of axing Sherman for his failure at Kennesaw Mountain? | Atlanta Campaign

It really doesnt seem that interesting of a question. If Corinth had been a Union defeat, Rosecrans would be done and Grant would have had to pick up the pieces. the next year Grant was already rising to the top before Rosecrans began moving in the summer of 63 - Vicksburg was going to surrender...

civilwartalk.com

 

[Jamieva]

Project MUSE -- Verification required!

Main one is the one mentioned in Tennessee, also some in Virginia.

 

[gjpratt]

Good to see you back posting @Nathan Towne

 

[Nathan Towne]

Was Tullahoma a "campaign" tho? Wasn't it really part of a larger campaign that terminated in the Battle of Chickamauga?

We covered this extensively when I compared Grant's Mississippi Overland Campaign, which was terminated December 5th by Halleck before it could achieve any of its strategic objectives. Nobody calls it brilliant, even though it was remarkably similar.

The Tullahoma Campaign was definitely distinct from the Chickamauga Campaign, with a substantial, except insofar as the Chickamauga Campaign continued the war effort.

Varney's first book is all about how the historiography is riddled with errors and historians have been making so many mistakes about Grant and Rosecrans. So it's almost comical how many mistakes that Varney himself makes.

Here's the full list I made, but I didn't check out every source in his book. There's probably more.

1. Varney cited Dabney Maury's "after-action report" for a quote that was actually from Maury's memoirs written 30 years after the war, and Varney ignored Maury's conflicting opinions which were closer in time to the war.

2. Varney criticized historians Woodworth and Cozzens for not sourcing a quote which was critical of Rosecrans, when in fact both historians provided a source. Varney also claimed the anecdote was dubious because the regiment was not at the Battle of Corinth. This is false. In fact, the regiment (50th Illinois) was at the Battle of Corinth.

3. Varney claimed Grant wrote in his memoirs that he chose the commander of the Army of the Cumberland based on a message from Dana. This is false. That's not what Grant wrote.

4. Varney claimed that Burnside did not move concurrently with Rosecrans. This is false. Varney claimed Burnside had 43,000 troops when in fact it was closer to 18,000. Varney claimed the "inertness" of Burnside caused Bragg to order Buckner back. This is also false.

5. Varney claimed that Grant sent no reinforcements to the Army of the Cumberland until he was placed in overall command of the department. This is false.

6. Varney claimed that Dana arrived at Rosecrans HQ directly from Grant's HQ. This is false. Varney also wrote that there are no orders on record sending Dana to Rosecrans. This is also false.

7. Varney claimed that Rosecrans was held in such high regard that he served as an instructor at West Point while still a cadet. This is false. Rosecrans became an instructor after graduating.

8. Varney claimed that Grant wrote in his memoirs that he designed the "trap" at Iuka. This is false. Grant credited Rosecrans.

9. Varney claimed that Stanton and Grant retaliated against a widow named Truesdail by disapproving her pension. This is false. By Varney's own note, the widow applied for a pension in 1882 when Stanton was dead and Grant was a civilian.

10. Varney accused Woodworth of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about Grant's plans for the Battle of Corinth. This is false. The Woodworth paragraph actually lists several sources and none of them are Grant's Memoirs.

11. Likewise, Varney accused Woodworth of sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about the post-Corinth pursuit. And again, it's false. Woodworth's paragraph cites several sources and again does not mention Grant's Memoirs.

12. Varney claimed the Battle of Corinth ended at 2:00 pm and the confederate retreat wasn't "confirmed" until 6:00 pm, thereby making it too late for Rosecrans to pursue. Most sources, even Rosecrans, say the battle ended at noon.

13. Varney accused Woodworth of low-balling the size of Hurlbut's force at Hatchie Bridge at 4000 men, and sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs. This is false. Woodworth actually put the number of men at "less than 6000," and again the sources he provided did not mention Grant's Memoirs.

14. Varney writes of the post-Corinth pursuit: "Rosecrans infantry followed the confederates more than 40 miles and his cavalry almost 60. A push of fewer than 40 miles more would have put them in Vicksburg." This is wildly wrong. The pursuit ended at Ripley, which is 250 miles from Vicksburg.

15. Varney writes of the post-Chickamauga reinforcement: "But six weeks after he had been ordered to cooperate with Rosecrans, and two weeks after Chickamauga had been fought, nothing from Grant's command had moved so much as a mile in the direction of Chattanooga." The six weeks is false, and all the early orders were to send troops to Tuscumbia - which is 170 miles from Chattanooga. Varney's sentence is also false in that troops were in fact set in motion before the end of September.

16. Varney claimed that "... rebel forces were available to strengthen the Army of Tennessee because Ambrose Burnside and Ulysses S. Grant did not follow orders." This is false. Neither Burnside not Grant had anything do with the confederate reinforcement, and neither Burnside nor Grant received any orders in time to reinforce Rosecrans before the Battle of Chickamauga.

17. Varney accused Jean Edward Smith of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs for a paragraph about Chickamauga. This is false. Grant's Memoirs are not mentioned for that paragraph.

18. Varney wrote that "Grant insisted, when Lincoln asked him to take command of the situation in Chattanooga, that he would only do so on the condition of Rosecrans removal." Varney provided no source for this claim.

19. Varney wrote that "Rosecrans had barely reached Missouri" before Grant told Halleck that Rosecrans should be removed, and that Grant gave no reason. This is false on both counts. Rosecrans took command in Missouri in January 1864 and Grant wrote the letter recommending his removal in November 1864. So, it was 10 months later, not when he'd barely reached Missouri. Also, Grant certainly did give reasons in the letter Varney quoted.

Ned Baldwin deserves credit for several of these. His blog posts were the first to call out Varney's poor scholarship.

Bits and pieces of Varney's book have good value, but much of it is really pretty weak. I highlighted the Murfreesboro section before and it is really a mess.

 

[SSVilla]

After decades of study I have concluded that Rosecrans was an example of the Peter Principle of rising to the level of incompetence. The engineer that made him such a brilliant organizer prevented him from becoming a brilliant combat commander. My conclusion is that an ideal division of labor would have been Rosecrans commanding the Department of the Cumberland & Thomas as commander of the army. They could have maintained their very productive partnership while each exercised his special gifts.

People who measure such things rate Rosecrans' IQ as the highest among CW generals... which is also the straight line for many jokes. He had an unhealthy habit of keeping his young staff up until 2:00am discussing Catholic theology. Under the stress of combat he would ride forward under fire. He would have the brains of staff members splattered onto his coat. This show of bravado deeply impressed the troops. Three cheers & a tiger greeted his appearance. Unfortunately, the stress caused him to shout nonsense orders in a jackhammer stutter to dumbfounded officers.

At Chickamauga a characteristically Rosecrans solution to his dashing around the battle space was implemented. The brilliant James Garfield had a War game-like board with unit counters on it. As reports came in, the pieces were moved accordingly. It was a preview of the aerial / satellite / drone real-time situational awareness of a modernHQ. It was a misplaced counter that gave Longstreet his opening.

Objectively, the compelling conclusion is that Rosecrans was not the man to break the siege & lead the advance to Atlanta. Dana's reports have been called a clinical report of the effects of stress & sleep deprivation. Grant's only criticism of the plans Rosecrans had for breaking the siege was that he had not implemented them.

In my judgement, Rosecrans was like a brilliant entrepreneur who had to step aside to let the enterprise be managed in a business like way.

I agree with your conclusion at the end and appreciate what you said. I only disagree with the first paragraph. My own brief study of Rosy leads me to believe he and Thomas worked well only because Thomas was a fiercely loyal subordinate and Rosecrans above all wanted the glory, the credit, and the power. He had everything he wanted and so it worked. The only thing missing to complete his picture of the ideal command was to get Grant demoted or sent to some insignificant spot. I find really ironic that he ultimately got the fate he wanted for Grant.

Anyway, my thoughts are that Thomas was an outstanding general and subordinate. Rosy on the other hand was ambitious but flawed, not flawed with IQ or ability but his temperament. He was a poor subordinate, disputatious to the point of being insolent and sometimes it's arguable whether he could be counted on to follow a plan designed by someone else, because he'd at least argue all the way. In short, if Thomas was his commander I don't think they work as well as they did. That would completely change the dynamics of their working relationship.

In other respects I concur with you. But my evaluation of his personality based on his acts makes me think he would have only been under Thomas long enough to get himself promoted somewhere else. In the meantime quarreling with Thomas along the way. Perhaps he ends up getting promoted to the east instead in one of Lincoln's search for a new AoP Commander. That would also spell trouble in my mind.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I agree with your conclusion at the end and appreciate what you said. I only disagree with the first paragraph. My own brief study of Rosy leads me to believe he and Thomas worked well only because Thomas was a fiercely loyal subordinate and Rosecrans above all wanted the glory, the credit, and the power. He had everything he wanted and so it worked. The only thing missing to complete his picture of the ideal command was to get Grant demoted or sent to some insignificant spot. I find really ironic that he ultimately got the fate he wanted for Grant.

Anyway, my thoughts are that Thomas was an outstanding general and subordinate. Rosy on the other hand was ambitious but flawed, not flawed with IQ or ability but his temperament. He was a poor subordinate, disputatious to the point of being insolent and sometimes it's arguable whether he could be counted on to follow a plan designed by someone else, because he'd at least argue all the way. In short, if Thomas was his commander I don't think they work as well as they did. That would completely change the dynamics of their working relationship.

In other respects I concur with you. But my evaluation of his personality based on his acts makes me think he would have only been under Thomas long enough to get himself promoted somewhere else. In the meantime quarreling with Thomas along the way. Perhaps he ends up getting promoted to the east instead in one of Lincoln's search for a new AoP Commander. That would also spell trouble in my mind.

I believe you will find that Thomas & Rosecrans were acquainted with each other going back several decades. They had a genuine partnership, something rare & precious.

 

[rbasin]

Again, as Steedman put it, the war got too large for him. He wasn't a coward, was ambitious as to getting an independent command.

I disagree with the idea of having Rosecrans in command of the department while Thomas had the army. Can't have two heads in charge.

I like Rosecrans quite a bit. He was a good/great organizer. He simply made a mistake in not stopping at Chattanooga.

 

[JerryD]

I agree with your conclusion at the end and appreciate what you said. I only disagree with the first paragraph. My own brief study of Rosy leads me to believe he and Thomas worked well only because Thomas was a fiercely loyal subordinate and Rosecrans above all wanted the glory, the credit, and the power. He had everything he wanted and so it worked. The only thing missing to complete his picture of the ideal command was to get Grant demoted or sent to some insignificant spot. I find really ironic that he ultimately got the fate he wanted for Grant.

Anyway, my thoughts are that Thomas was an outstanding general and subordinate. Rosy on the other hand was ambitious but flawed, not flawed with IQ or ability but his temperament. He was a poor subordinate, disputatious to the point of being insolent and sometimes it's arguable whether he could be counted on to follow a plan designed by someone else, because he'd at least argue all the way. In short, if Thomas was his commander I don't think they work as well as they did. That would completely change the dynamics of their working relationship.

In other respects I concur with you. But my evaluation of his personality based on his acts makes me think he would have only been under Thomas long enough to get himself promoted somewhere else. In the meantime quarreling with Thomas along the way. Perhaps he ends up getting promoted to the east instead in one of Lincoln's search for a new AoP Commander. That would also spell trouble in my mind.

Agree 100%. Rosecrans was a good to very good general, but for his flawed personality. He was not a team player and was rather insolent to his superiors. I always think of him as the McClellan of the West in that regard, although to be fair to Rosy he was much more active and had greater succcess than Little Mac.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Again, as Steedman put it, the war got too large for him. He wasn't a coward, was ambitious as to getting an independent command.

I disagree with the idea of having Rosecrans in command of the department while Thomas had the army. Can't have two heads in charge.

I like Rosecrans quite a bit. He was a good/great organizer. He simply made a mistake in not stopping at Chattanooga.

A review of the orders that Rosecrans was receiving from the Sec. of War will leave no doubt about him "deciding" to advance on Atlanta. There was a blatant "Do this or we will find someone who will." theme.

CONTENTdm

hdl.huntington.org

Rather than hearing my take on the subject, I encourage you to read Dana's reports from the exclusive logbook from the Washington Station US Military Telegraph.

Dana was Lincoln's personal envoy. The telegraphs are addressed to the Sec. of War, but it was Lincoln who was the recipient.

Absolutely the best way to read from Dana's log is to do it out loud. That is what Lincoln did. He would read the dispatches to his cabinet members.

Far less entertaining are the official communications preserved in the daily signal traffic preserved in the Ecker Collection.

Discussions are often little more than individuals imaginings. These messages are absolutely original sources.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Rosecrans has Washington breathing down his neck, including Dana looking over his shoulder, and is well aware of his superiors' impatience toward his methodical preparations for Tullahoma and for outflanking Chattanooga.

Bragg has fallen back with little fighting during the Tullahoma Campaign and now has abandoned Chattanooga without a fight. Initiative, momentum, and morale are in Rosecran's favor - much like Lee when he decided to invade Maryland in 1862.

Meanwhile, Burnside is taking Knoxville and securing East TN. If Rosecrans stops the Confederates can potentially move against Burnside's much smaller and less experienced army.

Rosecrans has three good reasons right there to keep going forward. Unless he knows Bragg has been reinforced and is finally launching a counter-offensive he has no reason to stop. Even if he knows that, he has some incentive to try to fight Bragg before Longstreet arrives. Even before Chickamauga Rosecrans didn't have enough men to hold the line of Missionary Ridge / Lookout Mountain / Bridgeport. Chattanooga has essentially the same problem as Harper's Ferry: it's a point that is strategically vital yet, due to the surrounding topography, almost indefensible.

 

[rbasin]

Rosecrans has Washington breathing down his neck, including Dana looking over his shoulder, and is well aware of his superiors' impatience toward his methodical preparations for Tullahoma and for outflanking Chattanooga.

Bragg has fallen back with little fighting during the Tullahoma Campaign and now has abandoned Chattanooga without a fight. Initiative, momentum, and morale are in Rosecran's favor - much like Lee when he decided to invade Maryland in 1862.

Meanwhile, Burnside is taking Knoxville and securing East TN. If Rosecrans stops the Confederates can potentially move against Burnside's much smaller and less experienced army.

Rosecrans has three good reasons right there to keep going forward. Unless he knows Bragg has been reinforced and is finally launching a counter-offensive he has no reason to stop. Even if he knows that, he has some incentive to try to fight Bragg before Longstreet arrives. Even before Chickamauga Rosecrans didn't have enough men to hold the line of Missionary Ridge / Lookout Mountain / Bridgeport. Chattanooga has essentially the same problem as Harper's Ferry: it's a point that is strategically vital yet, due to the surrounding topography, almost indefensible.

Maybe. But where would he have stopped? Was there a defensible position south of Chattanooga!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Maybe. But where would he have stopped? Was there a defensible position south of Chattanooga!

Rosecrans' goal was Atlanta. As events played out that was, in all likelihood, not achievable with just the Army of the Cumberland. Simply too many moving parts to conclude where Rosecrans' advance would have stalled out.

What we do know is that the winter of 1863-64 was a record breaker. The Mississippi River below Memphis froze over. A cold front hit Chattanooga with hurricane force horizontal winds dropping down the side of Lookout Mountain. The fighting season was over long before any advance to Atlanta was possible.

From the CSA side the elephant in the room was the map. Atlanta & transshipment point Dalton were exclusively dedicated to the Army of Northern Virginia.

The direct rail link was via the Sequache Valley via Knoxville. With the loss of Chattanooga Longstreet's corps winter quarters were served via a rail route 500 miles longer. The brutal winter & the roundabout rail connection meant a season of want for Longstreet's men.

The map, the winter & demographics meant that the CSA could not retake Chattanooga. That was a reality of emended strategic import.

 

[uaskme]

Halleck told Rosecrans to go south as far as Dalton. Rosecrans was sending Calvary to Rome. Thought he could stop Bragg there. Halleck repeatedly told Rosecrans Bragg wouldn't be reinforced. Rosecrans ask Halleck to keep JJ busy in MS. Halleck told him he was on his own.

What most people don't understand. There were few gaps over Lookout Mtn. 21st Corps came into Chattanooga around the northern end of Lookout. 14th Corps the next gap south which was 18 miles from the Northern end. 21st Corps the next gap south which was at Alpine Al another 20 miles south. It took Thomas a day to get up Lookout. And another day to get down, Forage was limited. Reason Rosecrans waited till the corn ripened. Rosecrans traveled with 4K wagons. He was 50 miles from his supply base. This was a mountainous area which couldn't support 130K Troops.

It is easy to look back 160 years and come to these conclusions. Lot harder to understand the whole story.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Halleck told Rosecrans to go south as far as Dalton. Rosecrans was sending Calvary to Rome. Thought he could stop Bragg there. Halleck repeatedly told Rosecrans Bragg wouldn't be reinforced. Rosecrans ask Halleck to keep JJ busy in MS. Halleck told him he was on his own.

What most people don't understand. There were few gaps over Lookout Mtn. 21st Corps came into Chattanooga around the northern end of Lookout. 14th Corps the next gap south which was 18 miles from the Northern end. 21st Corps the next gap south which was at Alpine Al another 20 miles south. It took Thomas a day to get up Lookout. And another day to get down, Forage was limited. Reason Rosecrans waited till the corn ripened. Rosecrans traveled with 4K wagons. He was 50 miles from his supply base. This was a mountainous area which couldn't support 130K Troops.

It is easy to look back 160 years and come to these conclusions. Lot harder to understand the whole story.

I agree entirely. I have driven the old roads here in Middle Tennessee many, many times. The physical challenge of moving a daily ration for 80,000 men, (+/-) ten boxcar loads; 26 pounds of feed for 20,000 equines, 520,000 pounds; plus ammunition & evaluate men & animals… the challenges to the operational arts go on & on.

A splendid opportunity to see what that entailed still exists. Any wagons traveling the main road south from McMinnville had pass through the Stone Door.

https://www.alltrails.com/trail/us/tennessee/stone-door-trail

Google Search

The 60 miles of trails at Savage Gulf Tennessee State Park include the old stage road. Here is a chance to experience a Civil War site while surrounded by thousands of acres of Forrest. In the gulf, aptly named for a family, there are stands of virgin timber.

The Stone door itself is accessible via a short hike. The vistas off the edge of the escarpment are splendid. In the stone shelf overlooking the crack that is the door, recovering CW soldiers carved their names.

Google Search

The old hotel at Beersheba Springs is where the soldiers were cared for.

https://www.beershebaassembly.org/about/

The old stage hotel has for generations been a retreat for the Methodist church.

Beersheba Springs is also where, in those pre-air conditioned days, Thomas Connelly summered & worked on his many books.

Beersheba Springs, Savage Gulf & The Stone Door are a unique off the beaten path experience I highly recommend.

 

[gjpratt]

Beersheba Springs is a location Alfred Leland Crabb used in several of his pre- and post-war novels on Nashville and Middle Tennessee,

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

But where would he have stopped? Was there a defensible position south of Chattanooga!

If I was Rosecrans I would probably expect Bragg to make a stand where Joe Johnston did that winter (Rocky Face Ridge area).

Here is a chance to experience a Civil War site while surrounded by thousands of acres of Forrest.

I have rarely gotten such a good chuckle out of an autocorrect typo. Thousands of acres of Nathan Bedford Forrest would be a big draw!

 

[Rhea Cole]

If I was Rosecrans I would probably expect Bragg to make a stand where Joe Johnston did that winter (Rocky Face Ridge area).



I have rarely gotten such a good chuckle out of an autocorrect typo. Thousands of acres of Nathan Bedford Forrest would be a big draw!

There is a Nathan Bedford Forrest Forest State Park.

Nathan Bedford Forrest State Park | Civil War - Tennessee Vacation

www.tnvacation.com

With all the arcane 19th Century language, military terms, & place names I habitually use, plus cranky arthritic fingers, it is a wonder the spellcheck works at all anymore. Sometimes what comes out is like proofreading a deeply disturbed drunken Cub Scout.

To address the question you raise, I not sure how far south Rosecrans could maintain communication. Grant explicitly stated that the sense of maps was why he did not pursue Bragg further. Sherman stated that without his detailed map of Georgia he would not have attempted the Atlanta Campaign. That tells me that Rosecrans' ability to maneuver would have been greatly restricted.

In fact, the famously impatient Sherman uncomplainingly held off the start of the Atlanta advance to let, "..Sergeant Finegan & his motley crew finish their work…"

You will find Finegan's name in the legend box of Sherman army group's maps. Because of the motley crew, Sherman's map had roads & trails Johnston did not know existed.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I thank you before I post this for your reply. Can you expound on your "He had an unhealthy habit of keeping his young staff up until 2:00 AM discussing Catholic theology. May I ask what is "unhealthy " about that? I ask being the most Calvinist person on planet Earth. Thank you for your time helping me understand the US Civil War!

I just realized that I had not replied to your question. Rosecrans, like a lot of recent converts, was very zealous. His behavior was psychological & catholic theology just happened to be his chosen object of fixation.

The staff did not go to bed until the commanding general did. Unfortunately for them, sleeping until noon was not one of their options. Under stress Rosecrans would only sleep four hours a night. His otherwise inexplicable behavior in Chattanooga has, by knowledge persons, been identified as an effect of sleep deprivation.

The Battles and Campaigns of Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, 1861-1865 (PB)

A leader in military and general history book publishing.

www.savasbeatie.com

John Scales & I discussed this very topic. He was a Special Forces brigadier. I was a local expert on an extended bus tour of the Tullahoma Campaign. We had plenty of time chat.

We discussed his capture of Ben Laden's Kandahar compound & subsequent actions. He said that no matter who you are, 4 days with high stress & little to no sleep makes you stupid. His analysis of Rosecrans' behavior, as described by Dana, was exactly what John would expect it to be.

My personal experience, albeit not violent, was both highly stressful & sleepless. I agree with entirely with John's conclusion that Rosecrans was simply worn out physically & mentally, that compounded by lack of sleep.

 

[David Moore]

Note there is not a single piece of documentation to back these statements.
I discuss Rosecrans' religious history in my biography of him.
The one person who mentioned staying up late with Rosecrans was Garfield who had a theological background and would have found such conversations interesting.
Journalist Albert Richardson wrote the following:
[Rosecrans] believes in some of the most staggering claims of his Church; sends requests to have certain sisters pray for him; thinks Gareschi (his old chief of staff) helped to buy the Stone River victory by a religious sacrifice of himself, per contract with the Almighty, etc. Of course I learn these things from men about Rosecrans not from himself, but fanatic or no fanatic, it is wonderful how enthusiastically everybody believes in him...And he impresses me as a pure, earnest, strong man."

As far as Chickamauga the basic fact is that Rosecrans was outnumbered. After the battle he immediately organized the defense of Chattanooga and developed a plan for its relief. HIs successor Graht apparently suffered a relapse of bad habits while in Chattanooga.

My sole motive is to respond to sincere questions such as that asked by Ms Lake. I will not respond to posts that don't have relevant and close to time of the event documentation.

 

[SSVilla]

Rosecrans is criticized for not starting Tullahoma sooner

My criticism of Rosecrans is with his personality. The timing of the campaign is actually a good example of how his personality gets in his own way. He creates a problem with perception all by himself.

I have often wondered what was delaying him, but not because of anything anywhere that anyone has written about this, but because of Rosecrans himself and what he wrote, the reasons he gave, and what was on his mind.

Of course I am going to wonder what's delaying him, upon reading a dispatch where he states that he took a survey of his senior subordinates and they all agreed (except one) to wait to advance. That says nothing about what the holdup is, or when he's expecting it to be resolved. Moreover as Halleck points out, that's not a valid military reason by itself. The responsibility lies with the commander and not a committee.

Another time, Rosecrans stated that he could better hold Bragg in place by staying static than by advancing. Bragg would in fact detach forces to reinforce Johnston, but that's beside the point that he also doesn't explain why he thinks advancing is going to push the enemy towards Grant. His reasoning was off and the President knows it.

Then he wrote that it was against some military precept to fight two different decisive battles at the same time. That made no sense and instead prompted me to think that what was on his mind was the publicity for his victory in the papers when it came. He didn't want to be eclipsed, he was playing the press and public opinion there.

Overall, he created an impression of being dilatory for no honest military reason by citing all these extraneous excuses. He could have been straightforward. There were times he had crowded the telegraphs with so much detail with no urgency that he was reprimanded for doing this. Yet when the administration was pressuring him to prevent reinforcements from being sent to raise the Vicksburg siege, he was raising objections that did not make military sense.

He eventually was threatened by Halleck (who wouldn't have done this without Lincoln approval) that if he didn't advance, he was going to have part of his forces sent to reinforce Grant, and only after that does he finally move.

————
In all this, Rosecrans just created a negative impression all by himself. Then, he had written to the President demanding that his commission be backdated to supersede Grant, to which Lincoln responded, in essence, you presume too much, setting him straight as to who held the power in that relationship. That's actually an incident that revealed how Rosecrans would push boundaries when it came to authority.

Then all these remarks were made in the context of Rosecrans' stubborn antagonism with Grant, which the President knew because Rosecrans wrote about this to Halleck, plus he then made all those efforts to outrank Grant explicit. Therefore one is left with a lot of questions about what was really motivating Rosecrans, and the problem is that all these questions and nebulous reasons derive just from Rosecrans own writing.

Again, he might have had a justifiable reason, several possibly. But he could have stuck to that and avoided all this extraneous stuff that just comes across as power hungry plays. And the thing is that this negative inference will always be there because it started with him, it comes across from his dispatches and letters.

As to criticisms that others may have about one thing or another, before or afterward I don't have any formed opinions, but I do know what (or rather, who) made me suspicious about the issue of his timing.