William S. Rosecrans

[VeronicaLake12]

Was William S Rosecrans arguably the most talented strategist of all Union generals?

 

[Pollaco]

I'm a little puzzled by the term "most talented strategist". I kind of doubt a really good strategist would have imagined the "gap" at Chickamauga.

 

[Irishtom29]

Arguably, though I wouldn't argue it. His strategy after his capture of Chattanooga dangerously divided his army and resulted in the only major defeat of a Midwestern army.

 

[VeronicaLake12]

I'm a little puzzled by the term "most talented strategist". I kind of doubt a really good strategist would have imagined the "gap" at Chickamauga.

May I ask your opinion of General Rosecrans performance at Iuka and Corinth?

 

[Pollaco]

There is no doubt Rosecrans had some pretty good plans in some earlier campaigns, Tullahoma comes to mind. But wasn't it Rosecrans that Lincoln was referring to when he said "He's confused, like a duck hit in the head"?

 

[Enoch L. Cade]

I'd like to recommend Rosecrans and the Union Victory by David Moore (who posts here). I don't think it answers your question (I'm not sure how you'd even determine who was the "best strategist" of the war, tbh) but it does a great job of placing Rosecrans in historical context. Of the Union commanders, Rosecrans is among those I like the most, along with Custer, Gibbon, Buford, and one or two others.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

I'm a little puzzled by the term "most talented strategist". I kind of doubt a really good strategist would have imagined the "gap" at Chickamauga.

Apparently you haven't studied the Tullahoma Campaign, which was an absolutely brilliantly conceived and executed campaign of maneuver.

 

[Pollaco]

Apparently you haven't studied the Tullahoma Campaign, which was an absolutely brilliantly conceived and executed campaign of maneuver.

I think I kind of acknowledged his"brillance" in post #5 or so I thought. Yes he was brilliant and Tullahoma is said to be one of the best in the whole war.

 

[David Moore]

In regards to campaigns the results of campaigns should be considered. Tullahoma was the first giant step towards the capture of Chattanooga which in turn was a key part to the capture of Atlanta. Michael Bradley in his Tullahoma book raises the question that if Tullahoma hadn't taken place and Chattanooga not taken before the winter of 1863 would Atlanta have been taken before the presidential election the next year. Bottom line Tullahoma is "brilliant" and important IMO.
Without having traversed the terrain between Murfreesboro and Chattanooga one can't really appreciate the Tullahoma and subsequent Chickamauga Campaign (not to be confused the the battle of the same name which of course is also important.)

 

[David Moore]

Arguably, though I wouldn't argue it. His strategy after his capture of Chattanooga dangerously divided his army and resulted in the only major defeat of a Midwestern army.

What would have been a better way for Rosecrans to have forced Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga?

 

[David Moore]

There is no doubt Rosecrans had some pretty good plans in some earlier campaigns, Tullahoma comes to mind. But wasn't it Rosecrans that Lincoln was referring to when he said "He's confused, like a duck hit in the head"?

Duck quote was based on info Lincoln was receiving from Charles Dana. Lincoln himself had no first hand information Lincoln also said he "must do something for General Rosecrans" after Chickamauga. He did send him to command in Missouri.
Grant later removed him from that post.

 

[David Moore]

May I ask your opinion of General Rosecrans performance at Iuka and Corinth?

A really interesting question is what would have been the fate of Grant had Rosecrans been defeated especially at Corinth.

 

[jackt62]

His strategy after his capture of Chattanooga dangerously divided his army and resulted in the only major defeat of a Midwestern army.

Was not Rosecrans' move in dividing his army an attempt to replicate his brilliant Tullahoma campaign in the mountains beyond Chattanooga? Bragg may have caught wind of the movement, tried to destroy elements of the AotC in detail, but failed to do so, which allowed Rosecrans time to re-concentrate the army along Chickamauga Creek. I don't necessarily see a direct connection between the original force division and the subsequent defeat at Chickamauga.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Was not Rosecrans' move in dividing his army an attempt to replicate his brilliant Tullahoma campaign in the mountains beyond Chattanooga? Bragg may have caught wind of the movement, tried to destroy elements of the AotC in detail, but failed to do so, which allowed Rosecrans time to re-concentrate the army along Chickamauga Creek. I don't necessarily see a direct connection between the original force division and the subsequent defeat at Chickamauga.

The original force division may have been the best way to maneuver Bragg out of Chattanooga, but continuing the force division after Chattanooga was captured was what got him into trouble. He should have concentrated his army immediately after capturing Chattanooga. I think that's IrishTom's point as well.

 

[neyankee61]

Rosecrans appeared to have a little bit of McClellan in him. He planned well but seemed to wait until everything was perfect. When urged to move by Lincoln and Washington he responded with reasons why he couldn't. While the Vicksburg and Gettysburg Campaigns were being waged he sat still. He claimed that by simply being where he was, he could keep troops from moving from his front to reinforce Vicksburg. The same could be said if he started moving.
Halleck not doubt with Lincoln's approval sent the following to Rosecrans. "I need not urge upon you the necessity of giving active employment of your forces. Neither the country or the Government will much longer put up with the inactivity of some of our armies and generals." This was sent in Oct, 1862.
That being said, when he moved he moved quickly and with purpose, unlike McClellan. His plans worked well and he achieved his goal. Tullahoma and Chattanooga were the result.
One thing, the war was evolving. It was no longer becoming a war of post. Confederate armies were becoming the target. Even though Chattanooga fell Bragg's army was still a force.

 

[Irishtom29]

One thing, the war was evolving. It was no longer becoming a war of post. Confederate armies were becoming the target. Even though Chattanooga fell Bragg's army was still a force.

Indeed. I was thinking about Tullahoma last night and while well done what was the result? The Federal army moved a short distance and Bragg's army was still intact and in fine fettle. Not so big a deal I'm thinking.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Some perspective on Rosecrans is in order. There was no operation in the Civil War that rises to the complexity, execution & strategic success of the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. All of Middle Tennessee & the gate to the Deep South, Chattanooga came under Union control without a large loss of life. The Army of the Cumberland was supported by a logistical complex stretching up river to Cincinnati OH. The Department of the Cumberland, that Rosecrans also commanded, had (+/-) 240,000 men. The massive logistical operation that Rosecrans created made everything that followed possible. That in & of itself was a stroke of strategic genius.

Contemporaneously, Lee had no logistical support a mere 41 miles north of the of the Potomac.

Once established in Chattanooga, Rosecrans faced a daunting tactical & strategic challenge. If you have never been there, wadding up a piece of stiff paper & loosely flattening out will give you an idea of what the area looks like. Complicating things, there were no accurate maps.

The A of the C's topographers were arguably the best at that time. Using a solar powered copy machine (+/-) 20,000 multicolored fully updated maps had been copied & distributed during the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. The area between Chattanooga & Atlanta was not properly mapped. Sherman said that without accurate maps, he would not have attempted the Atlanta Campaign. Unlike him, Rosecrans could not wait for, "…Sgt. Finegan & his motley crew to finish their work."

The challenge Rosecrans faced can be imagined via the currier line between Thomas' HQ & Rosecrans in Chattanooga. By mounted courier, it took 14 hours each way to transmit a message & receive an answer. The "should-done-this or Should-a-done that" experts never take that into account. One unfortunate courier stumbled upon an HQ after 36 hours in the wilderness & handed his dispatch bag regardless of which HQ it was. Logically, the only thing an army commander wanted to do was to get south of there where topological sanity returned. Logical engineer that he was, it probably did not cross Rosecrans' well ordered mind that Bragg would come north & fight a battle there. What Rosecrans' strategic vision for an Atlanta campaign are unknowable.

To my mind there was no best strategist. Grant fought a river war in the Mississippi valley. Rosecrans fought a rail road war. There was a littoral war. The march back & forth a dozen times war in Virginia was a singular strategic challenge. The only General who commanded armies & created a strategy across all of the distinct operating areas was Grant. He adopted Lincoln's insightful phrase, " If you can't skin, you can hold a leg." to describe his strategy for ending the war. Every Union army was ordered to maintain maximum pressure so as to leave no space for CSA forces to maneuver & support each other. As each was defeated, It freed forces up to contribute to the next operation. E.g., an entire corps was escorted to New Orleans from Muscle Shoals by 40 tin clads after Hood's defeat.

Nobody exercised a command like Grant did.

Note: Wittenberg's Tullahoma Campaign book is one everyone should have on their book shelf.

 

[tony_gunter]

I'm curious about the timing of the Tullahoma Campaign. It started June 24, right? What was in place June 24th that wasn't in place 2 weeks earlier? 4 weeks? 8 weeks?

If the ultimate goal was the occupation of Chattanooga, the timing seems curious because it places Rosecrans at the doorstep of Chattanooga right as the two other theaters of the war were concluding massive operations, opening up reinforcements for Chattanooga from both the east and the west.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I'm curious about the timing of the Tullahoma Campaign. It started June 24, right? What was in place June 24th that wasn't in place 2 weeks earlier? 4 weeks? 8 weeks?

If the ultimate goal was the occupation of Chattanooga, the timing seems curious because it places Rosecrans at the doorstep of Chattanooga right as the two other theaters of the war were concluding massive operations, opening up reinforcements for Chattanooga from both the east and the west.

Actually it was June 23rd. Nine days before that a completely worked up Beardslee Repeating Telegraph unit arrived from the East. Along with it came an officer who became the signal officer on Rosecrans' staff.

As the Army of the Cumberland was forming up for the long anticipated advance, it began to rain.

This was not one of the lines of thunderstorms that march through Middle Tennessee on regular intervals, it was a 500 year rain event.

There is no way to exaggerate what the following 30 days were like. Rosecrans himself dismounted & helped drag a gun sunk up to the axil box in mud.

The plan was for a corps to sweep around Bragg's right flank. It was bogged down, barely able to move. Improbably, Wilder's Brigade broke through Hoover's Gap.

Because the Beardslee Repeaters connected Thomas with Rosecrans HQ, overnight, the main thrust of a 50 mile wide advance shifted from the left to the center. Before Bragg knew what was happening, Thomas' corps flanked the elaborate Tullahoma earthworks. Only the rain swollen rivers & bottomless mud saved the Army of Tennessee.

Cumberlanders entered the vast Tullahoma works & feasted on mounts of abandoned rations. Row after row of sparkling white tents still stood staked down & slashed.

Without the Beardslees, Wilder's unprecedented mounted infantry armed with repeating rifles would possibly made no difference.

I realize that it is the conventional trope that Rosecrans diddled away the six months between January & June 1864. In fact, Rosecrans & the entrepreneurial officers like Wilder were rewriting the book. No other army on the planet could have advanced to Chattanooga & stayed there. Waiting for the Beardslees was just the final piece of the puzzle that completed the picture.

 

[Pollaco]

It did rain buckets. The soldiers even started the rumor about how the word Tullahoma meant mud. Tulla for mud and Homa for more mud.