William S. Rosecrans

[David Moore]

Rosecrans was irrationally brave. He was actually in front of the battle line on numerous occasions. As a result, he wore the brains & blood of aides on his coat almost as a trademark.

The field where a cannonball struck the head of an aide, showering Rosecrans with gore, is between the cemetery & the Hazen Brigade Monument at Stones River NB. As a living ng history volunteer newer at the park, I have contemplated on that event & site for 30 years.

As we know, the sight of "Old Rosey" mounted on a magnificent horse right there in the thick of the fighting inspired a fierce loyalty in the soldiers. At the same time, the nonsense orders he shouted at officers in a jackhammer stutter perplexed & alarmed officers who rightly ignored his commands.

Shelby Foote said that Grant had 2:00 in the morning courage. He remained calm & analytical at all times. Rosecrans had both intellect & physical courage at an elite level, of that there is no doubt. His over reaction to his inability to process the tactical chaos of battle was his fatal weakness. At Chickamauga he implemented his engineer's solution to that problem. It is a profound irony that his attempt at managing a battle like an army commander is dismissed as a fiasco.

As so often happens in battle Longstreet, who had received no orders from Bragg, decided to attack just where & when a mistake opened a hole in the Army of the Cumberland's line. A river of ink had excoriated Rosecrans for falling back & organizing the successful defense of Chattanooga… exactly what he should have done. There was not a square mile of strategic ground on the Chickamauga battlefield. Every square inch of Chattanooga was existentially strategic. By securing Chattanooga, Rosecrans made Chickamauga nothing but a strategically empty tactical victory. As Dana documented, Rosecrans' officers saw it in that light almost immediately.

Grant wrote that the only criticism of Rosecrans' preparations for lifting the supply bottlenecks at Chattanooga was that he had not already implemented them.

The very characteristics that made Rosecrans a great departmental commander prevented him from being a great tactical combat leader.

Rosecrans wore two hats. He was both commander of the 240,000 man Department of the Cumberland & the Army of the Cumberland. He was arguably an elite departmental commander. It would have been better for all concerned if George Thomas had been the army commander. Their hand in glove partnership would have had unbounded potential. That was not to be.

In the end at Chattanooga Rosecrans was like so many brilliant entertainers. He had created the Army of the Cumberland with all its innovative elements by applying his huge intellect & engineer's aptitude. It was time to step aside & let a man with very different talents manage the enterprise.

For the record there's not a single piece of documentation for this post. Only mere opinion.
I post this not to get into another endless Rosecrans-Grant discussion but to
re assure anyone that has doubts about Grant's CW career that they are onto something.
Read Frank Varney's new book for Grant's issues with other generals post Rosecrans.
Ignore the anti Varney comments here. I don't think any of his critics on this site have actually read his books. Certainly not the newest one.
Now back to research. A pastime I highly recommend for the would be historian.

 

[DanSBHawk]

For the record there's not a single piece of documentation for this post. Only mere opinion.
I post this not to get into another endless Rosecrans-Grant discussion but to
re assure anyone that has doubts about Grant's CW career that they are onto something.
Read Frank Varney's new book for Grant's issues with other generals post Rosecrans.
Ignore the anti Varney comments here. I don't think any of his critics on this site have actually read his books. Certainly not the newest one.
Now back to research. A pastime I highly recommend for the would be historian.

I've read Varney's first book, and I have his second book on my kindle. I will read it at some point.

I would recommend to anyone reading Varney's books that they should actually check his citations. You'll find many mis-citations and some that don't support Varney's claims. And his many accusations against other historian's work are often false. Verify his claims. You'll be surprised.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I've read Varney's first book, and I have his second book on my kindle. I will read it at some point.

I would recommend to anyone reading Varney's books that they should actually check his citations. You'll find many mis-citations and some that don't support Varney's claims. And his many accusations against other historian's work are often false. Verify his claims. You'll be surprised.

DanSBHawk makes a valid point. Albeit, I can't image why anybody would voluntarily read one of those books. In class, Varney is cited as an example of how not to write about history. As noted above, there is an incomprehensible obliviousness about using citations that contradict the author's conclusions.

It was Varney's example where I first learned about inductive logic. That is coming to a conclusion & then filtering the facts to support it. For example:

"I would not believe something that is untrue. I believe this, therefore it is true."

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It would have been better for all concerned if George Thomas had been the army commander. Their hand in glove partnership would have had unbounded potential.

As I was reading your post I has this same thought.

It's remiscent of how, if he had gotten along with Lincoln, McClellan would have probably been much better choice for General in Chief than army commander. He built and organized armies well, and had good strategy. He faltered in the execution.

Unfortunately, I think this kind of tag team approach to command was probably beyond the capabilities of the Union Army to implement, especially considering the egos of many generals.

there is an incomprehensible obliviousness about using citations that contradict the author's conclusions.

It's remarkable how two different people can view the same source material and sometimes come to very different conclusions about what it means. If you go looking for malfeasance you may well see it whether it's there or not.

 

[67th Tigers]

It was Varney's example where I first learned about inductive logic. That is coming to a conclusion & then filtering the facts to support it. For example:

"I would not believe something that is untrue. I believe this, therefore it is true."

This isn't inductive logic, it's circular reasoning.

Induction is the "system I" of the human brain. "The last 50 apples I've dropped from the roof have smashed on hitting the ground, ergo the 51st will too."

Historical research uses a mixture of the two as appropriate. For example, if we find, by deduction, many examples of Grant being mendacious, then we can generalise by induction that Grant was a mendacious person. This is, of course, what Varney has done.

 

[DanSBHawk]

This isn't inductive logic, it's circular reasoning.

Induction is the "system I" of the human brain. "The last 50 apples I've dropped from the roof have smashed on hitting the ground, ergo the 51st will too."

Historical research uses a mixture of the two as appropriate. For example, if we find, by deduction, many examples of Grant being mendacious, then we can generalise by induction that Grant was a mendacious person. This is, of course, what Varney has done.

No, that's not what Varney has done. As I said, verify his sources.

Varney's main theme for his first book is that historians rely too much on Grant's Memoirs. But as I read Varney's book, I had a copy of Steven Woodworths Nothing But Victory beside me, and every time Varney accused Woodworth of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs for a paragraph, I actually checked Woodworth's source, and every accusation Varney made was false.

If sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs is such a widespread problem among historians, why couldn't Varney come up with valid examples instead of phony examples? Varney either didn't bother to check Woodworth's sources, or he did check Woodworth's sources and made false accusations.

 

[67th Tigers]

Varney's main theme for his first book is that historians rely too much on Grant's Memoirs. But as I read Varney's book, I had a copy of Steven Woodworths Nothing But Victory beside me, and every time Varney accused Woodworth of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs for a paragraph, I actually checked Woodworth's source, and every accusation Varney made was false.

Interesting. The sentence in question from Woodworth is:

"On the morning of September 20, Grant ordered Rosecrans's entire force after Price immediately and rode with Rosecrans for the first several miles. Not long after Grant left the column, however, Rosecrans called off the pursuit, much to Grant's displeasure.69"

69. Grant, Personal Memoirs, 1:413.

Since there is only one reference to justify Woodworth's writing, and that reference is Grant memoir itself, what are the other sources used?

Let me state, that is is precisely this sentence, which someone else has paraphrased in another article, that was noted to be single-source. Nothing more.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Interesting. The sentence in question from Woodworth is:

"On the morning of September 20, Grant ordered Rosecrans's entire force after Price immediately and rode with Rosecrans for the first several miles. Not long after Grant left the column, however, Rosecrans called off the pursuit, much to Grant's displeasure.69"

69. Grant, Personal Memoirs, 1:413.

Since there is only one reference to justify Woodworth's writing, and that reference is Grant memoir itself, what are the other sources used?

Let me state, that is is precisely this sentence, which someone else has paraphrased in another article, that was noted to be single-source. Nothing more.

There are more than only one accusation against Woodworth. Check the other ones. I'll check what you've posted, and will admit if I missed one. Here are some for you to check:

Varney criticized historians Woodworth and Cozzens for not sourcing a quote which was critical of Rosecrans, when in fact both historians provided a source. Varney also claimed the anecdote was dubious because the regiment was not at the Battle of Corinth. This is false. In fact, the regiment (50th Illinois) was at the Battle of Corinth.

Varney accused Woodworth of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about Grant's plans for the Battle of Corinth. This is false. The Woodworth paragraph actually lists several sources and none of them are Grant's Memoirs.

Varney accused Woodworth of sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about the post-Corinth pursuit. And again, it's false. Woodworth's paragraph cites several sources and again does not mention Grant's Memoirs.

Varney accused Woodworth of low-balling the size of Hurlbut's force at Hatchie Bridge at 4000 men, and sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs. This is false. Woodworth actually put the number of men at "less than 6000," and again the sources he provided did not mention Grant's Memoirs.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Interesting. The sentence in question from Woodworth is:

"On the morning of September 20, Grant ordered Rosecrans's entire force after Price immediately and rode with Rosecrans for the first several miles. Not long after Grant left the column, however, Rosecrans called off the pursuit, much to Grant's displeasure.69"

69. Grant, Personal Memoirs, 1:413.

Since there is only one reference to justify Woodworth's writing, and that reference is Grant memoir itself, what are the other sources used?

Let me state, that is is precisely this sentence, which someone else has paraphrased in another article, that was noted to be single-source. Nothing more.

My library does not have Varney's book available for online borrowing right at the moment. You are claiming that Varney, in his first book, specifically accused Woodworth of single-sourcing Grant's Memoirs for that sentence?

 

[General JJ]

I don't have a dog in this fight, but the 50th Illinois error strikes me as particularly egregious. The regiment is clearly seen in the order of battle and is visible on battle maps of Second Corinth.

That being said, I've read books that had some egregious errors, but still were valuable resources.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I don't have a dog in this fight, but the 50th Illinois error strikes me as particularly egregious. The regiment is clearly seen in the order of battle and is visible on battle maps of Second Corinth.

That being said, I've read books that had some egregious errors, but still were valuable resources.

Varney's first book is all about how the historiography is riddled with errors and historians have been making so many mistakes about Grant and Rosecrans. So it's almost comical how many mistakes that Varney himself makes.

Here's the full list I made, but I didn't check out every source in his book. There's probably more.

1. Varney cited Dabney Maury's "after-action report" for a quote that was actually from Maury's memoirs written 30 years after the war, and Varney ignored Maury's conflicting opinions which were closer in time to the war.

2. Varney criticized historians Woodworth and Cozzens for not sourcing a quote which was critical of Rosecrans, when in fact both historians provided a source. Varney also claimed the anecdote was dubious because the regiment was not at the Battle of Corinth. This is false. In fact, the regiment (50th Illinois) was at the Battle of Corinth.

3. Varney claimed Grant wrote in his memoirs that he chose the commander of the Army of the Cumberland based on a message from Dana. This is false. That's not what Grant wrote.

4. Varney claimed that Burnside did not move concurrently with Rosecrans. This is false. Varney claimed Burnside had 43,000 troops when in fact it was closer to 18,000. Varney claimed the "inertness" of Burnside caused Bragg to order Buckner back. This is also false.

5. Varney claimed that Grant sent no reinforcements to the Army of the Cumberland until he was placed in overall command of the department. This is false.

6. Varney claimed that Dana arrived at Rosecrans HQ directly from Grant's HQ. This is false. Varney also wrote that there are no orders on record sending Dana to Rosecrans. This is also false.

7. Varney claimed that Rosecrans was held in such high regard that he served as an instructor at West Point while still a cadet. This is false. Rosecrans became an instructor after graduating.

8. Varney claimed that Grant wrote in his memoirs that he designed the "trap" at Iuka. This is false. Grant credited Rosecrans.

9. Varney claimed that Stanton and Grant retaliated against a widow named Truesdail by disapproving her pension. This is false. By Varney's own note, the widow applied for a pension in 1882 when Stanton was dead and Grant was a civilian.

10. Varney accused Woodworth of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about Grant's plans for the Battle of Corinth. This is false. The Woodworth paragraph actually lists several sources and none of them are Grant's Memoirs.

11. Likewise, Varney accused Woodworth of sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about the post-Corinth pursuit. And again, it's false. Woodworth's paragraph cites several sources and again does not mention Grant's Memoirs.

12. Varney claimed the Battle of Corinth ended at 2:00 pm and the confederate retreat wasn't "confirmed" until 6:00 pm, thereby making it too late for Rosecrans to pursue. Most sources, even Rosecrans, say the battle ended at noon.

13. Varney accused Woodworth of low-balling the size of Hurlbut's force at Hatchie Bridge at 4000 men, and sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs. This is false. Woodworth actually put the number of men at "less than 6000," and again the sources he provided did not mention Grant's Memoirs.

14. Varney writes of the post-Corinth pursuit: "Rosecrans infantry followed the confederates more than 40 miles and his cavalry almost 60. A push of fewer than 40 miles more would have put them in Vicksburg." This is wildly wrong. The pursuit ended at Ripley, which is 250 miles from Vicksburg.

15. Varney writes of the post-Chickamauga reinforcement: "But six weeks after he had been ordered to cooperate with Rosecrans, and two weeks after Chickamauga had been fought, nothing from Grant's command had moved so much as a mile in the direction of Chattanooga." The six weeks is false, and all the early orders were to send troops to Tuscumbia - which is 170 miles from Chattanooga. Varney's sentence is also false in that troops were in fact set in motion before the end of September.

16. Varney claimed that "... rebel forces were available to strengthen the Army of Tennessee because Ambrose Burnside and Ulysses S. Grant did not follow orders." This is false. Neither Burnside not Grant had anything do with the confederate reinforcement, and neither Burnside nor Grant received any orders in time to reinforce Rosecrans before the Battle of Chickamauga.

17. Varney accused Jean Edward Smith of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs for a paragraph about Chickamauga. This is false. Grant's Memoirs are not mentioned for that paragraph.

18. Varney wrote that "Grant insisted, when Lincoln asked him to take command of the situation in Chattanooga, that he would only do so on the condition of Rosecrans removal." Varney provided no source for this claim.

19. Varney wrote that "Rosecrans had barely reached Missouri" before Grant told Halleck that Rosecrans should be removed, and that Grant gave no reason. This is false on both counts. Rosecrans took command in Missouri in January 1864 and Grant wrote the letter recommending his removal in November 1864. So, it was 10 months later, not when he'd barely reached Missouri. Also, Grant certainly did give reasons in the letter Varney quoted.

Ned Baldwin deserves credit for several of these. His blog posts were the first to call out Varney's poor scholarship.

 

[Rhea Cole]

As I was reading your post I has this same thought.

It's remiscent of how, if he had gotten along with Lincoln, McClellan would have probably been much better choice for General in Chief than army commander. He built and organized armies well, and had good strategy. He faltered in the execution.

Unfortunately, I think this kind of tag team approach to command was probably beyond the capabilities of the Union Army to implement, especially considering the egos of many generals.



It's remarkable how two different people can view the same source material and sometimes come to very different conclusions about what it means. If you go looking for malfeasance you may well see it whether it's there or not.

Joshim, I agree that there are parallels between McClellan & Rosecrans. They were both engineers root, stem & branch. That training prepared them to each scale up & organize an army larger than anything that had ever been stood up in North America. The complexity of the task transcends the imagination of many of those who have made categorical pronouncements about both of them.

Because I live in Murfreesboro TN, Rosecrans' standing up the Army of the Cumberland is something that I am reminded of every time I leave home. I live a few blocks from both army & department HQ's. The massive remains of Fortress Rosecrans are where I walk with my grands & greats. The historic single track right of way of the Nashville & Chattanooga RR that leads through the 2,000 foot Monteagle Tunnel is a sonic constant from our screen porch. The CSX north & southbound freights hoot back & forth in the night sounding exactly like dinosaurs calls echoing. Can you imagine what the steam whistles must have sounded like signaling to their brake men as they do-se-doed hourly 24/7?

The sheer determination & innovative will power that went into the Department of the Cumberland's logisticians cannot be exaggerated. Whatever else there is to say about Rosecrans as a tactician, the six months between December '61 & June 62 were revolutionary. They literally changed the course of the war & set the stage everything that followed right up until Mother Bickerdyke rode with Sherman at the head of the Western Army

Varney's first book is all about how the historiography is riddled with errors and historians have been making so many mistakes about Grant and Rosecrans. So it's almost comical how many mistakes that Varney himself makes.

Here's the full list I made, but I didn't check out every source in his book. There's probably more.

1. Varney cited Dabney Maury's "after-action report" for a quote that was actually from Maury's memoirs written 30 years after the war, and Varney ignored Maury's conflicting opinions which were closer in time to the war.

2. Varney criticized historians Woodworth and Cozzens for not sourcing a quote which was critical of Rosecrans, when in fact both historians provided a source. Varney also claimed the anecdote was dubious because the regiment was not at the Battle of Corinth. This is false. In fact, the regiment (50th Illinois) was at the Battle of Corinth.

3. Varney claimed Grant wrote in his memoirs that he chose the commander of the Army of the Cumberland based on a message from Dana. This is false. That's not what Grant wrote.

4. Varney claimed that Burnside did not move concurrently with Rosecrans. This is false. Varney claimed Burnside had 43,000 troops when in fact it was closer to 18,000. Varney claimed the "inertness" of Burnside caused Bragg to order Buckner back. This is also false.

5. Varney claimed that Grant sent no reinforcements to the Army of the Cumberland until he was placed in overall command of the department. This is false.

6. Varney claimed that Dana arrived at Rosecrans HQ directly from Grant's HQ. This is false. Varney also wrote that there are no orders on record sending Dana to Rosecrans. This is also false.

7. Varney claimed that Rosecrans was held in such high regard that he served as an instructor at West Point while still a cadet. This is false. Rosecrans became an instructor after graduating.

8. Varney claimed that Grant wrote in his memoirs that he designed the "trap" at Iuka. This is false. Grant credited Rosecrans.

9. Varney claimed that Stanton and Grant retaliated against a widow named Truesdail by disapproving her pension. This is false. By Varney's own note, the widow applied for a pension in 1882 when Stanton was dead and Grant was a civilian.

10. Varney accused Woodworth of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about Grant's plans for the Battle of Corinth. This is false. The Woodworth paragraph actually lists several sources and none of them are Grant's Memoirs.

11. Likewise, Varney accused Woodworth of sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about the post-Corinth pursuit. And again, it's false. Woodworth's paragraph cites several sources and again does not mention Grant's Memoirs.

12. Varney claimed the Battle of Corinth ended at 2:00 pm and the confederate retreat wasn't "confirmed" until 6:00 pm, thereby making it too late for Rosecrans to pursue. Most sources, even Rosecrans, say the battle ended at noon.

13. Varney accused Woodworth of low-balling the size of Hurlbut's force at Hatchie Bridge at 4000 men, and sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs. This is false. Woodworth actually put the number of men at "less than 6000," and again the sources he provided did not mention Grant's Memoirs.

14. Varney writes of the post-Corinth pursuit: "Rosecrans infantry followed the confederates more than 40 miles and his cavalry almost 60. A push of fewer than 40 miles more would have put them in Vicksburg." This is wildly wrong. The pursuit ended at Ripley, which is 250 miles from Vicksburg.

15. Varney writes of the post-Chickamauga reinforcement: "But six weeks after he had been ordered to cooperate with Rosecrans, and two weeks after Chickamauga had been fought, nothing from Grant's command had moved so much as a mile in the direction of Chattanooga." The six weeks is false, and all the early orders were to send troops to Tuscumbia - which is 170 miles from Chattanooga. Varney's sentence is also false in that troops were in fact set in motion before the end of September.

16. Varney claimed that "... rebel forces were available to strengthen the Army of Tennessee because Ambrose Burnside and Ulysses S. Grant did not follow orders." This is false. Neither Burnside not Grant had anything do with the confederate reinforcement, and neither Burnside nor Grant received any orders in time to reinforce Rosecrans before the Battle of Chickamauga.

17. Varney accused Jean Edward Smith of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs for a paragraph about Chickamauga. This is false. Grant's Memoirs are not mentioned for that paragraph.

18. Varney wrote that "Grant insisted, when Lincoln asked him to take command of the situation in Chattanooga, that he would only do so on the condition of Rosecrans removal." Varney provided no source for this claim.

19. Varney wrote that "Rosecrans had barely reached Missouri" before Grant told Halleck that Rosecrans should be removed, and that Grant gave no reason. This is false on both counts. Rosecrans took command in Missouri in January 1864 and Grant wrote the letter recommending his removal in November 1864. So, it was 10 months later, not when he'd barely reached Missouri. Also, Grant certainly did give reasons in the letter Varney quoted.

Varney's first book is all about how the historiography is riddled with errors and historians have been making so many mistakes about Grant and Rosecrans. So it's almost comical how many mistakes that Varney himself makes.

Here's the full list I made, but I didn't check out every source in his book. There's probably more.

1. Varney cited Dabney Maury's "after-action report" for a quote that was actually from Maury's memoirs written 30 years after the war, and Varney ignored Maury's conflicting opinions which were closer in time to the war.

2. Varney criticized historians Woodworth and Cozzens for not sourcing a quote which was critical of Rosecrans, when in fact both historians provided a source. Varney also claimed the anecdote was dubious because the regiment was not at the Battle of Corinth. This is false. In fact, the regiment (50th Illinois) was at the Battle of Corinth.

3. Varney claimed Grant wrote in his memoirs that he chose the commander of the Army of the Cumberland based on a message from Dana. This is false. That's not what Grant wrote.

4. Varney claimed that Burnside did not move concurrently with Rosecrans. This is false. Varney claimed Burnside had 43,000 troops when in fact it was closer to 18,000. Varney claimed the "inertness" of Burnside caused Bragg to order Buckner back. This is also false.

5. Varney claimed that Grant sent no reinforcements to the Army of the Cumberland until he was placed in overall command of the department. This is false.

6. Varney claimed that Dana arrived at Rosecrans HQ directly from Grant's HQ. This is false. Varney also wrote that there are no orders on record sending Dana to Rosecrans. This is also false.

7. Varney claimed that Rosecrans was held in such high regard that he served as an instructor at West Point while still a cadet. This is false. Rosecrans became an instructor after graduating.

8. Varney claimed that Grant wrote in his memoirs that he designed the "trap" at Iuka. This is false. Grant credited Rosecrans.

9. Varney claimed that Stanton and Grant retaliated against a widow named Truesdail by disapproving her pension. This is false. By Varney's own note, the widow applied for a pension in 1882 when Stanton was dead and Grant was a civilian.

10. Varney accused Woodworth of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about Grant's plans for the Battle of Corinth. This is false. The Woodworth paragraph actually lists several sources and none of them are Grant's Memoirs.

11. Likewise, Varney accused Woodworth of sourcing Grant's Memoirs in a paragraph about the post-Corinth pursuit. And again, it's false. Woodworth's paragraph cites several sources and again does not mention Grant's Memoirs.

12. Varney claimed the Battle of Corinth ended at 2:00 pm and the confederate retreat wasn't "confirmed" until 6:00 pm, thereby making it too late for Rosecrans to pursue. Most sources, even Rosecrans, say the battle ended at noon.

13. Varney accused Woodworth of low-balling the size of Hurlbut's force at Hatchie Bridge at 4000 men, and sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs. This is false. Woodworth actually put the number of men at "less than 6000," and again the sources he provided did not mention Grant's Memoirs.

14. Varney writes of the post-Corinth pursuit: "Rosecrans infantry followed the confederates more than 40 miles and his cavalry almost 60. A push of fewer than 40 miles more would have put them in Vicksburg." This is wildly wrong. The pursuit ended at Ripley, which is 250 miles from Vicksburg.

15. Varney writes of the post-Chickamauga reinforcement: "But six weeks after he had been ordered to cooperate with Rosecrans, and two weeks after Chickamauga had been fought, nothing from Grant's command had moved so much as a mile in the direction of Chattanooga." The six weeks is false, and all the early orders were to send troops to Tuscumbia - which is 170 miles from Chattanooga. Varney's sentence is also false in that troops were in fact set in motion before the end of September.

16. Varney claimed that "... rebel forces were available to strengthen the Army of Tennessee because Ambrose Burnside and Ulysses S. Grant did not follow orders." This is false. Neither Burnside not Grant had anything do with the confederate reinforcement, and neither Burnside nor Grant received any orders in time to reinforce Rosecrans before the Battle of Chickamauga.

17. Varney accused Jean Edward Smith of sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs for a paragraph about Chickamauga. This is false. Grant's Memoirs are not mentioned for that paragraph.

18. Varney wrote that "Grant insisted, when Lincoln asked him to take command of the situation in Chattanooga, that he would only do so on the condition of Rosecrans removal." Varney provided no source for this claim.

19. Varney wrote that "Rosecrans had barely reached Missouri" before Grant told Halleck that Rosecrans should be removed, and that Grant gave no reason. This is false on both counts. Rosecrans took command in Missouri in January 1864 and Grant wrote the letter recommending his removal in November 1864. So, it was 10 months later, not when he'd barely reached Missouri. Also, Grant certainly did give reasons in the letter Varney quoted.

DanSBHawk has kindly given us a textbook example of why real historians have their manuscripts peer reviewed.

There is nothing like a read through by a variety of knowledgeable readers & a good editor. I, for one, find proofreading my own copy extremely vexing.

In my experience, crank theorists such as the author in question don't want to hear anything that contradicts their concoctions… the sound of one hand clapping, indeed.

 

[tony_gunter]

Apparently you haven't studied the Tullahoma Campaign, which was an absolutely brilliantly conceived and executed campaign of maneuver.

Was Tullahoma a "campaign" tho? Wasn't it really part of a larger campaign that terminated in the Battle of Chickamauga?

We covered this extensively when I compared Grant's Mississippi Overland Campaign, which was terminated December 5th by Halleck before it could achieve any of its strategic objectives. Nobody calls it brilliant, even though it was remarkably similar.

 

[tony_gunter]

Was William S Rosecrans arguably the most talented strategist of all Union generals?

He had some pretty terrible operational security ... I just was reading through this material, a Confederate report warning of Streight's Raid *two months* before it launched.

TULLAHOMA, February 11, 1863.

Brigadier-General DONELSON:

GENERAL: I have just seen a letter to a general officer of this army from an acquaintance of his whose residence is north of the Cumberland, in which it is stated that mules [pack] have been passing out of Kentucky to Nashville since January. The last lot passed last week. The whole number is 3,000. It is further stated that these mules are to be used in an expedition from General Rosecrans' army into East Tennessee, the troops to have neither personal baggage nor wagons, and their subsistence stores to be carried by these pack-mules. Would it not be well to give this information to Brigadier-General Pegram, that he may be on the watch, and near enough to oppose this party or operate on its flank or rear, as the case may be? I hope to see you in Knoxville in two or three days.

Most respectfully, &c.,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Was Tullahoma a "campaign" tho? Wasn't it really part of a larger campaign that terminated in the Battle of Chickamauga?

We covered this extensively when I compared Grant's Mississippi Overland Campaign, which was terminated December 5th by Halleck before it could achieve any of its strategic objectives. Nobody calls it brilliant, even though it was remarkably similar.

The Tullahoma Campsign is aptly named. It really was a discrete operation that was the fruit of six months careful preparation & planning.

For example, the disinformation campaign that convinced absolutely everybody that Rosecrans' attack would be via the Shelbyville axis. There were many excellent reasons to believe that was true, just look at a map.

Rosecrans was willing to take extreme measures to maintain the illusion. An otherwise tragicomic footnote of campaign was the execution of two CSA officers who inexplicably road into Union lines wearing Inion uniforms. All evidence is that then & now nobody knows what they were up to. So, why the summery executions?

The answer is a simple one. It was feared that the officers could only have undertaken such a perilous venture for one reason only. That was to uncover the elaborate deception Rosecrans was engaged in.

Over the visual signal net preemptory orders were waved. In plain language it would have read, kill them now. No chance of Forrest making a foray to rescue them could be risked. The botched nature of the execution is testimony to how he urgency with which it was carried out.

Once the Army of the Cumberland reached the top of Monteagle Mountain, the gateway into the Highland Plateau, it became a logistic & engineering operation. Only when that highly complex task was completed could it he perilous crossing of the Tennessee b accomplished.

My personal way of addressing the June to October 1863 Campsigns is to call it the Tullahoma/Chattanooga Campaign.

In the final phase it should be called the Cumberland Gap / Knoxville / Sequatchie Valley / Chattanooga / N&CRR Campaign… albeit that is a lot to have to write in over & over.

 

[tony_gunter]

The Tullahoma Campsign is aptly named. It really was a discrete operation that was the fruit of six months careful preparation & planning.

Just because Rosecrans spent an overly long time planning it doesn't necessarily make it a distinct campaign tho ... and if we do consider it a campaign designed to push forward 50 miles in order to better situate a second campaign, we need to consider Grant's 100 mile push from Grand Junction, TN to Grenada, MS to be a distinct campaign, equally brilliant.

 

[DanSBHawk]

DanSBHawk has kindly given us a textbook example of why real historians have their manuscripts peer reviewed.

There is nothing like a read through by a variety of knowledgeable readers & a good editor. I, for one, find proofreading my own copy extremely vexing.

The thing that struck me is,... if a publisher has an author like this that makes many criticisms of respected historians, and this author makes these criticisms the premise of the book and the core of his argument, wouldn't you think the publisher would want to verify the criticisms before publishing the book?

Doesn't it reflect badly on the publisher if the author is making false accusations? How does someone like Varney even get published?

 

[Rhea Cole]

The thing that struck me is,... if a publisher has an author like this that makes many criticisms of respected historians, and this author makes these criticisms the premise of the book and the core of his argument, wouldn't you think the publisher would want to verify the criticisms before publishing the book?

Doesn't it reflect badly on the publisher if the author is making false accusations? How does someone like Varney even get published?

The only answer I can offer is self-published. An early lesson I learned when I started out as a commercial artist is that the author hope & the illustrator do not meet or coordinate. I found out why when I went to see a self publishing ranting crank about a job… lesson learned.

A book with the egregious errors you have noted never passed through the hand of an editor, which is the hallmark of self-publishing.

 

[wausaubob]

Apparently you haven't studied the Tullahoma Campaign, which was an absolutely brilliantly conceived and executed campaign of maneuver.

But it was not a strategic exercise. It was an operational plan which kept the Confederates off balance as Rosecrans and Thomas were able to shield their forces behind the hills and mountains. Prior to airial surveillance and telephones, the mountains could be used for concealment.

 

[wausaubob]

Was not Rosecrans' move in dividing his army an attempt to replicate his brilliant Tullahoma campaign in the mountains beyond Chattanooga? Bragg may have caught wind of the movement, tried to destroy elements of the AotC in detail, but failed to do so, which allowed Rosecrans time to re-concentrate the army along Chickamauga Creek. I don't necessarily see a direct connection between the original force division and the subsequent defeat at Chickamauga.

But that is not strategy. That is working at the operational level, directing the movement of forces not directly in contact with the enemy. Strategy involves creating and deploying forces that will produce success at war and achieve the political objectives of that belligerent.