Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[American87]

Why not simply take Long streets advice and move around the Union position southwest towards Washington? Meade would have followed and been forced to attack. Given a strong defensive position, there is no reason Lee could not have been able to score victory. Remember, Meade had prepared just such a defensive position at Pipe's Creek.

Lee knew that Meade's army was approaching from the south. Moreover, if Lee moved when Longstreet suggested, they would have left Pickett's division lagging behind. A move to the south would've met a meeting engagement-randomly running into the enemy-since Lee did not have enough cavalry to recon. his advance. It would have been a total shot in the dark, and Lee would have had no idea what ground he would meet the Unionists on or how many troops would be in his front, flank, even rear perhaps. Again, he would also have left Pickett's division behind, which would have had to fend for itself in keeping up with the rest of the army.

Meade also would not have to attack. It depends on which position Lee took up, but Meade may have been able to manuever around Lee's army and get in his rear, similar to what Hooker and Lee did to each other at Chancellorsville. Lee anticipated this by endeavoring to cross the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg; that would have place a strong natural barrier between the two armies. Lee would be free to move east of the river and guard against a Union crossing. This is kind of-sort of the idea Longstreet had in mind, but Longstreets method was was open to debate on too many grounds.

 

[rpkennedy]

On day 2, Lee planned to take Cemetery Hill from the flank and rear as early as possible. Had Longstreet been up much earlier than he was, the Union position would've been weak enough to take. However, as Longstreet had all night to march and still arrived about four hours after sunrise, the Union troops had time to be reinforced, and they strengthened Cemetery Ridge.

Lee had no plan to attack early on July 2. It wasn't until mid morning that he had received Captain Johnston's report and put together his plan to attack en echelon against the Union left flank. Even then, Longstreet asked for and received permission to wait to move until Law's Brigade arrived.

When Lee had to come up with a new plan after Longstreet arrived, he based it off faulty intelligence. He was under the impression that the southern end of Cemetery Ridge was clear of Union troops, and he sent Longstreet down there to turn the flank. Longstreet, however, found the position occupied. Longstreet made the decision to attack without notifying Lee of the changed situation, and his attack was piecemeal. Had he ordered Hood and McLaws to advance in some formation they might have succeeded, or maybe the position was too strong no matter what he did.

Longstreet carried out the attack as Lee intended. It wasn't a piecemeal attack but en echelon from right to left. Lee was quite specific about what he wanted and Longstreet carried Lee's wishes out, perhaps too much to the letter. It also didn't help that Hood went down when his attack was already starting to go off track.

As for day 3, Lee's original plan was to resume the attack of July 2nd. Longstreet, again, argued and bickered until Lee called it off. Even Freeman, Lee's chief biographer, called Lee's amiability a "positive weakness."

You are right that Lee wanted to resume his attack early on July 3 but circumstances forced him to alter his plans. Longstreet, informed of a further attack on his front, took the leeway in Lee's orders and began preparing to move further to the right, which was not what Lee wanted. In addition, the Twelfth Corps attacked Ewell at first light on July 3 with the battle raging until about 11 when Ewell was forced to pull back. Longstreet can certainly be criticized for his actions early on July 3 because he took actions which he knew were against Lee's wishes and plans but that he could argue were within the parameters of Lee's orders.

In my opinion Lee's amiability got the better of him. Longstreet took advantage of this and resisted orders until Lee fell back on the least desirable option. Lee wasn't going to leave Gettysburg without a fight, and he accomated his lieutenants as much as possible without actually abandoning the field.

Lee's command style certainly didn't help him at Gettysburg but there were failings up and down Confederate command corps. Virtually no Confederate general was at his best and the Army of the Potomac fought the battle of the war.

Ryan

 

[American87]

Lee had no plan to attack early on July 2. It wasn't until mid morning that he had received Captain Johnston's report and put together his plan to attack en echelon against the Union left flank. Even then, Longstreet asked for and received permission to wait to move until Law's Brigade arrived.

I've seen people say this before, but I don't know where it comes from. Do you have a source for it? Longstreet wrote that on the 1st he was ordered to attack on the 2nd, and this is corroborated by several other sources including AL Long, who Longstreet corroborates, Ewell, and Early (both during and after the war.) All these sources agree Lee planned on the 1st to attack the rear of Cemetery Ridge early on the morning of the 2nd.

Lee did not plan the en echelon attack up the south end of Cemetery Ridge until Longstreet arrived too late for the original plan to work.

Longstreet carried out the attack as Lee intended. It wasn't a piecemeal attack but en echelon from right to left. Lee was quite specific about what he wanted and Longstreet carried Lee's wishes out, perhaps too much to the letter. It also didn't help that Hood went down when his attack was already starting to go off track.

Longstreet's attack may appear to be en echelon, but he sent in McLaws too late for it to be effective. It was, in effect, one division attacking, then another coming up later. Hood had been engaged too long for McLaws' advance to have the effect of a true en echelon attack.

I have been curious for a while now about Longstreet's orders to Hood and McLaws. I'm not sure he wrote any, but he kept McLaws from advancing for a long time.

You are right that Lee wanted to resume his attack early on July 3 but circumstances forced him to alter his plans. Longstreet, informed of a further attack on his front, took the leeway in Lee's orders and began preparing to move further to the right, which was not what Lee wanted. In addition, the Twelfth Corps attacked Ewell at first light on July 3 with the battle raging until about 11 when Ewell was forced to pull back. Longstreet can certainly be criticized for his actions early on July 3 because he took actions which he knew were against Lee's wishes and plans but that he could argue were within the parameters of Lee's orders.

Longstreet may have been acting within his parameters on the 3rd before he arrive, your memory seems fresher than mine here. But Lee did arrive on the ground and tell Longstreet to resume his attack from the day before, which Longstreet refused to do-and this had nothing to do with flanking Big Round Top.

Lee's command style certainly didn't help him at Gettysburg but there were failings up and down Confederate command corps. Virtually no Confederate general was at his best and the Army of the Potomac fought the battle of the war.

Ryan

I agree. This was the hight point of the Army of the Potomac. The Confederates made mistakes up and down the line, but Lee's plans for the 2nd and 3rd were in part determined by his submission to Longstreet. Lee was too kind, and Longstreet was too imposing. Lee may have thought he was making Longstreet feel important, which he was, but if Lee took a strong arm he could have gotten more done in my opinion.

 

[rpkennedy]

I've seen people say this before, but I don't know where it comes from. Do you have a source for it? Longstreet wrote that on the 1st he was ordered to attack on the 2nd, and this is corroborated by several other sources including AL Long, who Longstreet corroborates, Ewell, and Early (both during and after the war.) All these sources agree Lee planned on the 1st to attack the rear of Cemetery Ridge early on the morning of the 2nd.

Let me rephrase, there is no contemporary evidence that there was an intention for a dawn attack. Captain Johnston was not sent out on his reconnaissance until around dawn and did not return until some time after 9am. Lee wrote, "Under these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about 4 miles in the rear during the night." If Longstreet was supposed to make a dawn attack, even Lee did not act as if one was being missed. Much of the literature of a dawn attack was in the back and forth between Longstreet and Early, et al. in the years after Lee's death when Longstreet began criticizing Lee and Early was bashing Longstreet.

Longstreet's attack may appear to be en echelon, but he sent in McLaws too late for it to be effective. It was, in effect, one division attacking, then another coming up later. Hood had been engaged too long for McLaws' advance to have the effect of a true en echelon attack.

I have been curious for a while now about Longstreet's orders to Hood and McLaws. I'm not sure he wrote any, but he kept McLaws from advancing for a long time.

I disagree that Longstreet held McLaws too long. The whole point was for Hood to launch his assault and draw troops in his direction which may have led to a weak point on McLaws' front. Besides, Kershaw was not really all that far behind Anderson's Brigade with Anderson eventually attacking alongside the Palmetto boys.

Longstreet may have been acting within his parameters on the 3rd before he arrive, your memory seems fresher than mine here. But Lee did arrive on the ground and tell Longstreet to resume his attack from the day before, which Longstreet refused to do-and this had nothing to do with flanking Big Round Top.

Longstreet offered to attack as soon as Pickett was up but when Lee asked how far back he was, it was explained that Pickett was several hours to the rear and simply would not be up much before mid-morning. That was far too late for an early attack and Ewell was already heavily engaged on Culp's Hill so Lee decided that he was going to need a Plan B.

I agree. This was the hight point of the Army of the Potomac. The Confederates made mistakes up and down the line, but Lee's plans for the 2nd and 3rd were in part determined by his submission to Longstreet. Lee was too kind, and Longstreet was too imposing. Lee may have thought he was making Longstreet feel important, which he was, but if Lee took a strong arm he could have gotten more done in my opinion.

We'll have to agree to disagree here. The plans were all Lee and were very much against Longstreet's wishes. And Lee taking a strong arm simply wasn't his style and I'm not sure that the army would have been any more efficient if he had since it would have been so out of character.

Ryan

 

[WJC]

Lee's plans for the 2nd and 3rd were in part determined by his submission to Longstreet. Lee was too kind, and Longstreet was too imposing. Lee may have thought he was making Longstreet feel important, which he was, but if Lee took a strong arm he could have gotten more done in my opinion.

Mention Lee and one immediately visualizes that grey-haired man standing in front of his Richmond home after the war. He looks like the kindest, gentlest of grandfathers.
But the more one studies Lee it becomes clear that in war, he was a ruthless, domineering, fearless, no-nonsense warrior who could be a cold-blooded killer in combat. He was not intimidated by anyone or anything.
To suggest that Longstreet or anyone else could intimidate him is nonsense.

 

[American87]

Let me rephrase, there is no contemporary evidence that there was an intention for a dawn attack. Captain Johnston was not sent out on his reconnaissance until around dawn and did not return until some time after 9am. Lee wrote, "Under these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about 4 miles in the rear during the night." If Longstreet was supposed to make a dawn attack, even Lee did not act as if one was being missed. Much of the literature of a dawn attack was in the back and forth between Longstreet and Early, et al. in the years after Lee's death when Longstreet began criticizing Lee and Early was bashing Longstreet.

There are three pieces of contemporary evidence, at least. One was the order of Longstreet's chief of artillery, who on the 1st wrote his men to be in preparation for a battle. The second is Ewell's report, which stated that Lee had given out plans for him and Longstreet to attack before any reconaissance was sent out, let lone returned, during the morning. Early's report says the same thing.

Longstreet, after the war, simply said that on the 1st he was ordered to attack early the next day. His chief of artillery's order corroborates this.

AL Long wrote the same thing after the war, explaining the conference Longstreet spoke about, and mentioning that AP Hill was there.

Ewell's report, a contemporary source, mentions the same thing.

Early's report, a contemporary source, also mentions it.

Early also wrote a statement after the war, explaining how Lee came to the Second Corps Headquarters to explain his plans to Ewell and others. However, some modern historians have let their Longstreet sympathies get the better of them by throwing out literally everything Early wrote of the war. This is because Early remembered Lee as saying the attack was to be at sunrise, although really the attack was merely supposed to be as early as possible.

Lee did not openly censure others in his reports. When he said he was waiting for Longstreet's arrival, he is leaving it obvious that Longstreet was 4 miles away the night before, but that it took him about 12 hours or more to make that march. He could not attack as planned because Longstreet was taking forever to get to the field. There fore he "had to wait for Longstreet's arrival." At that point the Union troops had Cemetery Ridge defended, and Lee had to draw up a new plan based on his recon. reports.

Where did you get this whole "Lee waited until late the next morning" narrative from? I have asked others, but no one has been able or willing to share.

I disagree that Longstreet held McLaws too long. The whole point was for Hood to launch his assault and draw troops in his direction which may have led to a weak point on McLaws' front. Besides, Kershaw was not really all that far behind Anderson's Brigade with Anderson eventually attacking alongside the Palmetto boys.

I have no idea what Longstreet's tactical intentions were, as I have never seen his orders to Hood and McLaws. I think they were verbal only. In that case, Longstreet ordered Hood to advance. Then, he waited a while. Then, he ordered McLaws to advance.

This is not en echelon, because Longstreet deprived Hood of McLaws' flank support. That much was intentional. Longstreet and McLaws both observed the fighting, and McLaws even grew impatient at Longstreet's delay. By the time Longstreet gave him the ok, it was too late for any tactical formation to take place. It was a piecemeal attack. Maybe he made a mistake in judgement, and wasn't just brooding, but he did not do anything by the book.

Longstreet offered to attack as soon as Pickett was up but when Lee asked how far back he was, it was explained that Pickett was several hours to the rear and simply would not be up much before mid-morning. That was far too late for an early attack and Ewell was already heavily engaged on Culp's Hill so Lee decided that he was going to need a Plan B.

Longstreet doesn't "offer" to attack. That is insubordination. He argued and bickered until Lee's amiability got the better of him, and he decided to make Longstreet feel important by ceding to his desires.

We'll have to agree to disagree here. The plans were all Lee and were very much against Longstreet's wishes. And Lee taking a strong arm simply wasn't his style and I'm not sure that the army would have been any more efficient if he had since it would have been so out of character.

Ryan

I agree that the plans were Lee's, as much as Longstreet stuck by them. But they were not Lee's original plans. Lee's first plan was to attack Cemetery Ridge as early as possible, but he had to change this when Longstreet arrived late. His second plan was to attack the southern end of Cemetery Ridge, but this went to pieces because his recon. was faulty and Longstreet delievered a piecemeal attack (It may have failed even if Longstreet delivered a solid attack). The third plan was to resume the attack on the 3rd, which Longstreet resisted.

They were all Lee's plans. He was polite to a fault.

 

[American87]

Mention Lee and one immediately visualizes that grey-haired man standing in front of his Richmond home after the war. He looks like the kindest, gentlest of grandfathers.
But the more one studies Lee it becomes clear that in war, he was a ruthless, domineering, fearless, no-nonsense warrior who could be a cold-blooded killer in combat. He was not intimidated by anyone or anything.
To suggest that Longstreet or anyone else could intimidate him is nonsense.

It's interesting you mention that. Lee did not overcome his "amiability weakness" until after Longstreet was wounded in the Wilderness. If you had picked an earlier picture of him, he would not look like he had just been marching and fighting for weeks without food or sleep, which he had been.

 

[WJC]

Longstreet doesn't "offer" to attack. That is insubordination. He argued and bickered until Lee's amiability got the better of him, and he decided to make Longstreet feel important by ceding to his desires.

Interesting speculation, but only speculation.

 

[WJC]

It's interesting you mention that. Lee did not overcome his "amiability weakness" until after Longstreet was wounded in the Wilderness. If you had picked an earlier picture of him, he would not look like he had just been marching and fighting for weeks without food or sleep, which he had been.

Thanks for your response.
I am uncertain of your point: are you suggesting that Lee was not fit for duty at Gettysburg? I believe we've all heard the speculation of Lee's ailment that may have colored his judgment. As I've read those excuses, I often wonder what Lee would say about them. I suspect he would dismiss them, saying "if a soldier is well enough to be on the field, he is well enough to fight."

 

[American87]

Interesting speculation, but only speculation.

That's not speculation. Lee was the commanding officer, so he gave the orders. A subordinate does not dicate to his superiors. Why do you think this is speculation?

 

[WJC]

That's not speculation. Lee was the commanding officer, so he gave the orders. A subordinate does not dicate to his superiors. Why do you think this is speculation?

Thanks for your response.
"Lee's amiability got the better of him, and he decided to make Longstreet feel important by ceding to his desires." Speculation.

 

[American87]

Thanks for your response.
I am uncertain of your point: are you suggesting that Lee was not fit for duty at Gettysburg? I believe we've all heard the speculation of Lee's ailment that may have colored his judgment. As I've read those excuses, I often wonder what Lee would say about them. I suspect he would dismiss them, saying "if a soldier is well enough to be on the field, he is well enough to fight."

I'm saying Lee had a temperament that did not mix well with some others on the battlefield. He was polite and accomodating, and he had confidence in his resourcefulness. If a subordinate was relcutant to follow a certain order, Lee would accomodate him and come up with a new plan. He did this on several occasions, including at Gettysburg with Longstreet. This is why he changed his plans on the mornings of July 2nd and 3rd.

 

[American87]

Thanks for your response.
"Lee's amiability got the better of him, and he decided to make Longstreet feel important by ceding to his desires." Speculation.

Lee was being amiable by ceding to Longstreet's desires, even though he, Lee, wanted Longstreet to attack. This is accomodation, or making others feel important by ceding to their wishes. It can be used for diplomacy over the long run, or in a pinch it can be a weakness.

 

[WJC]

I'm saying Lee had a temperament that did not mix well with some others on the battlefield. He was polite and accomodating, and he had confidence in his resourcefulness. If a subordinate was relcutant to follow a certain order, Lee would accomodate him and come up with a new plan. He did this on several occasions, including at Gettysburg with Longstreet. This is why he changed his plans on the mornings of July 2nd and 3rd.

Thanks for your response.
So there were no other, practical factors influencing Lee's decision? Lee went into Pennsylvania intent on fighting a great battle, one that would win the war. He hadn't planned for it to be at Gettysburg, but since it started there, he wanted to win. He was ready to do everything in his power to WIN!
That required the 'cold-blooded killer' Lee, not the 'kindly, gentle grandfather' Lee. He knew plans are made to be modified, changed or even abandoned depending on circumstances, so since the circumstances had changed, it made sense to modify his plan. But he did not change his plan simply to "accommodate" a subordinate.
Lee was far too professional for that.

 

[WJC]

Lee was being amiable by ceding to Longstreet's desires, even though he, Lee, wanted Longstreet to attack. This is accomodation, or making others feel important by ceding to their wishes. It can be used for diplomacy over the long run, or in a pinch it can be a weakness.

Thanks for your response.
I don't believe 'amiability' had anything to do with it.

 

[Jamieva]

I'm saying Lee had a temperament that did not mix well with some others on the battlefield. He was polite and accomodating, and he had confidence in his resourcefulness. If a subordinate was relcutant to follow a certain order, Lee would accomodate him and come up with a new plan. He did this on several occasions, including at Gettysburg with Longstreet. This is why he changed his plans on the mornings of July 2nd and 3rd.

Please cite other examples of this

 

[American87]

Thanks for your response.
So there were no other, practical factors influencing Lee's decision? Lee went into Pennsylvania intent on fighting a great battle, one that would win the war. He hadn't planned for it to be at Gettysburg, but since it started there, he wanted to win. He was ready to do everything in his power to WIN!
That required the 'cold-blooded killer' Lee, not the 'kindly, gentle grandfather' Lee. He knew plans are made to be modified, changed or even abandoned depending on circumstances, so since the circumstances had changed, it made sense to modify his plan. But he did not change his plan simply to "accommodate" a subordinate.
Lee was far too professional for that.

Thanks for your response.

I agree that Lee changed his plans, at times, due to circumstance, but I guess every general does this. He had to change his plan for an early attack on July 2nd because Longstreet took over 12 hours to march 4 miles, even though he was ordered to attack as early as possible. Lee did not accomodate here, but acted on changed conditions.

On the morning of July 3rd, Lee wanted Longstreet to resume the attack he had made on the 2nd, and Longstreet bickered and bickered. Lee decided to call off the attack and charge the Union center. Lee was not adjusting to new conditions, he was adjusting to an insuborindate officer who made it clear he did not want to follow orders and continue the attack.

 

[American87]

Thanks for your response.
I don't believe 'amiability' had anything to do with it.

Thanks for your resposne.

Then why do you think Lee decided to call off the attack and charge the Union center instead?

 

[American87]

Please cite other examples of this

At Second Manassas, Lee "suggested" to Longstreet that he attack Pope's flank. Longstreet refused. Lee could have stepped in and ended the battle a day sooner. It was not until the following day, when Jackson asked for reinforcements, that Longstreet charged.

In the West Virginia campaign, Lee ceded control of the forces operating against Cheat Mountain to General Loring. Lee was the ranking officer, had a plan for taking the Union position, and was vexed at Loring's unncessary delays, but he preferred to let Loring run things and use diplomacy to try to get what he wanted.

He did the same thing in the Kanawha Valley of West Virginia with General Floyd.

He also did it with Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, when Jackson decided to take his whole corps, and not just a fraction of it, on his flank march around Hooker's rear.

 

[WJC]

why do you think Lee decided to call off the attack and charge the Union center instead?

Thanks for your response.
I don't believe he did change his plans to assault the center of the US position. When circumstances changed, he executed that portion of his original plan.
Lee clearly described the situation on July 3, 1863:

The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early's division.
General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.
After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 p.m.​

<Lee's Last Official Report For The Battle of Gettysburg, O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44].
http://civilwarhome.com/leelastgettysburgor.htm>
So Lee planned a simultaneous attack on both the US right and center. However, the attack on the US right was abandoned after US forces initiated an exhausting action early in the morning of July 3, 1863. Lee adjusted his plan, deciding to rely on only the assault on the US center.