Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

Longstreet was napping, or as he described it, 'laying down with my eyes closed.' He was also drunk later when he was arranging troops for a possible Union counterattack.
Again, do you have a contemporaneous source for this allegation?
Nowhere have I seen an allegation that Longstreet was drunk as you describe, not even from his most severe critics.
 
Drunk.
That is a very serious accusation that you need to back up with primary sources...

And really "fetish for the tactical defense" sound to me like you only ever read popular history of the war.
(Jackson was the attacking guy and Longstreet the defensive guy)

At 2nd Bull run it was Longstreets attack that broke the union army. (after Jackson had held the line against heavy attacks)
Arguably Lee's greatest victory.

At Chickamauga is was also Longstreets attack that broke the Union army.

At the Wilderness Longstreets counterattack causes serious damage to Grants army.

Longstreet commanded some of the most effective CSA attacks of the war.

It’s not serious. It’s fun. Grant drank too. Do you need a source? Grant and Longstreet were friends. They probably drank together. But Grant was good so no one cares. Longstreet is an overrated boor, to be fair. But since you asked, the source is Fremantle the Brits account, and McLaws report, where he describes the interesting orders Longstreet gave under the influence.
 
Lee's general plan was unchanged in the sense that he was still attacking the Union position.
Thanks for your response.
Even a "general plan" requires detail, something more than "still attacking the Union position". Lee's report clearly states (1) "it was determined to continue the attack"; (2) in the same manner as on July 2, 1863. If he only intended to communicate his intent of "attacking the Union position" he needn't have added, "The general
plan was unchanged." He was clearly stating that his expectation was a repeat of the plan for the second day that nearly succeeded. In his own words:
The result of this day's [July 2, 1863] operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged.​
<Lee's Last Official Report For The Battle of Gettysburg, O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44].
http://civilwarhome.com/leelastgettysburgor.htm>
 
It’s not serious. It’s fun. Grant drank too. Do you need a source? Grant and Longstreet were friends. They probably drank together. But Grant was good so no one cares. Longstreet is an overrated boor, to be fair. But since you asked, the source is Fremantle the Brits account, and McLaws report, where he describes the interesting orders Longstreet gave under the influence.
Nowhere in Fremantle's account does he state that Longstreet was drunk. He was not with Longstreet during the assault of July 3, 1863, joining him after it was repulsed. Longstreet had already arranged a defensive position in anticipation of a US counterattack. This was being done, according to Fremantle:
He asked for something to drink: I gave him some rum out of my silver flask, which I begged he would keep in remembrance of the occasion; He smiled, and, to my great satisfaction, accepted the memorial. He then went off to give some orders to McLaw's division.​
<Arthur Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April, June, 1863. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1863), p. 267.>
This is certainly evidence that after the assault Longstreet took a drink of rum. It is not evidence that "Longstreet drank alcohol during the Charge and gave orders under the influence" as Fremantle wasn't with Longstreet at that time.
 
Read the report again. Lee said Longstreet was supposed to resume the attack on the morning of the 3rd, but that his dispositions were not made as early as expected. Later on, he says the attack on the enemy's left (Longstreet's front) was not made, allowing the Union troops to defend their right (at least that's how Lee saw it.)
Thanks for your response.
You may be misinterpreting Lee's statement:
His [Meade's] batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance works, and capturing some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back with heavy loss.​
<Lee's Last Official Report For The Battle of Gettysburg, O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44].
http://civilwarhome.com/leelastgettysburgor.htm>
Clearly, Lee credits his right- Longstreet- with "penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance works, and capturing some of his artillery". He was well aware, it seems, that Longstreet had indeed "made the attack on the enemy's left".
 
Nowhere in Fremantle's account does he state that Longstreet was drunk. He was not with Longstreet during the assault of July 3, 1863, joining him after it was repulsed. Longstreet had already arranged a defensive position in anticipation of a US counterattack. This being done, according to Fremantle:
He asked for something to drink: I gave him some rum out of my silver flask, which I begged he would keep in remembrance of the occasion; He smiled, and, to my great satisfaction, accepted the memorial. He then went off to give some orders to McLaw's division.​
<Arthur Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April, June, 1863. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1863), p. 267.>
This is certainly evidence that after the assault Longstreet took a drink of rum. It is not evidence that "Longstreet drank alcohol during the Charge and gave orders under the influence" as Fremantle wasn't with Longstreet at that time.

Yes read McLaws report. Longstreet was intoxicated and giving confused orders. He should have been court martialed but Lee never did such things.
 
Yes read McLaws report. Longstreet was intoxicated and giving confused orders. He should have been court martialed but Lee never did such things.
Thanks for your response.
Please post the portion of McLaw's report that claims that "Longstreet was intoxicated".
 
It’s not serious. It’s fun. Grant drank too. Do you need a source? Grant and Longstreet were friends. They probably drank together. But Grant was good so no one cares. Longstreet is an overrated boor, to be fair. But since you asked, the source is Fremantle the Brits account, and McLaws report, where he describes the interesting orders Longstreet gave under the influence.
And now you show us the quotes.
Or give us the exact books, with page number...
 
To me, the question is not why Lee attack
I forget the detail, but he tried having Alexander issue the attack. It was immature. Longstreet should've done his duty and followed orders. Instead he had a fetish for the tactical defense and wasted valuable time trying to take command in the West. Longstreet was an idiot. He had some tactical skills, definitely, but he could not cooperate with others and he was a complete buffon with his strategic-tactical defensive plans.



In ref. to the general ineffectiveness of Longstreet on Days 2 and 3, I agree. At Gettysburg, time was of the essence of success for Lee and Longstreet, et. al., seems to have been a great waster of time, on plans he did not agree with.

In ref. to the OP, it seems Lee attacked because he thought he could command his corps commanders, instead of having to negotiating with them.
 
At Gettysburg, time was of the essence of success for Lee and Longstreet, et. al., seems to have been a great waster of time, on plans he did not agree with.
Lee's intention in June-July 1863 was to bring on a battle with the Army of the Potomac. He was confident of victory and believed that a victory in Pennsylvania could win the war.
Unfortunately for Lee, when he did encounter the AofP at Gettysburg, his forces were dispersed over a wide area. This positioning of his army and the inability to quickly move such large forces over the roads leading into Gettysburg was a far greater problem for him than some alleged intransigence by Longstreet.
Further, if Lee was concerned about Longstreet's lack of enthusiasm for the assault on July 3, 1863, he should have put another officer in charge, one who supported the plan. Early was just such a general. Yet given the opportunity to make a change, he entrusted the assault to Longstreet.
 
To me, the question is not why Lee attack




In ref. to the general ineffectiveness of Longstreet on Days 2 and 3, I agree. At Gettysburg, time was of the essence of success for Lee and Longstreet, et. al., seems to have been a great waster of time, on plans he did not agree with.

In ref. to the OP, it seems Lee attacked because he thought he could command his corps commanders, instead of having to negotiating with them.

In all fairness, Lee didn't really seem to be in a rush to get things done either. There didn't seem to be a sense of urgency for many in the Army of Northern Virginia.

Ryan
 
In all fairness, Lee didn't really seem to be in a rush to get things done either. There didn't seem to be a sense of urgency for many in the Army of Northern Virginia.

Ryan

I have long thought that Lee was not well-served by his staff and commanders at Gettysburg. I think that had an impact on his decision making not often discussed. IMHO:
  • Longstreet was a bit mulish and difficult on Day 2 (although not quite as bad as often pictured. He is reluctant to give enthusiastic support to an attack he sees as doomed to a bloody repulse on Day 3, but does a decent job anyway.
  • A. P. Hill seems to be a non-entity for most of the battle. Even on Day 1, it is hard to determine how he impacted the battle.
  • Ewell has a good result on Day 1, but also seems to be uninvolved on Day 2 and 3. His troops fight, but he doesn't drive the battle, leading to the impression he is too dependent on Jubal Early.
  • Stuart does well enough on Day 3, but his absence during the raid led to problems with Lee's control and intel in the campaign.
  • Lee's staff (incredibly small) lost track of Robertson's cavalry, leading to the intel failure East of South Mountain, leading to the battle. During the battle, Lee's LOC between commands functioned poorly (small staff, difficult routes and distances for couriers, some foot-dragging by higher commanders)
  • Lee himself seems off. Perhaps it was his heart problem. Perhaps it was his sense of urgency being frustrated by the experience of Hill/Ewell replacing Jackson or the effect of Stuart's absence disrupting his intel. Maybe it was the sinking feeling that he needed a big victory now and watching as it slipped away just out of reach. Whatever the reason, July 3 was not Lee's finest hour.
On July 3, Lee has an incorrect understanding of the situation. He doesn't grasp how hard the battle has been on the divisions of Heth and Pender. I don't think he understands what July 2 did to Hood's and McLaw's divisions. He probably over-estimates the damage done to the AoP on July 1-2 (severe though it was) and he does not think they can possibly be all up yet (not knowing about the arrival of the VI Corps, the largest AoP corps or the extra ammo train Hunt has been dragging along with the AoP).

Given all that, Lee based his plan on a picture of a much smaller, badly-hammered AoP with no real reserve to counter a breakthrough over-extended on the high ground across from him. If that's the case, a strong blow preceded by a massive bombardment makes sense: crack the middle and the entire position collapses. Lee then waves the rest of the ANV forward, hopefully isolating and pocketing chunks of the AoP. Stuart is positioned to cut off the Baltimore Pike retreat route; that leaves only the road south to Taneytown behind the Round Tops as an escape. None of the troops cut off above a Pickett breakthrough should get out.

Lee's evaluation was wrong and so that plan will not work, but if he'd been right and Pickett had pierced the Union center Lee might have won his biggest victory at Gettysburg.
 
I have long thought that Lee was not well-served by his staff and commanders at Gettysburg. I think that had an impact on his decision making not often discussed. IMHO:
  • Longstreet was a bit mulish and difficult on Day 2 (although not quite as bad as often pictured. He is reluctant to give enthusiastic support to an attack he sees as doomed to a bloody repulse on Day 3, but does a decent job anyway.
  • A. P. Hill seems to be a non-entity for most of the battle. Even on Day 1, it is hard to determine how he impacted the battle.
  • Ewell has a good result on Day 1, but also seems to be uninvolved on Day 2 and 3. His troops fight, but he doesn't drive the battle, leading to the impression he is too dependent on Jubal Early.
  • Stuart does well enough on Day 3, but his absence during the raid led to problems with Lee's control and intel in the campaign.
  • Lee's staff (incredibly small) lost track of Robertson's cavalry, leading to the intel failure East of South Mountain, leading to the battle. During the battle, Lee's LOC between commands functioned poorly (small staff, difficult routes and distances for couriers, some foot-dragging by higher commanders)
  • Lee himself seems off. Perhaps it was his heart problem. Perhaps it was his sense of urgency being frustrated by the experience of Hill/Ewell replacing Jackson or the effect of Stuart's absence disrupting his intel. Maybe it was the sinking feeling that he needed a big victory now and watching as it slipped away just out of reach. Whatever the reason, July 3 was not Lee's finest hour.
On July 3, Lee has an incorrect understanding of the situation. He doesn't grasp how hard the battle has been on the divisions of Heth and Pender. I don't think he understands what July 2 did to Hood's and McLaw's divisions. He probably over-estimates the damage done to the AoP on July 1-2 (severe though it was) and he does not think they can possibly be all up yet (not knowing about the arrival of the VI Corps, the largest AoP corps or the extra ammo train Hunt has been dragging along with the AoP).

Given all that, Lee based his plan on a picture of a much smaller, badly-hammered AoP with no real reserve to counter a breakthrough over-extended on the high ground across from him. If that's the case, a strong blow preceded by a massive bombardment makes sense: crack the middle and the entire position collapses. Lee then waves the rest of the ANV forward, hopefully isolating and pocketing chunks of the AoP. Stuart is positioned to cut off the Baltimore Pike retreat route; that leaves only the road south to Taneytown behind the Round Tops as an escape. None of the troops cut off above a Pickett breakthrough should get out.

Lee's evaluation was wrong and so that plan will not work, but if he'd been right and Pickett had pierced the Union center Lee might have won his biggest victory at Gettysburg.

That is an excellent summation, especially the issues around Lee's small staff and the difficulties in regards to coordinating with what cavalry Stuart had left behind for him.

Now, under normal circumstances (I.e. while Stuart is present) Lee's staff is just about adequate for its role. Without Stuart (whose staff as standard deal with the intelligence gathering and most importantly the collation of the jigsaw that is military intelligence in to the bigger picture) Lee is left blind for simply he doesn't have enough people around him to allow him to grasp that bigger picture. Oh, attempts are made - Johnson's 'Reconnaissance' - but it is (woefully) inadequate. Now we can argue about whose fault Stuart's absence is all we want but I like Eric Wittenburg's verdict - 'plenty of blame to go around' (and definitely including Robert E Lee himself) - but this in my personal opinion leads to most of the (internal) issues the ANV faces.

Specifically being effectively blind (or at least significantly impaired) seems to understandably make Lee irritable. [That he ordered the mission that has made him so may or may not have also played on his mind]. As a result of this irritability rather than his usual affability some of his more prickly subordinates seem to have become irritated themselves and when one adds this in with the heat factors [see the recent excellent https://civilwartalk.com/threads/heat-casualties-–-the-other-opponent-at-gettysburg.151581/] which probably aggravated things then the ANV is not operating at peak efficiency.

Unfortunately Lee does not or does not wish to see this/ does not allow himself to see this given the situation of the war.

Thus it all mounts up and the result is Day 3...
 
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That is an excellent summation, especially the issues around Lee's small staff and the difficulties in regards to coordinating with what cavalry Stuart had left behind for him.

Now, under normal circumstances (I.e. while Stuart is present) Lee's staff is just about adequate for its role. Without Stuart (whose staff as standard deal with the intelligence gathering and most importantly the collation of the jigsaw that is military intelligence in to the bigger picture) Lee is left blind for simply he doesn't have enough people around him to allow him to grasp that bigger picture. Oh, attempts are made - Johnson's 'Reconnaissance' - but it is (woefully) inadequate. Now we can argue about whose fault Stuart's absence is all we want but I like Eric Wittenburg's verdict - 'plenty of blame to go around' (and definitely including Robert E Lee himself) - but this in my personal opinion leads to most of the (internal) issues the ANV faces.

Specifically being effectively blind (or at least significantly impaired) seems to understandably make Lee irritable. [That he ordered the mission that has made him so may or may not have also played on his mind]. As a result of this irritability rather than his usual affability some of his more prickly subordinates seem to have become irritated themselves and when one adds this in with the heat factors [see the recent excellent https://civilwartalk.com/threads/heat-casualties-–-the-other-opponent-at-gettysburg.151581/] which probably aggravated things then the ANV is not operating at peak efficiency.

Unfortunately Lee does not or does not wish to see this/ does not allow himself to see this given the situation of the war.

Thus it all mounts up and the result is Day 3...

Generally, yes. Lee's plan for Day 3 has possibilities if he is right about the AoP not being all up -- but even then the Pickett attack is a big risk.

On Stuart: much as I might like to blame him, I have to think he really wasn't all that late getting up to the Gettysburg area. If he'd been a few hours earlier getting to Hanover, he'd have been in contact with Ewell/Early sometime early on July 1st. Lee's small staff is responsible for losing track of Robertson's 2 brigades and not keeping on them (Stuart's orders to Robertson look like they were written to a commander who couldn't be trusted to follow instructions).

Probably the biggest problems were command-and-control. Jackson was gone; Ewell and Hill weren't equivalent. Stuart was out of touch and Lee's tiny staff had no capability to pick up the slack. Lee preferred to place good officers in combat command slots rather than in staff slots, pushing traditional staff jobs down to lower commands. With Stuart absent, his cavalry was without a commander, but he was also without anyone to do intel work (interrogation/analysis/correlation/etc.) as Stuart did. I'd say it was Stuart himself that Lee missed the most, not the 3 brigades with him. The ANV was not operating at the same level it had been at only a few months earlier.
 
It’s not serious. It’s fun. Grant drank too. Do you need a source? Grant and Longstreet were friends. They probably drank together. But Grant was good so no one cares. Longstreet is an overrated boor, to be fair. But since you asked, the source is Fremantle the Brits account, and McLaws report, where he describes the interesting orders Longstreet gave under the influence.

What are the specific passages in those sources because nobody knows what you are talking about
 
I would argue that Gettysburg is vintage Lee and absolutely not an anomaly. Lee demonstrated repeatedly during the war that he was willing to make risky gambles in order to achieve greater results. In another time and profession, Lee would have been a master riverboat gambler. The difference at Gettysburg was that the dice did not fall the way that Lee expected for a number of reasons (the Army of the Potomac fought the battle of the war, a lack of accurate intelligence, major failures of generalship, officer casualties at extremely inconvenient times, etc.).

As for Longstreet's statement, it's pure fantasy from a time when he was defending himself from attacks that blamed him for losing the war at Gettysburg. To believe that Lee would go into a campaign and promise to limit his tactical options is, to be frank, absurd. Lee was nothing if not flexible in what he was willing to try in an attempt to gain a victory.

Ryan
I agree wholeheartedly. His regal bearing and that marble man facade often lull people into forgetting that Lee was very agressive in his tactics. I believe it was Mosby who said he was one of the most agressive men he had ever known: personally, I do not believe this was a charge of desperation but of necessity. Lee knew the “brutal arithmetic” of the manpower necessity and he knew he had to destroy the army of the Potomac. As you say, this is vintage Lee.
 
I agree wholeheartedly. His regal bearing and that marble man facade often lull people into forgetting that Lee was very agressive in his tactics. I believe it was Mosby who said he was one of the most agressive men he had ever known: personally, I do not believe this was a charge of desperation but of necessity. Lee knew the “brutal arithmetic” of the manpower necessity and he knew he had to destroy the army of the Potomac. As you say, this is vintage Lee.
Not sure about Mosby. Porter Alexander asked Col Joseph Ives about Lee Ives reply "Alexander, if there is one man in either army, Confederate or Federal, head and shoulders above every other in audacity, it is General Lee! His name might be Audacity. He will take more desperate chances and take them quicker than any other general in this country, and you will live to see it too.
 
Not sure about Mosby. Porter Alexander asked Col Joseph Ives about Lee Ives reply "Alexander, if there is one man in either army, Confederate or Federal, head and shoulders above every other in audacity, it is General Lee! His name might be Audacity. He will take more desperate chances and take them quicker than any other general in this country, and you will live to see it too.

On page 6 of Pickett’s Charge by Phillip Tucker there are two quotes. One is attributed to a soldier under John Bell Hood’s command that Lee was “in temperament a gamecock known for his pugnacity.” In that same paragraph it quotes Mosby as saying that “Lee was the most aggressive man I met during the war years.”

I’m trying to verify by looking at the referenced source material.
 
Generally, yes. Lee's plan for Day 3 has possibilities if he is right about the AoP not being all up -- but even then the Pickett attack is a big risk.

On Stuart: much as I might like to blame him, I have to think he really wasn't all that late getting up to the Gettysburg area. If he'd been a few hours earlier getting to Hanover, he'd have been in contact with Ewell/Early sometime early on July 1st. Lee's small staff is responsible for losing track of Robertson's 2 brigades and not keeping on them (Stuart's orders to Robertson look like they were written to a commander who couldn't be trusted to follow instructions).

Probably the biggest problems were command-and-control. Jackson was gone; Ewell and Hill weren't equivalent. Stuart was out of touch and Lee's tiny staff had no capability to pick up the slack. Lee preferred to place good officers in combat command slots rather than in staff slots, pushing traditional staff jobs down to lower commands. With Stuart absent, his cavalry was without a commander, but he was also without anyone to do intel work (interrogation/analysis/correlation/etc.) as Stuart did. I'd say it was Stuart himself that Lee missed the most, not the 3 brigades with him. The ANV was not operating at the same level it had been at only a few months earlier.
My biggest problem with Stuart was leaving Robertson behind in charge of his and Jones troopers. Longstreet had assumed he would leave Hampton behind. Hampton-Jones would have been a efficient and formattable team. Only Robertson would have sat watching an empty valley. Lee was left with Imbodens, Jenkins, and some smaller units like whites and McNeils
Drunk.
That is a very serious accusation that you need to back up with primary sources...

And really "fetish for the tactical defense" sound to me like you only ever read popular history of the war.
(Jackson was the attacking guy and Longstreet the defensive guy)

At 2nd Bull run it was Longstreets attack that broke the union army. (after Jackson had held the line against heavy attacks)
Arguably Lee's greatest victory.

At Chickamauga is was also Longstreets attack that broke the Union army.

At the Wilderness Longstreets counterattack causes serious damage to Grants army.

Longstreet commanded some of the most effective CSA attacks of the war.
Longstreet was Longstreet. His Wilderness counterattack, if he had not be hours late and relieved A.P. Hills corps like he was suppose to he wouldn't had to make it. Hill also is to blame as he let his troops rest and not be ready. 2nd Manassas he watch Jackson get hammered all afternoon and most of the next day, Lee had suggested he attack several times. When he finally did darkness ended it, and anyreal chance of really destroying Popes army.
 
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