A Renewed Attack at the Sunken Road?

[Andy Cardinal]

Fron Carman-Cope Map, 1:00

In reading Cory M. Pfarr's The Federal Signal Service at Antietam: stations, Officers and Battlefield Intelligence on America's Bloodiest Day, I came across this passage on pp. 55-56:

A further signal from Sumner through Brooks and Hill, preserved in the Official Records without a timestamp – again, likely transmitted via the Michael Miller Farm station – asked McClellan: "Do you think it proper to countermand the order to send Slocum's division to Richardson's support, as I shall need it on the right if I advance?" The timing of this dispatch is uncertain, though it may correspond to the conference McClellan held with Sumner, Franklin, and other senior officers in the right flank around 2:30 p.m.

I went back to Hartwig and found a brief discussion of this on p. 422.

I also looked it up in the OR (volume 19, pt. 1, p. 134). Here is a screenshot:

The issue with this message, as Pfarr notes, is that there is no time stamp. Chronologically, it is placed between Sedgwick's defeat in the West Woods and McClellan's conference with Franklin and Sumner in the afternoon. Hartwig places it within the context of that conference, but there is no real evidence of timing.

I've been trying to study the Sunken Road fight a little more deeply. I have probably read Captain William Graham's report more than several times before this statement really caught my attention:

"A very sharp fire of shot, spherical case, and shell was now opened upon my battery by two of the enemy's batteries of rifled guns, one of which enfiladed me. I returned this fire as rapidly as possible, but after firing some twenty minutes found that they were beyond my range, my solid shot falling short several hundred yards, and having called General Richardson's attention to this fact, was told by him that he wished me to save the battery as much as possible, in order that it might advance with his division at signal then expected from Major-General Sumner. While communicating this to me, General Richardson was mortally wounded by a ball of a spherical case from the battery enfilading mine. After this I continued my fire some five minutes, and then retired over the crest of the hill to a point 200 yards in rear of my first position. I then returned and brought off two of my caissons, which were necessarily left at first, the horses being all killed, and having brought all the wounded off, I replaced the limbers of the pieces and sent two caissons to the ammunition supply-train, to be refilled."

In my mind, these two statements -- what Richardson told Graham and the signal message -- are connected. If so, it would put the time of the signal message somewhere around 1:00 give or take -- but obviously before it was known that Richardson had been wounded. According to Graham, Richardson's wounding occured almost immediately after his conversation with Graham.

Maybe this has been discussed elsewhere but I don't remember ever seeing it connected this way. This is just speculation of course, but taken together there seems to have been some sort of half formed plan to send Slocum's division to reinforce Richardson's and renew the attack on the Confederate center after the Sunken Road fell. Richardson made clear that rifled artillery would be needed as well, but he was told no rifled artillery was available and was sent Graham's Napoleons instead.

It also seems that McClellan was at least aware of the plan if he did not order it in the first place because the signal message sent from Sumner questions the order given the situation. My guess is Sumner's questioning has to do with Cooke's counterattack around 12:00. Irwin's 6th corps brigade from Smith's division was ultimately sent to repel this attack and Slocum's division (following Smith's) was diverted elsewhere.

Not sure what anyone else might think about this, but I would welcome any thoughts or comments about it. Perhaps it is discussed in Steve Stotelmyer's or Moe Daoust's upcoming books.

 

[rpkennedy]

View attachment 589089
Fron Carman-Cope Map, 1:00

In reading Cory M. Pfarr's The Federal Signal Service at Antietam: stations, Officers and Battlefield Intelligence on America's Bloodiest Day, I came across this passage on pp. 55-56:

A further signal from Sumner through Brooks and Hill, preserved in the Official Records without a timestamp – again, likely transmitted via the Michael Miller Farm station – asked McClellan: "Do you think it proper to countermand the order to send Slocum's division to Richardson's support, as I shall need it on the right if I advance?" The timing of this dispatch is uncertain, though it may correspond to the conference McClellan held with Sumner, Franklin, and other senior officers in the right flank around 2:30 p.m.

I went back to Hartwig and found a brief discussion of this on p. 422.

I also looked it up in the OR (volume 19, pt. 1, p. 134). Here is a screenshot:

View attachment 589085

The issue with this message, as Pfarr notes, is that there is no time stamp. Chronologically, it is placed between Sedgwick's defeat in the West Woods and McClellan's conference with Franklin and Sumner in the afternoon. Hartwig places it within the context of that conference, but there is no real evidence of timing.

I've been trying to study the Sunken Road fight a little more deeply. I have probably read Captain William Graham's report more than several times before this statement really caught my attention:

"A very sharp fire of shot, spherical case, and shell was now opened upon my battery by two of the enemy's batteries of rifled guns, one of which enfiladed me. I returned this fire as rapidly as possible, but after firing some twenty minutes found that they were beyond my range, my solid shot falling short several hundred yards, and having called General Richardson's attention to this fact, was told by him that he wished me to save the battery as much as possible, in order that it might advance with his division at signal then expected from Major-General Sumner. While communicating this to me, General Richardson was mortally wounded by a ball of a spherical case from the battery enfilading mine. After this I continued my fire some five minutes, and then retired over the crest of the hill to a point 200 yards in rear of my first position. I then returned and brought off two of my caissons, which were necessarily left at first, the horses being all killed, and having brought all the wounded off, I replaced the limbers of the pieces and sent two caissons to the ammunition supply-train, to be refilled."

In my mind, these two statements -- what Richardson told Graham and the signal message -- are connected. If so, it would put the time of the signal message somewhere around 1:00 give or take -- but obviously before it was known that Richardson had been wounded. According to Graham, Richardson's wounding occured almost immediately after his conversation with Graham.

Maybe this has been discussed elsewhere but I don't remember ever seeing it connected this way. This is just speculation of course, but taken together there seems to have been some sort of half formed plan to send Slocum's division to reinforce Richardson's and renew the attack on the Confederate center after the Sunken Road fell. Richardson made clear that rifled artillery would be needed as well, but he was told no rifled artillery was available and was sent Graham's Napoleons instead.

It also seems that McClellan was at least aware of the plan if he did not order it in the first place because the signal message sent from Sumner questions the order given the situation. My guess is Sumner's questioning has to do with Cooke's counterattack around 12:00. Irwin's 6th corps brigade from Smith's division was ultimately sent to repel this attack and Slocum's division (following Smith's) was diverted elsewhere.

Not sure what anyone else might think about this, but I would welcome any thoughts or comments about it. Perhaps it is discussed in Steve Stotelmyer's or Moe Daoust's upcoming books.

It does make sense. Richardson was a pretty aggressive officer and would have looked for a way to strike at the Confederates, especially considering how fragile they seemed. I remember reading it in Hartwig but I honestly didn't put 2 and 2 together until this post.

Ryan

 

[lelliott19]

A very sharp fire of shot, spherical case, and shell was now opened upon my battery by two of the enemy's batteries of rifled guns, one of which enfiladed me. I returned this fire as rapidly as possible, but after firing some twenty minutes found that they were beyond my range, my solid shot falling short several hundred yards, and having called General Richardson's attention to this fact, was told by him that he wished me to save the battery as much as possible, in order that it might advance with his division at signal then expected from Major-General Sumner. While communicating this to me, General Richardson was mortally wounded by a ball of a spherical case from the battery enfilading mine. After this I continued my fire some five minutes, and then retired over the crest of the hill to a point 200 yards in rear of my first position. I then returned and brought off two of my caissons, which were necessarily left at first, the horses being all killed, and having brought all the wounded off, I replaced the limbers of the pieces and sent two caissons to the ammunition supply-train, to be refilled."

Do you know which two Confederate batteries these were? That had rifled guns, firing spherical case and shell, one of which infiladed Graham's position?

Im guessing it's some of the un-named batteries circled in the image below?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Miller's section of the Washington artillery in Piper's cornfield and I believe Molliere's section of the Donaldsonville Artillery (Maurin) to their left. Lt. William Chamberlain would be in the same area with a gun from Huger's battery but I don't see that depicted on the Carman-Cope map.

Maurin's Donaldsonville Artillery had a 3 gun section of rifled artillery on Reel Ridge and Molliere's section of 6 pounders.

The rifled guns (especially Maurin, Carter, and Hardaway) on Reel Ridge were the ones that Graham was talking about. The guns on the Piper farm (Miller, Boyce before he moved, Molliere, etc) were instrumental in repulsing Richardson's infantry as the moved from the Sunken Road toward the Piper farm around 12:30.

I highly recommend Jim Rosebrock and Aaron Holley's just released Artillery Atlas from the Antietam Institute. Maps are excellent and easy to read.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

This was the period this famous episode took place. According to Moxley Sorrell: "The gunners had fallen by their pieces, which were temporarily without cannoneers." Longstreet ordered his staff to man the guns. "Fairfax, Goree, Manning, Walton, myself, and perhaps some others took our horses' bridles as we leaped from them to the guns. The position was important and it would never do for these 'barkers' to be dumb, even for a minute, so at it we went—the improvised gunners."

According to Napier Bartlett, who was a member of Miller's battery: "One line of the enemy's infantry came so near us, that we could see their Colonel on horseback waving his men on, and even the stripes on the Corporals arms. How it made our blood dance and nerves quiver as we saw their colors floating steadily forward…."

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Lieutenant William Chamberlain (6th Virginia) account:

"There was a confused crowd at that place, opposite to the entrance to Piper's Lane, but the efforts of the officers succeeded in forming a line along the eastern side of the Turnpike; different commands were mixed. I did not recognize there any of the 6th Virginia. Looking down the Turnpike I saw a gun standing on one side. There was no soldier with it and but one horse hitched to the limber and wounded besides. I requested the assistance of four Infantry soldiers near me, and we drew the gun to the entrance of Pipe's Lane and loaded it. The enemy's skirmishers were crossing the lane near Piper's dwelling. Just at that moment Major Fairfax, of General Longstreet's staff, stopped there and dismounted. I asked him if we should fire. He said yes and I handed the lanyard to him. He pulled it and the shell went bounding down the lane by Piper's house. He mounted and rode away. Then some voices were heard saying, "Over here is the place for that gun" and several more Infantry soldiers came and the gun was drawn to the top of the next rise in the Turnpike about fifty yards. From that point could be seen the Dunker Church, and in the field in front of it were lines of the Federals advancing towards the Church. Quite a number participated in getting the gun in position and aiming it at the advancing lines. When it was fired the shell bounded along some distance in front of those lines. It was a very poor shot. After that shot the enemy's artillery was directed in that position. The Colonel of the 14th North Carolina Regiment was there, as well as other officers, and I believe they were glad to have the gun moved, for when I remarked, "This is not the proper place for it" and directed the improvised gun's crew to draw it back to the original position, no one objected. So it was taken back. In loading the gun, I discovered that there were no more friction primers in the limber chest and requested one of the crew to go to a Battery on the elevation to the left and rear of our position and ask for a supply of primers. He did so and soon returned with them. It was none too soon, for the enemy soon appeared advancing towards our position. A Regiment or small Brigade of Confederates had been advanced from the Turnpike and stationed about one hundred feet east of the same under a slight rise in the ground and some outcropping rock, and their battle flag was waved; that movement, and the appearance of the flag encouraged the rallied men; before that some appeared to be demoralized. Between the orchard and the sunken road was a corn field, the stalks being from four to six feet in height. The enemy's line appeared advancing through the corn about three hundred yards from the Turnpike. The gun was then in just the right position to oppose their line; three shots were fired and struck them where their colors were visible. Their line halted and fell back and was hidden by the corn. In a few moments they appeared again. Three more shots were fired with the same precision; again the line disappeared. Then it advanced the third time, and again it received three more shots equally as true. As the line retired the third time, a Federal soldier turned around and fired deliberately at me, and his ball struck the ground near my feet. The Battery on the eminence to our left and rear was firing, but more to our left. The line that we fired at was partly in the corn field and extended through the west side of the orchard towards Piper's farm house. Our Infantry line did not have occasion to fire. The Federal line apparently fell back to the ravine a little to their rear and remained quiet the rest of the day, so far as we could judge from our position. The gun was a smooth bore six-pounder and supposed to belong to Huger's Battery. That Battery had been heavily engaged early in the morning in the adjoining field, and had been pretty badly used by the Federal Artillery. It had not been able to take away that gun because of the great loss of horses. A movement of the Infantry was then made; the line was stretched towards the hill, where now is located the cemetery. It was quiet on that part of the line for quite a long time."

 

[Kerry Won Ohio]

McClellan could have forced Lee to surrender with one more Union attack after taking the Sunken Road. The Confederate center was in disarray. Lee had no escape with the Potomac River in his rear.

 

[67th Tigers]

Interestingly, in the afternoon Porter was suggesting that Hancock's (ex-Richardson's) division make a cautious advance:

"The infantry on the right of Sharpburg pike I think should move up slowly and cautiously and I think they will crown the hill. F J P" (from Hartwig, note the infantry in question are Hancock's (ex-Richardson's) division that have halted at the Sunken Road, not his own)

"Burnside is warmly engaged with Arty—I see no movement of anything except the gathering of infantry near Sharpsburg. Sykes skirmishers pushed up toward S(harpsburg) and I soon saw a flank and front fire—and troops moving up. I have been looking for the advance of the infantry on my right which is still lying down. Sykes men went pretty close to ridge. 4:30 p.m. F J Porter" (From Hartwig, clarification of Sharpsburg mine)

It appears that this is an alternative to going "all in" on the right; instead McClellan could have moved Slocum to the Sunken Road and an attack against the centre be made instead. It appears the decision may have been a simple matter of timing. Burnside's advance is too early in most accounts, and actually started after 1600. The decision to sent the concentrate all the reserves on the right (Slocum and much of Morell) had already been made by McClellan.

 

[Kerry Won Ohio]

Interestingly, in the afternoon Porter was suggesting that Hancock's (ex-Richardson's) division make a cautious advance:

"The infantry on the right of Sharpburg pike I think should move up slowly and cautiously and I think they will crown the hill. F J P" (from Hartwig, note the infantry in question are Hancock's (ex-Richardson's) division that have halted at the Sunken Road, not his own)

"Burnside is warmly engaged with Arty—I see no movement of anything except the gathering of infantry near Sharpsburg. Sykes skirmishers pushed up toward S(harpsburg) and I soon saw a flank and front fire—and troops moving up. I have been looking for the advance of the infantry on my right which is still lying down. Sykes men went pretty close to ridge. 4:30 p.m. F J Porter" (From Hartwig, clarification of Sharpsburg mine)

It appears that this is an alternative to going "all in" on the right; instead McClellan could have moved Slocum to the Sunken Road and an attack against the centre be made instead. It appears the decision may have been a simple matter of timing. Burnside's advance is too early in most accounts, and actually started after 1600. The decision to sent the concentrate all the reserves on the right (Slocum and much of Morell) had already been made by McClellan.

Burnside was trying to cross that bridge all day long. That's why the bridge is named after him. His men didn't get to the other side of Antietam Creek until they found a ford further south that they could use to cross the creek.

Trying to cross that bridge is suicide, for anyone who has seen it in person. The bridge is at the foot of a steep hill, which made Burnside's troops very easy targets for the Confederates at the top of the hill.

 

[67th Tigers]

Burnside was trying to cross that bridge all day long. That's why the bridge is named after him. His men didn't get to the other side of Antietam Creek until they found a ford further south that they could use to cross the creek.

Trying to cross that bridge is suicide, for anyone who has seen it in person. The bridge is at the foot of a steep hill, which made Burnside's troops very easy targets for the Confederates at the top of the hill.

This is backwards. Rodman's division crossed the ford after the bridge was taken, and the Georgians dominating the ford withdrew.

Burnside orders the 11th CT and Cox's brigade to assault the bridge at 0900. Cox doesn't know where the bridge is and can't find it, and so Kingsbury's 11th CT attack alone and are slaughtered.

Nagle comes up, and the 2nd MD charges at 1000, and the 6th NH at 1030. Both get pinned down and the 48th PA has to extract them from the killing area.

About 1100, Sturgis decides the bridge cannot be taken until the enemy batteries are suppressed. He thus brings up artillery the duel with the rebel batteries. They fairly quickly win, and the rebel batteries are withdrawn. Burnside orders Ferrero's brigade to assault. However, Ferrero disputed the order and Sturgis had to make it peremptory. The problem was, the brigade was basically in a state of mutiny. Ferrero's own 35th MA was panicky, had had a blue-on-blue incident at South Mountain, and was being kept in the rear. The other three colonels were basically refusing to recognise Ferrero's authority. Hence he has to go around the colonels and appeal to the men of the 51st NY and 51st PA to come with him. At about 1230-1300 they charged across the bridge, basically unopposed. The rebels had bugged out about 1130, when their batteries withdrew.

By 1400, Willcox's division and Crook's brigade have followed Sturgis over the bridge. Rodman's division crossed the ford 1500-1600.

 

[Kerry Won Ohio]

This is backwards. Rodman's division crossed the ford after the bridge was taken, and the Georgians dominating the ford withdrew.

Burnside orders the 11th CT and Cox's brigade to assault the bridge at 0900. Cox doesn't know where the bridge is and can't find it, and so Kingsbury's 11th CT attack alone and are slaughtered.

Nagle comes up, and the 2nd MD charges at 1000, and the 6th NH at 1030. Both get pinned down and the 48th PA has to extract them from the killing area.

About 1100, Sturgis decides the bridge cannot be taken until the enemy batteries are suppressed. He thus brings up artillery the duel with the rebel batteries. They fairly quickly win, and the rebel batteries are withdrawn. Burnside orders Ferrero's brigade to assault. However, Ferrero disputed the order and Sturgis had to make it peremptory. The problem was, the brigade was basically in a state of mutiny. Ferrero's own 35th MA was panicky, had had a blue-on-blue incident at South Mountain, and was being kept in the rear. The other three colonels were basically refusing to recognise Ferrero's authority. Hence he has to go around the colonels and appeal to the men of the 51st NY and 51st PA to come with him. At about 1230-1300 they charged across the bridge, basically unopposed. The rebels had bugged out about 1130, when their batteries withdrew.

By 1400, Willcox's division and Crook's brigade have followed Sturgis over the bridge. Rodman's division crossed the ford 1500-1600.

Actually, both actions happened at approximately the same time, around 1 pm. --

 

[67th Tigers]

Actually, both actions happened at approximately the same time, around 1 pm. --

Not according to the reports of the men on the ground.

There was no order to Rodman to move round to a ford until about 0900. Then the ford he's aiming for is "farm ford." They move there, but the rebels on on the near side of the creek, preventing Duane from examining it. After driving in the skirmishers and examining it, it's found to be unsuitable. They they move upriver and eventually reach Snavely's Ford, which was two miles away. There aren't many reliable timings here, but various reports give timings for crossing the ford (sometimes determined by offsets from known timings) between 1500 and 1600.

The issue is that Cox and Burnside contended they ordered Rodman set out to find a ford at 0700. They did not. In response to the Confederate arty opening, at 0700 Rodman was ordered to withdraw his infantry from the bluffs and into cover, where they remained until about 0900, when they were ordered to move and look for a ford. Generally, a good rule is to take Cox's time and add a couple of hours.

 

[Saphroneth]

Toombs' report has "repeated disastrous repulses" for the Union up to about 1 o'clock. Toombs says that at this point (that is, explicitly "after these repeated disastrous repulses") the Union turns their attention to the fords and starts moving troops in that direction, and so Toombs moves back because he doesn't have the troops to contest the fords.

Toombs here presumably assumes that if the enemy reaches the fords (and crosses, which he cannot prevent) they'd be in his right rear, and he'd have to withdraw while being flanked, so he moves back before that can actually happen.