SAVAGE'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.
From early in the morning until twelve o'clock the Sixteenth Regiment was in line of battle in the dry bed of Chaplain Creek, its right resting on the road that leads to Harrodsburg. The regiment was then ordered to march down Chaplain Creek. After going a mile or more the cannon balls began to fall among the men but did no harm. At the distance of about two miles the creek widened to something like a small bottom, with water in it, the banks having become forty to fifty feet high, covered by heavy timber and undergrowth. Turning to the left the Sixteenth was ordered by General Donelson to ascend the bluff, through the timber and undergrowth, which was steep and difficult to get up. The path led along the foot of the bluff some fifty or sixty yards to a dug road, up which I rode into an open field and saw a battery of artillery some two hundred yards out in the field.
[1] Riding to where the men were getting up the hill into the edge of the field, I formed the regiment into line on the edge of the bluff directly fronting the battery. By this time General Donelson rode up and said, "Colonel, I am ordered to attack," to which I made no reply. He repeated a second time, "Colonel, I am ordered to attack." I again made no reply. He repeated a third time, "Colonel, I am ordered to attack the enemy!" I then said: "General, I see no enemy to attack except that battery over there in the field. Do you mean, sir, that you want the Sixteenth to charge that battery?" He said, "Yes." I replied, "General, I will obey your orders but if the Sixteenth is to charge that battery you must give the order." He raised his voice in a rather loud and excited tone and said, "Charge."
I believed that the battery was supported by a strong line of infantry concealed by a fence, and a forest not more than eighty yards in its rear, and that it had been placed in the field as a decoy to invite a charge. I believed that a charge would end in my death and the defeat and ruin of my regiment, and while I had often disobeyed Donelson's orders, for which he had court-martialed me, I could think of no military principles that would authorize me to disobey such an order in the face off the enemy and at the beginning of such a battle.
There was running up from Chaplain Creek a long hollow about half way between the battery and where the regiment was in line.
[2] I thought as soon as I moved into that hollow I would be out of reach of the battery and that I could come up on the other side within sixty or seventy yards of the battery. I was in no hurry; got in front of my regiment and said, "Forward, march!"
About the time the regiment reached the bottom of the hollow an aide of General Cheatham's came from the woods near the right, saying that the enemy was in the woods at the head of the hollow at the right.
[3] I halted the regiment, ordered my color bearers to the front and ordered the regiment to dress on them so as to march in the new direction indicated by Cheatham's order. I was in no hurry, for outside of Cheatham's aide and Donelson there was no Confederate in sight. There was no reason why the battery should not have fired upon the regiment while it was in line, except that a fire would pass through the line and only do a little damage.
[4] Marching in the new direction indicated by Cheatham's aide, I was soon in an open beech forest on the top of the hill.
[5] I was riding in front expecting a surprise, the left of the regiment was at the edge of the forest and the field, when the battery, about one hundred and fifty yards from the regiment, fired, enfilading it, sweeping the whole length of the line, killing a captain, a lieutenant and many privates.
[6] I was riding in front of the regiment; a grape shot passed through the head of my horse below the eyes. Remembering to have seen thirty or forty rider-less horses running over the field of Molino del Rey, I threw the bridle of my horse over a snag, took a Remington pistol from the holsters, and ordered the regiment forward to get out of range of the battery. Descending the hill some forty or fifty yards, we were fired on by the main line of the Yankee army, not more than fifty or sixty yards distant, concealed behind a rail fence which was a prolongation of the fence enclosing the field in which the battery was situated.
[7]
There was a fence and a field on my right running up to two cabins at the line of the enemy's forces.
[8] There were skirmish lines along this fence which fired on our rear as we advanced.
[9] The Sixteenth had no protection except a few trees in the forest. I ordered a charge. We drove the enemy from behind the fences, killing many of them as they fled. The right of the regiment was at the two cabins. There was a battery in the line of battle to the right,
[10] about thirty or forty yards from these cabins, between which cabins there was an entry, or space, of ten or fifteen feet. The battery opened fire upon us, killing many men, and at the same time a fire of small arms from the line of battle was directed upon these cabins. The battery fired obliquely into this space. I stood between the cabins, would watch the gunner ram home the charge, and say, "Lie low, boys; he is going to fire," and step for protection close to the cabin nearest the battery. The battle was furious, the men loading and firing as rapidly as possible, falling back and again charging up to the fence. A private, Andrew Dow Mercer, said, "Boys, let's take the battery," and started in that direction. At this time I saw a force to my right and in my rear. I countermanded Mercer's order, but he had gone some five or six steps towards the battery to a tree. Seeing that he was not supported, he hugged the tree closely for a short space of time and returned to the cabin without being wounded. While standing between the cabins a Minié ball passed through my leg without breaking the bone, and the wood off of a canister shot struck the opposite cabin, and glancing knocked me down, paralyzing me for a time. The men at the battery had been killed or wounded or had fled before Maney's brigade appeared in the field to my right, some hundred yards or more distant, and the battle had ceased at the battery.
[11] I said to Colonel Donelson: "I am unfit for duty. Take charge. Go to the battery. It belongs to the Sixteenth." There was then no enemy in front or firing upon the regiment.
[12] After the battle was over Captain Fisher of the Sixteenth said to me: "Colonel, we killed at that battery the bravest captain we ever saw. We tried to get him to surrender, but he would not surrender and we had to kill him," and I recognized in Captain Fisher's "brave captain," Major-General Jackson, whose body was found among the guns of this battery.
[13]
None of General Maney's brigade was nearer than one hundred yards of this battery. The batteries taken by General Maney's brigade were half a mile or more to the right of this battery.
[14] During the hottest of the battle my lieutenant-colonel, Donnell, came to me and said: "Colonel, order a retreat. We are losing all our men and are not supported." I replied: "Protect your men by those trees and that fence and I will protect this wing by these cabins. We were ordered to fight. To order a retreat at the beginning of a great battle is not war. We must hold this position until supported, and it is the duty of our commanding officers to bring us support." The regiment could not then retreat without being brought again under the fire of the battery in the field. Soon after the time that Maney's brigade appeared on the right the Thirty-eighth Regiment belonging to Donelson's brigade engaged the enemy's line of battle on the left. It is stated in this same volume of "Confederate Military History" that the Sixteenth Regiment under Colonel Savage lost one hundred and ninety-nine men, more than half the casualties of the brigade.
Either Savage or his commanders are responsible to God and their country for this terrible slaughter of brave men. It is difficult to form an opinion as to why this occurred as it did. Was it incompetency or neglect on the part of Donelson and Cheatham, or were there other motives operating to produce this result? There was at the time no good feeling between Donelson, his son and son-in-law upon his staff, and Savage. The friends of Savage claim that by disobeying Donelson's orders at Huntersville in Virginia he saved his regiment from great loss by fatal disease. It was also claimed that by disobeying Donelson's order at Valley Mountain in Western Virginia he saved Donelson's brigade and also General Robert E. Lee from capture next morning.
It appears in the sixteenth volume, page 1022, "War of the Rebellion", that the battle of Perryville has been reported by forty-four officers, twenty-eight of whom are Yankees, and sixteen Rebels. I have carefully read these reports to try to form an opinion as to the truth and fairness of the statements made on each side. I am inclined to treat the statements made by officers as testimony made by a witness in court, whose feelings and prejudice are all on one side. There are certain leading facts on each side that must be credited, because in accordance with reason and in harmony with admission on each side. To corroborate and sustain my report, I have taken the statements of five soldiers of the Sixteenth Regiment, now residing in Warren County—James C. Biles, Jesse Walling, E.S. Rowan, Huel Moffit and William H. White
[15]—who all remember the facts as I report them, and they all agree that no regiment of Donelson's brigade or other Confederate force was in sight when Cheatham and Donelson gave the fatal order to the Sixteenth Regiment, solitary and alone, under the fire of the battery in sight in the field, to charge the main line of the Yankee army; and that the regiment was engaged for half an hour before Maney's brigade appeared on the right.
[16]
SAVAGE'S COMMENTARY UPON CHEATHAM AND DONELSON AT THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.
Generals Donelson and Cheatham were guilty of a crime or an inexcusable blunder in sending one regiment, solitary and alone, under the fire of a battery to attack the main line of the Yankee Abolition army. It was their duty to see that all the regiments were in line of battle in supporting distance of each other. The brigade should have been moved forward as a unit and the attack should have been made by all the regiments at the same time. It was Cheatham's business to see that all the brigades in his division were on hand and in line of battle and in supporting distance of each other, so that his whole division could make a simultaneous attack upon the enemy. Cheatham's aide, changing Donelson's order to attack the battery, came out of the woods near the beech forest and near the Sixteenth Regiment, and Cheatham must have seen the Sixteenth Regiment at the time he changed Donelson's order and must have known that there was no support in sight for the Sixteenth Regiment. It was his duty to arrest Donelson's march and to order him to form his brigade in the proper place to support the Sixteenth in the charge which they ordered.
[17] Savage never saw Cheatham during the battle and does not know whether he was drunk or sober.
Savage assumes that this fatal order of Cheatham's and Donelson's resulted from one of three causes:
First. From undue excitement by the presence of the batteries and main line of the Yankee army, dethroning their reason and banishing their common sense.
[18]
Second. From drinking liquor to stimulate their courage to meet the dangers in the impending battle.
[19]
Third. To cause the death of the disrespectful, disobedient and insubordinate Colonel Savage, who was constantly declaring that the army should be reorganized, Davis removed and a dictator appointed, or the conquest of the South by the abolitionists was a certainty. This made all office-holders the bitter enemy of Savage.
[20]
[1] Precisely what battery he is referring to is not known—only that there were no batteries that close to the regiment upon their ascent of the river bank. Traditional interpretations suggest Harris or Simonson. The re-evaluation suggests the guns of Stone and Bush.
[2] This long hollow referred to in traditional interpretations is the valley that runs from Doctor's Creek to the head of the valley near which Harris' battery was planted. This interpretation suggests that the regiment would advance up the length of the valley rather than traverse its width as Savage suggests. In the reevaluation, it is suggested that it is the draw between the first and second fingers descending from the ridge that accommodates 'Open Knob' and 'Starkweather's Heights.'
[3] This is clear evidence that the regiment's advance was south of the intended objective. They reformed facing in a northerly direction, and they advanced up the hollow. They regiment had yet to take any enemy fire and was in complete defilade.
[4] Just as they were in sight of the battery, the gunners could undoubtedly see them. The guns had remained quiet for the reasons Savage gave.
[5] Savage noted that the regiment was no longer in 'the hollow' but on top of the hill.
[6] This implies that the first battery fire received was from their left flank, as the right of the regiment was still in the beech forest.
[7] Their advance took them closer to the guns, but to a nearly defilade position for, at least, a portion of the regiment.
[8] The cabins were those belonging to the Widow Gibson by traditional interpretations. The re-evaluation suggests that two cabins were located on the eastern slope of the 'Open Knob.'
[9] The skirmish line was likely the troops of the 123rd Illinois that had just been repulsed in their bayonet charge on the Sixteenth.
[10] Parsons' Battery was a short distance up the hill and on the right-front of the regiment.
[11] Savage was aware of Maney's presence—although he would like to claim the capture of the guns by the Sixteenth single-handedly. Savage mentions that Maney appeared, "… in the field to my right…" It is important to note that he states it is a field. If the Sixteenth had been at the Widow Gibson's, Maney would have appeared in the woods. The nearest field would have been north of Benton Road. Had Maney been further than a hundred yards away, it is unlikely Savage or any of his men would have been aware of his arrival.
[12] The combined fire of the Sixteenth and Maney's Brigade—with their charge on the guns—left the enemy retreating to the lane at Benton Road. Indeed, Savage's position at the cabins was not receiving fire at this time.
[13] It is irrelevant as to what unit is responsible for the death of Gen. Jackson; but, what is relevant is that: the Sixteenth was at the location where his body was recovered. That was Parsons' battery.
[14] Savage believed that Maney's men seized the battery on Starkweather's Heights. From his position at the cabins, it was further to the right (or north), but in fact, the battery was about 450 yards west.
[15] The author's great-great-grandfather—William H. White—was the regimental color-bearer. It is assumed he carried the colors after the severe wounding of the Ensign W. T. Mayberry.
[16] (Savage, pp. 117-124)
[17] Interestingly, although Bragg was on the field, some accounts suggest he was to oversee the entire operation leaving Polk in field command of the actions. Could it be this was the case? Is there a possibility that Donelson forgot to inform Savage that he would be commanding the brigade? It is clear that Savage had no knowledge of any such change in the command structure. It would make more sense that Donelson was in command of the division as it was sent in so hap-hazard. Donelson never showed promise as a tactician or at command and control as even a brigade commander—neither at Perryville or Murfreesboro. Food for thought.
[18] If there is any foundation to this accusation, it is that there was a sense of urgency to seize the lone battery, and perhaps, this urgency superseded the deployment of the entire division.
[19] There is no evidence to substantiate this claim, only Savage's wish.
[20] (Savage, pp. 135-136) Although Savage was brash as well as sometimes disrespectful, disobedient and insubordinate, the belief that he was targeted for death by his superiors is likely a sign of some form of paranoia that he suffered from.
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