- Joined
- May 18, 2005
- Location
- Spring Hill, Tennessee
In 2016 the Perryville Battlefield Park issued a statement on my interpretation of the battle. It was an attempt to discredit the new interpretation of the battle on the Confederate right. In an earlier post, I included the statement, but this time I have rebutted it.
THE REBUTTAL OF THE PARK'S STATEMENT
Now, the entire statement will be rebutted with hard evidence. The first point of contention is regarding the capture of Colonel Moore of the Thirty-third Ohio. The argument that the Sixteenth Tennessee did not engage the Thirty-third Ohio has already been made, but a few points may still be made. The park's statement is emboldened with rebuttals in brackets. Although there was no author attributed to the Park's official statement, it is believed to have been the former Park Manager. Almost all the following arguments had been made in emails to the author.
REPORTS: After the battle, reports from significant Confederate commanders and other writings invariably pointed to the conclusion that Savage fought Harris and that Maney took Parsons' Hill. Savage himself specifically reported recognizing during the fighting his friend and former colleague from the U. S. Congress, Lt. Col. Oscar Moore, who lay wounded on the field near the Gibson cabin.
[None of the "writings" of any of the commanders suggest that Donelson's brigade engaged the Federal center. In fact, none of the reports point to the idea that "Savage fought Harris," although there is no argument that Maney's men participated in the action on Open Knob against Parsons. The "writings" that invariably pointed to that idea were created and perpetuated by modern historians. There is no source or evidence that even suggests where Lt. Col. Moore was found. Savage did not recognize Moore "during the fighting." It was brought to his attention that Moore had been captured after the fight. He never even admitted to personally seeing the man.]
Savage personally ordered his men to attend to his old friend. Moore's 33rd Ohio was never on Parsons' Hill. Thomas Head of the 16th Tennessee later confirmed in the 16th Tennessee's regimental history that the 16th Tennessee was opposite the 33rd Ohio and the "7th Ohio," which can be no other than 2nd Ohio, since all sources have those two units fighting together all through the battle, and the 7th Ohio served in Virginia. Head in contrast writes nothing about Col. William Terrill's regiments on the Open Knob. It is impossible that Oscar Moore was on or near Parsons' position.
[It has never been suggested that the Thirty-third Ohio fought on or near Open Knob. Clearly, another assumption was made by Thomas Head when writing the regimental history. When Moore was taken prisoner, the natural assumption would be that the regiment fought the unit Moore commanded. However, it is made clear by Savage's statement, that Moore was found and carried to the rear "about dusk." The Sixteenth Tennessee had been relieved and reengaged at about 5:45 P.M., and it was—more than likely—in their second advance over different ground that Colonel Moore was discovered. At that point, Donelson's brigade was advancing on the left of Stewart's brigade[1] and would not have been traversing the same field on which they had fought earlier—but much further south of where they were first engaged. Additionally, the park's statement falsely states that "all sources" have the 2nd Ohio and 33rd Ohio "fighting together all through the battle." This is a misstatement, as the Chief of staff for the Tenth Division states that—for a large portion of the fight—the 2nd and 94th Ohio came into their lines between Bush's and Stone's batteries to help support the left.[2]]
Brig. Gen. Daniel Donelson, Savage's brigade commander, wrote that his brigade (excepting the 8th Tennessee and 51st Tennessee) were together. The 16th Tennessee did attack too early, which is why its casualties were so high. Contrary to Gillum, it was never detached from the brigade. Had the 16th Tennessee moved toward Parsons, the 15th and 38th would have followed, yet evidence from those regiments shows that they did not.
[As will be seen in Donelson's report—later in the text, Donelson never suggested that the Sixteenth Tennessee "attacked too early." Additionally, it has never been suggested that the Sixteenth Tennessee was "detached" from the brigade. The writer states that the 15th and 38th Tennessee would have followed the Sixteenth if they had moved towards Parsons, "yet evidence from those regiments shows that they did not." It would be interesting to see the "evidence" that "they did not" follow the Sixteenth wherever they went. The Sixteenth was the guide regiment, and in fact, all evidence presented—old and new—supports the fact that they did follow the Sixteenth. While the Sixteenth concentrated their attacks on the 123rd Illinois and Parsons, the Fifteenth and Thirty-eighth regiments engaged the Twenty-fourth Illinois and Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania of Starkweather's brigade.]
In his memoir, Gen. St. John Liddell specifically puts General B. F. Cheatham (Donelson's wing commander) at Capt. Samuel Harris' captured battery near the Gibson cabin and reported a conversation with him, asking instructions as to where to deploy his brigade. Liddell also gives credit to the capture of Harris' battery to "Cheatham's Men."
[The argument concerning Liddell was made in depth earlier in the narrative. A member of the Thirty-third Alabama (Wood's brigade) specifically relates the capture of that battery.]
JOHN SAVAGE AND THE "THE RIGHT TURN": After some narrative confusion about timing and events at the beginning of the battle, Gillum assumes that Savage initially drove to the west and then turned right under orders from his superiors, which would have taken him northwest to Parsons' Hill. Savage indeed describes turning to the right while under heavy fire. But the available evidence reinforces the traditional interpretation that Savage started out moving to the southwest, and so his right turn took him west toward the Gibson cabin.
[The above statements are very misleading. First, the "narrative confusion about timing and events" could well be confusion on that writer's behalf. He suggests that Donelson's brigade commenced the attack to the southwest in the direction of Simonson's battery over a half mile away. This axis of advance would have placed them marching obliquely in front of the aligned regiments of Wood's brigade that had occupied the woods and were not already fighting the 33rd Ohio in the woods to their front. The alignment of Confederate divisions and brigades had already been completed when Cheatham's division was the last to file into line. Donelson and Savage were certain to observe Jones', Wood's and Brown's brigades to their left—just north of Doctor's Creek. No commander would march his force in front of—or across the frontage—of its supporting forces. It is the park's erroneous belief of the exact location that Donelson's brigade began its advance that leads him to this unsubstantiated conclusion.]
Crucially, the only Union battery that could have been visible to Savage at the outset was Capt. Peter Simonson's. It also was the only U. S. battery firing at the time. That is why the initial attack was directed towards this battery.
[According to the above statement, the writer's understanding of where Donelson's attack position was located west of Chaplin River is critical in his belief of how the battle played out. He believes that the starting point for the brigade was on a hilltop in the bend of Chaplin River. Only from that specific location can his interpretation make sense, but even then, it discounts the fact that the regiment and brigade would be advancing in front of and overlapping Wood's and Jones' brigades. Additionally, while the terrain has remained the same, the landscape has changed. Woods—that once covered the approaches between Mackville Pike and Chaplin River—have largely been cleared. The trees present at the time would have added an additional 25 to 35 feet in elevation preventing the observation of Simonson's guns. But—most importantly, the Tenth Division's Chief of Staff once again dispels the belief that Simonson's battery was the only one firing. In his testimony during the Court of Inquiry for General Buell, he testified that previous to seeing rebel infantry approach, "we were firing at long range from two batteries."[3] Which battery was the second battery? We know that Stone's battery had already been firing at cavalry in the deep valley to the north as stated in other Federal reports.]
The 45 degree turn to the right faced the 16th Tennessee to the west, into "the valley of death," not northwest to the Open Knob. Gillum's interpretation instead requires Savage to intentionally expose his flank to Simonson's fire while initially attacking a battery (Capt. Samuel Harris's) that had yet to be seen or open fire.
[Here, the writer misinterprets the reevaluation. The reevaluation does not in any way suggest that Savage ever saw or advanced in the direction of Harris' battery. Nor does it suggest in any way that Donelson's brigade received fire from Simonson's battery. Simonson's battery directly confronted the brigades of Brown, Jones and three brigades of Buckner's division. The new interpretation—instead—suggests that the Sixteenth Tennessee changed direction to the northwest to attack Parsons' battery after beginning their advance in the direction of Stone's Battery atop Starkweather's Heights. Additionally, "the 45 degree turn" is fabricated by the writer of the statement. The most accurate information that can be had regarding the direction of the turn came from a soldier in the Sixteenth Regiment that stated the regiment was reformed "at right angles (practically 90 degrees) to the line when marching to charge the battery in the field." In the following paragraphs, the writer attempts to use Savage's "own words" to support his version of events.]
Savage himself reinforces the traditional interpretation in his own words:
"There was running up from Chaplain Creek a long hollow about half way between the battery and where the regiment was in line. I thought as soon as I moved into that hollow I would be out of reach of the battery and that I could come up on the other side within sixty or seventy yards of the battery." Note that topographically, there is no "hollow" that would take the 16th Tennessee to Parsons' Hill.
[It's interesting that the writer states that there is no "hollow" topographically that would take the Sixteenth Tennessee to Parsons' position. In fact, there is only one terrain feature that separated the two forces at the commencement of the action. It was one deep hollow that separated the first finger of terrain from the second finger upon which Parsons' battery and Terrill's brigade were deploying. If Savage advanced up the "Valley of Death"—as the writer puts it—there would definitely be NO hollows in which to avoid enemy fire. His interpretation suggests that they would have advanced up the length of the valley in the bottoms of what is currently called "Donelson's Run."]
"There was no reason why the battery should not have fired upon the regiment while it was in line, except that a fire would pass through the line and only do a little damage. Marching in the new direction indicated by Cheatham's aide, I was soon in an open beech forest on the top of the hill. I was riding in front expecting a surprise, the left of the regiment was at the edge of the forest and the field, when the battery, about one hundred and fifty yards from the regiment, fired, enfilading it, sweeping the whole length of the line, killing a captain, a lieutenant and many privates. I was riding in front of the regiment; a grape shot passed through the head of my horse below the eyes." This description reinforces the conclusion that the battery was Simonson's, and that the right turn took the regiment to the Widow Gibson farm.
[Here, the writer has somehow translated the above to support his version of events. The fact is that Savage doesn't state which direction the fire from the enemy battery came from. He simply states that the battery was "about one-hundred and fifty yards from the regiment" when it fired and enfiladed the regiment. How does this "reinforce" any idea that the battery was Simonson's or that the "right turn" took the regiment to Widow Gibson's? Additionally, his interpretation would have the regiment engaging the Tenth Wisconsin of Lytle's brigade that supported the left of Simonson's battery. The only battery that members of the Sixteenth Tennessee mention being in very close proximity to them is located on the regiment's right flank as is seen in Savage's account as well as those of his men. That alone implies that the fire was most likely taken from a battery on their right. If the fire did come from the right, it would rule out the possibility of the fire coming from Simonson's guns—as those guns would have been located on the regiment's left.]
"The men at the battery had been killed or wounded or had fled before Maney's brigade appeared in the field to my right, some hundred yards or more distant, and the battle had ceased at the battery." If this was not Harris's battery, but instead Parsons', what was Maney attacking? Remember that there was no Federal battery north of Parsons' to be assaulted by Maney.
[Again, it appears that the writer cannot get past the fact that direction is relative to an individual's orientation and perspective of the field. The above assertion would indicate that Harris' battery was defenseless and fell to the Confederates only thirty minutes into the fight. However, it is stated in Federal and Confederate reports that Harris' battery fell around 6 p.m. The Confederate attack commenced between 1:20 and 2:00 p.m. All accounts of the participants claim that Maney came to their assistance thirty minutes after the Sixteenth became engaged. That would mean that in less than thirty minutes, Maney had crushed Terrill, captured Parsons' guns and caused the retreat of Starkweather. Impossible. When Savage stated that the "battle had ceased at the battery," he was implying that his regiment was more responsible for its capture than Maney's men. The facts support the idea that the battery Maney was attacking was the same one that Savage's regiment had been fighting for thirty minutes.]
"None of General Maney's brigade was nearer than one hundred yards of this battery. The batteries taken by General Maney's brigade were half a mile or more to the right of this battery." Again, if Savage took Parsons' battery, what batteries could Maney have taken?
[This was Savage's attempt to claim capture of Parsons' guns. Savage believed that his regiment was RESPONSIBLE for the capture of Parsons' battery, while Maney was responsible for the capture of the remaining guns of Bush and Stone on Starkweather's Hill. It's likely that neither of the batteries could have been captured without the assistance of both units.]
PARSONS' GUNS: All of the guns taken from Col. John Starkweather's brigade were recovered and accounted for by Federal troops on October 9, 1862. Only two captured Federal cannons left the field (and the state) after the battle. Based on the reports of Union Gen. Alexander McCook and Confederate battery commander Lt. William B. Turner, (and others) there can be no doubt that the guns in questions are Parsons'. Sources from Maney's brigade invariably assert say they captured two batteries unassisted.
Savage himself wrote that Maney's Brigade captured batteries (plural) on his right (to the north), and were not to be confused with any guns his regiment took. There were no other batteries on the Confederate right past Parsons, so Savage clearly states here that Maney took Parsons' battery. It is worth noting as well that Savage, because of a wound, did not witness the capture of any battery personally.
Also notable is the correspondence that ensued between Gen. Braxton Bragg's Chief of Ordnance and Col. Maney about whose names should be engraved on those captured guns as honors. Note that Bragg gave Maney, not Donelson, the honor of choosing the names. Maney replied that at Perryville, along with his four Tennessee regiments, there also was the 41st Georgia, led by Col. Charles A. McDaniel. Maney asked that McDaniel's name be engraved on a gun and it presented to a Georgia Battery. Never mentioned was any thought of adding the 16th Tennessee to the list of regiments to be honored. In the end, the two Napoleons were engraved with the names of color bearer A.T. Mitchell and Lt. Col. John Patterson, both of the 1st Tennessee of Maney's Brigade. The Napoleon engraved to Mitchell later was seen in Germantown, Pennsylvania, by a former Confederate who wrote a letter to the Confederate Veteran for its January 1914 issue.
[The argument above—regarding Savage's claims—was rebutted in detail earlier in the narrative. The fact is that just because a captured gun had the names of members of Maney's brigade engraved on them does not mean they were solely responsible for the capture of the guns. Two guns were eventually engraved with the names of two members of the First Tennessee that played NO role in the capture of Parsons' battery. What the writer ignores is that the correspondence which he refers to is in regards the capture of guns at the Battle of Murfreesboro. The request for names to inscribe was made in reference to that battle. Maney's reply to the correspondence stated, "it would be a profound gratification to me to be allowed the privilege of inscribing the name of Colonel McDaniel on one of the guns captured by my brigade at the battle of Murfreesborough, the gun to be presented to some Georgia battery…"[4] Maney clearly had great respect for the man. He made no other suggestions. General Ed Walthall and many other brigade commanders were asked the same question regarding guns captured at Murfreesboro in the Spring of 1863. Walthall did submit four names.[5] Conversely, when an inquiry came after the Battle of Murfreesboro to attain a list of names to add to the Confederate Roll of Honor, Colonel Savage declined stating that he could not name a few when so many were so courageous. If such was asked of Savage after Perryville, his response would have certainly been the same. The following argument made by the park shows how an argument can be made from nothing at all.]
WHERE ARE THE CABINS? Sources from Savage's brigade invariably describe fighting around log buildings. Savage famously wrote that "There was a fence and a field on my right running up to two cabins at the line of the enemy's forces. There were skirmish lines along this fence which fired on our rear as we advanced. The Sixteenth had no protection except a few trees in the forest. I ordered a charge. We drove the enemy from behind the fences, killing many of them as they fled. The right of the regiment was at the two cabins. There was a battery in the line of battle to the right, about thirty or forty yards from these cabins, between which cabins there was an entry, or space, of ten or fifteen feet. The battery opened fire upon us, killing many men, and at the same time a fire of small arms from the line of battle was directed upon these cabins. The battery fired obliquely into this space."
Based on this description, that battery mentioned can only be Harris's.
[Nowhere in the above description did Savage say "Harris' battery." How can one CONCLUDE that based on THAT description that the battery "can only be Harris's"? Additionally, the park's management insists that Harris' battery was located about three-hundred yards further northwest of the only archeological evidence of a corn crib that they allege belonged to Gibson. Savage and other members of the regiment state that the enemy battery they faced was within "thirty or forty yards" of their right flank.]
No soldier ever mentioned anything about any structure anywhere on the slopes of Parsons' Hill, even though more soldiers, both North and South, wrote about that piece of ground more than any other on the field.
[That is easy to believe if one believes that Savage's regiment did not attack Open Knob. As was noted in earlier narrative, there is a Federal source that mentions a structure on Open Knob. If the writer is wrong—as the wealth of evidence suggests—then the only cabin structures mentioned by Confederate commanders and privates alike speak only of the Hafley cabins on the slope of Open Knob. Additionally, the fight against Open Knob was recorded no more than the participants of the fight in front of and against Lytle's brigade near Squire Bottom's house and Burnt Barn.]
In his book, Gillum concludes without any evidence that there still must have been a structure on Parsons' Hill, it simply hasn't been found yet by archeologists. In his book he also points hopefully to areas where trees later were removed and suggests that those depressions might comprise the remains of a house structure.
[The writer states that "Gillum concludes without any evidence" that there were cabins on the east slope of Open Knob. In fact, all the evidence supports that the Hafley cabins were indeed on the slope of Open Knob. The evidence includes census data, participants' accounts, two maps drawn from war-time surveys, and even the Park's own "Owners of Battlefield" document that admits Hafley lived on Bottom's land from 1858 to 1862. Additionally, the park has not conducted any sort of dig in the area of the Hafley cabins—as they do not believe it existed. How can one find archeological evidence of a structure when one is unwilling to conduct a scientific dig? Finally, since the introduction of earth moving machinery to make the park look closer to what it may have looked like in 1862, a wealth of potential archeological evidence has been destroyed or dispersed.]
More recently, after publication, Gillum pointed in several online venues to an 1877 map of the battlefield that shows a "Hayflay" cabin southeast of the Open Knob. He has concluded that this must be the missing cabin, and thus this map confirms his interpretation. There are two obvious problems, however. First, the cabin is in the wrong place for his narrative. The map places the cabin near the modern outdoor pavilion and playground, nowhere near where it would support the Gillum narrative. It is much too far to the east.
[The writer's declaration that the cabin is "in the wrong place for his narrative" is false. In fact, if one observes the actual map and observes the north seeking arrow, the cabin site is located due north and slightly west of the symbol for the Confederate cemetery. This position is actually 300 yards from the playground and is less than 100 yards from the known position of Parsons' battery. It is in the precise vicinity that the cabins were supposed to have been.]
Second, and more importantly, the map clearly depicts 1862 troop movements on an 1877 landscape. Notably, Squire Bottom's cemetery constructed after the battle also is shown on the map. All the map really establishes is that a man named Hayflay (probably Hafely) lived on the battlefield in 1877. There remains no evidence of a cabin there in 1862. It is not on the more familiar "Work Map" of the battlefield. The history of the Sleettown site also demonstrates that in terms of structures, the battlefield looked quite different by 1877. An 1877 map says little then about the state of the battlefield in October 1862. The most logical conclusion is that the structure was built in the mid-1870s.
[In fact, nearly all the names associated with the map are found in the 1860 census, but not in following censuses. That fact—coupled with the two maps, "Owners of Battlefield" document, eyewitness testimony and census data from 1860 and 1870—points to the "most logical conclusion:" that there was a home-site occupied by Joseph Hafley on the southeast slope of Open Knob in 1862. The only family named Hafley living in Boyle county in the 1870 census is the same Joseph Hafley that lived miles south of Perryville with a Mitchellsburg post office. Additionally, not one "Sleettown" resident or structure is identified or located on the 1877 battlefield map—more indication that the map was compiled from the 1862 survey. The primary reason that there is no archeological evidence of a structure is due to the fact that no archeological survey has been conducted on that site location. Lastly, the writer mentions the "more familiar Work Map." This is supposed to be the J. B. Work map. It is hard to believe that the J. B. Work map is considered reliable. That map was published in 1900 and was "compiled by the records and other sources."[6] It is possibly the least reliable map of all of the known maps. A more reliable map might be the one included in The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War. That map was also compiled by Ruger and Kilp's surveys taken in 1862 and can be found on Plate 24, number 2. Another more credible map is from History of the Army of the Cumberland which was compiled from Ruger and Kilp's survey of 1862 as well. Why would two of their maps contain a symbol for a home-site and the name Hayflay (Hafley) while other maps don't? It may simply be the fact that the map became over-crowded with superfluous information and troop dispositions. To this author's knowledge, there are only four well-known and reliable maps in existence. All four are compiled from the Ruger and Kilp map. Two of them include the Hafley name and home-site. Only one of those two has troop positions superimposed on it. Of the remaining two maps that were also published from surveys by them, both have troop dispositions but no reference of the Hafley name. The map from History of the Army of the Cumberland does not include the Hafley name, but neither does it include the H.P. Bottom House or barn, Widow Gibson's Cabin nor the Russell House. Similarly, the more familiar map from The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War does include the Gibson, Russell and the Bottom House, but no mention of Hafley.]
CONCLUSION: Historical inquiry and revision is always welcome at the park, and over the years we have indeed altered several interpretations based upon new evidence. Mr. Gillum, however, has not proven his case to our satisfaction. Instead, our inquiry reconfirms the traditional interpretation of these events as currently depicted at the park.
[Let the reader be the judge.]
[1] Maj. Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Report of Battle of Perryville : Brig. Gen. D. S. Donelson, Report of Battle of Perryville
[2] Capt. Percival P. Oldershaw, Report of Battle of Perryville, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, p. 1059-62.
[3] Capt. P. P. Oldershaw, Buell Court of Inquiry, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, p. 293-96.
[4] OR, Vol. 16, Pt. 2, p. 1003-04. (Emphasis added.)
[5] https://www.fold3.com/image/271/75442331
[6] Work, J. B. Map of the battle-field of Perryville, Ky., October 8th 1862. [Chicago, Ill, 1900] Map. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/99447187/. (Accessed June 04, 2017.)
THE REBUTTAL OF THE PARK'S STATEMENT
Now, the entire statement will be rebutted with hard evidence. The first point of contention is regarding the capture of Colonel Moore of the Thirty-third Ohio. The argument that the Sixteenth Tennessee did not engage the Thirty-third Ohio has already been made, but a few points may still be made. The park's statement is emboldened with rebuttals in brackets. Although there was no author attributed to the Park's official statement, it is believed to have been the former Park Manager. Almost all the following arguments had been made in emails to the author.
REPORTS: After the battle, reports from significant Confederate commanders and other writings invariably pointed to the conclusion that Savage fought Harris and that Maney took Parsons' Hill. Savage himself specifically reported recognizing during the fighting his friend and former colleague from the U. S. Congress, Lt. Col. Oscar Moore, who lay wounded on the field near the Gibson cabin.
[None of the "writings" of any of the commanders suggest that Donelson's brigade engaged the Federal center. In fact, none of the reports point to the idea that "Savage fought Harris," although there is no argument that Maney's men participated in the action on Open Knob against Parsons. The "writings" that invariably pointed to that idea were created and perpetuated by modern historians. There is no source or evidence that even suggests where Lt. Col. Moore was found. Savage did not recognize Moore "during the fighting." It was brought to his attention that Moore had been captured after the fight. He never even admitted to personally seeing the man.]
Savage personally ordered his men to attend to his old friend. Moore's 33rd Ohio was never on Parsons' Hill. Thomas Head of the 16th Tennessee later confirmed in the 16th Tennessee's regimental history that the 16th Tennessee was opposite the 33rd Ohio and the "7th Ohio," which can be no other than 2nd Ohio, since all sources have those two units fighting together all through the battle, and the 7th Ohio served in Virginia. Head in contrast writes nothing about Col. William Terrill's regiments on the Open Knob. It is impossible that Oscar Moore was on or near Parsons' position.
[It has never been suggested that the Thirty-third Ohio fought on or near Open Knob. Clearly, another assumption was made by Thomas Head when writing the regimental history. When Moore was taken prisoner, the natural assumption would be that the regiment fought the unit Moore commanded. However, it is made clear by Savage's statement, that Moore was found and carried to the rear "about dusk." The Sixteenth Tennessee had been relieved and reengaged at about 5:45 P.M., and it was—more than likely—in their second advance over different ground that Colonel Moore was discovered. At that point, Donelson's brigade was advancing on the left of Stewart's brigade[1] and would not have been traversing the same field on which they had fought earlier—but much further south of where they were first engaged. Additionally, the park's statement falsely states that "all sources" have the 2nd Ohio and 33rd Ohio "fighting together all through the battle." This is a misstatement, as the Chief of staff for the Tenth Division states that—for a large portion of the fight—the 2nd and 94th Ohio came into their lines between Bush's and Stone's batteries to help support the left.[2]]
Brig. Gen. Daniel Donelson, Savage's brigade commander, wrote that his brigade (excepting the 8th Tennessee and 51st Tennessee) were together. The 16th Tennessee did attack too early, which is why its casualties were so high. Contrary to Gillum, it was never detached from the brigade. Had the 16th Tennessee moved toward Parsons, the 15th and 38th would have followed, yet evidence from those regiments shows that they did not.
[As will be seen in Donelson's report—later in the text, Donelson never suggested that the Sixteenth Tennessee "attacked too early." Additionally, it has never been suggested that the Sixteenth Tennessee was "detached" from the brigade. The writer states that the 15th and 38th Tennessee would have followed the Sixteenth if they had moved towards Parsons, "yet evidence from those regiments shows that they did not." It would be interesting to see the "evidence" that "they did not" follow the Sixteenth wherever they went. The Sixteenth was the guide regiment, and in fact, all evidence presented—old and new—supports the fact that they did follow the Sixteenth. While the Sixteenth concentrated their attacks on the 123rd Illinois and Parsons, the Fifteenth and Thirty-eighth regiments engaged the Twenty-fourth Illinois and Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania of Starkweather's brigade.]
In his memoir, Gen. St. John Liddell specifically puts General B. F. Cheatham (Donelson's wing commander) at Capt. Samuel Harris' captured battery near the Gibson cabin and reported a conversation with him, asking instructions as to where to deploy his brigade. Liddell also gives credit to the capture of Harris' battery to "Cheatham's Men."
[The argument concerning Liddell was made in depth earlier in the narrative. A member of the Thirty-third Alabama (Wood's brigade) specifically relates the capture of that battery.]
JOHN SAVAGE AND THE "THE RIGHT TURN": After some narrative confusion about timing and events at the beginning of the battle, Gillum assumes that Savage initially drove to the west and then turned right under orders from his superiors, which would have taken him northwest to Parsons' Hill. Savage indeed describes turning to the right while under heavy fire. But the available evidence reinforces the traditional interpretation that Savage started out moving to the southwest, and so his right turn took him west toward the Gibson cabin.
[The above statements are very misleading. First, the "narrative confusion about timing and events" could well be confusion on that writer's behalf. He suggests that Donelson's brigade commenced the attack to the southwest in the direction of Simonson's battery over a half mile away. This axis of advance would have placed them marching obliquely in front of the aligned regiments of Wood's brigade that had occupied the woods and were not already fighting the 33rd Ohio in the woods to their front. The alignment of Confederate divisions and brigades had already been completed when Cheatham's division was the last to file into line. Donelson and Savage were certain to observe Jones', Wood's and Brown's brigades to their left—just north of Doctor's Creek. No commander would march his force in front of—or across the frontage—of its supporting forces. It is the park's erroneous belief of the exact location that Donelson's brigade began its advance that leads him to this unsubstantiated conclusion.]
Crucially, the only Union battery that could have been visible to Savage at the outset was Capt. Peter Simonson's. It also was the only U. S. battery firing at the time. That is why the initial attack was directed towards this battery.
[According to the above statement, the writer's understanding of where Donelson's attack position was located west of Chaplin River is critical in his belief of how the battle played out. He believes that the starting point for the brigade was on a hilltop in the bend of Chaplin River. Only from that specific location can his interpretation make sense, but even then, it discounts the fact that the regiment and brigade would be advancing in front of and overlapping Wood's and Jones' brigades. Additionally, while the terrain has remained the same, the landscape has changed. Woods—that once covered the approaches between Mackville Pike and Chaplin River—have largely been cleared. The trees present at the time would have added an additional 25 to 35 feet in elevation preventing the observation of Simonson's guns. But—most importantly, the Tenth Division's Chief of Staff once again dispels the belief that Simonson's battery was the only one firing. In his testimony during the Court of Inquiry for General Buell, he testified that previous to seeing rebel infantry approach, "we were firing at long range from two batteries."[3] Which battery was the second battery? We know that Stone's battery had already been firing at cavalry in the deep valley to the north as stated in other Federal reports.]
The 45 degree turn to the right faced the 16th Tennessee to the west, into "the valley of death," not northwest to the Open Knob. Gillum's interpretation instead requires Savage to intentionally expose his flank to Simonson's fire while initially attacking a battery (Capt. Samuel Harris's) that had yet to be seen or open fire.
[Here, the writer misinterprets the reevaluation. The reevaluation does not in any way suggest that Savage ever saw or advanced in the direction of Harris' battery. Nor does it suggest in any way that Donelson's brigade received fire from Simonson's battery. Simonson's battery directly confronted the brigades of Brown, Jones and three brigades of Buckner's division. The new interpretation—instead—suggests that the Sixteenth Tennessee changed direction to the northwest to attack Parsons' battery after beginning their advance in the direction of Stone's Battery atop Starkweather's Heights. Additionally, "the 45 degree turn" is fabricated by the writer of the statement. The most accurate information that can be had regarding the direction of the turn came from a soldier in the Sixteenth Regiment that stated the regiment was reformed "at right angles (practically 90 degrees) to the line when marching to charge the battery in the field." In the following paragraphs, the writer attempts to use Savage's "own words" to support his version of events.]
Savage himself reinforces the traditional interpretation in his own words:
"There was running up from Chaplain Creek a long hollow about half way between the battery and where the regiment was in line. I thought as soon as I moved into that hollow I would be out of reach of the battery and that I could come up on the other side within sixty or seventy yards of the battery." Note that topographically, there is no "hollow" that would take the 16th Tennessee to Parsons' Hill.
[It's interesting that the writer states that there is no "hollow" topographically that would take the Sixteenth Tennessee to Parsons' position. In fact, there is only one terrain feature that separated the two forces at the commencement of the action. It was one deep hollow that separated the first finger of terrain from the second finger upon which Parsons' battery and Terrill's brigade were deploying. If Savage advanced up the "Valley of Death"—as the writer puts it—there would definitely be NO hollows in which to avoid enemy fire. His interpretation suggests that they would have advanced up the length of the valley in the bottoms of what is currently called "Donelson's Run."]
"There was no reason why the battery should not have fired upon the regiment while it was in line, except that a fire would pass through the line and only do a little damage. Marching in the new direction indicated by Cheatham's aide, I was soon in an open beech forest on the top of the hill. I was riding in front expecting a surprise, the left of the regiment was at the edge of the forest and the field, when the battery, about one hundred and fifty yards from the regiment, fired, enfilading it, sweeping the whole length of the line, killing a captain, a lieutenant and many privates. I was riding in front of the regiment; a grape shot passed through the head of my horse below the eyes." This description reinforces the conclusion that the battery was Simonson's, and that the right turn took the regiment to the Widow Gibson farm.
[Here, the writer has somehow translated the above to support his version of events. The fact is that Savage doesn't state which direction the fire from the enemy battery came from. He simply states that the battery was "about one-hundred and fifty yards from the regiment" when it fired and enfiladed the regiment. How does this "reinforce" any idea that the battery was Simonson's or that the "right turn" took the regiment to Widow Gibson's? Additionally, his interpretation would have the regiment engaging the Tenth Wisconsin of Lytle's brigade that supported the left of Simonson's battery. The only battery that members of the Sixteenth Tennessee mention being in very close proximity to them is located on the regiment's right flank as is seen in Savage's account as well as those of his men. That alone implies that the fire was most likely taken from a battery on their right. If the fire did come from the right, it would rule out the possibility of the fire coming from Simonson's guns—as those guns would have been located on the regiment's left.]
"The men at the battery had been killed or wounded or had fled before Maney's brigade appeared in the field to my right, some hundred yards or more distant, and the battle had ceased at the battery." If this was not Harris's battery, but instead Parsons', what was Maney attacking? Remember that there was no Federal battery north of Parsons' to be assaulted by Maney.
[Again, it appears that the writer cannot get past the fact that direction is relative to an individual's orientation and perspective of the field. The above assertion would indicate that Harris' battery was defenseless and fell to the Confederates only thirty minutes into the fight. However, it is stated in Federal and Confederate reports that Harris' battery fell around 6 p.m. The Confederate attack commenced between 1:20 and 2:00 p.m. All accounts of the participants claim that Maney came to their assistance thirty minutes after the Sixteenth became engaged. That would mean that in less than thirty minutes, Maney had crushed Terrill, captured Parsons' guns and caused the retreat of Starkweather. Impossible. When Savage stated that the "battle had ceased at the battery," he was implying that his regiment was more responsible for its capture than Maney's men. The facts support the idea that the battery Maney was attacking was the same one that Savage's regiment had been fighting for thirty minutes.]
"None of General Maney's brigade was nearer than one hundred yards of this battery. The batteries taken by General Maney's brigade were half a mile or more to the right of this battery." Again, if Savage took Parsons' battery, what batteries could Maney have taken?
[This was Savage's attempt to claim capture of Parsons' guns. Savage believed that his regiment was RESPONSIBLE for the capture of Parsons' battery, while Maney was responsible for the capture of the remaining guns of Bush and Stone on Starkweather's Hill. It's likely that neither of the batteries could have been captured without the assistance of both units.]
PARSONS' GUNS: All of the guns taken from Col. John Starkweather's brigade were recovered and accounted for by Federal troops on October 9, 1862. Only two captured Federal cannons left the field (and the state) after the battle. Based on the reports of Union Gen. Alexander McCook and Confederate battery commander Lt. William B. Turner, (and others) there can be no doubt that the guns in questions are Parsons'. Sources from Maney's brigade invariably assert say they captured two batteries unassisted.
Savage himself wrote that Maney's Brigade captured batteries (plural) on his right (to the north), and were not to be confused with any guns his regiment took. There were no other batteries on the Confederate right past Parsons, so Savage clearly states here that Maney took Parsons' battery. It is worth noting as well that Savage, because of a wound, did not witness the capture of any battery personally.
Also notable is the correspondence that ensued between Gen. Braxton Bragg's Chief of Ordnance and Col. Maney about whose names should be engraved on those captured guns as honors. Note that Bragg gave Maney, not Donelson, the honor of choosing the names. Maney replied that at Perryville, along with his four Tennessee regiments, there also was the 41st Georgia, led by Col. Charles A. McDaniel. Maney asked that McDaniel's name be engraved on a gun and it presented to a Georgia Battery. Never mentioned was any thought of adding the 16th Tennessee to the list of regiments to be honored. In the end, the two Napoleons were engraved with the names of color bearer A.T. Mitchell and Lt. Col. John Patterson, both of the 1st Tennessee of Maney's Brigade. The Napoleon engraved to Mitchell later was seen in Germantown, Pennsylvania, by a former Confederate who wrote a letter to the Confederate Veteran for its January 1914 issue.
[The argument above—regarding Savage's claims—was rebutted in detail earlier in the narrative. The fact is that just because a captured gun had the names of members of Maney's brigade engraved on them does not mean they were solely responsible for the capture of the guns. Two guns were eventually engraved with the names of two members of the First Tennessee that played NO role in the capture of Parsons' battery. What the writer ignores is that the correspondence which he refers to is in regards the capture of guns at the Battle of Murfreesboro. The request for names to inscribe was made in reference to that battle. Maney's reply to the correspondence stated, "it would be a profound gratification to me to be allowed the privilege of inscribing the name of Colonel McDaniel on one of the guns captured by my brigade at the battle of Murfreesborough, the gun to be presented to some Georgia battery…"[4] Maney clearly had great respect for the man. He made no other suggestions. General Ed Walthall and many other brigade commanders were asked the same question regarding guns captured at Murfreesboro in the Spring of 1863. Walthall did submit four names.[5] Conversely, when an inquiry came after the Battle of Murfreesboro to attain a list of names to add to the Confederate Roll of Honor, Colonel Savage declined stating that he could not name a few when so many were so courageous. If such was asked of Savage after Perryville, his response would have certainly been the same. The following argument made by the park shows how an argument can be made from nothing at all.]
WHERE ARE THE CABINS? Sources from Savage's brigade invariably describe fighting around log buildings. Savage famously wrote that "There was a fence and a field on my right running up to two cabins at the line of the enemy's forces. There were skirmish lines along this fence which fired on our rear as we advanced. The Sixteenth had no protection except a few trees in the forest. I ordered a charge. We drove the enemy from behind the fences, killing many of them as they fled. The right of the regiment was at the two cabins. There was a battery in the line of battle to the right, about thirty or forty yards from these cabins, between which cabins there was an entry, or space, of ten or fifteen feet. The battery opened fire upon us, killing many men, and at the same time a fire of small arms from the line of battle was directed upon these cabins. The battery fired obliquely into this space."
Based on this description, that battery mentioned can only be Harris's.
[Nowhere in the above description did Savage say "Harris' battery." How can one CONCLUDE that based on THAT description that the battery "can only be Harris's"? Additionally, the park's management insists that Harris' battery was located about three-hundred yards further northwest of the only archeological evidence of a corn crib that they allege belonged to Gibson. Savage and other members of the regiment state that the enemy battery they faced was within "thirty or forty yards" of their right flank.]
No soldier ever mentioned anything about any structure anywhere on the slopes of Parsons' Hill, even though more soldiers, both North and South, wrote about that piece of ground more than any other on the field.
[That is easy to believe if one believes that Savage's regiment did not attack Open Knob. As was noted in earlier narrative, there is a Federal source that mentions a structure on Open Knob. If the writer is wrong—as the wealth of evidence suggests—then the only cabin structures mentioned by Confederate commanders and privates alike speak only of the Hafley cabins on the slope of Open Knob. Additionally, the fight against Open Knob was recorded no more than the participants of the fight in front of and against Lytle's brigade near Squire Bottom's house and Burnt Barn.]
In his book, Gillum concludes without any evidence that there still must have been a structure on Parsons' Hill, it simply hasn't been found yet by archeologists. In his book he also points hopefully to areas where trees later were removed and suggests that those depressions might comprise the remains of a house structure.
[The writer states that "Gillum concludes without any evidence" that there were cabins on the east slope of Open Knob. In fact, all the evidence supports that the Hafley cabins were indeed on the slope of Open Knob. The evidence includes census data, participants' accounts, two maps drawn from war-time surveys, and even the Park's own "Owners of Battlefield" document that admits Hafley lived on Bottom's land from 1858 to 1862. Additionally, the park has not conducted any sort of dig in the area of the Hafley cabins—as they do not believe it existed. How can one find archeological evidence of a structure when one is unwilling to conduct a scientific dig? Finally, since the introduction of earth moving machinery to make the park look closer to what it may have looked like in 1862, a wealth of potential archeological evidence has been destroyed or dispersed.]
More recently, after publication, Gillum pointed in several online venues to an 1877 map of the battlefield that shows a "Hayflay" cabin southeast of the Open Knob. He has concluded that this must be the missing cabin, and thus this map confirms his interpretation. There are two obvious problems, however. First, the cabin is in the wrong place for his narrative. The map places the cabin near the modern outdoor pavilion and playground, nowhere near where it would support the Gillum narrative. It is much too far to the east.
[The writer's declaration that the cabin is "in the wrong place for his narrative" is false. In fact, if one observes the actual map and observes the north seeking arrow, the cabin site is located due north and slightly west of the symbol for the Confederate cemetery. This position is actually 300 yards from the playground and is less than 100 yards from the known position of Parsons' battery. It is in the precise vicinity that the cabins were supposed to have been.]
Second, and more importantly, the map clearly depicts 1862 troop movements on an 1877 landscape. Notably, Squire Bottom's cemetery constructed after the battle also is shown on the map. All the map really establishes is that a man named Hayflay (probably Hafely) lived on the battlefield in 1877. There remains no evidence of a cabin there in 1862. It is not on the more familiar "Work Map" of the battlefield. The history of the Sleettown site also demonstrates that in terms of structures, the battlefield looked quite different by 1877. An 1877 map says little then about the state of the battlefield in October 1862. The most logical conclusion is that the structure was built in the mid-1870s.
[In fact, nearly all the names associated with the map are found in the 1860 census, but not in following censuses. That fact—coupled with the two maps, "Owners of Battlefield" document, eyewitness testimony and census data from 1860 and 1870—points to the "most logical conclusion:" that there was a home-site occupied by Joseph Hafley on the southeast slope of Open Knob in 1862. The only family named Hafley living in Boyle county in the 1870 census is the same Joseph Hafley that lived miles south of Perryville with a Mitchellsburg post office. Additionally, not one "Sleettown" resident or structure is identified or located on the 1877 battlefield map—more indication that the map was compiled from the 1862 survey. The primary reason that there is no archeological evidence of a structure is due to the fact that no archeological survey has been conducted on that site location. Lastly, the writer mentions the "more familiar Work Map." This is supposed to be the J. B. Work map. It is hard to believe that the J. B. Work map is considered reliable. That map was published in 1900 and was "compiled by the records and other sources."[6] It is possibly the least reliable map of all of the known maps. A more reliable map might be the one included in The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War. That map was also compiled by Ruger and Kilp's surveys taken in 1862 and can be found on Plate 24, number 2. Another more credible map is from History of the Army of the Cumberland which was compiled from Ruger and Kilp's survey of 1862 as well. Why would two of their maps contain a symbol for a home-site and the name Hayflay (Hafley) while other maps don't? It may simply be the fact that the map became over-crowded with superfluous information and troop dispositions. To this author's knowledge, there are only four well-known and reliable maps in existence. All four are compiled from the Ruger and Kilp map. Two of them include the Hafley name and home-site. Only one of those two has troop positions superimposed on it. Of the remaining two maps that were also published from surveys by them, both have troop dispositions but no reference of the Hafley name. The map from History of the Army of the Cumberland does not include the Hafley name, but neither does it include the H.P. Bottom House or barn, Widow Gibson's Cabin nor the Russell House. Similarly, the more familiar map from The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War does include the Gibson, Russell and the Bottom House, but no mention of Hafley.]
CONCLUSION: Historical inquiry and revision is always welcome at the park, and over the years we have indeed altered several interpretations based upon new evidence. Mr. Gillum, however, has not proven his case to our satisfaction. Instead, our inquiry reconfirms the traditional interpretation of these events as currently depicted at the park.
[Let the reader be the judge.]
[1] Maj. Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Report of Battle of Perryville : Brig. Gen. D. S. Donelson, Report of Battle of Perryville
[2] Capt. Percival P. Oldershaw, Report of Battle of Perryville, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, p. 1059-62.
[3] Capt. P. P. Oldershaw, Buell Court of Inquiry, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, p. 293-96.
[4] OR, Vol. 16, Pt. 2, p. 1003-04. (Emphasis added.)
[5] https://www.fold3.com/image/271/75442331
[6] Work, J. B. Map of the battle-field of Perryville, Ky., October 8th 1862. [Chicago, Ill, 1900] Map. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/99447187/. (Accessed June 04, 2017.)
Bringing the