Perryville vs. Antietam

[neyankee61]

Yesterday on Oct. 7, 1862 the Battle of Perryville, KY, was fought. Though a tactical victory for the South, Gen. Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee retreated south, ending the invasion of Kentucky. Marching north with Gen. Kirby Smith's column, it was one of the five Confederate forces that mounted an offensive during the fall of 1862. Along with Lee's invasion of Maryland, it marked the last time the South would mount numerous offensive actions into the North.
Gen. Bragg maintained that his invasion was more successful than Lee's in terms of results, at less the cost.
He claimed he cleared East Tennessee and the threat to Chattanooga which allowed the farmers to gather their crops. He "succeeded in getting away with the largest number of provisions, clothing, etc. ever obtained by an army. He brought out 15,000 horses and mules, 8,000 beeves, 50,000 barrels of pork, a great number of hogs, and a million yards of Kentucky cloth. It was said Bragg's wagon train was 40 miles long." All of this was done at a cost of approx. 3,400 men at Perryville compared to Lee's loss of over 10,000 at Antietam.
Both Lee's and Bragg's invasion could be considered failures in terms of the number of recruits gathered. Western Maryland provided Lee with very few and Bragg was disappointed in his result. The governor of Kentucky blamed the lack of numbers of Bragg's failure to remain in the state long enough to organize the number available.
By December 1862, both armies had returned to positions in Va and TN that were similar to positions taken before their offensives.

 

[Reconstructed Rebel]

He "succeeded in getting away with the largest number of provisions, clothing, etc. ever obtained by an army. He brought out 15,000 horses and mules, 8,000 beeves, 50,000 barrels of pork, a great number of hogs, and a million yards of Kentucky cloth. It was said Bragg's wagon train was 40 miles long."

I've seen it suggested that this bounty of provisions, forcibly taken from the population in so many cases, helped to swing any number of Kentuckians who were sitting on the fence over toward the Federals.

My impression is that at that time, many folks in Kentucky still just wished the whole problem of war would go away and were not champing at the bit to get involved one way or another. I think the KY governor was mistaken in thinking if the Confederate army had lingered longer then more men would have flocked to their banner.

 

[wausaubob]

Yesterday on Oct. 7, 1862 the Battle of Perryville, KY, was fought. Though a tactical victory for the South, Gen. Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee retreated south, ending the invasion of Kentucky. Marching north with Gen. Kirby Smith's column, it was one of the five Confederate forces that mounted an offensive during the fall of 1862. Along with Lee's invasion of Maryland, it marked the last time the South would mount numerous offensive actions into the North.
Gen. Bragg maintained that his invasion was more successful than Lee's in terms of results, at less the cost.
He claimed he cleared East Tennessee and the threat to Chattanooga which allowed the farmers to gather their crops. He "succeeded in getting away with the largest number of provisions, clothing, etc. ever obtained by an army. He brought out 15,000 horses and mules, 8,000 beeves, 50,000 barrels of pork, a great number of hogs, and a million yards of Kentucky cloth. It was said Bragg's wagon train was 40 miles long." All of this was done at a cost of approx. 3,400 men at Perryville compared to Lee's loss of over 10,000 at Antietam.
Both Lee's and Bragg's invasion could be considered failures in terms of the number of recruits gathered. Western Maryland provided Lee with very few and Bragg was disappointed in his result. The governor of Kentucky blamed the lack of numbers of Bragg's failure to remain in the state long enough to organize the number available.
By December 1862, both armies had returned to positions in Va and TN that were similar to positions taken before their offensives.

He succeeded in assisting to cause the relief from command of General Buell. I doubt the Confederates ever had enough freight capacity to form a wagon train 40 miles. Is there a photograph? Would that be about 2,200 wagons at 30 yards per wagon?

 

[wausaubob]

Big difference in the opposing federal commander between Kentucky and Maryland.

 

[NFB22]

The only way the Heartland Campaign is "successful" in my eyes is if Bragg and Smith collectively and decisively defeat Buell and take Louisville while perhaps pushing into northern Kentucky near Cincinnati and being able to hold it as well to threaten Indiana and Ohio. However, that would have left many back doors open since the Union Navy controlled Ohio River and this was after the surrender of Fort Donelson earlier in the year and the capture of Nashville.

 

[Bruce Vail]

He succeeded in assisting to cause the relief from command of General Buell. I doubt the Confederates ever had enough freight capacity to form a wagon train 40 miles. Is there a photograph? Would that be about 2,200 wagons at 30 yards per wagon?

A train 40 miles long is not really possible, is it?

 

[Sheltowee]

The captured bounty sounds terrific- but I'm certain Bragg would have traded all for keeping a confederate governor in Frankfort, and a significant influx of recruits.

How many of those returning wagons were still loaded with the 20,000 original rifles he brought to supply these eager new regiments?

By Bragg's account, he picked up a couple thousand Kentuckians- of whom nearly half quickly deserted.

Fail……

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

The only way the Heartland Campaign is "successful" in my eyes is if Bragg and Smith collectively and decisively defeat Buell and take Louisville while perhaps pushing into northern Kentucky near Cincinnati and being able to hold it as well to threaten Indiana and Ohio. However, that would have left many back doors open since the Union Navy controlled Ohio River and this was after the surrender of Fort Donelson earlier in the year and the capture of Nashville.

To be honest, I don't think there is a force the confederacy ever fielded that could have taken Cincinnati.

 

[neyankee61]

I just used the quote to reinforced Bragg's thought on his campaign. 40 miles long may be an overreach! Bragg was always a bit touchy and I believe he was trying to show that his "results" were more successful than Lee's by showing how much provisions he brought back.

 

[NFB22]

To be honest, I don't think there is a force the confederacy ever fielded that could have taken Cincinnati.

I think having forces in Northern Kentucky, maybe in the area of Williamstown, between Lexington and Cincinnati would be enough to tie up some Union troops around Cincinnati. Pushing all the way to Ohio River and trying to garrison that area seems like a bad idea since the river turns south both east and west of Covington, Kentucky and would leave a force's rear vulnerable.

 

[Sheltowee]

I think having forces in Northern Kentucky, maybe in the area of Williamstown, between Lexington and Cincinnati would be enough to tie up some Union troops around Cincinnati. Pushing all the way to Ohio River and trying to garrison that area seems like a bad idea since the river turns south both east and west of Covington, Kentucky and would leave a force's rear vulnerable.

Seems I've read that there was a fair degree of reb sympathy in Grant and Owen counties. So perhaps having Heth set up a recruiting effort in Williamstown would have been more effective than the fruitless march to Boone county?

The Heartland campaign was just chock full of half- baked schemes and crippling indecisiveness.

And I am no scholar- but the more I read about JH Morgan, the more I am convinced he was far more trouble than his worth. He had everyone convinced the Commonwealth was ripe for the picking. Crazy….

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

I think having forces in Northern Kentucky, maybe in the area of Williamstown, between Lexington and Cincinnati would be enough to tie up some Union troops around Cincinnati. Pushing all the way to Ohio River and trying to garrison that area seems like a bad idea since the river turns south both east and west of Covington, Kentucky and would leave a force's rear vulnerable.

The terrain alone would prevent crossing, let alone capture. Numerous hills. No bridges. The city on the north side of the river, and a hub of commerce. I don't think the south could have ever realistically threatened the north through Cincinnati. It was a total pipe dream.

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

Seems I've read that there was a fair degree of reb sympathy in Grant and Owen counties. So perhaps having Heth set up a recruiting effort in Williamstown would have been more effective than the fruitless march to Boone county?

The Heartland campaign was just chock full of half- baked schemes and crippling indecisiveness.

And I am no scholar- but the more I read about JH Morgan, the more I am convinced he was far more trouble than his worth. He had everyone convinced the Commonwealth was ripe for the picking. Crazy….

The problem is there are not many people there. The total population of Grant, Owen and Pendleton counties in 1860 was 30,000. Even if you use press gangs you might raise a regiment or two. Not going to make much of a difference.

 

[wausaubob]

The problem is there are not many people there. The total population of Grant, Owen and Pendleton counties in 1860 was 30,000. Even if you use press gangs you might raise a regiment or two. Not going to make much of a difference.

Morgan's raiders made it across the Ohio River. I think they were unable to recross. Getting back matters.

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

Morgan's raiders made it across the Ohio River. I think they were unable to recross. Getting back matters.

Right, but what did he have, a couple thousand? The population of Cincinnati was over 150,000. For the 1862 defense of Cincinnati they were able to raise about 75,000+, with batteries ringing the city south of the river. The number needed to cross the river, capture, and hold the city was just not reachable for the confederacy.

I'd love to hear someone give a detailed explanation of how Cincinnati could have been taken when in reality the only "attempt" was Heth approaching, seeing what he'd be dealing with, and turning around.

 

[Sheltowee]

In 1866, a newspaper quoted Heth as saying he could have taken Covington, Newport, and Cincinnati in 1862….. with a loss of perhaps a hundred men.

You just can't make this stuff up.

 

[Rhea Cole]

When Bragg ordered the retreat from Perryville, he had three days rations. Kirby Smith had dispersed his force over a significant chunk of Eastern Kentucky in order to forage for rations & feed for his animals.

It was an El Niño year. Corn had died in the fields knee high. Pastures were little more than crispy brown stubble. Wheeler's horses were dropping in their tracks. As is typical of El Niño years, snow started falling in the passes back into Tennessee earlier than anyone could remember. The way through the mountains closed up as the rearguard passed through.

The myth of a long line of wagons hauling loot back to Tennessee has its roots in John Hunt Morgan's self aggrandizing reports of the damage he inflicted on Union supply elements. He also completely misjudged the enthusiasm for him personally with a desire to join the Confederacy.

To arm the expected rush to the enlist as soon as the "Stars & Bars" First National flag showed itself in Kentucky, Bragg brought arms & traps for over 10,000 men. When only a low two digit number of boys who wanted to be "Morgan's men" rallied to the colors, there was nothing to do but haul the wagon loads of ordinance back to Tennessee. Bragg's men were starving, there was no great haul of looted foodstuffs.

The retreat to Knoxville is almost indescribable. It was so cold that pickets were found huddled around cold fires, frozen to death while a comrade stood guard, an icy statue. On top of it all, in one of those inexplicable celebrations of incompetence, the Chattanooga depot was removed from Bragg's command while he was in Kentucky. The orders he gave for rations to be transferred Knoxville was ignored by the new commander.

Bragg left the army to fend for itself at Knoxville & headed eastward to consult with Davis. His report stated that he did not know how many men were present, nor did he have any idea where they were or where they were.

Davis found this report heartening, because he affirmed Bragg's position & ordered his army to Murfreesboro TN. There are those who celebrate this as a great military success.

 

[NFB22]

Morgan's raiders made it across the Ohio River. I think they were unable to recross. Getting back matters.

Morgan crossed west of Louisville in the town of Brandenburg. It was lightly populated and not much has changed now and the terrain allowed for such a crossing. The portion of Indiana he crossed into was also not a hub for activity. His larger problem was crossing back into friendly territory as he was pursued by Union forces and militia as well being shadowed by the U.S. Navy on the Ohio as he pressed east across Indiana and into Ohio.

Much like Bragg and Smith's forces, he was unable to muster as much support from the Southern Indiana populace that he thought he would and much like the others, he did a lot of damage to the Confederates cause as his troops commandeered horses, food and other possessions from the populace as they passed through, even from sympathizers.

I'd love to hear someone give a detailed explanation of how Cincinnati could have been taken when in reality the only "attempt" was Heth approaching, seeing what he'd be dealing with, and turning around.

Heth making a show of force in the direction of Cincy and Morgan skirting the city during his raid is the closest anyone could have come.

Even taking the Louisville would have been a stretch for a combined force under Bragg & Smith as it too, was ringed with fortifications and had plenty of logistical and troop support from directly across the river in Jeffersonville and New Albany, Indiana. Take that situation and put them north of the river. It's an impossibility. Add the terrain features that Cincinnati has in the area, definitely not possible.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Morgan crossed west of Louisville in the town of Brandenburg. It was lightly populated and not much has changed now and the terrain allowed for such a crossing. The portion of Indiana he crossed into was also not a hub for activity. His larger problem was crossing back into friendly territory as he was pursued by Union forces and militia as well being shadowed by the U.S. Navy on the Ohio as he pressed east across Indiana and into Ohio.

Much like Bragg and Smith's forces, he was unable to muster as much support from the Southern Indiana populace that he thought he would and much like the others, he did a lot of damage to the Confederates cause as his troops commandeered horses, food and other possessions from the populace as they passed through, even from sympathizers.


Heth making a show of force in the direction of Cincy and Morgan skirting the city during his raid is the closest anyone could have come.

Even taking the Louisville would have been a stretch for a combined force under Bragg & Smith as it too, was ringed with fortifications and had plenty of logistical and troop support from directly across the river in Jeffersonville and New Albany, Indiana. Take that situation and put them north of the river. It's an impossibility. Add the terrain features that Cincinnati has in the area, definitely not possible.

Well put. Let's give credit where credit is due. The citizen militia that rallied to the crisis is very impressive. For good reason Heath only tapped the outer defenses.

Heath had none of the resources necessary to successfully assault earthworks manned by determined defenders.

The rapidly improving earthworks were challenging enough. The defenders were on home ground with a massive supply depot a walk away. Due to the drought, Heath faced a real possibility of starvation for men & animals after only a short halt.

I also agree whole heartedly with your depiction of Morgan's fantastical thinking doing real harm to the Army of TN. He culled out the Army of Tennessee's best horses & men. The token force he left behind in McMinnville was blitzed on the opening day of the Tullahoma Campaign.

Again, like the Cincinnati militia, the unsung contribution of the tinclad gunboats barely gets a mention.

 

[rpkennedy]

I just used the quote to reinforced Bragg's thought on his campaign. 40 miles long may be an overreach! Bragg was always a bit touchy and I believe he was trying to show that his "results" were more successful than Lee's by showing how much provisions he brought back.

Agreed in regards to the 40 mile long train. Lee's train after Gettysburg was "only" 17 miles long and that's including both his wounded and the supplies gathered in Pennsylvania. 40 is a ridiculous number.

Ryan