- Joined
- May 18, 2005
- Location
- Spring Hill, Tennessee
I have studied the 16th Tennessee - for all practical purposes - my whole life. One battle that they were heavily involved in was Perryville.
For anyone that doesn't know the story there - Polk extended his lines to the north to gain the flank of the Federal army and sent Cheatham's division into the fray first. The plan was supposed to be to crush the Federal left flank and roll up the enemy corps from right to left. As a kid, I read account after account of their actions there in various early post-war history books, and gained what I thought to be an ample understanding of events at that battle regarding the 16th TN. However, as I grew older and discovered modern books by more recent historians that regurgitated their comprehension of the story, I couldn't help but notice that none of their conclusions about what the 16th did there were in concert with the accounts of the men in the ranks and/or friendly units adjacent to them as well as Federal accounts.
Comprehending a battlefield is hard enough for the men on it or leading the men on it - and just as tough is writing about something when you weren't there. I have long believed that historians often rely too strongly on corps and division reports and rarely search deep into the regimental level - but I believe if we did so, it is far easier to gain a better understanding of the battlefield. What unit was where - who was to their right or left - what units they engaged.
However, this search can't stop at the unit in question. It has to extend to the units that were on their right and left. After an exhaustive search within the histories of those units at the same battle, we might gather pertinent information relative to the regiment in question. This is what has happened in my case with the Sixteenth Tennessee.
Like I said, while early post-war books related the regiment's experiences in one way, modern 21st century revisions actually have managed to change history! Not the outcome of a battle of course - but the unfolding of events.
In the Sixteenth Tennessee's case for instance, the regiment was ORIGINALLY interpreted as attacking the extreme right flank of the Federal army and being caught in a horrific cross-fire for nearly thirty minutes until Maney's brigade came to their relief. With this additional support, the regiment and Maney's brigade were able to seize the guns of Parsons' battery on Open Knob. It was a blood bath and related as such by the men who fought on the extreme right.
The NEWER versions of the 16th's experiences - apparently incorrectly - relate (based off modern scholarship that differs dramatically from written word by the men who were there...) that the 16th was ordered to attack a position that was thought to be the Union flank but was in fact (according to modern scholarship) the Union CENTER!
I could accept this version of events - if I wasn't absolutely convinced of otherwise by eyewitness testimony. Undeniable evidence from Colonel Savage of the 16th, numerous men in his ranks, General George Maney, Marcus Toney of the 1st TN in Maney's brigade and at least two men in Stewart's brigade correctly (and I say correctly because they were there) relate the true experiences of the men of the 16th Tennessee that day.
They all relate that the Sixteenth initially went into action as the extreme right most unit that day. They were the first Confederate unit to be heavily engaged, and although their original axis of advance was off spot - they received a correction to their direction in the protection of a defilade position. They then advance on the TRUE left flank of Jackson's Union division and were heavily engaged with the 123rd Illinois and Parsons' battery for no less than thirty minutes before the arrival of Maney's brigade on their immediate right that had been instructed that Donelson (the 16th's brigade commander) was in immediate need of support.
I will post some of the evidence - if not all of it in a following post. But this is one example of modern scholarship perhaps cutting corners. Battles are big. They are not easy to comprehend - however, it will be shown that some of the most crucial information can be found at the regimental level and pieced together that can clarify nearly incomprehensible actions.
Stay tuned.
For anyone that doesn't know the story there - Polk extended his lines to the north to gain the flank of the Federal army and sent Cheatham's division into the fray first. The plan was supposed to be to crush the Federal left flank and roll up the enemy corps from right to left. As a kid, I read account after account of their actions there in various early post-war history books, and gained what I thought to be an ample understanding of events at that battle regarding the 16th TN. However, as I grew older and discovered modern books by more recent historians that regurgitated their comprehension of the story, I couldn't help but notice that none of their conclusions about what the 16th did there were in concert with the accounts of the men in the ranks and/or friendly units adjacent to them as well as Federal accounts.
Comprehending a battlefield is hard enough for the men on it or leading the men on it - and just as tough is writing about something when you weren't there. I have long believed that historians often rely too strongly on corps and division reports and rarely search deep into the regimental level - but I believe if we did so, it is far easier to gain a better understanding of the battlefield. What unit was where - who was to their right or left - what units they engaged.
However, this search can't stop at the unit in question. It has to extend to the units that were on their right and left. After an exhaustive search within the histories of those units at the same battle, we might gather pertinent information relative to the regiment in question. This is what has happened in my case with the Sixteenth Tennessee.
Like I said, while early post-war books related the regiment's experiences in one way, modern 21st century revisions actually have managed to change history! Not the outcome of a battle of course - but the unfolding of events.
In the Sixteenth Tennessee's case for instance, the regiment was ORIGINALLY interpreted as attacking the extreme right flank of the Federal army and being caught in a horrific cross-fire for nearly thirty minutes until Maney's brigade came to their relief. With this additional support, the regiment and Maney's brigade were able to seize the guns of Parsons' battery on Open Knob. It was a blood bath and related as such by the men who fought on the extreme right.
The NEWER versions of the 16th's experiences - apparently incorrectly - relate (based off modern scholarship that differs dramatically from written word by the men who were there...) that the 16th was ordered to attack a position that was thought to be the Union flank but was in fact (according to modern scholarship) the Union CENTER!
I could accept this version of events - if I wasn't absolutely convinced of otherwise by eyewitness testimony. Undeniable evidence from Colonel Savage of the 16th, numerous men in his ranks, General George Maney, Marcus Toney of the 1st TN in Maney's brigade and at least two men in Stewart's brigade correctly (and I say correctly because they were there) relate the true experiences of the men of the 16th Tennessee that day.
They all relate that the Sixteenth initially went into action as the extreme right most unit that day. They were the first Confederate unit to be heavily engaged, and although their original axis of advance was off spot - they received a correction to their direction in the protection of a defilade position. They then advance on the TRUE left flank of Jackson's Union division and were heavily engaged with the 123rd Illinois and Parsons' battery for no less than thirty minutes before the arrival of Maney's brigade on their immediate right that had been instructed that Donelson (the 16th's brigade commander) was in immediate need of support.
I will post some of the evidence - if not all of it in a following post. But this is one example of modern scholarship perhaps cutting corners. Battles are big. They are not easy to comprehend - however, it will be shown that some of the most crucial information can be found at the regimental level and pieced together that can clarify nearly incomprehensible actions.
Stay tuned.
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