Perryville Understanding Perryville.

[Elennsar]

Requirements for a Ph.D:

http://history.emory.edu/home/graduate/phd-requirements.html

Dismissing this as if the study involved is no sign of anything that might lend weight to someone claiming to know what they're talking about is a little hard to take seriously.

I'm not claiming it makes anyone infallible, but nothing does.

 

[BillO]

Requirements for a Ph.D:

http://history.emory.edu/home/graduate/phd-requirements.html

Dismissing this as if the study involved is no sign of anything that might lend weight to someone claiming to know what they're talking about is a little hard to take seriously.

I'm not claiming it makes anyone infallible, but nothing does.

I think the problem is historians are people. I know it's hard to figure but there it is. Other historians usually are rehashing what other historians said and have a tendency to simply follow along with what the other said in the smaller and sometimes even the bigger details. Academics are almost always very good at explaining what and when but not so much on the why and the little details that get changed in the telling.

 

[gunny]

People tend to weigh the opinion of people who are supposed to be experts more than the average person. That's not a a bad thing. That's not even a dubious thing. Obviously being "supposed to be an expert" doesn't automatically grant someone expertise, but if I had a question on the law, I'd ask a lawyer before I asked Bob Down The Street, even if I liked and respected Bob.

And that's understandable. The average Joe doesn't study law without wanting to become a lawyer. But, even within the world of law, laws are struck down or changed. This doesn't mean they were bad laws necessarily, but it does mean that perceptions change. What makes that different from history though is that history is subjective to a large degree. Meaning - if someone is lacking evidence due to a failure to search deep enough OR they assume scratching the surface is good enough - that person can easily come to an inaccurate conclusion.

In many cases, the historians may have done an in depth job uncovering all sources available at the time the conclusions were made. That doesn't mean that all the evidence was unearthed or that the conclusion is correct. It just means that based on the current evidence X makes sense.

As for hard evidence and being argumentive: I don't know enough about either the standard account or your sources to do anything, personally. I mean, and I'm saying this to explain that, not to argue, I don't know Toney from Adam. Was he honest? Was he observant? Was he even there? All of these I'm taking your word for it on that (which I trust, I assure you) and have no means of comparing it to the basis used by people presenting things differently.

I trust that you've put in a lot of research into this, and I trust that you've answered those questions for yourself on Toney (and others). So I'm prepared to accept your conclusions as well founded, whether you have a degree or not.

The interesting thing about the Toney fella is that he wrote two accounts. One was sort of a summary of what happened at the battle - the second was in-depth and detailed. He was there, as were all of the individuals presented.

Which raises the question of, if the men in those brigades saw things in such and such a way, where the people presenting events in a different light are drawing information from. Most historians don't just make stuff up as they go along, and I presume - correct me if I'm wrong - that these are not obscure, hard to find sources. So what is going on? Whose accounts ARE being used?

This goes beyond Perryville's events into historiography's problems, but it makes me wonder. Someone's information is either dishonest or grossly mistaken, because the 16th Tennessee couldn't have been doing X and doing the opposite at the same time - at least not outside quantum level stuff.

The part that makes unraveling what happened at Perryville so difficult is that many (but not all) of the accounts that support my REVISED version of events can also be used to support the CURRENT interpretation of events. However, ALL of the accounts support the REVISED version of events. Where I have them scratching their heads is regarding the chronological order of events.

It is clear that the 16th TN was the first unit heavily engaged. It is also clear the 123rd Illinois was the first Union unit heavily engaged on the Open Knob where Parsons' battery was located. The current interpretations have the 16th TN attacking the Federal CENTER and according to the same interpretation they were first ordered to attack the enemy's SUPPOSED flank - a flank that was in reality, the Union RIGHT flank. This would have the brigade and regiment attacking ACROSS the Federal frontage (as well as in front of their own army) to strike the Union guns of Simonson's battery on the opposite side of the battlefield. According to the current interpretations, they then make a correction to the right that put them single handedly attacking the Union center and this is why they sustained such severe losses. But the same account has them hold on for four hours until Maney's brigade came to their support on their right and the last Union battery of the day fell at the hands of 16th TN. Sounds great, but evidence doesn't support it.

Other interpretations have the unit fall back, and in one case they disengage after thirty minutes of fighting. ALL of the evidence clearly states that they were engaged by themselves for no less than thirty minutes at the opening of the fight until assisted by Maney on their immediate right. They continued in action until nearly 5 PM when they were withdrawn to resupply and marched back in thirty minutes later.

The fact is, the regiment was engaged for no less than thirty minutes by themselves; Maney came to their aid; and the battery that the 16th was engaged with on their right flank fell (Parsons'). All of this happened in the first 45 minutes to an hour of the opening of the fight. Parsons' battery was the first to fall - which is also well known. It is this failure to accept something that doesn't fit one's COMPREHENSION of the battlefield that bothers me.

See the below accounts.

 

[gunny]

All of the following accounts are by members of the Sixteenth Tennessee. Some were written the day after the battle and others were written many years later. However, they all have the same recollection in general. That is - they were the first engaged - they fought by themselves for a period of time without support - and a battery on their right fell near the opening of the battle.

Private James R. Thompson


The weather was dry and water was scarce. There was a long hole of water in the bed of Chapman Creek and a spring near it. Buell pressed his attack to our left and in the direction of the spring and pool of water. Our Cavalry there advanced and checked it and Hardee's Corps was sent to their relief. The enemy was posted in line of battle a few hundred yards from Chapman[1] Creek. We were ordered to attack him and we had to climb a hill which was difficult to ascend. We went up an old road, and the 15th Tennessee reached the top about the time we did. We were given a few minutes rest. We were then ordered forward, which was obeyed with a loud "Hurrah!" We were perhaps two hundred yards from the enemy when we were ordered to open fire, which we did with effect on the enemy, judging from the piles of dead which were before us after firing a few rounds.

Colonel Savage who was in front of our line rode around to our site and his horse got wounded. I ran forward to a little stump six or eight inches through and about two feet high and rested my gun on the top and took deliberate aim. Before I could fire, some of our men shot a ball into the stump, which barely missed me. I stormed out at them that if any of the shot me, I would come back there and kill him. About this time we were ordered to charge, and we went forward with a rush.[2] The enemy fell back and we crossed the fence they were behind, amid hundreds of their slain.

Just at this time Colonel Savage got wounded. I was right by him, and he said to me, "I am wounded. Where is Colonel Donelson? He will have to take charge of the Regiment." Colonel Donelson appeared on the right where I was and a flanking party had started around us on our right with their guns at a right shoulder shift. Our men had failed to get up the hill as fast as we did. Just at this critical moment, Maney's Brigade appeared upon the scene. With a yell they charged and drove back the flanking party.[3] We had been in the fight 30 minutes according to Colonel Savage's statement, with no help except the 15th Tennessee. They were on our left. We would have been captured in ten or fifteen minutes longer. There was a battery just to our right side.[4] When the flanking party was driven back, I thought it should be silenced or captured. There were two little log cabins just behind the enemy line that we had captured and a fence running about north and south. I jumped over this little fence and started toward the battery. I came to a small shade tree and rested my gun against it. I commenced firing at the cannoneers. A ball from down the fence tore through my hat and hair. About this time Alvin Simpson, one of my company, came and rested his gun against the six or seven inch tree and fired. A ball from the same direction that had clipped so close to me, split his hat on the side about four inches. When the flanking party was driven back, it opened the way for our artillery, which was put in use with vigor. And the enemy finally yielded this line and fell back a few hundred yards to a lane.[5]

They reformed their lines and arranged their artillery. The battle now raged with terror and the slaughter was terrible. About sundown the enemy withdrew from this line and fell back to a woods about three miles. So the battle was over for the day and we had won a complete victory.[6]




Private Thomas R. Hooper


Thursday Oct the 8th/62

We remained in camps at

Harrodsburg until about dusk

But previous to leaving we

cooked up about 2 days rations

We marched back to Perryville

but a more werst road than the

one we came. Distance about 12 m

previous to leaving camp sight

orders to leave our knapsacks, we

then knew or thought a fight was

close at hand, and marched out

a little beyond Perryville, lay in line

of battle till the next morning.

We herd some picket fighting

going on in the night our batteries

taken position in the night.

We expected to be attacked or

attack the enemy on the morning

of the 8th.



Wednesday October the 8th 1862

We remained in line of battle until

about 11 oc A.M. When General Bragg

came up and taken command in person

Then General Cheatham Donelson

and Col. Savage all come back to

their respective commands[7] though

previous to this there had been fight

ing going on most all day with cavlry

We now had our positions on the

left wing. But when Gen. Bragg

taken command, our Division

taken its proper place on the right

as ours is the first division.

We taken our position on the right

And remained in position I guess some

thing like 1 hour; but all this time

very heavy cannonading was going on

on both sides of our position for

I guess something near ¾ of a mile

from the enemie's line of battle. up

to this time their batteries had done


Continue Oct the 8th 1862

but little damage to our lines.

At this hour I guess about 2oc P.M.

We were ordered to advance on

the enemy, our brigade was in

advance of the remainder of the

Division. Continuing to advance

the line got in 3 or 4 hundred yards

of the enemy, when General Cheatham

give command to charge – General

Polk also told us to let the

Yanks know what Tennessee

steel was made for; we raised

the yell and charged with few

obstacles;[8] got in 1 ½ or 200

yards where we turned loose on

them, but we were now carried

in advance of the other Regiments

but we advanced on driving the

Enemy before us; for some distance

til we were about to be cut off

at this critical time we got help


by or from General Maney's

Brigade[9] we were at this time

and had been for some time in

about fifty to one hundred yards

of a battery of 8 or 9 pieces on our

right[10] and our left wing with another

firing down our center,[11] all

heavily supported by infantry.

We with our assistance now taken

the battery on our right[12] but before

this I think we had killed nearly all

their horses, and a great many of their

men and to be regretted we had

lost many of our brave fellows out

of the old 16th. And I for one got knocked

down by a grapeshot scalping

me in the side of the head, but

In a few minutes I was giving

my lead away again in a short

time after this our Regiment was

relieved for a short time but I was a

head of the rest of the company and


Regiment and did not know that

we were relieved til the Regiment

came upon me I therefore staid a

head with the relief for some

time til we had driven the Yanks

for near a half mile, when I got

wounded again by a buckshot

striking me in the left jaw

knocking me down

for the sixth time. I thought

now that I was ruined for a few

moments, for I bled liken to a

hog that had been stuck where

the shot entered about the mouth

and impaired for a short time. But in

a few minutes I found that I was

able to walk, but now very weak

from the loss of so much blood.

I think the shot lodged in my

jaw breaking the bone I think.


I was now so weak that I could

not keep up. I therefore went to

the rear, taken a pair of shoes off

a dead Yank on my way but I would

not have did it for any a account if

I had not been in great need of them.

I also picked up a cup and canteen

could have got pistoles and a great

many other things if I could have

packed them. I went back through

our Regiment found several wounded

but did not see any one of our

company killed. As I was not

able to fight any longer and our

surgeons had not time to dress

wounds of those that were more

serious than mine. I therefore

started with some others of our

Regiment that were able to walk

to go to our Division Hospital.

Walked about 1 mile then got ride

2 – 3 miles but did not find our Hospital.[13]


[1] This is Thompson's spelling.

[2] This was the regiment's second charge to seize the cabins and fence.

[3] The flanking force of the 105th Ohio—that appeared on the regiment's right—is forced back up the hill by Maney's men.

[4] Again, this would have to be Parsons' battery. At the Widow Gibson's there was no battery within 200 yards—only Harris' guns over 200 yards to their direct front.

[5] The mention of the artillery had to be the guns of Turner. Also Thompson states that the enemy fell back, "… a few hundred yards to a lane." This was unquestionably Benton Road—about three hundred yards west of 'Open Knob.'

[6] (Thompson, pp. 9-10)

[7] This statement is in direct opposition to Savage's statement that he was never in command of the brigade but also verifies that he was not in command of the brigade during the battle—at least to his knowledge.

[8] This was—likely—after the correction in their advance from the defilade of the hollow or first draw.

[9] Clearly, the rank and file recognized Maney's advance a short distance away.

[10] Parsons' Battery.

[11] Bush to their left-front and Stone on the extreme left.

[12] Clearly, the Sixteenth and Maney seized Parsons' guns.

[13] (Hooper, pp. 74-79)


​

 

[gunny]

More accounts from men in the 16th:

Captain J. J. Womack


Oct. 8. Wednesday—Clear & hot. The enemy began cannonading at sunrise and continued slowly till about nine o'clock in the morning, occasionally answered by our skirmishers and some pretty brisk firing was heard along our front lines. Our division (Cheatham's) changed position from where we were first formed in rear of Perryville to our extreme right and took a position in the front line about this time. Here our division remained till about noon, all of which time considerable cannonading was going on along most of the line. About twelve o'clock the batteries of our division were put in position and brought to bear on one of the enemy's now opened just in our front. The duel between these two lasted about two hours, and was said to be the briskest of the day. Here one of our Brigadiers, whose name I do not now remember, was wounded in the head by one of the enemy's shells.[1] About this time the battery of our brigade (General Donelson's) commanded by Capt. Carnes, moved from its present position farther to the right, immediately after which, the whole division moved in double quick, forward, near one mile across some fields, and again halted and formed. Here we remained but a short time, stopping only long enough to pile away all the extra weight about us, such as blankets, knapsacks etc. Again we moved forward across a small creek, and quietly formed in line of battle behind the top of the hill, lying, till the whole line would have time to cross over and form.

We now occupied ground about three hundred yards from where the enemy lay concealed in an enclosed wood, about one quarter of a mile in length north and south. At each extremity of this wood they had placed a battery. The one at the northern extremity, of 7 guns, that at the southern about the same.[2] "Victory" for our motto was shouted all along our line, and fearlessly and gallantly we charged them. The Regt. to which I belonged (Col. Savage's) was on the extreme right of Gen. Bragg's army, and was directly in front of the seven-gun battery before spoken of.[3] Donelson's brigade either executed orders too promptly, or else other commands not hastily enough, in consequence of which this brigade, and the 16th regiment especially, was exposed to a most terrific fire from both the above batteries and at the same time an opening line of infantry. Here at the onset we suffered very much both in officers and men.

The men from drought and fatigue were almost exhausted at the opening, but they made the charge & received the fire of the enemy, although the first battle in which most of them had ever engaged, in a manner worthy the cause in which they were engaged.

With two batteries and the whole line of infantry occupying a chosen position, pouring a destructive fire upon us, (one brigade) we were compelled, after the most stubborn resistance possibly to be made, to fall back, not without however, having first dislodged the enemy from his stronghold and chosen ground.

With our numbers now much weakened we rallied and charged them a second time, with about the same success as the first.[4] Again we were compelled to fall back, and again formed and charged them a third time, but our forces were so diminished by this time that I am not at all sure we would have been able to drive them from their guns had it not been for the timely arrival of re-enforcements on our right.[5] Fortunately however they appeared in time to gain the day, although they scarcely fired a gun themselves. But their appearance on the field stuck terror to the already retreating enemy, who fell back about three hundred yards, on their second line, but the resistance they made was very slight compared with that of their first.[6]

They had now not only left their splendid battery of seven cross pieces in our hands, which they had been commanded never to desert, together with many a one of their fellows slain and wounded, but also their general, the gallant Jackson, who fell exhorting his men never to abandon the field.[7] Soon after this, about five o'clock in the evening, the regiments of the first Tennessee brigade were withdrawn and held in reserve for half an hour, when about sunset they were marched in again; but night coming on and the enemy still retreating they were ordered to pursue no further.

Farther down the line to our left, just at sunset the carnage was terrible indeed.[8]

Thus closed the ever memorable eighth of October, 1862, on which the fierce and bloody battle of Perryville was bravely fought and nobly won.

Our loss on this occasion was heavy, but not near so heavy as that of the enemy. The 16th regiment went into the action with about 400 men, just fifty percent of whom were killed and wounded, the Col. among the latter.

Just fifty percent of my company (E) was wounded, but not a man killed upon the field; five or six had, notwithstanding, received mortal wounds.

We occupied the field all night, taking care of the wounded; the enemy as well as our own comrades.

When the broad face moon began to shed her silvery beams on the faces of the dead and dying, the field presented a most horrible spectacle indeed; and the shrieks and groans of the wounded constantly pointed to where another brave and gallant fellow had sacrificed his all on the alter of liberty.[9]


Private R. C. Carden


I remember we went into the battle close to a small creek. We had just got to the top of a small hill when we saw the enemy rise to their feet and then business began, and things were hot for a time.[10] There was a battery on our left that was giving us grape and canister and the bullets were singing around us. A man was standing just in front of me while I was loading my gun and I happened to have my eyes on him just as a canister struck him in the breast and I saw the white flesh before it bled. He was a dead man.

Colonel John H. Savage, in his report of the engagement said that our regiment, the 16th Tennessee, killed the Yankee general Jackson. The Yankee general was one of the bravest men that ever went into battle. Some of my company was close by him when he was killed. They said he was standing on some part of a cannon with his hat in his hand, urging his men to put it to us. Our men demanded his surrender but he would not notice a word they said and in the conflict some one shot him dead.[11]


Private C. H. Clark


We were formed into line & awaited the order to march forward. The enemy was about one half mile from us & the crack of the pickets rifle & the occasional roar of a cannon made us feel sad. The day (Oct. 8, 1862) was clear and beautiful. It was afternoon when we were ordered to move forward. We crossed a creek or brook and went out on top of the hill & ordered to halt and reform. We were in sight of the enemy & it looked to me like the whole face of the earth was covered with Yankeys. Shot & shell from their batterys made me wish that I was at home but oh my! We were ordered forward again. The whole line of battle was expected to keep in line on the forward movement, but some of the boys seemingly anxious to close in on the enemy raised the yell & rushed forward which caused our Regiment to get far in advance of our main line, & it is yet a wonder to me that any man in our Regiment escaped death. Three batteries of cannon & a Brigade of the enemy were directed at our Regiment & the boys were falling dead & wounded all around me, & I thought all would be killed. Some of my school & playmates, neighbors, and friends lost their lives there. 12 Van Buren County boys were killed & mortally wounded on Perryville's bloody field. If you wish to know how a soldier feels in such a battle as that, you must ask some one else. I cannot explain, but I had no hope of getting out alive. Such trials as that has a tendency to temporarily derange the minds of some, at least it was the case with me. If you ask me if I was scared, I answer, I don't know, but I do know that I was scared before we got in the thickest of the fight. We were in 40 yards of the enemy & they were falling fast. I hurriedly glanced to the right & left to see if the main line was engaged. Genl. Maney's Brigade came to our rescue on our right, & saved the remainder of our regiment from being killed & captured.[12] Many times when thinking of that bloody battle, the tears roll down my cheeks, & I cannot force them back now while writing this article. Some sheep and rabbits were between the two lines, scared and demoralized, but I paid no attention to them. Some claimed that they never dreaded a battle & some claimed to have a gizzard full of sand…

The enemy finally retreated & we followed on. They loaded as they fell back but would whirl & shoot back. As we passed the little cabin on the hill[13] I was seriously wounded through my right side above my hip. We then had them on the run. James Martin was the only living man near me and offered to assist me off the battlefield, but I told him I could make it & for him to go on & kill all of them. On my way back I passed the boys lying dead, & oh my! Col. Savage was with us in the thickest of the fight and was shot through his leg, & his horse (George) was killed. The moaning & sighing of the wounded & dieing that night were heart rendering & enough to make any man oppose war. Lieut. Denny Cummings, a cousin to Danny Cummings, was shot in the mouth breaking his jaw and carrying away about 14 or 15 teeth & we thought he would die but he got over it & rejoined our company and was in the battle of Chickamauga! …

The severely wounded could not be carried away, but left in the hands of the enemy. I was very sorry that I had to be left back. The day after the battle, all the wounded who could be moved were carried up to Harrodsburg, 20 miles from Perryville. I was carried up there & put in the court house, with good many wounded. … 9 of the wounded in the hospital with me died that night. I was fearful that the Yanks would mistreat us Rebs in the hospital, but, I was mistaken.[14]


Lieutenant Jesse Walling


The letter of Jesse Walling, now president of the National Bank at McMinnville, is given and is in accordance with the statement of Biles and the others.

COLONEL JOHN H. SAVAGE:

DEAR SIR: In reply to your inquiry as to what I remember about the part your regiment took in the battle of Perryville, Ky., I would state that we were encamped near a creek when orders were given to break camp and move forward. We ascended a very steep embankment, formed line and moved southward, probably one-half mile, when General Donelson appeared, and after talking with you for about a minute or so we were ordered to charge the enemy. The first sight that we had of the enemy was a battery of beautiful cannon. We charged in right oblique course and were met by the grape and canister shot from these guns, which killed many of our men.[15]

All at once the enemy raised up from behind a rail fence, pouring a deadly fire into us and killing great numbers of our men.[16] We fell back a short distance, rallied and charged again, meeting the same deadly fire which drove us back for the second time.[17] The third time we went over the fence, driving the enemy before us, capturing the cannon.[18] We continued running them, killing them as they ran. Their dead and wounded lay thick behind the fence and over the field.

I was in the center of the regiment (Sixteenth Tennessee), and noticed that we were not supported either to the right or to the left. My company went into the fight numbering eighty-four men and next morning we only had sixteen men able for service. You will see that our loss was terrible, but the most surprising thing to me is that every man in your regiment was not killed, as we fought the enemy to the front, left and right flanks unsupported.

The Sixteenth was engaged with the enemy for at least thirty minutes when General Maney's men appeared to our right as we were running the enemy across the field.[19]

I could not begin to name over all the dead and wounded as most all our company were in this list, and to name some of our brave and good and leave out others equally as honorable, I could not do.

Why our regiment was ordered to fight this battle alone and on a field where our position was decidedly against us I shall never be able to understand. To look at the great numbers of the enemy in comparison to our little regiment it seemed that we were brought up to be slaughtered.

One of the bravest men I have ever seen was one of the enemy, who stood upon his fine brass gun, waving his hat over his head after all his comrades had fled. But he too fell in this brave act. I could not hear distinctly his words as he stood there waving his hat.

You will please pardon me for speaking of this brave fellow, but he is always before me when I think of this terrible battle. Yours very truly,


JESSE WALLING, First Lieutenant.[20]


[1] Brigadier General S. A. M. Wood.

[2] The battery on the right is thought to be Parsons' and the one on the left was Stone's Battery

[3] Parsons' Battery.

[4] This was the charge on the fence and cabins.

[5] Maney's Brigade.

[6] This was the retreat of Terrill's Brigade to Benton Road—three hundred yards west.

[7] Another first-hand account of the proximity of the regiment to the dead General Jackson. This was written the night of—or day after the battle.

[8] This is probably a reference to Liddell's assault just at darkness.

[9] (Womack, pp. 62-64)

[10] This is most likely a reference to the 123rd Illinois.

[11] (Carden, pp. Apr. 12, 1912)

[12] Clark refers to the wing of the enemy attempting to gain the regiment's right and rear that was itself flanked by Maney's arrival.

[13] This is another reference to a cabin that would have been on the east slope of 'Open Knob.'

[14] (Clark, pp. Article 14-15)

[15] This is likely in reference to their charge toward Parsons' guns up the slope of the second finger in a north-westerly direction.

[16] This was the 123rd Illinois.

[17] This was likely the second charge that seized the fence and cabins forcing them back to the cover of the fence after the arrival of the 105th Ohio and 80th Illinois.

[18] Walling fails to mention the appearance or assistance of Maney's Brigade in the capture of the cannon; however, his company commander—J. J. Womack—recorded his recollection that very day.

[19] His final mention of Maney's Brigade is to suggest that they didn't need Maney's assistance—which they certainly did need.

[20] (Savage, pp. 126-128)​

 

[gunny]

In my quest to comprehend the right side of the battlefield, I have searched high and low for any information that might support my interpretation. It seems I may have made a breakthrough today.

Yesterday, I was on Fold3 looking at battlefield maps. There were four listed for Perryville. They were originally drawn by orders of General George Thomas, and this version of the map was printed in 1877.

The primary notion that my interpretation of Perryville is considered wrong by some historians well versed in the battle relies on their belief that the 16th Tennessee was engaged at the Widow Gibson's home and outbuildings near the center of the battlefield. I contend that not all maps of any battlefield would necessarily list every single home or structure.

However, on this high definition map, I was able to zoom in to a level that the small print became very clear - that is usually illegible on most copies of the map. At first glance, it looked like it said Hayfield. I naturally assumed this was just identifying a hay-field on the battlefield, but I noted a small black box that appeared to be made on purpose, and thought it may be a name representing a house.

Further magnification showed that it was the name "Hayflay."

On the off-possibility that it was indeed a surname, I went to Ancestry.com and searched the 1860 Kentucky census for Boyle County, Kentucky. Luckily, Ancestry.com has syllable recognition - and will generate names that sound like whatever you are spelling. Guess what...

A Joseph C. Hafley was listed in the census with a Perryville P.O.! He and his wife and three boys are listed in the census from 1850 all the way to 1910.

Even better, this map that clearly showed his name and a structure representing his home is located precisely where I believed a structure to exist. I will show my map from one of my books - rotated to show the same directional view as the 1877 map.

The two black squares are representations of where I believed the cabins to be located. To this day, there are still two slight depressions on the east face of the hill that I believe evidenced the location of these two structures. Below, is the 1877 map.

The name Hayflay is centered on the map and the structure is indicated as a block just above the letter "y" in the name. This below version shows the house highlighted in yellow and the fence-rows in orange as indicated by dashed lines in the above map.

Now, as excited as I am about this potentially ground-breaking discovery that will alter written history concerning Perryville - I am sure the critics will say: "So what if the name is listed in the 1860 census - he may not have lived there (at that precise location) at the time of the battle." What will it take though to get people to accept fact according to eyewitness testimony, tactical sense, and sheer common sense?

There comes a time when the evidence is so substantial that it cannot be over-looked. When will that day come?

 

[Elennsar]

I think the problem is historians are people. I know it's hard to figure but there it is. Other historians usually are rehashing what other historians said and have a tendency to simply follow along with what the other said in the smaller and sometimes even the bigger details. Academics are almost always very good at explaining what and when but not so much on the why and the little details that get changed in the telling.

And nonhistorians are ALSO people, but with less study of the topic. Making this out as if being a historian or an academic grants one special weaknesses that Ordinary Folks lack is nonsense.

 

[Elennsar]

And that's understandable. The average Joe doesn't study law without wanting to become a lawyer. But, even within the world of law, laws are struck down or changed. This doesn't mean they were bad laws necessarily, but it does mean that perceptions change. What makes that different from history though is that history is subjective to a large degree. Meaning - if someone is lacking evidence due to a failure to search deep enough OR they assume scratching the surface is good enough - that person can easily come to an inaccurate conclusion.

In many cases, the historians may have done an in depth job uncovering all sources available at the time the conclusions were made. That doesn't mean that all the evidence was unearthed or that the conclusion is correct. It just means that based on the current evidence X makes sense.

Yeah, and that's a problem with the study of history, not with historians as distinct from people like you and I (not professional historians but enthusiastically interested in finding information).

One reason I am following this is that I think you've put in the kind of effort and dedication to answer these sorts of things, even though as someone who hasn't done so over this unit or this battle I don't know anything to support or undermine your argument.

As such, I'm unable to comment on what you have to say from said accounts beyond what I already have, but I assure you I'm not ignoring it - I just don't have anything better to say than "Wow, good research."

Which I will say, but I don't think you really want me to repeat it fifty times like I was trying to suck up to you or something.



Thank you on the behalf of the interested and uninformed for taking the time to look this stuff over in depth.

 

[BillO]

And nonhistorians are ALSO people, but with less study of the topic. Making this out as if being a historian or an academic grants one special weaknesses that Ordinary Folks lack is nonsense.

You've completely missed my point. IMO ordinary folks and historians do have the same faults. Lay people have a tendency to blindly follow someone cause they have a title even when the actual work is kind of shoddy.

 

[mobile_96]

Lay people have a tendency to blindly follow someone cause they have a title even when the actual work is kind of shoddy.

And will also blindly follow if the work meets what the reader Wants the results to be.

 

[Elennsar]

You've completely missed my point. IMO ordinary folks and historians do have the same faults. Lay people have a tendency to blindly follow someone cause they have a title even when the actual work is kind of shoddy.

So why are you referring to historians by "Other historians usually are rehashing what other historians said and have a tendency to simply follow along with what the other said in the smaller and sometimes even the bigger details. Academics are almost always very good at explaining what and when but not so much on the why and the little details that get changed in the telling." as if nonhistorians and academics are different than anyone else here?

I'm not sure I understand now.

Also, "someone with a title" ? Do you mean a history degree? (as opposed to a title as in say, the 2nd Viscount Norwich, who has written some reasonably popular books on the Byzantine Empire, but who is not a professional historian)

Just making sure I follow.

 

[gunny]

Most historians don't just make stuff up as they go along, and I presume - correct me if I'm wrong - that these are not obscure, hard to find sources. So what is going on? Whose accounts ARE being used?

This goes beyond Perryville's events into historiography's problems, but it makes me wonder. Someone's information is either dishonest or grossly mistaken, because the 16th Tennessee couldn't have been doing X and doing the opposite at the same time - at least not outside quantum level stuff.

Much of what I have posted is not necessarily obscure; however, some of the sources had never even been seen by Perryville experts. Again, this might help to explain why their current interpretations made sense when they came to the their conclusions... pieces of the puzzle were missing. No telling how many more pieces are out there waiting to be found.

That's part of what makes history exciting to me.

 

[gunny]

The location of the Hafley (pronounced Hayflay) cabin in the 1877 map of the Battle of Perryville has huge significance. It literally shifts the events on the battlefield for nearly three brigades several hundred yards to the right. To solidify evidence to support this, I have researched more deeply the Hafley name and evidence to support that this was where the family lived during the 1860 census and at the time of the battle.

First, it is not known what county Joseph Hafley was born in, but it might be supposed that it was in Lincoln County, Kentucky. In the 1830 census - by sheer proximity and later censuses, his father appears to have been a Henry Hafley and his first son - Joseph - was born while living there. This county is adjacent to Boyle County.

The family re-appears in the 1850 census living in Washington County, Kentucky - adjacent to Boyle County. The family is listed as: Henry Hafley45Sarah Hafley36Joseph Hafley19Jacob W Hafley16Nancy J Hafley13Elizabeth E Hafley9

By 1860, Joseph is on his own. He has married and moved to Boyle County. Perryville is listed as his P.O. and he has three boys:
J C Hafley29
Frances A Hafley28
George W Hafley6
Thors M Hafley4
Merit H Hafley1

The 1870 census shows the family still in Boyle County - but they had moved to Mitchellsburg - nearly 3 and 1/2 miles south of Perryville as the crow flies. Later in the 1880 through the 1910 censuses, Joseph is found in Little South Fork in Casey County, Kentucky.

What makes this significant is the fact that it places Joseph and his family with a Perryville P.O. in only the 1860 census. The map was printed in 1877, and according to census information, he and his family lived in Mitchellsburg - miles south of Perryville at that time. If he didn't live there in 1876-7 and hadn't lived there during the battle, why would his surname be placed on a map created in 1877? Additionally, it is significant that now a map identifies an actual structure on the eastern slope of Open Knob where Parsons' battery was located.

Additional evidence is the proximity of the names Russell and Bottoms to Joseph Hafley in the 1860 census. These two names are closely associated with the battle.

Property records will not show his name. He owned no land in 1860 and the value of his personal estate was $300. By 1870, he still owned no land but his personal estate was worth $400. By 1880 he had found his long time home in Casey County and probably died there.

It is clear, however, that a structure must have been there at the time of the battle - and most likely - it was occupied by the Hafley family.

I can't find any service records - Federal or Confederate for him.

 

[James N.]

Much of what I have posted is not necessarily obscure; however, some of the sources had never even been seen by Perryville experts. Again, this might help to explain why their current interpretations made sense when they came to the their conclusions... pieces of the puzzle were missing. No telling how many more pieces are out there waiting to be found.

That's part of what makes history exciting to me.

I've encountered similar situations involving what I firmly believe to be the mis-identification of a Confederate flag from the equally obscure and poorly-documented Battle of Pea Ridge, Ark. Many of these smaller engagements have been studied more in the last decade or so than ever before, and like in your example often reveal what can only be seen as contradictions to established versions of what happened.

Edit: I'm currently interested in the 33d Alabama of Cleburne's Division. I don't remember if they were present at Perryville or not - if so it must've been their first battle. Do you know any good sources for what they might've done if they were there?

 

[gunny]

I've encountered similar situations involving what I firmly believe to be the mis-identification of a Confederate flag from the equally obscure and poorly-documented Battle of Pea Ridge, Ark. Many of these smaller engagements have been studied more in the last decade or so than ever before, and like in your example often reveal what can only be seen as contradictions to established versions of what happened.

Edit: I'm currently interested in the 33d Alabama of Cleburne's Division. I don't remember if they were present at Perryville or not - if so it must've been their first battle. Do you know any good sources for what they might've done if they were there?

They were in S. A. M. Wood's brigade. Noe's book on Perryville mentions them on 6 pages. He lists their strength going into the fight at 380. He lists their casualties at 14 killed and 153 wounded.

 

[Elennsar]

Much of what I have posted is not necessarily obscure; however, some of the sources had never even been seen by Perryville experts. Again, this might help to explain why their current interpretations made sense when they came to the their conclusions... pieces of the puzzle were missing. No telling how many more pieces are out there waiting to be found.

That's part of what makes history exciting to me.

Here's wishing you luck finding more pieces. Looks like a pretty good image is emerging so far, but learning more is always good.

 

[gunny]

This is my take on the situation using google earth and all the eyewitness accounts of the battle.

The 16th Tennessee advances toward Stone's and Bush's batteries indicated in light-blue in the bottom-left of the image. Cheatham sends word that the enemy he wants attacked is at the head of the hollow. They change direction to the north-west. When they reach the top of the hill they are struck on their left flank by artillery fire from Stone. Parsons' opens on them from the north-west striking their right half of the regiment. They break the raw 123rd Illinois and eventually seize the cabins belonging to the Hafley family. They are too weak to take the guns until Maney arrives and they push in conjunction with Maney to seize the guns of Parsons' battery. They press the enemy back over 300 yards to a lane (Benton Road). They break that line and push on Stone's and Bush's guns for the next hour, but don't force him back until the arrival of Stewart.

 

[gunny]

Based off of current interpretations this is what the field would look like as far as I can make sense of it.

At 2 o'clock, the 16th Tennessee rushes alone up the valley to within 300 yards of Harris' battery at the widow Gibson cabins apparently sidestepping the 79th PN, 33rd Ohio, 10th Ohio and other Federal infantry regiments. He holds on there for thirty minutes. In those thirty minutes, somehow, Maney single handedly manages to overrun Parsons on the Open Knob, route four Yankee regiments and push on to force Starkweather back with all of his regiments and the batteries of Bush and Stone with the assistance of Stewart - who in turn - arrive on the 16th's right flank in the first 30 minutes of the battle. Then, they seize Harris' guns at 6 p.m. Wait! What happened to the three and a half remaining hours? Don't ask me...

Interesting how the 1st and 27th Tennessee have to shift behind the 6th and 9th Tennessee to "uncover" from the 16th Tennessee here - right? Oh yeah, wait... they don't have to.

 

[gunny]

I got this hilarious 1 star review on Amazon today! I'm sure it would have been -1 or more stars based on the language - but lucky for me - Amazon doesn't offer lower than one!

This book is a pile of miss informed ****. Don't waste your time or money on it
By Timothy Dye - July 30, 2014
I Didn't get this book from Amazon but it was loaned to me by someone who did. This book is a complete fantasy. There is no history to support any of the authors conclusion. This book is a pile of miss informed ****. Don't waste your time or money on it.​

I can't wait to respond to the review. Should I?

I really don't care if someone gives a less than stellar review, but questioning my research and the eyewitness testimony (which all of my research is based on) is ludicrous.

The statement that, "There is no history to support any of the authors conclusion" makes me question if this obvious follower of modern historians philosophies has ever opened anything other than a modern history book.

It's clear to me that Tim's understanding of the battle doesn't come from primary sources such as participants or the OR's.

In fact, if he did read the book, he didn't read the dozen or so accounts of the men in their entirety in the appendices. I'll give him the fact that the Hafley cabin site was not known at the time I wrote the book, but will definitely be included in the revision which this 'robot' will never read.

To each their own - right?

 

[Elennsar]

If someone isn't going to even give an example of the ----, it's not worth your time.