Southern Rail Difficulties

[steamman]

By 1861 as mentioned above the concept of an intergrated army was not new. Soldiers of color had already proved their worth in the American Revolutionary War and especially in the Independence struggle of Hatti. The Confederacy just couldn't bring itself to do what was necessary to recruit soldiers of color but the again doing so would contradict their politcal rational for having a war in the first place.
Leftyhunter

I doubt that an integrated army in the modern sense would be necessary. If the South had beenbeen rational, I'd be pleging alliance to txhe 3rd national.

 

[steamman]

It would of taken a massive investment in terms of creating factories, raw materials and skilled manpower for the Confederacy to have a viable railroad industry. To make things worse said Industrial equipment and imported skilled manpower required a viable internationally recognized currency or specie both in desperately short supply in the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

The South used cotton in the place of gold frequently. The British and French wanted it very much.

 

[leftyhunter]

I doubt that an integrated army in the modern sense would be necessary. If the South had beenbeen rational, I'd be pleging alliance to txhe 3rd national.

As I mentioned racially intergrated armies existed long before 1861 in South America. not sure what the " 3rd National" is?
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

The South used cotton in the place of gold frequently. The British and French wanted it very much.

True but per a source provided by @Poorville less then ten percent of the Confederate cotton crop was exported with ten percent of that amount being confiscated by the USN. So bartering has severe limitations.
Leftyhunter

 

[Rhea Cole]

What would it have taken for the Confederacy to make the most efficient 'wartime economy' use of available manpower?

Here is a vividly clear example of what it would have taken for the Confederacy to build & maintain the RR's.

​

This is a list of the men who built the fortress complex in Middle Tennessee, laid the track & maintained the 70 mile long Nashville & North Western Rail Road. In 1863, many of them joined USCT regiments the defended the RR & Johnsonville depot. Of course, the whole point of secession was to guarantee "the right of white men to hold other human beings as property" so a rational allocation of labor was not one of the Confederacy's options.

 

[wausaubob]

That was written in 2002 as a student paper at an Army college.

These rail maintenance problems became more serious as the duration of the war lengthened.
1. The US reduced the agricultural area of Virginia. That meant more food and forage had to be transported to the swollen population of Richmond, and the army.
2. Sherman's army gained on a position the railroad east of Atlanta. The Confederates tried to drive the US forces off, but the damage had been done, and the attempt was unsuccessful.
3. Farragut's flotilla closed Mobile Bay, and the work needed to tighten the blockade was simplified and made more efficient.
4. Grant designed an operation to get Warren's 5th corp onto the Richmond/Weldon railroad. The operation was successful and a horrific, but small battle followed to re-open this direct line south from Petersburg. The fact that is attempt was unsuccessful had to have a large impact on General Lee's appraisal of the continual viability of the Richmond as the Confederate capital.
5. Finally, General Sherman's high risk operation, to swing away from his railroad, though deep in Confederate territory, with Confederate cavalry still potentially active and able to raid his supply line, succeeded. And it so surprised the Confederates, that much of the rolling stock could not be evacuated and had to be destroyed.
Those were the major efforts. But there were also US cavalry raids both west and north of Richmond, to disrupt railroad traffic and test the repair capability of the Confederate railroad companies.

 

[wausaubob]

When the US railroad industry successfully transported the eastern troops to Bridgeport, AL, in October of 1863, the railroad managers and owners probably had the attention of the administration and the generals. From that point on, the facts of railroad maintenance gradually took over US strategy.

 

[DaveBrt]

Here is a vividly clear example of what it would have taken for the Confederacy to build & maintain the RR's.

View attachment 363891

View attachment 363889
​

This is a list of the men who built the fortress complex in Middle Tennessee, laid the track & maintained the 70 mile long Nashville & North Western Rail Road.

I'm curious, who do you think built all the Southern railroads? The only whites involved in the field were civil engineers, track-layer supervisors and slave supervisors. Do you really believe the South did not use slaves to build and maintain almost everything?

 

[DaveBrt]

These rail maintenance problems became more serious as the duration of the war lengthened.
1. The US reduced the agricultural area of Virginia. That meant more food and forage had to be transported to the swollen population of Richmond, and the army.
2. Sherman's army gained on a position the railroad east of Atlanta. The Confederates tried to drive the US forces off, but the damage had been done, and the attempt was unsuccessful.
3. Farragut's flotilla closed Mobile Bay, and the work needed to tighten the blockade was simplified and made more efficient.
4. Grant designed an operation to get Warren's 5th corp onto the Richmond/Weldon railroad. The operation was successful and a horrific, but small battle followed to re-open this direct line south from Petersburg. The fact that is attempt was unsuccessful had to have a large impact on General Lee's appraisal of the continual viability of the Richmond as the Confederate capital.
5. Finally, General Sherman's high risk operation, to swing away from his railroad, though deep in Confederate territory, with Confederate cavalry still potentially active and able to raid his supply line, succeeded. And it so surprised the Confederates, that much of the rolling stock could not be evacuated and had to be destroyed.
Those were the major efforts. But there were also US cavalry raids both west and north of Richmond, to disrupt railroad traffic and test the repair capability of the Confederate railroad companies.

The supply of Richmond and the ANV was only barely possible as early as the spring of 1863. Lee was screaming (in his gentlemanly way) about the need for more food for his horses starting in November 1862. To help reduce his demand, he reduced the number of wagons allowed to the ANV and did not increase his artillery as much as he might have wished. He also sent Longstreet to cover the removal of supplies from the Suffolk area of Virginia, reducing the demand on the railroad supply line.

The impact of army operations on agricultural areas was sever. Forage operations, by both armies, stripped the fields and forced the farmers to leave the area to prevent starvation. Farms just south of the area of operations (ie southern Virginia and North Carolina) were far less productive than usual because of the very high percentage of the men in those 2 states who were in the army. So supplies had to come from South Carolina (but they used most of what they produced) and southwestern Georgia -- untouched by armies throughout the war.

Southern railroads were never designed to send goods from SW Georgia to Virginia, and the requirement to do so, while meeting all the other transportation requirements, was more than could be accomplished. Cavalry raids and army movements made things worse, but the wear and tear of the war's demands and the inability of the South to replace the iron, locomotives and cars as they were lost (to say nothing of expanding the stock) was a killer by itself. With the blockade preventing shipping by water and the manpower requirements preventing the expansion of the RR industry, they system was guaranteed to fail just about the time it did.

 

[steamman]

Here is a vividly clear example of what it would have taken for the Confederacy to build & maintain the RR's.

View attachment 363891

View attachment 363889
​

This is a list of the men who built the fortress complex in Middle Tennessee, laid the track & maintained the 70 mile long Nashville & North Western Rail Road. In 1863, many of them joined USCT regiments the defended the RR & Johnsonville depot. Of course, the whole point of secession was to guarantee "the right of white men to hold other human beings as property" so a rational allocation of labor was not one of the Confederacy's options.

Rational to my forefathers. It worked long enough for the South to win, except the war lasted longer than that.

 

[steamman]

As I mentioned racially intergrated armies existed long before 1861 in South America. not sure what the " 3rd National" is?
Leftyhunter

Now you do

 

[Rhea Cole]

I'm curious, who do you think built all the Southern railroads? The only whites involved in the field were civil engineers, track-layer supervisors and slave supervisors. Do you really believe the South did not use slaves to build and maintain almost everything?

Actually, I know who built Southern RR's. For dangerous work such as blasting, "Irish N- - - ers" as they were called, were used. Slaves were too valuable for that kind of work. The Irishmen were also used for digging cuts where there was danger of collapse. I suppose the use of Irish laborers might not fit your 'white' category because Victorian era racists did not believe they were white.

I would have thought that the documentation I have posted indicated that I know quite a bit about RR's in the Western Theater.

 

[wausaubob]

The supply of Richmond and the ANV was only barely possible as early as the spring of 1863. Lee was screaming (in his gentlemanly way) about the need for more food for his horses starting in November 1862. To help reduce his demand, he reduced the number of wagons allowed to the ANV and did not increase his artillery as much as he might have wished. He also sent Longstreet to cover the removal of supplies from the Suffolk area of Virginia, reducing the demand on the railroad supply line.

The impact of army operations on agricultural areas was sever. Forage operations, by both armies, stripped the fields and forced the farmers to leave the area to prevent starvation. Farms just south of the area of operations (ie southern Virginia and North Carolina) were far less productive than usual because of the very high percentage of the men in those 2 states who were in the army. So supplies had to come from South Carolina (but they used most of what they produced) and southwestern Georgia -- untouched by armies throughout the war.

Southern railroads were never designed to send goods from SW Georgia to Virginia, and the requirement to do so, while meeting all the other transportation requirements, was more than could be accomplished. Cavalry raids and army movements made things worse, but the wear and tear of the war's demands and the inability of the South to replace the iron, locomotives and cars as they were lost (to say nothing of expanding the stock) was a killer by itself. With the blockade preventing shipping by water and the manpower requirements preventing the expansion of the RR industry, they system was guaranteed to fail just about the time it did.

As each direct connection was lost to the Confederacy, it meant more indirect routes had to be maintained, and fewer locomotives had to travel longer distances. It was bad situation in 1863, but as Virginia was ruined by the war, in the summer of 1864, the reality of starvation, first for the horses and mules, and then for the citizens and soldiers loomed. By late fall I think they were importing rotten pork through the blockade.

 

[dgfred]

Might be a good time for an 'abandon Richmond' as the capital talk.

 

[leftyhunter]

As each direct connection was lost to the Confederacy, it meant more indirect routes had to be maintained, and fewer locomotives had to travel longer distances. It was bad situation in 1863, but as Virginia was ruined by the war, in the summer of 1864, the reality of starvation, first for the horses and mules, and then for the citizens and soldiers loomed. By late fall I think they were importing rotten pork through the blockade.

That's interesting and counter intuitive. For example a Confederate sanctions buster could in theory purchase virtually any amount of pork via a Canadian or British front company to Canada then ship it to a British Carribean port then reship it to Wilmington. Of course said pork would be processed and slated in Canada so it need not spoil. Not sure why the Confederates woul import spoiled food?
Leftyhunter

 

[dgfred]

Not to mention it would kill ya to eat it.

 

[leftyhunter]

Might be a good time for an 'abandon Richmond' as the capital talk.

If the Confederacy can't hold on to Richmond what city can they hold on to? In order to have a viable capitol city the population should be at least 25k and most if not all of those Southern cities are near a large body of water. Richmond is by far the most important Industrial city in the South. If the Confederacy can't defend Richmond it's simply not a viable entity.
Leftyhunter

 

[dgfred]

I would have picked Atlanta most likely... or Columbia, SC.

 

[dgfred]

If supply is a massive struggle then the number of people and location is a problem... not an advantage as a capitol.

 

[wausaubob]

Not to mention it would kill ya to eat it.

May not have been lethal, but after having been shipped and stored several times, but the time it go to Richmond it could have been very appetizing.