Southern Rail Difficulties

[Lubliner]

Before the war, construction on railroads was a joint project generally between two cities. City 'A' would receive bids for running a line to City 'B', which itself would also generate funds for the project. Scheduled completions were seldom met due to delays and difficulties, and many times the ownership or stockholders bailed out and new appropriations made. Upon completion, a rail line was beneficial not only for the commerce but also for tourism that can be associated with new inventions and travel.

These purposes came abruptly to a standstill once the Confederacy began enrollments, and needful purposes of soldiering began to crowd out the civilian requirements. To meet heavier demands than private holders/owners were willing to offer meant impressments of the service. This all proved a shortage of stock and line, as well as harmonious agreements until new contracts and rail yards should be built.



Already having mentioned antebellum accomplishments and how they sprang to existence, what bureaucratic channels were developed for rail projects once war began; how were they funded; by State or Confederate treasuries in the military or civil departments?
Anyone care to share what they know.

Lubliner.

 

[DaveBrt]

Before the war, construction on railroads was a joint project generally between two cities. City 'A' would receive bids for running a line to City 'B', which itself would also generate funds for the project. Scheduled completions were seldom met due to delays and difficulties, and many times the ownership or stockholders bailed out and new appropriations made. Upon completion, a rail line was beneficial not only for the commerce but also for tourism that can be associated with new inventions and travel.

These purposes came abruptly to a standstill once the Confederacy began enrollments, and needful purposes of soldiering began to crowd out the civilian requirements. To meet heavier demands than private holders/owners were willing to offer meant impressments of the service. This all proved a shortage of stock and line, as well as harmonious agreements until new contracts and rail yards should be built.



Already having mentioned antebellum accomplishments and how they sprang to existence, what bureaucratic channels were developed for rail projects once war began; how were they funded; by State or Confederate treasuries in the military or civil departments?
Anyone care to share what they know.

Lubliner.

Two methods were used to fund major railroad construction in the South during the war. In almost every case, the desired RR was declared a military necessity by some general and, with the agreement of the QM General, Secretary of War and the President, a request for funds was made to Congress. If passed, the money was provided as a loan to the new RR, usually paid back by credits to the CSA for transportation provided. A mortgage of the RR was required to cover the loan.

The other method was by the sale of stock shares in the new RR. The Piedmont RR was built by this method, with the Richmond & Danville RR purchasing over 90% of the stock and providing some of the manpower, equipment and rolling stock to build the new road.

Once the RR had been determined to be a military necessity, there was push from Congress to get the job done. Unfortunately, the Confederacy's resources were not up to rapid construction (or much construction, at all) so the projects were rarely completed quickly. The main weaknesses were in manpower (owners were unwilling to see their slaves worked on RR projects for long periods) and iron. Both were not solvable without the force of government, and especially in the case of iron, it was essential.

Iron was provided by taking it from lesser roads to build (and maintain) more important ones. In some cases, it made perfect sense -- the iron of the Alabama & Florida (of Florida) RR was no longer needed after Pensacola was abandoned and it was taken to complete the road from Selma to Meridian. In less clear cases, the owners fought the removal of their iron in court and delayed or prevented the removal (ex: the Florida RR). RRs in some states were protected from iron removal by the fact of the state being a major owner of the RR's stock and bonds (in NC, it was frequently 60%) and the CSA was unwilling to force the removal of a state's property.

Here are pages I have created, showing all the RRs the business world wanted to build and on which some work was done during the war and the RRs that were built strictly for military requirements.

Confederate Railroad Construction Plans

Confederate Military Railroads

 

[Lubliner]

Thank you for replying, @DaveBrt. This is a very good overview to a specific point I was wishing to emphasize.
My purpose in the OP was the ongoing discussion of difficulties expressed in many threads of the forum, and which you countenance as well. The inabilities of proper maintenance of the southern rails, the shortage of materials and manpower, all this I saw as a systemic flaw operating at a higher level. These were expressed aptly by not only you, but others too.

I was injecting a theory, possibly of where the crux should have been mended with what was controlled.
Choosing one link you gratefully posted for an example of the direction I wish to pursue is this:

http://csa-railroads.com/Essays/Orignial Docs/NA/NA,_SWR_12-4A-61.htm

The Quartermaster in December of 1861, J. S. Calhoun submits a data sheet of accounting to the President of the Montgomery and West Point Railroad, Col. Charles Pollard. It proves a reduction in cost of $158. 80 per the coming month(s). He also provides the total amount that was accumulated during the previous 8 months.

How was the former debt of $16, 819.65 cleared?
1) By the QM Department in Richmond Virginia.
2) By the Treasury Department in Richmond Virginia
3) Some other means of requisition.

How is the future expense of $1,942.75 to be paid?
1) Immediately.
2) After 6 Months.
3) Arbitrary management of monies in time.

Again, there is a flaw in the confederate system for managing the railroads that has a clear beginning point. As an example of a closely related industry I can point out Letters of Marque where civilians applied and received legal papers for their vessels. Davis had set specific rules to be adhered to and a bond of $5000 dollars trust for each applicant's vessel. The system, when scrutinized did not provide favoritism. Neither was it in accord with the Navy Department, unless vessels were bought or leased by Mallory's authority.

Enough for now to point the direction I desire to establish in the future, and it will take an extreme amount time to review the links provided. I want to take this bureaucratic management system step by step to discover the best feasible plan for solving and lessening the problems we all agree upon already; or to set clearly the breaks that are impossible to bridge.
Thank you,
Lubliner.

 

[John S. Carter]

Before the war, construction on railroads was a joint project generally between two cities. City 'A' would receive bids for running a line to City 'B', which itself would also generate funds for the project. Scheduled completions were seldom met due to delays and difficulties, and many times the ownership or stockholders bailed out and new appropriations made. Upon completion, a rail line was beneficial not only for the commerce but also for tourism that can be associated with new inventions and travel.

These purposes came abruptly to a standstill once the Confederacy began enrollments, and needful purposes of soldiering began to crowd out the civilian requirements. To meet heavier demands than private holders/owners were willing to offer meant impressments of the service. This all proved a shortage of stock and line, as well as harmonious agreements until new contracts and rail yards should be built.



Already having mentioned antebellum accomplishments and how they sprang to existence, what bureaucratic channels were developed for rail projects once war began; how were they funded; by State or Confederate treasuries in the military or civil departments?
Anyone care to share what they know.

Lubliner.

Investments ; How much investment of capital went towards rail systems in the North while in the South it was still wagon to docks on rivers with private investment in limited rails.Was there federal money on rail systems in the South or because of the policial thoughts that if the federals did invest in rail system that that would single a dependence on federal system there by federal control in other aspects of states authority as with investment in state education means control of the system,Was it the narrow business that money was better left in agriculture and than in transportation system for people and profitable goods to the docks?At the start of the war Union rail system would transport goods and troops from the West and Northeast quickly while the South with limited rail system could not excepte for two Noted events and they had the experience engineers to repair systems when needed Even during the war the administration was able with joint private and government investment were able to begin the Pacific rail.

 

[Lubliner]

Investments ; How much investment of capital went towards rail systems in the North while in the South it was still wagon to docks on rivers with private investment in limited rails.Was there federal money on rail systems in the South or because of the policial thoughts that if the federals did invest in rail system that that would single a dependence on federal system there by federal control in other aspects of states authority as with investment in state education means control of the system,Was it the narrow business that money was better left in agriculture and than in transportation system for people and profitable goods to the docks?At the start of the war Union rail system would transport goods and troops from the West and Northeast quickly while the South with limited rail system could not excepte for two Noted events and they had the experience engineers to repair systems when needed Even during the war the administration was able with joint private and government investment were able to begin the Pacific rail.

Thank you for replying. You ask some very good questions I cannot answer yet with proof of the difference, North and South on expansion. But the North it appears had land speculation that provided more political support, the further west the rails were extended. That alone was a significant contribution to the costs and interests for the public. The rail system was still in it's infancy even by 1860, and the improvements needed were still stymied from progress, though many were already realized. Incentive and motivation weighed heavily in the balance for undertaking these projects and I believe the North had much more foresight and purpose than did the South. Remember the south was not a progressive society regarding future pursuits as long as their own capital interests were fulfilled. Complacency is really a natural side effect of Instituted Slavery for the southern breeds. They had plenty of political aspirations, but their finances were controlled by their culture. So this makes me think the North was committed early on to advance the industries coming to pass. The June 29th 1864 passage of Lincoln's Act to complete the transcontinental railroad gave a great amount of hope to many for off-setting the burdens of the war on both the mind and the purse. This oversight and implementation of railroad construction was preempted in the south, and my concerns were to focus on specific management procedures that had to be inaugurated once the war began. Were these done systematically per private enterprise, or were their differences between contractual agreements from one board of commissioners to another? Specifically a southern focus.
Lubliner.

 

[DaveBrt]

The Quartermaster in December of 1861, J. S. Calhoun submits a data sheet of accounting to the President of the Montgomery and West Point Railroad, Col. Charles Pollard. It proves a reduction in cost of $158. 80 per the coming month(s). He also provides the total amount that was accumulated during the previous 8 months.

How was the former debt of $16, 819.65 cleared?
1) By the QM Department in Richmond Virginia.
2) By the Treasury Department in Richmond Virginia
3) Some other means of requisition.

How is the future expense of $1,942.75 to be paid?
1) Immediately.
2) After 6 Months.
3) Arbitrary management of monies in time.

Again, there is a flaw in the confederate system for managing the railroads that has a clear beginning point. As an example of a closely related industry I can point out Letters of Marque where civilians applied and received legal papers for their vessels. Davis had set specific rules to be adhered to and a bond of $5000 dollars trust for each applicant's vessel. The system, when scrutinized did not provide favoritism. Neither was it in accord with the Navy Department, unless vessels were bought or leased by Mallory's authority.

Enough for now to point the direction I desire to establish in the future, and it will take an extreme amount time to review the links provided. I want to take this bureaucratic management system step by step to discover the best feasible plan for solving and lessening the problems we all agree upon already; or to set clearly the breaks that are impossible to bridge.
Thank you,
Lubliner.

This specific letter was a part of an investigation into the question of whether the Government should continue using drayage (ie hauling by wagon) between two railroads in Montgomery or should lay a RR track between the two. It was decided that a rail link was the better use of money and it was constructed.

Regarding the payment for the Services -- local expenses were usually paid by the local QM from funds he had requested. So the hauling person was paid by the QM, probably monthly. Major expenses, like the cost of RR transportation on a single RR for a period (monthly or quarterly) was submitted to the QM who audited the claim and made sure that all the claims were valid (ie should the Government pay for the cost of transporting a horse to an officer on duty) and were properly charged (rate of an item [varies by type] per 100 pounds per 100 miles). After any disagreements were resolved, the RR was paid by either the QM on site or by the QM in Richmond (if the bill had been presented in person there). Payment was mostly in bonds; refusal to take at least a major part in bonds would usually delay the payment, but was allowed. The delay for cash was caused by the Treasury Department's inability to provide enough pieces of paper (notes) to meet all the Government's needs.

I think you will find that the delay in paying was the same as all the rest of the South's problems -- lack of the required resources, especially manpower. The South did not have enough people to do all the work required and man the military to the level needed. This shortage put a brake on everything the army/government/business wanted to do.

I will be interested to see where you go with your investigation.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Before the war, British banks provided the loans that financed RR's North & South. Railroading began in1840, mostly in the North. For that reason, Southern RR's we're newer & often in better shape than their Northern counterparts.

British banks agitated for intervention in the Civil War. Quite rightly, they feared that after defeat Southern RR's would renege on their loans.

You could win a trivia contest any day of the week by asking folks to name the three men who were put in charge of the CSA government RR commission. The chances of even the wonkiest of Civil War wonks knowing that such a position existed, let alone name the unfortunates who held the post. It was not until February 1865 that Davis was given the authority to manage Southern RR's.

During the winter & spring of 1863, the Army of Tennessee was allowed to slowly starve because their RR lifeline was inoperable. A combination of wartime traffic, natural forces, residual damage done by Confederates & Yankee raids had left the line a shambles. Bragg's attempts to repair, effectively rebuild the line, all ended in abject failure. He finally declared it a lost cause & stop trying.

Whatever the ins & outs of issuing bonds or other financial transactions were, one of the Confederacy's largest armies that was guarding R E Lee's supply line was allowed to starve for lack of RR repair assets.That says everything you need to know about the collapse of Confederate railroads.

 

[John S. Carter]

Thank you for replying. You ask some very good questions I cannot answer yet with proof of the difference, North and South on expansion. But the North it appears had land speculation that provided more political support, the further west the rails were extended. That alone was a significant contribution to the costs and interests for the public. The rail system was still in it's infancy even by 1860, and the improvements needed were still stymied from progress, though many were already realized. Incentive and motivation weighed heavily in the balance for undertaking these projects and I believe the North had much more foresight and purpose than did the South. Remember the south was not a progressive society regarding future pursuits as long as their own capital interests were fulfilled. Complacency is really a natural side effect of Instituted Slavery for the southern breeds. They had plenty of political aspirations, but their finances were controlled by their culture. So this makes me think the North was committed early on to advance the industries coming to pass. The June 29th 1864 passage of Lincoln's Act to complete the transcontinental railroad gave a great amount of hope to many for off-setting the burdens of the war on both the mind and the purse. This oversight and implementation of railroad construction was preempted in the south, and my concerns were to focus on specific management procedures that had to be inaugurated once the war began. Were these done systematically per private enterprise, or were their differences between contractual agreements from one board of commissioners to another? Specifically a southern focus.
Lubliner.

I would say that as far as being progressive ,the South was at least fifty to seventy years in the rear to the North.This in not just in rail but incapital investments {would that be the correct word for that time?] in industrial, Granted the South did have limited investments as the steel industrial in Brighingham and some in Richmond but the overall was in agricultural[,true believers of Jefferson of the farming life [as long has there were slaves to do the farming.] From the start it was and would continue to be Jefferson/Madison and the rural verses Hamilton and the industrial /financial Northeast.Names of the political parties changed but the philosophies were at the core the same.

 

[Rhea Cole]

John Carter has hit the nail on the head. The 4,000,000 slaves were worth more than all the RR's North & South. The slaves in Tennessee were literally worth more than the state was. A majority of the top ten wealthiest men in the US were slave-holders. All that capital was tied up in frail human beings who wanted nothing more than being free.

The Southern slave-holding economy generated a huge cash flow, but it did not invest in assets like mills that could produce a return for decades to come. The rule of thumb was that slaves were productive for seven years. That was roughly from physical maturity at about 24 until the early 30's. Rotating your stock every 7 years is a theme found in slave management publications.

A considerable percentage of the cash flow generated by plantations was eaten up by the constant necessity to replace their stock. When slaves self-liberated, Scrooge McDuck Volumes of capital vanished into thin air. The exquisitely rare individuals like Atalisa Atkins who managed to have Baron Rothschild hold the gold from the sale of her cotton came out of war fabulously wealthy. For everybody else, every penny they had evaporated overnight.

 

[Lubliner]

This specific letter was a part of an investigation into the question of whether the Government should continue using drayage (ie hauling by wagon) between two railroads in Montgomery or should lay a RR track between the two. It was decided that a rail link was the better use of money and it was constructed.

Regarding the payment for the Services -- local expenses were usually paid by the local QM from funds he had requested. So the hauling person was paid by the QM, probably monthly. Major expenses, like the cost of RR transportation on a single RR for a period (monthly or quarterly) was submitted to the QM who audited the claim and made sure that all the claims were valid (ie should the Government pay for the cost of transporting a horse to an officer on duty) and were properly charged (rate of an item [varies by type] per 100 pounds per 100 miles). After any disagreements were resolved, the RR was paid by either the QM on site or by the QM in Richmond (if the bill had been presented in person there). Payment was mostly in bonds; refusal to take at least a major part in bonds would usually delay the payment, but was allowed. The delay for cash was caused by the Treasury Department's inability to provide enough pieces of paper (notes) to meet all the Government's needs.

I think you will find that the delay in paying was the same as all the rest of the South's problems -- lack of the required resources, especially manpower. The South did not have enough people to do all the work required and man the military to the level needed. This shortage put a brake on everything the army/government/business wanted to do.

I will be interested to see where you go with your investigation.

I believe your clarification helps me a great deal. After reading the next few sub-links on dray topics, I felt that General Bragg inflated his figures.
Perusing further into the railroad system, and reading the Railroad Commissioners (i.e. Ashe) recommendations I noticed one main principle I felt was discrepant in the confederate system. The Virginia railroads were governed by the General Assembly and Legislative branch of State Government. Requests for construction in places such as Saltville, Kanawha, Bristol were submitted to this authority, while Tennessee and Alabama rails appear to have a Commission of stockholders and private capitalists ruling the regulatory procedures.

I see a big problem where the allocation requests made, though approved, were deficient to my understanding. Too many pokers in the fire, for one. Another point for consideration is the inducements offered by the rails, such as free mail freights, and movements of soldiers upon short notice. Wasn't their any military input for priority with contract agreements? I see all recommendations made at a civil level.

Also by extension of seasonal upgrades beyond acceptable time periods with the cost estimates override the uncertainty of the times. Again too much is being requested by looking too far ahead. I almost feel as though tactics are plentiful on what needs are required, but strategy is totally faulty. Even by brushing past immediate events and near future events, just by qualifying a contract set a year and two ahead puts a motivation to continue a war into the hands of profiteers.

As far as I have come. Thank you for your hope to see it through, @DaveBrt.
Lubliner.

 

[John S. Carter]

John Carter has hit the nail on the head. The 4,000,000 slaves were worth more than all the RR's North & South. The slaves in Tennessee were literally worth more than the state was. A majority of the top ten wealthiest men in the US were slave-holders. All that capital was tied up in frail human beings who wanted nothing more than being free.

The Southern slave-holding economy generated a huge cash flow, but it did not invest in assets like mills that could produce a return for decades to come. The rule of thumb was that slaves were productive for seven years. That was roughly from physical maturity at about 24 until the early 30's. Rotating your stock every 7 years is a theme found in slave management publications.

A considerable percentage of the cash flow generated by plantations was eaten up by the constant necessity to replace their stock. When slaves self-liberated, Scrooge McDuck Volumes of capital vanished into thin air. The exquisitely rare individuals like Atalisa Atkins who managed to have Baron Rothschild hold the gold from the sale of her cotton came out of war fabulously wealthy. For everybody else, every penny they had evaporated overnight.

Has anyone read where one of the reasons that the plantation owner did not not emancipate their work force was that they could not due to the fact that the investment which they had in the system,For the federal government to do this would have bankrupt the treasury. and we today could still be paying for this.Another question on a theory; What would coast be if they would have placed his slaves on salary bases per hour or straight weekly bases with housing and meals?

 

[Lubliner]

John Carter has hit the nail on the head. The 4,000,000 slaves were worth more than all the RR's North & South. The slaves in Tennessee were literally worth more than the state was. A majority of the top ten wealthiest men in the US were slave-holders. All that capital was tied up in frail human beings who wanted nothing more than being free.

The Southern slave-holding economy generated a huge cash flow, but it did not invest in assets like mills that could produce a return for decades to come. The rule of thumb was that slaves were productive for seven years. That was roughly from physical maturity at about 24 until the early 30's. Rotating your stock every 7 years is a theme found in slave management publications.

A considerable percentage of the cash flow generated by plantations was eaten up by the constant necessity to replace their stock. When slaves self-liberated, Scrooge McDuck Volumes of capital vanished into thin air. The exquisitely rare individuals like Atalisa Atkins who managed to have Baron Rothschild hold the gold from the sale of her cotton came out of war fabulously wealthy. For everybody else, every penny they had evaporated overnight.

This is a serious setback for sure with the southern system. Regarding the limitations of progress to come, the rails though newer to the south (as you mentioned elsewhere) were made of substandard materials, and needed replacements due to military use. But look at the terrible deficiency for providing the time, material, men, planning and accomplishment they faced.
Remember General Lee before his claim to fame went south to inspect and start operations on coastal fortifications. Needful of men, material, slaves, time etc. If this stood alone maybe something could be made ready in the south. But now the railroads are overused by moving troops into Virginia, removing equipments from Harper's Ferry, by moving heavy artillery from Norfolk and Charleston to other places. This is a very heavy toll. Even moving the Capital from Montgomery to Richmond, requiring a more luxuriant coach put stress on the system.
The circumstances were unfavorable. Nothing could be done by experience, it had to all be learned afresh. So the list of requirements to rebuild a system of infrastructure was not a later occurrence. It was immediate. Contemporary accounts all speak of the future as being dark and foreboding. With no light their is no vision, and everything to us seems up close and personal. Were they desiring the darkness to cover them? We can witness what their own blindness attempts, and the fanatasy (sp) of what their creation desired.
Reality sees it, but the sweat, the blood, the treachery, the futility is felt by them. What a gamble it was.
I really appreciate your comments, @Rhea Cole, and @John S. Carter. It is always a help.
Lubliner.

 

[Rhea Cole]

This is not my thing, but after the war they brought in Chinese laborers to replace the slaves. The economics of contract labor vs slave labor was revolutionary. Opera Winfrey has Mongolian DNA, as do many black people because the coolies were almost exclusively male. The slavery by another name of sharecropper, white & black, was more economical than chattel slavery. As I say, I can't discuss this at an educated level, but there are many books on this subject.

 

[Lubliner]

Has anyone read where one of the reasons that the plantation owner did not not emancipate their work force was that they could not due to the fact that the investment which they had in the system,For the federal government to do this would have bankrupt the treasury. and we today could still be paying for this.Another question on a theory; What would coast be if they would have placed his slaves on salary bases per hour or straight weekly bases with housing and meals?

It seems the only thing the south had an abundance of was slaves. These were impressed into service for confederate projects. Emancipating a fortune of their own kingdom, not likely. Looking for replacements, only when necessary.
Lubliner.

 

[Rhea Cole]

This is a serious setback for sure with the southern system. Regarding the limitations of progress to come, the rails though newer to the south (as you mentioned elsewhere) were made of substandard materials, and needed replacements due to military use. But look at the terrible deficiency for providing the time, material, men, planning and accomplishment they faced.
Remember General Lee before his claim to fame went south to inspect and start operations on coastal fortifications. Needful of men, material, slaves, time etc. If this stood alone maybe something could be made ready in the south. But now the railroads are overused by moving troops into Virginia, removing equipments from Harper's Ferry, by moving heavy artillery from Norfolk and Charleston to other places. This is a very heavy toll. Even moving the Capital from Montgomery to Richmond, requiring a more luxuriant coach put stress on the system.
The circumstances were unfavorable. Nothing could be done by experience, it had to all be learned afresh. So the list of requirements to rebuild a system of infrastructure was not a later occurrence. It was immediate. Contemporary accounts all speak of the future as being dark and foreboding. With no light their is no vision, and everything to us seems up close and personal. Were they desiring the darkness to cover them? We can witness what their own blindness attempts, and the fanatasy (sp) of what their creation desired.
Reality sees it, but the sweat, the blood, the treachery, the futility is felt by them. What a gamble it was.
I really appreciate your comments, @Rhea Cole, and @John S. Carter. It is always a help.
Lubliner.

The thing to remember is just what maintenance hogs CW RR's were. When the constant replacement of rails & regular maintenance of the rolling stock stoped, it was a matter of when, not if the Southern RR's were going to grind to a halt.

 

[leftyhunter]

Has anyone read where one of the reasons that the plantation owner did not not emancipate their work force was that they could not due to the fact that the investment which they had in the system,For the federal government to do this would have bankrupt the treasury. and we today could still be paying for this.Another question on a theory; What would coast be if they would have placed his slaves on salary bases per hour or straight weekly bases with housing and meals?

The actual costs would be those given to workers of color during Reconstruction.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Before the war, construction on railroads was a joint project generally between two cities. City 'A' would receive bids for running a line to City 'B', which itself would also generate funds for the project. Scheduled completions were seldom met due to delays and difficulties, and many times the ownership or stockholders bailed out and new appropriations made. Upon completion, a rail line was beneficial not only for the commerce but also for tourism that can be associated with new inventions and travel.

These purposes came abruptly to a standstill once the Confederacy began enrollments, and needful purposes of soldiering began to crowd out the civilian requirements. To meet heavier demands than private holders/owners were willing to offer meant impressments of the service. This all proved a shortage of stock and line, as well as harmonious agreements until new contracts and rail yards should be built.



Already having mentioned antebellum accomplishments and how they sprang to existence, what bureaucratic channels were developed for rail projects once war began; how were they funded; by State or Confederate treasuries in the military or civil departments?
Anyone care to share what they know.

Lubliner.

I don't know overall how much negative pact Unionist guerrillas had on Confederate RRs but definitely a factor in East Tennessee.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

The thing to remember is just what maintenance hogs CW RR's were. When the constant replacement of rails & regular maintenance of the rolling stock stoped, it was a matter of when, not if the Southern RR's were going to grind to a halt.

I had understood the huge workload required in maintenance. But to add connections and new lines to come while not having downtime for their system being used put them at a full disadvantage, in spite of having interior lines. Engineers were a vanishing commodity in the south. Thank you for your insight.
Lubliner.

 

[Lubliner]

I don't know overall how much negative pact Unionist guerrillas had on Confederate RRs but definitely a factor in East Tennessee.
Leftyhunter

Don't overlook the border with Kentucky and Virginia, either. Border wars seem to be the cradle of guerilla hostility. Nothing was safe when left unattended. Blockhouses, small forts, all to shelter and defend the troops in place. Guerillas changed uniforms too frequently for use to their own advantage. But regardless of this, plenty of reports all along the waterways and rails point primarily to confederates. The Union raiding parties were oriented by rank, leadership, and proper authority, generally. Of course the confederate subsets were a counterbalance for grievances and revenge.
Thanks @leftyhunter for the question.
Lubliner.

 

[John S. Carter]

The actual costs would be those given to workers of color during Reconstruction.
Leftyhunter

Would one know of the number of plantations were lost to former slaves due to inability to pay taxes and how many were taken by Northern investors {carpetbaggers} and banks which were owned loans by the previous owners who could not repay these loans? Could this be one of the reason that certain plantations owners did not desire to succeed ,fear of losing the war,sure that this action would bring war, then losing their way of life and political influence.Most had been North and knew of the North's economic and industrial strength ?