Southern Rail Difficulties

[leftyhunter]

Would one know of the number of plantations were lost to former slaves due to inability to pay taxes and how many were taken by Northern investors {carpetbaggers} and banks which were owned loans by the previous owners who could not repay these loans? Could this be one of the reason that certain plantations owners did not desire to succeed ,fear of losing the war,sure that this action would bring war, then losing their way of life and political influence.Most had been North and knew of the North's economic and industrial strength ?

Perhaps an economics professor or a professor of political economy might know the answer.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Don't overlook the border with Kentucky and Virginia, either. Border wars seem to be the cradle of guerilla hostility. Nothing was safe when left unattended. Blockhouses, small forts, all to shelter and defend the troops in place. Guerillas changed uniforms too frequently for use to their own advantage. But regardless of this, plenty of reports all along the waterways and rails point primarily to confederates. The Union raiding parties were oriented by rank, leadership, and proper authority, generally. Of course the confederate subsets were a counterbalance for grievances and revenge.
Thanks @leftyhunter for the question.
Lubliner.

I just remembered that per " Bitterly Divided the South's Inner Civil War" David Williams Lumbee Indians attacked Confederate RR lines in their section of North Carolina. Unionist guerrillas were like Confederate guerrllas rather informally organized.
Neither the Confederacy nor the Union had anything resembling formal aid and coordination of guerrllas similar to the British Special Operations Executive or the US Office of Strategic Services. Both sides particularly the USN in South East Florida provided logistical support to guerrllas but not control.
As @Rhea Cole pointed out in a previous thread the Confederate guerrllas tried mighty hard to sabatoge and disrupt Union RR lines but despite some sucess ultimately failed to do so.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

I just remembered that per " Bitterly Divided the South's Inner Civil War" David Williams Lumbee Indians attacked Confederate RR lines in their section of North Carolina. Unionist guerrillas were like Confederate guerrllas rather informally organized.
Neither the Confederacy nor the Union had anything resembling formal aid and coordination of guerrllas similar to the British Special Operations Executive or the US Office of Strategic Services. Both sides particularly the USN in South East Florida provided logistical support to guerrllas but not control.
As @Rhea Cole pointed out in a previous thread the Confederate guerrllas tried mighty hard to sabatoge and disrupt Union RR lines but despite some sucess ultimately failed to do so.
Leftyhunter

In many instances it appears the Union guerillas became concentrated due to disaffection with Military enforcement. In fact even the confederate guerillas became cohesive, and banded together because they did not like being ruled. When I stop and think about the character of warfare, when men become abstract numbers and are left unsung heroes. Their reward is not forthcoming, and even early on a bounty jumper preys on gaining more than offered by the system of military rule. It was a dangerous life either way, staying present for duty or desertion. The personal conflicts have so many angles that the mind has a tendency to conspire with any outlet to bring relief. Their hardships and exposure once chosen to pursue either course became a reckoning for survival, and they took the route, maybe, that seemed surer at the time. I am sure once the choice was made to rampage, and it could no longer be mitigated with authorities, they may have wished otherwise. It depends on the hardness of the heart and the threats abounding all around. In Kentucky, the aggravation of slavery fractured their society to the point of third party guerillas, no longer a war of just north and south. Same with Kansas, West Virginia, Maryland until it was cleaned out by Martial Law, and all through the south men sought ways to seek vengeance, and make the rules for themselves. There are no rights of ownership when everything but your life can be taken from you, and then that life exists on only one condition; called the moment.
Organizational handling of much requires many. In the guerilla world, the less the better. Nothing permanent, and everything transitory.
Thanks @leftyhunter for replying. You know the main guerilla goals were styled on Mosby and Forrest tactics, disrupt and destroy lifelines of supply, communication, feeling of safety, and anything held dear to the public, such as places to vote and family estates.
Lubliner.

 

[Lubliner]

Has anyone read where one of the reasons that the plantation owner did not not emancipate their work force was that they could not due to the fact that the investment which they had in the system,For the federal government to do this would have bankrupt the treasury. and we today could still be paying for this.Another question on a theory; What would coast be if they would have placed his slaves on salary bases per hour or straight weekly bases with housing and meals?

Though in some respects not related to the railroads, I found one telegram that I believe may help answer the question you have posed.
The use of manpower (especially negro) and the Federal purse at Washington for payment?

Goodrich's Landing, La., October 2, 1863. to Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, Comdg. Dept. of the Tennessee, Vicksburg, Miss.
: General : The time is approaching when the plantations on this side of the river held by the Government will have to be re-leased. It is important that the two cuts, one at Lake Providence (the most important) and the other known as the Bissell cut, should be filled up, as otherwise a large district of country will, on the next rise of the river, be overflowed, including not only the Government plantations, but also that part of the parish over which the railroad running from opposite Vicksburg passes. As I have no funds at my command to do this work, I request that you will authorize the stationing of some one of the negro regiments now at this place at Lake Providence, as well to fill up that cut as to give protection to lessees of plantations in that neighborhood in gathering their crops. It is estimated that 500 men will complete the work in ten days after they shall have fairly commenced. If this is done, I request that the necessary spades, wheelbarrows, gang planks, and other utensils be furnished. After the completion of the work at Lake Providence, the same body of men can be taken to the Bissell cut.
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. THOMAS, Adjutant- General.

Essentially, the whole scheme of using labor as hired hands, and befitting the purpose to put 'contraband' back to a material meaning that did not denigrate the Negro is visible in the transmission above.

The southern slave-holder would hire out his slaves for money in his own pocket, and the confederate government was liable for any losses due to escape, mistreatment, etc. The whole system was for financial profit.

Once the war was though, the Freedman's Bureau helped with land allotments, education, resettlement, community services. That would be the proper hunt and peck for information after the facts. Thanks for joining in again @John S. Carter.

Lubliner.

 

[leftyhunter]

In many instances it appears the Union guerillas became concentrated due to disaffection with Military enforcement. In fact even the confederate guerillas became cohesive, and banded together because they did not like being ruled. When I stop and think about the character of warfare, when men become abstract numbers and are left unsung heroes. Their reward is not forthcoming, and even early on a bounty jumper preys on gaining more than offered by the system of military rule. It was a dangerous life either way, staying present for duty or desertion. The personal conflicts have so many angles that the mind has a tendency to conspire with any outlet to bring relief. Their hardships and exposure once chosen to pursue either course became a reckoning for survival, and they took the route, maybe, that seemed surer at the time. I am sure once the choice was made to rampage, and it could no longer be mitigated with authorities, they may have wished otherwise. It depends on the hardness of the heart and the threats abounding all around. In Kentucky, the aggravation of slavery fractured their society to the point of third party guerillas, no longer a war of just north and south. Same with Kansas, West Virginia, Maryland until it was cleaned out by Martial Law, and all through the south men sought ways to seek vengeance, and make the rules for themselves. There are no rights of ownership when everything but your life can be taken from you, and then that life exists on only one condition; called the moment.
Organizational handling of much requires many. In the guerilla world, the less the better. Nothing permanent, and everything transitory.
Thanks @leftyhunter for replying. You know the main guerilla goals were styled on Mosby and Forrest tactics, disrupt and destroy lifelines of supply, communication, feeling of safety, and anything held dear to the public, such as places to vote and family estates.
Lubliner.

I do have a thread I can bump up " Union vs CSA guerrllas" if you're interested. I would hesitate to compare any guerrllas on either side to Mosby and of Forrest's men. They were after all regular troops under an official command.
Getting back to RRs ACW guerrllas were a threat to RRs but definitely the threat could be overcome.
Leftyhunter

 

[Rhea Cole]

A petri dish example of building & winning a "banditti" vs a rail road war is the Nashville & North Western Rail Road. Because of El Niño, the water level in the Cumberland River at Nashville was so low in 1862 that it was fordable. Before the war it had been recognized that the city & Middle Tennessee needed a dependable transportation connection other than the Louisville & Nashville RR. One of the first things done when the Union army took over Nashville was to pick up where the locals had left off & finish laying track to the bank of the Tennessee River. They accomplished that engineering feat using an asset denied Southern railroaders.

Requisition order requiring Silas Tucker to provide 6 negroes with tools & wheel barrows. ​

As soon as the Yankees occupied Nashville & the surrounding area, first a trickle, then a flood of self-liberating people flocked into Union lines. Grant's order that put Chaplin John Eaton Jr. as General Superintendent of Freedmen for the Department of Middle Tennessee was one of the unsung success stories of the war. The story for another thread line, it is sufficient to state that Eaton's efforts created a pool of desperately needed labor that made the vast logistical operation in Middle Tennessee possible. Using both impressment & wage paying, Union engineers drove the N & NWRR to the Tennessee & built an extensive quartermaster depot at Johnsonville. Almost from the moment the first spike was driven, the seventy mile long RR was under constant attack by both regular & irregular cavalry attacks.

About the only thing that anybody knows about the Johnsonville depot is that an attack by Nathan Bedford Forrest in November 1864 set it on fire. General Thomas had already decided to withdraw from Johnsonville & other outlying positions, so Forrest's attack was too little, too late. The reason for that is what makes this storyline link with the sad state of Southern RR's.

Note: The laborers who had built the rail line, earthworks & moved the freight were recruited into the 13th USCT. I am familiar with that unit because men from Rutherford Co., southeast of Nashville where I live were members of that unit. A sergeant in the 9th Michigan who fought N.B. Forrest from my front yard veteranized as an officer in the 13th & a brevet Major at the Battle of Nashville.

The men of the 13th & other USCT regiments fought an almost daily war with Alexander Duval McNairy's "banditti." Direct attacks on trains, burning building & every sort of harassment imaginable was inflicted on the N & NWRR. McNairy's first attempt to interdict the RR involved removing the spikes & leaving the rails in place. You can imagine their amazement when a train chugged past without incident, in fact three more trains passed the sabotaged track as McNariy's bemused men let go a hail of fire. Three train guards & a child who was asleep in the caboose were killed. From 1862 to 1865, the men of the USCT Infantry & Artillery kept the N & NW open despite constant harassment & attacks.

The Nashville & North Western Rail Road was constructed, operated & guarded by self-liberated slaves. Reassigning slave labor to build, operate & guard a rail road in the Confederacy was unthinkable... raising regiments of infantry & artillery to battle banditti was never going to happen. Isn't it ironic that the very "right to hold other human beings as property" that the Confederacy was created "to protect in perpetuity" was what denied them the laborers who could have maintained & kept their RR's running.

Johnsonville, Union Supply Operations on the Tennessee River & the Battle of Johnsonville, November 4-5, 1864, by Jerry T. Wooten is the best reference there is on the N & NW RR. He is the former Superintendent of Johnsonville Tennessee State Historic Park, 90 Neil Beard Rd, New Johnsonville, TN 37134.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I believe your clarification helps me a great deal. After reading the next few sub-links on dray topics, I felt that General Bragg inflated his figures.
Perusing further into the railroad system, and reading the Railroad Commissioners (i.e. Ashe) recommendations I noticed one main principle I felt was discrepant in the confederate system. The Virginia railroads were governed by the General Assembly and Legislative branch of State Government. Requests for construction in places such as Saltville, Kanawha, Bristol were submitted to this authority, while Tennessee and Alabama rails appear to have a Commission of stockholders and private capitalists ruling the regulatory procedures.

I see a big problem where the allocation requests made, though approved, were deficient to my understanding. Too many pokers in the fire, for one. Another point for consideration is the inducements offered by the rails, such as free mail freights, and movements of soldiers upon short notice. Wasn't their any military input for priority with contract agreements? I see all recommendations made at a civil level.

Also by extension of seasonal upgrades beyond acceptable time periods with the cost estimates override the uncertainty of the times. Again too much is being requested by looking too far ahead. I almost feel as though tactics are plentiful on what needs are required, but strategy is totally faulty. Even by brushing past immediate events and near future events, just by qualifying a contract set a year and two ahead puts a motivation to continue a war into the hands of profiteers.

As far as I have come. Thank you for your hope to see it through, @DaveBrt.
Lubliner.

Because Atlanta Depot was exclusively dedicated to supply the Army of Northern Virginia, the rich bounty of North Georgia farms was denied to the Army of Tennessee. Bragg depended on supplies from Northern Alabama to supply's army. After the Battle of Stones River, his army was spread out over a 50 mile wide front McMinnville to Columbia TN so that he could feed his horses. Unfortunately, both Union & Confederate QM's (including those from the Atlanta Depot) had already scoured Middle Tennessee. According to inspector general reports, by the spring of 1863 the AoT's wagons & draft animals were effectively destroyed by the long hauls transporting fodder. This dire state of affairs was a direct result of the closing of his RR link. In June, 1863, the Army of Tennessee ran out of meat. None was available to be issued just as Rosecrans began his Tullahoma Campaign. The South's inability to maintain their RR's inflicted real harm on the AoT.

 

[Lubliner]

So being involved here now accounting to retaliation by guerillas, mismanagement and delinquency, all which has been actively pursued on present threads on the forum, my question from the first post states; "....what bureaucratic channels were developed for rail projects once war began....". Please presume for instance, that you were a sitting member on a railroad board of commissioners, or a private owner.
*This exempts the Virginia rails simply because the active Governor and General Assembly decided what was to be done there.*

On the link @DaveBrt provided which I pointed out in a previous post, stated a monthly cost expenditure of mules, wagons etc. for supply trains. This was nearly equal to a debt already incurred by advancements of $15,000 the first year of operation, owed by the company. The cost to transport tonnage by rail was equated at $1.00 a ton (2,250lbs.?). This cost alone in transporting by drayage is already provided for by the original quote given to the board by the quartermaster in Montgomery, as the cost of shipping.

Or if you will, presume you are a sitting member of a staff or board in the Confederate House of Congress, reviewing the requests for passing contractual agreements (or Senate). This entails the Treasury Department, which appears to dictate where the money goes, and has a veto privilege. A contract of more stringent terms has to be presented that will benefit the rail management of immediate concerns involving maintenance, upkeep, assets on hand, and profitable returns. Existing contracts do not work to provide workers, materials, nor the necessary time for consumption rates being expended. Supply and Demand is at fault here. Too much vs. Too little.

This is the direction I hope to progress to, knowing at hand what we already have, and trying to see if our present day intelligence can do better. Hindsight cannot necessarily be determined for the fact that if new ground is laid, or tracks committed to required purposes, we still have the fog of war covering the outcome.

Thank you,
Lubliner.

 

[DaveBrt]

So being involved here now accounting to retaliation by guerillas, mismanagement and delinquency, all which has been actively pursued on present threads on the forum, my question from the first post states; "....what bureaucratic channels were developed for rail projects once war began....". Please presume for instance, that you were a sitting member on a railroad board of commissioners, or a private owner.
*This exempts the Virginia rails simply because the active Governor and General Assembly decided what was to be done there.*

On the link @DaveBrt provided which I pointed out in a previous post, stated a monthly cost expenditure of mules, wagons etc. for supply trains. This was nearly equal to a debt already incurred by advancements of $15,000 the first year of operation, owed by the company. The cost to transport tonnage by rail was equated at $1.00 a ton (2,250lbs.?). This cost alone in transporting by drayage is already provided for by the original quote given to the board by the quartermaster in Montgomery, as the cost of shipping.

Or if you will, presume you are a sitting member of a staff or board in the Confederate House of Congress, reviewing the requests for passing contractual agreements (or Senate). This entails the Treasury Department, which appears to dictate where the money goes, and has a veto privilege. A contract of more stringent terms has to be presented that will benefit the rail management of immediate concerns involving maintenance, upkeep, assets on hand, and profitable returns. Existing contracts do not work to provide workers, materials, nor the necessary time for consumption rates being expended. Supply and Demand is at fault here. Too much vs. Too little.

This is the direction I hope to progress to, knowing at hand what we already have, and trying to see if our present day intelligence can do better. Hindsight cannot necessarily be determined for the fact that if new ground is laid, or tracks committed to required purposes, we still have the fog of war covering the outcome.

Thank you,
Lubliner.

If someone wanted to build a new railroad, pre-war, they had to get a bill passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor. They then had to raise money and build the road.

During the war, the only new lines, as opposed to those approved before the war but not yet completed, were those that the CS Government saw a military need for. All the roads that were desired turned out to be roads that the public had already mentioned building before the war. For example, the Piedmont RR (Greensboro, NC to Danville, Va) had been discussed for several years before the war. (Other examples were the Blue Mountain RR, the Selma to Meridian RR, the Winchester to Strasburg RR, the Columbia to Atlanta Air Line, etc) Now that it was needed, the Government pushed to get it built and the natural business allies of the road helped to make it happen (and the enemies fought against it). Davis had to get a bill through Congress to support the loan to support the building of the desired road. After that, it was up to the QM and Engineer organizations to support the building of the road. The states could fight against the road, but that had to be done in Congress trying to mold the loan to support what they wanted.

I don't know why you think the Treasury had a veto on when railroad money went. They only made sure contracts were followed and provided the funds. The approvers were the Departments and Bureaus.

 

[Lubliner]

If someone wanted to build a new railroad, pre-war, they had to get a bill passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor. They then had to raise money and build the road.

During the war, the only new lines, as opposed to those approved before the war but not yet completed, were those that the CS Government saw a military need for. All the roads that were desired turned out to be roads that the public had already mentioned building before the war. For example, the Piedmont RR (Greensboro, NC to Danville, Va) had been discussed for several years before the war. (Other examples were the Blue Mountain RR, the Selma to Meridian RR, the Winchester to Strasburg RR, the Columbia to Atlanta Air Line, etc) Now that it was needed, the Government pushed to get it built and the natural business allies of the road helped to make it happen (and the enemies fought against it). Davis had to get a bill through Congress to support the loan to support the building of the desired road. After that, it was up to the QM and Engineer organizations to support the building of the road. The states could fight against the road, but that had to be done in Congress trying to mold the loan to support what they wanted.

I don't know why you think the Treasury had a veto on when railroad money went. They only made sure contracts were followed and provided the funds. The approvers were the Departments and Bureaus.

I understand my mistake regarding Veto Power now. As you say, the bill would need passage through Congress to support a loan. Thanks for clarifying that for me, @DaveBrt. Without dumping a lot of questions out on the thread, it looks like the North Carolina Legislature for Greensboro had tabled up with Virginia Legislature for Danville to construct the Piedmont Railroad. They were still in planning stages from what I gather, up to the beginning of the war. I speculate the crux of settling on an agreement was possessive rights on a profit sharing basis and workload requirements, regarding length of the line, and the adverse terrain south of the Virginia border below Danville. With military precedence now arising, the added mediation with the Confederate Government was necessary.
All of this effort that did finalize completion of rail projects was not sufficient. At least that is the way it has been judged.
Supposing there was no lack of agreement on contracts made and the purposes for construction, it should not be allocation of funding by Congress at fault. The south was industriously committed to boat projects, and seemed to overcome similar hurdles that confronted the rail system. So the military use of impressment on the system caused collapse. I mean you can't float a boat until it is buoyant.
Is this an agreeable assertion with everyone else?
Thank you for the response,
Lubliner.

 

[DaveBrt]

it looks like the North Carolina Legislature for Greensboro had tabled up with Virginia Legislature for Danville to construct the Piedmont Railroad. They were still in planning stages from what I gather, up to the beginning of the war. I speculate the crux of settling on an agreement was possessive rights on a profit sharing basis and workload requirements, regarding length of the line, and the adverse terrain south of the Virginia border below Danville. With military precedence now arising, the added mediation with the Confederate Government was necessary.

The main problem was that the owners of the North Carolina RR did not want traffic to have an easy way of going north out of NC. Income was created by weight times miles traveled, so going north out of Greensboro removed from the NC RR company the income that would otherwise have been generated from Greensboro east to Raleigh. The NC RR project had been the largest undertaking in the state's history and everyone with money had bought shares -- traffic/income was needed to pay to continue to improve the RR and to pay off the construction loans, and to provide enough profit to pay dividends.

Even the route from the North Carolina RR to Danville was not agreed upon until the war forced a decision. There were three competing routes, with the final Piedmont RR route being the shortest -- and being the one generating the least income for the NC RR.

 

[DaveBrt]

Supposing there was no lack of agreement on contracts made and the purposes for construction, it should not be allocation of funding by Congress at fault. The south was industriously committed to boat projects, and seemed to overcome similar hurdles that confronted the rail system. So the military use of impressment on the system caused collapse. I mean you can't float a boat until it is buoyant.

The main problem was lack of manpower, not lack of money from Congress. Congress could have allocated millions and it would still have been constrained by the inability to provide the rails and rolling stock needed. Manpower was needed to mine the iron ore, make the iron, construct the rails and locomotives, grade the routes, lay rail, and run the trains. The fundamental weakness of the southern rail system was the same as all the other systems -- lack of manpower.

 

[Pat Answer]

What would it have taken for the Confederacy to make the most efficient 'wartime economy' use of available manpower?

 

[DaveBrt]

What would it have taken for the Confederacy to make the most efficient 'wartime economy' use of available manpower?

From my viewpoint:
1. Provide long term details from the army to critical industries (not the usual 30-60 day ones).
2. Force the army commanders to allow the detail of critical industry manpower. 2-400 men, sprinkled throughout each entire army would have not significantly decreased the combat power of each army, especially early in the war.
3. Advertise for critical skills in Europe. It would require fine tuning to get men to come to the CS without destroying the morale of the local workers, but a better effort could have been made.
4. Enforce importation of war goods through the blockade. This would have made some more manufactured goods available, especially early, using the manpower of Europe.
5. Prioritize manpower policies at the cabinet level, with Davis' engagement and agreement. This would have driven out the lower value uses of manpower, though I can really think of few of these.

Unfortunately, I don't see the above making a major impact on the needs of industry. The army still had to defend, successfully, the industrial and resource areas (ie middle and SE Tennessee, the iron mines in western Virginia, etc).

 

[leftyhunter]

From my viewpoint:
1. Provide long term details from the army to critical industries (not the usual 30-60 day ones).
2. Force the army commanders to allow the detail of critical industry manpower. 2-400 men, sprinkled throughout each entire army would have not significantly decreased the combat power of each army, especially early in the war.
3. Advertise for critical skills in Europe. It would require fine tuning to get men to come to the CS without destroying the morale of the local workers, but a better effort could have been made.
4. Enforce importation of war goods through the blockade. This would have made some more manufactured goods available, especially early, using the manpower of Europe.
5. Prioritize manpower policies at the cabinet level, with Davis' engagement and agreement. This would have driven out the lower value uses of manpower, though I can really think of few of these.

Unfortunately, I don't see the above making a major impact on the needs of industry. The army still had to defend, successfully, the industrial and resource areas (ie middle and SE Tennessee, the iron mines in western Virginia, etc).

One problem of importing European workers is how would they be paid? How many European workers would want to be paid in bonds or Confederate currency especially as Confederate money quickly looses it's value?
A second problem is convincing European labor that the Confederacy is even viable as they would have to evade the USN or enter from Mexico prior to the seizure of Brownsville,Texas.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

The main problem was lack of manpower, not lack of money from Congress. Congress could have allocated millions and it would still have been constrained by the inability to provide the rails and rolling stock needed. Manpower was needed to mine the iron ore, make the iron, construct the rails and locomotives, grade the routes, lay rail, and run the trains. The fundamental weakness of the southern rail system was the same as all the other systems -- lack of manpower.

Your next post (#34) provided some amenable solutions to the problem of manpower; realistically speaking. I have read accounts concerning Tredegar employees as well as the mining and niter bureau where demands are made for their men to be exempt from conscription. Also the deeper south still had powder and shot factories that lasted through to the last 3 or 4 months of the war.
Even Florida was pressing for exemption from the draft due to the need for their citizens to harvest and manage crops and cattle, and guard home property. Georgia and North Carolina were in continual arbitration with Richmond authorities regarding the same principle. With Tennessee and Kentucky being occupied in 1863 by Federal force, and Mississippi and Louisiana also under the heel of Union might, the confederate ideal of protecting it's citizens is shattered. I agree with @leftyhunter on post #35 about imported workers, though it didn't stop German immigrants up north. Every resource the confederacy had was dwindling with no way to build morale except battle success. No wonder they fought so hard, and talked so boldly.
The medical department was able to use disabled men, and the ones' still healing for hospital purposes. Two examples of successful management, and yet the railroads get short shrift. I am not sure where to place the blame??
Thanks all for the reply, and especially the question by @Pat Answer which keeps the ball in court, so to speak.
Lubliner.

 

[leftyhunter]

Your next post (#34) provided some amenable solutions to the problem of manpower; realistically speaking. I have read accounts concerning Tredegar employees as well as the mining and niter bureau where demands are made for their men to be exempt from conscription. Also the deeper south still had powder and shot factories that lasted through to the last 3 or 4 months of the war.
Even Florida was pressing for exemption from the draft due to the need for their citizens to harvest and manage crops and cattle, and guard home property. Georgia and North Carolina were in continual arbitration with Richmond authorities regarding the same principle. With Tennessee and Kentucky being occupied in 1863 by Federal force, and Mississippi and Louisiana also under the heel of Union might, the confederate ideal of protecting it's citizens is shattered. I agree with @leftyhunter on post #35 about imported workers, though it didn't stop German immigrants up north. Every resource the confederacy had was dwindling with no way to build morale except battle success. No wonder they fought so hard, and talked so boldly.
The medical department was able to use disabled men, and the ones' still healing for hospital purposes. Two examples of successful management, and yet the railroads get short shrift. I am not sure where to place the blame??
Thanks all for the reply, and especially the question by @Pat Answer which keeps the ball in court, so to speak.
Lubliner.

I would just add that the Union had an overwhelming advantage in attracting immigrants since they could pay immigrants in an international convertible currency which they could send to their families overseas vs Confederate monopoly money.
Certainly much safe to travel to the US on any non US flagged vessel then trying to run the blockade or travel to the Atlantic South via Mexico through Texas.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

I would just add that the Union had an overwhelming advantage in attracting immigrants since they could pay immigrants in an international convertible currency which they could send to their families overseas vs Confederate monopoly money.
Certainly much safe to travel to the US on any non US flagged vessel then trying to run the blockade or travel to the Atlantic South via Mexico through Texas.
Leftyhunter

I can't recall which Volume I found it in (O. R.) but mention was made about the confederacy awaiting some response to hear from Spain about intervention, I think sometime along the lines of 1863. Harbors on their coast could have been beneficial, but I wonder what sort of strength of support elsewise they could offer. I wish I could locate the reference now.
Thanks for the good rejoinder. It is safe to say the Union had a more lucrative inducement by all means.
Lubliner.

 

[leftyhunter]

I can't recall which Volume I found it in (O. R.) but mention was made about the confederacy awaiting some response to hear from Spain about intervention, I think sometime along the lines of 1863. Harbors on their coast could have been beneficial, but I wonder what sort of strength of support elsewise they could offer. I wish I could locate the reference now.
Thanks for the good rejoinder. It is safe to say the Union had a more lucrative inducement by all means.
Lubliner.

That's interesting because I never heard of the Spanish having any interest in intervening in the ACW on any side. Yes Havana was used by blockade runners but it was by far not the most important port used by the blockade runners. From what I gather the countries that were reliant on cotton or important textile manufacters were the UK,France and Czarist Russian occupied Poland.
Spain was still had something similar to Serfs well into the 20th Century. Perhaps Spain did contemplate intervention in the ACW but by the 1860s Spain's military power had declined significantly since the American Revolutionary War.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

Good Monday morning!! I have spent most of Sunday evening studying the Link below provided by @DaveBrt;

Confederate Railroad Construction Plans

First let me make it clear I haven't much practice in writing technical briefs on economic transactions, so this wasn't easy.
But I have had success in seeing a clear misunderstanding on proposals, their acceptance, and negotiations.
Here are some facts reflecting the growth of the administration with the planned railroad between Selma and Demopolis.

In 1861 there were 3 Administrators; a President, Chief Engineer, and Secretary/Treasurer. The Alabama and Mississippi railroad advertised on April 4, 1861 it was now open for passengers from New Bern, Alabama to Selma, covering 129 miles, point to point, with seven stations between them. It took 3 to 3 hours and forty minutes each way. The war began.

In 1862, the administrative officers totaled seven, adding a Director, two more engineers, and another secretary/treasurer.
In 1863 a total of 14 officers were present, six more directors, one master machinist position, one road master position, but less one engineer.
In 1864 this number was reduced to twelve administrative officers but added one more President. In 1865 it was again reduced back to three administrators.

The major supplier for the Company in 1861 was J. R. Anderson & Co.

Lubliner. (cont.).