Southern Rail Difficulties

[Lubliner]

The increasing numbers of administrative officers shows a productive growth of the Company.
The Anderson Company is in the process of building a new foundry in Sept. 1861, and reports that the proposals made to them for payments owed by the Railroad were unacceptable. Also the Supplier is swamped with Government work.

The proposal for a Government Loan for $150,000 was made on Dec. 13, 1861 and was not finalized until Feb. 15, 1862. This loan was for completing the Selma to Demopolis road with grading and iron.
On Jan.23, 1862 there is enough iron on hand to complete 7 miles of track at Demopolis. The RR president says with just $100,000 dollars spent on iron he can complete 28 miles more, by Oct. 1, 1862, and if enough iron is available he can complete all but the Tombigbee Bridge by April 1, 1863. Pollard thinks he can get iron from Augusta or New Orleans.
On March 19, 1862 the Q. M. General, A. C. Myers in Richmond notifies the RR Company no locomotives or iron can be obtained. He advises them to build a plank road.
On April 1, 1862 the RR president is summoned to Richmond to discuss detailed measures of the work to be accomplished.
On April 4, 1862 Pollard notifies the Government that he has contracted out the work to William Wadley, President of the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad. He also says that a plank road will not suffice, and refuses the advisement.
On April 7, 1862, the Government acquiesces to Pollard's desire for iron, and remits all duty charge on imported iron purchased within the next three months, if used specifically for the project.

Before I go further I want to point out the idea of $100,000 dollars needed by the Company to purchase iron. Also the dates of completion being pressed in the statement by the RR president.
And being as late as it is, now (3:50 a. m.) I will follow up this coming evening p. m.
Lubliner.

 

[DaveBrt]

Good Monday morning!! I have spent most of Sunday evening studying the Link below provided by @DaveBrt;

Confederate Railroad Construction Plans

First let me make it clear I haven't much practice in writing technical briefs on economic transactions, so this wasn't easy.
But I have had success in seeing a clear misunderstanding on proposals, their acceptance, and negotiations.
Here are some facts reflecting the growth of the administration with the planned railroad between Selma and Demopolis.

In 1861 there were 3 Administrators; a President, Chief Engineer, and Secretary/Treasurer. The Alabama and Mississippi railroad advertised on April 4, 1861 it was now open for passengers from New Bern, Alabama to Selma, covering 129 miles, point to point, with seven stations between them. It took 3 to 3 hours and forty minutes each way. The war began.

In 1862, the administrative officers totaled seven, adding a Director, two more engineers, and another secretary/treasurer.
In 1863 a total of 14 officers were present, six more directors, one master machinist position, one road master position, but less one engineer.
In 1864 this number was reduced to twelve administrative officers but added one more President. In 1865 it was again reduced back to three administrators.

The major supplier for the Company in 1861 was J. R. Anderson & Co.

Lubliner. (cont.).

You are misunderstanding the information I have posted regarding the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers RR officers. The names shown are those I have been able to find and do not indicated the number actually employed.

When enough stock has been subscribed, the people pushing the sale of stock are allowed to call for a convention of the stockholders. At that first meeting, a full slate of officers is elected/hired -- President, the number of Directors called for in the legislative bill creating the company, Engineer, Secretary, Treasurer. The names listed on one line for an office indicates the men who held that one office during the year; one office (directors) with names on many lines shows the men who held the office at the same time (ie 10 office on 10 lines indicates 10 men serving at the same time).

The names of the President, Superintendent (who replaces the Engineer when the road become operational) and Treasurer are reasonably easy to find in the correspondence with the government and in newspaper articles and advertisements. The Directors are frequently named in newspaper articles. All officers are named in the company's annual reports.

 

[Lubliner]

You are misunderstanding the information I have posted regarding the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers RR officers. The names shown are those I have been able to find and do not indicated the number actually employed.

When enough stock has been subscribed, the people pushing the sale of stock are allowed to call for a convention of the stockholders. At that first meeting, a full slate of officers is elected/hired -- President, the number of Directors called for in the legislative bill creating the company, Engineer, Secretary, Treasurer. The names listed on one line for an office indicates the men who held that one office during the year; one office (directors) with names on many lines shows the men who held the office at the same time (ie 10 office on 10 lines indicates 10 men serving at the same time).

The names of the President, Superintendent (who replaces the Engineer when the road become operational) and Treasurer are reasonably easy to find in the correspondence with the government and in newspaper articles and advertisements. The Directors are frequently named in newspaper articles. All officers are named in the company's annual reports.

Are you saying that it is a possibility that the number of employed officers diminished from 1861 to 1865?
I have my doubts that it is so. The rail line was relatively new and being managed per use in 1861. Due to extreme demands upon haste in building the road to meet the excess, the necessity to hire more management, I feel is necessary and certain. I do understand the board members are not listed. They were the ones setting security and selling bonds for the company, and owned the road. Designated from that board were some officers but not the total number you included, though some were listed such as the President. Some of those officers were not ever on the board was my belief. My supposition is the number of officers increased dramatically while new board members didn't.
I question a misunderstanding for the sheer fact of my finding an irregularity in the board activity after the Loan was committed. I am not using the point you believe I am mistaken with as a foundation for the irregularity. Please understand I stopped without divulging the rest of my discovery, and see whether you can understand my meaning as far as what information I am given. The point mistaken by me (?) is that I assumed too much on an increase of management reflecting some form of cashflow in the Company(??). Okay, but that doesn't change the irregularity I am about to point out. Thank you for remaining critical, for it is your data I worked with, and I understand the touchiness of it being misinterpreted. Please allow me to reveal what I believe to be an irregularity, and I very much desire your honest response as to whether you think I am right or wrong. Coming up @DaveBrt.
Lubliner.

 

[DaveBrt]

Are you saying that it is a possibility that the number of employed officers diminished from 1861 to 1865?
I have my doubts that it is so. The rail line was relatively new and being managed per use in 1861. Due to extreme demands upon haste in building the road to meet the excess, the necessity to hire more management, I feel is necessary and certain. I do understand the board members are not listed. They were the ones setting security and selling bonds for the company, and owned the road. Designated from that board were some officers but not the total number you included, though some were listed such as the President. Some of those officers were not ever on the board was my belief. My supposition is the number of officers increased dramatically while new board members didn't.
I question a misunderstanding for the sheer fact of my finding an irregularity in the board activity after the Loan was committed. I am not using the point you believe I am mistaken with as a foundation for the irregularity. Please understand I stopped without divulging the rest of my discovery, and see whether you can understand my meaning as far as what information I am given. The point mistaken by me (?) is that I assumed too much on an increase of management reflecting some form of cashflow in the Company(??). Okay, but that doesn't change the irregularity I am about to point out. Thank you for remaining critical, for it is your data I worked with, and I understand the touchiness of it being misinterpreted. Please allow me to reveal what I believe to be an irregularity, and I very much desire your honest response as to whether you think I am right or wrong. Coming up @DaveBrt.
Lubliner.

I await your disclosure, but a road only had so many officers. The number of employees would go up and down as needed, but not the number of officers. As the road went operational, it became necessary to add a chief mechanic to run the shops. As the road grew, you would add a chief carpenter, a Road Master, a warehouse manager, etc. But the number of officers remained steady.

 

[leftyhunter]

The increasing numbers of administrative officers shows a productive growth of the Company.
The Anderson Company is in the process of building a new foundry in Sept. 1861, and reports that the proposals made to them for payments owed by the Railroad were unacceptable. Also the Supplier is swamped with Government work.

The proposal for a Government Loan for $150,000 was made on Dec. 13, 1861 and was not finalized until Feb. 15, 1862. This loan was for completing the Selma to Demopolis road with grading and iron.
On Jan.23, 1862 there is enough iron on hand to complete 7 miles of track at Demopolis. The RR president says with just $100,000 dollars spent on iron he can complete 28 miles more, by Oct. 1, 1862, and if enough iron is available he can complete all but the Tombigbee Bridge by April 1, 1863. Pollard thinks he can get iron from Augusta or New Orleans.
On March 19, 1862 the Q. M. General, A. C. Myers in Richmond notifies the RR Company no locomotives or iron can be obtained. He advises them to build a plank road.
On April 1, 1862 the RR president is summoned to Richmond to discuss detailed measures of the work to be accomplished.
On April 4, 1862 Pollard notifies the Government that he has contracted out the work to William Wadley, President of the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad. He also says that a plank road will not suffice, and refuses the advisement.
On April 7, 1862, the Government acquiesces to Pollard's desire for iron, and remits all duty charge on imported iron purchased within the next three months, if used specifically for the project.

Before I go further I want to point out the idea of $100,000 dollars needed by the Company to purchase iron. Also the dates of completion being pressed in the statement by the RR president.
And being as late as it is, now (3:50 a. m.) I will follow up this coming evening p. m.
Lubliner.

Also @DaveBrt,
Just to clarify the Confederacy could lay at least a limited amount of new railroad tracks?Per Freemantle's Diary the Confederacy was not good at rail maintenance since he went through sever derailments while in the Confederacy for approximately six months in 1863.
The Confederacy could not produce it's own locomotives and or railroad cars?
Not sure if the Confederacy did import British made locomotives even in sections that could be assembled at a latter date.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

I left off with the Loan finalized by Feb. 15, and that the work was being committed to the Vicksburg and Shreveport RR President William Wadley on April 4. Now for that loan to be secured, a board member named James L. Price submitted the security required in the agreement on April 10, 1862.
But in his confirmation of the security for $150,000 dollars, he then says it is an inadequate sum to do the job required. Now he advances a sum of $500,000 dollars for the road to be placed into order with rolling-stock.
Price says $1,000,000 has already been spent for 45 miles of road completed, most grading under contract, and $300,000 unavailable stock notes on hand. (He is faulting the loan in my opinion). He is now arguing for $350,000 dollars more and a credit on the debt when used for military purposes. He wants now to secure this newly proposed advance of $350,000 mortgage by giving power to sell, so existing bonds can mature.
Five days later on April 15, 1862, Price returns saying after inspection of the contract, only $200,000 more is necessary to complete the roadbed but rolling-stock will be insufficient. So he requests a transfer from other lines less important. That this inability to meet the demands of the original agreement is only a time factor for completion. It would hasten the work depending on the supply of iron. He now feels it is necessary to renegotiate the Loan for ten years time without interest, that the Company will always be given preference for freights by the Government over other lines, customary rates will be charged so the payments shall be entered in as credit on the obligation. He says the Company assets for securing this new loan amount to $1,500,000 including stock, fixtures, machine-shop, depots, etc. but makes no mention now for power to sell. There is already a $300,000 liability on the existing assets, and mentions two existing mortgages for securing payment from planters for $300,000.
I fail to see proper management in this affair. The agreement was for $150,000. That is what passed Congress. The Government was lenient enough to forgo duty on imports if iron is purchased within three months to date. The facts of shortage in iron had been expressed. The RR complained that an increase of price in goods due to the blockade had kept the company less profitable than what was predicted. But the fact remains here that what was already known and signed for under agreement, is now being called inadequate. This is a hardball toss from Price on wanting more, when the other rail lines were also in need. That is the irregularity I believe to be leading, where what is promised isn't enough, now give me more. Please, this business has a bit of interest in itself, understandably.

Thanks, @DaveBrt for your patience to look this over.
Lubliner

 

[DaveBrt]

Also @DaveBrt,
Just to clarify the Confederacy could lay at least a limited amount of new railroad tracks?Per Freemantle's Diary the Confederacy was not good at rail maintenance since he went through sever derailments while in the Confederacy for approximately six months in 1863.
The Confederacy could not produce it's own locomotives and or railroad cars?
Not sure if the Confederacy did import British made locomotives even in sections that could be assembled at a latter date.
Leftyhunter

The Confederacy produced about 5 miles of strap iron for the the Shelby Iron Works RR -- when the IW made them, despite the government's opposition. All other construction used rail scavenged from other lines, often against serious opposition from the owners.

Rails were damaged one of three ways (usually). First was by flooding carrying away the iron -- might be found and reused, but not always. Second, by enemy action. The iron was usually straightened sufficiently to resume operations in a surprisingly short amount of time. Third, by the lamination of the rails (wearing out). The iron in the rails would come apart in longitudinal slices. These slices could no longer support the weight of the rolling stock and that weight would crush the rails. This would create a "pot hole" and cause the cars to drop into it as the crossed over. This put flat spots on the car wheels and shook the cars badly. Lamination was repaired in one of several ways, but all of them caused the loss of some length of rail. To make up for the loss of length, rails were taken from sidings and per-war stock -- neither of which lasted beyond 1863.

Track maintenance required manpower, almost always slaves under a white section master. Increased railroad usage required additional maintenance, but the shortage of manpower caused a reduction of section masters and section hands.

The South could make locomotives, but did not have enough manpower to produce enough iron to make them or enough manpower to make the actual machines. Tredegar had made about 50 locomotives during the 1850's and a couple of other companies had made about 20 more. None were made during the war, though a few reconstructions were called new locomotives.

Cars were reasonably easy to make, as long as you had manpower and the iron parts. The South made about 300 cars during the war and captured another 100+. Sims had a project going at the end of the war to make another 200+ cars in the central Confederacy.

No British locomotives were brought into the South after about 1848. The needs of US railroads and British railroads were enough different that US companies did not use British equipment. Could the South have done so? Probably, but I have never seen any proposal to such.

 

[DaveBrt]

I left off with the Loan finalized by Feb. 15, and that the work was being committed to the Vicksburg and Shreveport RR President William Wadley on April 4. Now for that loan to be secured, a board member named James L. Price submitted the security required in the agreement on April 10, 1862.
But in his confirmation of the security for $150,000 dollars, he then says it is an inadequate sum to do the job required. Now he advances a sum of $500,000 dollars for the road to be placed into order with rolling-stock.
Price says $1,000,000 has already been spent for 45 miles of road completed, most grading under contract, and $300,000 unavailable stock notes on hand. (He is faulting the loan in my opinion). He is now arguing for $350,000 dollars more and a credit on the debt when used for military purposes. He wants now to secure this newly proposed advance of $350,000 mortgage by giving power to sell, so existing bonds can mature.
Five days later on April 15, 1862, Price returns saying after inspection of the contract, only $200,000 more is necessary to complete the roadbed but rolling-stock will be insufficient. So he requests a transfer from other lines less important. That this inability to meet the demands of the original agreement is only a time factor for completion. It would hasten the work depending on the supply of iron. He now feels it is necessary to renegotiate the Loan for ten years time without interest, that the Company will always be given preference for freights by the Government over other lines, customary rates will be charged so the payments shall be entered in as credit on the obligation. He says the Company assets for securing this new loan amount to $1,500,000 including stock, fixtures, machine-shop, depots, etc. but makes no mention now for power to sell. There is already a $300,000 liability on the existing assets, and mentions two existing mortgages for securing payment from planters for $300,000.
I fail to see proper management in this affair. The agreement was for $150,000. That is what passed Congress. The Government was lenient enough to forgo duty on imports if iron is purchased within three months to date. The facts of shortage in iron had been expressed. The RR complained that an increase of price in goods due to the blockade had kept the company less profitable than what was predicted. But the fact remains here that what was already known and signed for under agreement, is now being called inadequate. This is a hardball toss from Price on wanting more, when the other rail lines were also in need. That is the irregularity I believe to be leading, where what is promised isn't enough, now give me more. Please, this business has a bit of interest in itself, understandably.

Thanks, @DaveBrt for your patience to look this over.
Lubliner

Your ability to create this story, without having to find all the documents yourself, is the reason I have my web site up. Thank you for making use of it.

Your conclusion is probably right, but immaterial -- there was no iron to be had at any price and no rolling stock could be spared. So the agreement, by this time, was meaningless (though they may not have realized it yet).

 

[Lubliner]

The Confederacy produced about 5 miles of strap iron for the the Shelby Iron Works RR -- when the IW made them, despite the government's opposition. All other construction used rail scavenged from other lines, often against serious opposition from the owners.

Rails were damaged one of three ways (usually). First was by flooding carrying away the iron -- might be found and reused, but not always. Second, by enemy action. The iron was usually straightened sufficiently to resume operations in a surprisingly short amount of time. Third, by the lamination of the rails (wearing out). The iron in the rails would come apart in longitudinal slices. These slices could no longer support the weight of the rolling stock and that weight would crush the rails. This would create a "pot hole" and cause the cars to drop into it as the crossed over. This put flat spots on the car wheels and shook the cars badly. Lamination was repaired in one of several ways, but all of them caused the loss of some length of rail. To make up for the loss of length, rails were taken from sidings and per-war stock -- neither of which lasted beyond 1863.

Track maintenance required manpower, almost always slaves under a white section master. Increased railroad usage required additional maintenance, but the shortage of manpower caused a reduction of section masters and section hands.

The South could make locomotives, but did not have enough manpower to produce enough iron to make them or enough manpower to make the actual machines. Tredegar had made about 50 locomotives during the 1850's and a couple of other companies had made about 20 more. None were made during the war, though a few reconstructions were called new locomotives.

Cars were reasonably easy to make, as long as you had manpower and the iron parts. The South made about 300 cars during the war and captured another 100+. Sims had a project going at the end of the war to make another 200+ cars in the central Confederacy.

No British locomotives were brought into the South after about 1848. The needs of US railroads and British railroads were enough different that US companies did not use British equipment. Could the South have done so? Probably, but I have never seen any proposal to such.

The iron shortage was prevalent early on, so you are correct in the contract dispute. No matter what money was loaned out I feel the RR made proper use of the funds. Lincoln exempted the northern RR Company engineers from military service. The confederacy was not that lucky. Money went to do what they could accomplish without iron. I am looking forward to returning to your link to know the outcome of the agreement anyway.
Thank you again,
Lubliner.

 

[DaveBrt]

The iron shortage was prevalent early on, so you are correct in the contract dispute. No matter what money was loaned out I feel the RR made proper use of the funds. Lincoln exempted the northern RR Company engineers from military service. The confederacy was not that lucky. Money went to do what they could accomplish without iron. I am looking forward to returning to your link to know the outcome of the agreement anyway.
Thank you again,
Lubliner.

RR companies were allowed to have a certain number of essential men exempt from the draft. ALL exempted their "train runners," civil engineers were rarely exempted and many went to the Confederate Army Engineer Corps.

 

[leftyhunter]

The Confederacy produced about 5 miles of strap iron for the the Shelby Iron Works RR -- when the IW made them, despite the government's opposition. All other construction used rail scavenged from other lines, often against serious opposition from the owners.

Rails were damaged one of three ways (usually). First was by flooding carrying away the iron -- might be found and reused, but not always. Second, by enemy action. The iron was usually straightened sufficiently to resume operations in a surprisingly short amount of time. Third, by the lamination of the rails (wearing out). The iron in the rails would come apart in longitudinal slices. These slices could no longer support the weight of the rolling stock and that weight would crush the rails. This would create a "pot hole" and cause the cars to drop into it as the crossed over. This put flat spots on the car wheels and shook the cars badly. Lamination was repaired in one of several ways, but all of them caused the loss of some length of rail. To make up for the loss of length, rails were taken from sidings and per-war stock -- neither of which lasted beyond 1863.

Track maintenance required manpower, almost always slaves under a white section master. Increased railroad usage required additional maintenance, but the shortage of manpower caused a reduction of section masters and section hands.

The South could make locomotives, but did not have enough manpower to produce enough iron to make them or enough manpower to make the actual machines. Tredegar had made about 50 locomotives during the 1850's and a couple of other companies had made about 20 more. None were made during the war, though a few reconstructions were called new locomotives.

Cars were reasonably easy to make, as long as you had manpower and the iron parts. The South made about 300 cars during the war and captured another 100+. Sims had a project going at the end of the war to make another 200+ cars in the central Confederacy.

No British locomotives were brought into the South after about 1848. The needs of US railroads and British railroads were enough different that US companies did not use British equipment. Could the South have done so? Probably, but I have never seen any proposal to such.

Good information ; so in essence it was to borrow a term " a bridge to far" for the Confederacy to have a viable manpower and industrial base to build and maintain a viable railroad system.
Leftyhunter

 

[DaveBrt]

Good information ; so in essence it was to borrow a term " a bridge to far" for the Confederacy to have a viable manpower and industrial base to build and maintain a viable railroad system.
Leftyhunter

Yes, and the same problem made a viable industrial base also a bridge too far.

 

[Lubliner]

Yes, and the same problem made a viable industrial base also a bridge too far.

I was reading the 1866 report of the Selma Railroad where some of the Tombigbee bridge materials were still safe after Selma got wiped out. They survived, but a requisition for open bidding had taken place for material to close on Feb. 1, 1863 and for the bridge to be completed in 10 months, due Dec. 1, 1863. I haven't gotten further on your link, and am not sure whether the bridge was ever begun, or if this material still in the shop was for a rebuild. Do you know @DaveBrt?
And thank you @leftyhunter for borrowing that term. The Tombigbee bridge material in the link was noticed by me and made me wonder about the funding of it, as far as Company assets go. The bid was for 6000 pieces of first class bridge masonry, 470 feet of Howe truss bridging (supports?), including an arch cord draw for 90 feet in the clear, plus one to one and a half miles of trestle work, varying in height from 10 to 20 feet.
Again I return to management of funding.

 

[DaveBrt]

I was reading the 1866 report of the Selma Railroad where some of the Tombigbee bridge materials were still safe after Selma got wiped out. They survived, but a requisition for open bidding had taken place for material to close on Feb. 1, 1863 and for the bridge to be completed in 10 months, due Dec. 1, 1863. I haven't gotten further on your link, and am not sure whether the bridge was ever begun, or if this material still in the shop was for a rebuild. Do you know @DaveBrt?
And thank you @leftyhunter for borrowing that term. The Tombigbee bridge material in the link was noticed by me and made me wonder about the funding of it, as far as Company assets go. The bid was for 6000 pieces of first class bridge masonry, 470 feet of Howe truss bridging (supports?), including an arch cord draw for 90 feet in the clear, plus one to one and a half miles of trestle work, varying in height from 10 to 20 feet.
Again I return to management of funding.

The masonry was for the bridge supports (piers). I don't remember if that specific material was used. If I have found that info, it is the links you are reading. The bridge was still under construction when the war was over.

 

[Lubliner]

The masonry was for the bridge supports (piers). I don't remember if that specific material was used. If I have found that info, it is the links you are reading. The bridge was still under construction when the war was over.

The plans called for three stone masonry pillars for crossing the river. Yes, the information was at the top of the Alabama and Mississippi Rivers Railroad highlighted sub-link you provided. No iron was available, so I believe the trestles and trusses called for wood. Some machinery was also saved after the Federal Force raided Selma. Thank you for helping and the link. I plan on learning more because it gets more interesting, so it shall be studied when I find time again.
Lubliner.

 

[leftyhunter]

I was reading the 1866 report of the Selma Railroad where some of the Tombigbee bridge materials were still safe after Selma got wiped out. They survived, but a requisition for open bidding had taken place for material to close on Feb. 1, 1863 and for the bridge to be completed in 10 months, due Dec. 1, 1863. I haven't gotten further on your link, and am not sure whether the bridge was ever begun, or if this material still in the shop was for a rebuild. Do you know @DaveBrt?
And thank you @leftyhunter for borrowing that term. The Tombigbee bridge material in the link was noticed by me and made me wonder about the funding of it, as far as Company assets go. The bid was for 6000 pieces of first class bridge masonry, 470 feet of Howe truss bridging (supports?), including an arch cord draw for 90 feet in the clear, plus one to one and a half miles of trestle work, varying in height from 10 to 20 feet.
Again I return to management of funding.

Of course I got the term " A bridge to far " from the movie based on Operation Market Garden" which is attributed to a lower ranking British Army Intelligence Officer.
It seems that the Confederacy was just to far behind the Eight Ball to have a viable railroad system.
Obviously to be self sufficient the Confederacy needed what the Union had that is its own iron ore mines, it's own steel mills, it's own factories and no shortage of skilled labor and still have plenty of manpower for it's army and navy.
To matters worse the Confederacy needed a viable internationally recognized currency or plentiful specie.
At best the Confederacy could try to smuggle cotton to the UK with a ten percent chance of confiscation for each small shipload by the USN plus the same ten percent chance of confiscation for each by definition small boat load of rail equipment from the UK.
That's quite a bridge to gap.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

I read up a bit on the Selma Raid in 1865 last night. From what I learn so far that whole area between Selma southward to Montgomery had not been trammeled by northern troops. The object of the raid entrusted to Wilson was to destroy the factories and production centers, and cutting into the regions yet untouched. Of course the second-largest armory of the south was in that region. Because this area was a center for confederate rally points, such as West Point, Demopolis, and the Cavalry headquartered in this area, it was heavily guarded by these troops. Constant raids were committed to crossing the Tennessee River to try and halt the advancements of the Federal Army. With the losses and encroachments constantly threatening their means, and with the major troops in continual retreat, the morale was devastated. So the spirit of the confederacy also was a factor, where each problem fractured and widened the gap of recovery. That old saying of 'a penny short and a day too late' is always on the horizon.
Lubliner.

 

[steamman]

The main problem was lack of manpower, not lack of money from Congress. Congress could have allocated millions and it would still have been constrained by the inability to provide the rails and rolling stock needed. Manpower was needed to mine the iron ore, make the iron, construct the rails and locomotives, grade the routes, lay rail, and run the trains. The fundamental weakness of the southern rail system was the same as all the other systems -- lack of manpower.

The lack of manpower was caused by the need to have every abled bodied white man under arms fighting for independence.

 

[steamman]

What would it have taken for the Confederacy to make the most efficient 'wartime economy' use of available manpower?

Lots more white men.

 

[steamman]

From my viewpoint:
1. Provide long term details from the army to critical industries (not the usual 30-60 day ones).
2. Force the army commanders to allow the detail of critical industry manpower. 2-400 men, sprinkled throughout each entire army would have not significantly decreased the combat power of each army, especially early in the war.
3. Advertise for critical skills in Europe. It would require fine tuning to get men to come to the CS without destroying the morale of the local workers, but a better effort could have been made.
4. Enforce importation of war goods through the blockade. This would have made some more manufactured goods available, especially early, using the manpower of Europe.
5. Prioritize manpower policies at the cabinet level, with Davis' engagement and agreement. This would have driven out the lower value uses of manpower, though I can really think of few of these.

Unfortunately, I don't see the above making a major impact on the needs of industry. The army still had to defend, successfully, the industrial and resource areas (ie middle and SE Tennessee, the iron mines in western Virginia, etc).

A big problem for the South was that the industrial and resource areas happened to be near where northern armies could get to easy enough rather than deep in the South.