Sickles Venture Forward

All we know are the facts and they show, there was a day three because of Sickles and that Longstreet's attack,on Day 3, had to be built around one Ist corps Div. rather than Ist Corps itself.
 
All we know are the facts and they show, there was a day three because of Sickles and that Longstreet's attack,on Day 3, had to be built around one Ist corps Div. rather than Ist Corps itself.

That would have been true, whether or not Sickles advanced - unless the attack was so wildly successful that McLaws and Hood were not badly damaged on July 2. Notice that Anderson's Division also did not participate.

Lee was hell bent on continuing the fight, no matter what Sickles did. Attributing Pickett's Charge to Sickles is like the Chicago Cubs attributing 66 years of not making the World Series on the billy goat. Or blaming Steve Bartman for an 8 run outburst to stop them in 2003.
 
I am attributing the fact that Lee could not make his final assault, on Day 3 by Longstreets entire corps, as Lee originally planned, to the fact of its engagement with Sickle's on Day 2.

P.S. where is the evidence of Meade's having any real intention of attacking on Day 3? He exhibited little inclination to so, while he was and Independent Army Commander, except vague references in his reports listing all the reason's why it was impossible.
 
I am attributing the fact that Lee could not make his final assault, on Day 3 by Longstreets entire corps, as Lee originally planned, to the fact of its engagement with Sickle's on Day 2.

P.S. where is the evidence of Meade's having any real intention of attacking on Day 3? He exhibited little inclination to so, while he was and Independent Army Commander, except vague references in his reports listing all the reason's why it was impossible.

Do you mean attacking after Picketts charge failed?
 
And Lee liked Heth so there would be no repurcussions. If Lee was unhappy with his subordinate officers, he need only look in the mirror to find out who to blame. Meade at least made his displeasure with Sickles perfectly clear.

Just a quick thought did Lee ever press charges against any of his officers, I cant really think of any..
 
I can't recall that Lee ever charged any commander but what I do know is that officers who got on Lee's bad side were transferred elsewhere, something that rarely happened away from the AoNV. A few that I can think of off the top of my head are Daniel Hill, Alfred Iverson, and Gustavus Smith. Just imagine what the Army of Tennessee would have looked like if Bragg had that kind of clout with Richmond.

R
 
Lee's plan for Day 3 was for Longstreet to pull back I Corps and continue a more direct attack on the Union Left(supposedly reinforcing success of Day 2). After arguing, unsuccessfully, to convince Lee to make a longer flank attacfk , Longstreet then informs Lee that his corps in too closely engaged in his present position and cannot be disengaged, without serious risk of a Union counter-attack.
Lee recasts his plans for Pickett to be supported by Hill's corps , rather than as an integral part of an I Corps attack.


P.S. it always puzzled me that after giving most of the assault force to Hill's corps, Lee left Longstreet in command, especially in view of his vehement declaration of its failure. Predictions of failure of an action by its leader, is more often than not, a self-fulfilling prohecy.
 
I am attributing the fact that Lee could not make his final assault, on Day 3 by Longstreets entire corps, as Lee originally planned, to the fact of its engagement with Sickle's on Day 2.

P.S. where is the evidence of Meade's having any real intention of attacking on Day 3? He exhibited little inclination to so, while he was and Independent Army Commander, except vague references in his reports listing all the reason's why it was impossible.
Yes a strong argument can be made for this observation. Need a time machine, put Sickles where Meade wanted him and re-fight the battle beggining on day 2. Then we will know and would not be able to debate this. But then that would remove a great on-going debate from the story.
 
I can't recall that Lee ever charged any commander but what I do know is that officers who got on Lee's bad side were transferred elsewhere, something that rarely happened away from the AoNV. A few that I can think of off the top of my head are Daniel Hill, Alfred Iverson, and Gustavus Smith. Just imagine what the Army of Tennessee would have looked like if Bragg had that kind of clout with Richmond.

R

And look at who he kept around. Not only Heth but William Nelson Pendleton. Lee was more than willing to accept incompetence if he got along with the incompetent general.
 
I am attributing the fact that Lee could not make his final assault, on Day 3 by Longstreets entire corps, as Lee originally planned, to the fact of its engagement with Sickle's on Day 2.

P.S. where is the evidence of Meade's having any real intention of attacking on Day 3? He exhibited little inclination to so, while he was and Independent Army Commander, except vague references in his reports listing all the reason's why it was impossible.

Regarding your first paragraph, well then you'd be mistaken, because Sickles Corps was slammed by Longstreet. The Federal reinforcements and the fact that Hill and Anderson failed to prepare from their end is what stymied Longstreet's attack on July 2.

As to Meade's intentions for July 3, it matters not what Meade wrote. What matters is that IF Meade wanted to attack, Sickles messed up that opportunity by way of the needless Union casualties he caused by moving to an untenable position.

You really tend to dislike Meade. While not a real genius, he bested Lee on those three days (and before) after only having command for about three days when the battle started. He began without knowledge of the whereabouts of his men as well as Lee's. He provided for contingencies (the Pipe Creek Line) while looking to aggressively search out Lee. The man deserves a lot more credit than you give him.
 
Lee's plan for Day 3 was for Longstreet to pull back I Corps and continue a more direct attack on the Union Left(supposedly reinforcing success of Day 2). After arguing, unsuccessfully, to convince Lee to make a longer flank attacfk , Longstreet then informs Lee that his corps in too closely engaged in his present position and cannot be disengaged, without serious risk of a Union counter-attack.
Lee recasts his plans for Pickett to be supported by Hill's corps , rather than as an integral part of an I Corps attack.


P.S. it always puzzled me that after giving most of the assault force to Hill's corps, Lee left Longstreet in command, especially in view of his vehement declaration of its failure. Predictions of failure of an action by its leader, is more often than not, a self-fulfilling prohecy.

Maybe because Hill was an almost complete non-factor those three days.
 
I am sooooo tired of the Pipe Creek line thing .....cause it never happened.. NEVER HAPPENED!!! 1 corps of Lee's army totaled...2nd day....spin it howerver. He had only 3. Hills corps wreaked the first day...badly. Yup. ANV beat by end of 2nd day. Lee should have done some kinda retrograde thing. In the "Lost Cause BS" Longstreet got the smack down. BS......he was correct....yes. It not rocket science. Just interesting to see how Lee just, well, threw that army away. I do belive Longstreet on this one. Yap...it right in yer face.

By the way...what IS the infatuation bout the Pipe Creek thing???????? DID not happen. Odd.

Good ground after the first day........perfect. Yap. Odd, .....
 
I am sooooo tired of the Pipe Creek line thing .....cause it never happened.. NEVER HAPPENED!!! 1 corps of Lee's army totaled...2nd day....spin it howerver. He had only 3. Hills corps wreaked the first day...badly. Yup. ANV beat by end of 2nd day. Lee should have done some kinda retrograde thing. In the "Lost Cause BS" Longstreet got the smack down. BS......he was correct....yes. It not rocket science. Just interesting to see how Lee just, well, threw that army away. I do belive Longstreet on this one. Yap...it right in yer face.

By the way...what IS the infatuation bout the Pipe Creek thing???????? DID not happen. Odd.

Good ground after the first day........perfect. Yap. Odd, .....

Yeah. Pipe Creek did not happen, and Jackson was not alive in early July of 1863, but people still have him winning the battle and the war if he were. I'm not infatuated by Pipe Creek, but given Meade's concerns about the possibilites of having to leave the field at Gettysburg, it is worth a look.
 
We all know the effect of Sickles' move forward, but we can only speculate how Day 2 would have ended had he remained on Cemetery Ridge. It seems that most of us who have more than a passing interest in Gettysburg have a strong opinion on the wisdom of moving the III Corps forward to the Peach Orchard. I tend to agree with those who say it was a huge mistake made by an abrasive-insubordanant Corps commander. However, those on the other side have presented compelling arguments supporting the theory that the Longstreet attack was so disrupted by the III Corps location that it had to have blunted the planned echelon attack. Makes for great discussion...and speculation. For those of you who have not been lucky enough to see the Peach Orchard and surrounding terrain for yourself I will link to a video I made at the PO a couple of years ago. (previously posted on similar thread)
Greg
 
The effect of Sickles' movement means the effect it had on Lee's plan for Day 2 And latterly, Day 3.


P.S. I am a great admirer of Meade's; if for no other reason(and there are many others)than he was tyhe First Union General. that Lee could not defeat.(as noted, my only real complaint was hos his almost trotal confidence in Gen. Lee, crippled the full use of his very real abilities as an army commander. .


P.P.S. Confederate corps were considerably larger than Union corps'; was Hill's corps badly Wrecked?(two-thirds of the assaulting force on Day three was from Hill's corps.
 
The effect of Sickles' movement means the effect it had on Lee's plan for Day 2 And latterly, Day 3.


P.S. I am a great admirer of Meade's; if for no other reason(and there are many others)than he was tyhe First Union General. that Lee could not defeat.(as noted, my only real complaint was hos his almost trotal confidence in Gen. Lee, crippled the full use of his very real abilities as an army commander. .


P.P.S. Confederate corps were considerably larger than Union corps'; was Hill's corps badly Wrecked?(two-thirds of the assaulting force on Day three was from Hill's corps.

Since Sickles was forced back to what was generally the original spot that he should have occupied, his corps had no effect upon Longstreet on July 3. Other units (like the Fifth Corps), which took up positions on the Round Tops might have constricted Longstreet, but not Sickles. Plus, again, many of those units were sitting where Sickles was supposed to be, plus a little farther south, not in that awful spot Danny boy put them.

As to the condition of Hill's Corps, Heth was pretty well shot up. Pender's division was better off, with Thomas' brigade only lightly engaged on July 1. Anderson's division had four of five brigades engaged on July 2 (and, of course, not at all on July 1) - Mahone was not engaged at all and Posey was engaged at the Bliss barn, but I believe their casualties were light. Longstreet went in with about 19,000/20,000 on July 2 and suffered about 6,000 casualties while the Federals suffered over 8,000.

As to Meade, remember that he was only in command for days and had that army coordinated and ready to fight when the battle started. I don't think he was afraid to attack. He and Reynolds were champing at the bit to fight at Chancellorsville and it was he who led the almost successful attack at Fredericksburg. Being an engineer and new to command, he was cautious but equally willing to be aggressive if conditions warranted. Also remember that at the council of war his corps commanders voted to stay and fight, not counterattack.
 
It remains, Tom, that Meade was the first to be not overly impressed with Lee's tactics. He got his high ground and held it. Against Lee. A first to be noted.

Now Meade was not that good except that he managed, on those three days, to make something different happen.

And I'm not worshipping Meade, but he stopped Lee and managed to take away his ability to wage war against the AotP. In a sense, he paved the way for Grant to come in and waste what remained of the AoNV.

However much he failed to put the finishing touches on it, he did get it started.
 
Meade also did not get fired after Grant arrived - every other Union commander was let go when he was "replaced" - I put that in quotes because Meade was not really replaced by Grant, a Lt. Gen. position was made for Grant and he was placed over Meade, but Meade retained his job.
 
It remains, Tom, that Meade was the first to be not overly impressed with Lee's tactics. He got his high ground and held it. Against Lee. A first to be noted.

Now Meade was not that good except that he managed, on those three days, to make something different happen.

And I'm not worshipping Meade, but he stopped Lee and managed to take away his ability to wage war against the AotP. In a sense, he paved the way for Grant to come in and waste what remained of the AoNV.

However much he failed to put the finishing touches on it, he did get it started.

Absolutely!
 
But, of the other 'presumed' effects of Sickles' miovement, it is unlikely that a very good case can be made that it foiled any plan of Meade's to attack on Day 3.
 

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