Sickles Venture Forward

[TDMD]

One important thing Sickles move did was sucker Lee into thinking he had actually gained ground on Day 2 when Longstreets men took the Wheatfield, Peach Orchard and Devil's Den.

As several have said, Sickles also necessitated the sacrifice of the 1st Minn (and 9th MA battery, and others) and gave Lee a near breakthrough that also suckered him into thinking he was closer to success than he really was.

So - if Sickles hadn't moved and the attacks on Day 2 hadn't budged the Union line - would there have even been a Pickett's Charge? In other words, if Lee hadn't thought he gained something on Day 2, might he have taken Longstreet's advice and adjusted his troops south on Day 3 to find better ground (there's some great high ground between Emmitsburg and Thurmont Lee might have been able to discover if he deployed Stuart that way as soon as he turned up.)

I believe that Longstreet tried to explain the reality of the situation to Lee, to no avail. Lee seemed bent on fighting at Gettysburg after day 2 for sure. In order to accomplish what Longstreet desired, it would more than likely require a cavalry screen. Lee had cavalry with him all three days, but didn't seem to trust them to run the screen.

Another thought, Lee believed that the Federal center was terminally weakened. I think he forgot about Meade's interior lines.

 

[meade21]

It had significant effects on the AOP at Gettysburg and beyond......

1. Undermined the defensive line of Meade and his authority on the field
2. Used up significant officers and men
3. Virtually destroyed the Third Corps
4. Used up significant reserves in Meade's attempt to save the line and rescue Sickles
5. Drew men and supplies from other spots, potentially weakening the line
6. Destroyed and plans that Meade had of counterattacking late on July 3 or July 4 - instead of having two full corps (5th & 6th) available to counterattack, Meade is left with virtually no reserves in order to make an offensive move
7. Sickles attempt to destroy Meade in the papers afterwards, only undermined the leadership of Meade and ruined his reputation
8. Because of this selfish man and his desire to save his own butt, we now have a skewed history of Gettysburg and the events on July 2.........

 

[TDMD]

It had significant effects on the AOP at Gettysburg and beyond......

1. Undermined the defensive line of Meade and his authority on the field
2. Used up significant officers and men
3. Virtually destroyed the Third Corps
4. Used up significant reserves in Meade's attempt to save the line and rescue Sickles
5. Drew men and supplies from other spots, potentially weakening the line
6. Destroyed and plans that Meade had of counterattacking late on July 3 or July 4 - instead of having two full corps (5th & 6th) available to counterattack, Meade is left with virtually no reserves in order to make an offensive move
7. Sickles attempt to destroy Meade in the papers afterwards, only undermined the leadership of Meade and ruined his reputation
8. Because of this selfish man and his desire to save his own butt, we now have a skewed history of Gettysburg and the events on July 2.........

You and I are on the same page here.

 

[ole]

For a canuck to get major kudos from TDMD is notable. Welcome to the forum, Meade. You are now into serious debate.

 

[TDMD]

For a canuck to get major kudos from TDMD is notable. Welcome to the forum, Meade. You are now into serious debate.

As long as he isn't Roberto Luongo in disguise.

 

[1SGDan]

:laugh1:let's not pump air in his tires>

Tim Thomas rules

 

[meade21]

Canucks?!?!?!?

Sorry to disappoint..but I am not a Canucks fan.....my heart is with the Capitals...lol

 

[OpnCoronet]

The basic problem is that everyone here is tending to ignore, just, exactly, what Lee's plan was. How do we know what Sickles accomplished unless we know what Lee was trying to do?


PS. Who on this thread believes Meade was 'really' planning tio attack on Day 3, under any circumstances???

 

[bama46]

The basic problem is that everyone here is tending to ignore, just, exactly, what Lee's plan was. How do we know what Sickles accomplished unless we know what Lee was trying to do?


PS. Who on this thread believes Meade was 'really' planning tio attack on Day 3, under any circumstances???

I disagree. The basic problem is that subordinate officers do not get to say " that old fool don't know what he's doin. I'm gonna do thus and such.." subordinate officers are just that, subordinate and subject to the orders of their commanders. Sickles ignored an order he did not like.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Subordinate officers 'doing their own thing', seems to have been more Lee's problem than Meade's.

 

[bama46]

Subordinate officers 'doing their own thing', seems to have been more Lee's problem than Meade's.

And that sir, is a lame attempt to deflect the issue to someone else...cheap shot as gen Lee is not a part of the discussion " Sickles Ventures Forward"

 

[meade21]

but in this case, we are talking about Sickles and his disobedience......and in that case, he did disobey a direct order......

In Lee's case, Longstreet basically did what Lee wanted, just with a lack of interest and enthusiasm. Stuart had the option to undertake that "ride" and Lee gave Ewell a way out by using the term "if practicable". Really the only one I can figure on Lee's staff that directly disobeyed would be Heth.....

 

[cash]

but in this case, we are talking about Sickles and his disobedience......and in that case, he did disobey a direct order......

In Lee's case, Longstreet basically did what Lee wanted, just with a lack of interest and enthusiasm. Stuart had the option to undertake that "ride" and Lee gave Ewell a way out by using the term "if practicable". Really the only one I can figure on Lee's staff that directly disobeyed would be Heth.....

And Lee liked Heth so there would be no repurcussions. If Lee was unhappy with his subordinate officers, he need only look in the mirror to find out who to blame. Meade at least made his displeasure with Sickles perfectly clear.

 

[TDMD]

but in this case, we are talking about Sickles and his disobedience......and in that case, he did disobey a direct order......

In Lee's case, Longstreet basically did what Lee wanted, just with a lack of interest and enthusiasm. Stuart had the option to undertake that "ride" and Lee gave Ewell a way out by using the term "if practicable". Really the only one I can figure on Lee's staff that directly disobeyed would be Heth.....

To go briefly off topic, as another out, Lee also told Ewell not to bring on a general engagement.

 

[TDMD]

Sorry to disappoint..but I am not a Canucks fan.....my heart is with the Capitals...lol

That's good, because I'm a Black Hawks fan.

 

[TDMD]

The basic problem is that everyone here is tending to ignore, just, exactly, what Lee's plan was. How do we know what Sickles accomplished unless we know what Lee was trying to do?


PS. Who on this thread believes Meade was 'really' planning tio attack on Day 3, under any circumstances???

There is no way to know for sure, but Sickles helped to destroy the option if Meade wanted to try.

We do know that Meade had Henry Hunt, Henry Slocum, and Warren check out the possibility of a counterattack near Culp's Hill the night of the First.

 

[OpnCoronet]

It is just as easily argued that Sickles action on Day 2, guaranteed Lee's failure on Day 3.
As to Meade's aggressiveness(or lack thereof) we have only his historical record[ as an independent Army commander. It seems, from that, that like McClellan, he was willing to plan offensives, but could never quite bring himself to accually do it.

 

[TDMD]

It is just as easily argued that Sickles action on Day 2, guaranteed Lee's failure on Day 3.
As to Meade's aggressiveness(or lack thereof) we have only his historical record[ as an independent Army commander. It seems, from that, that like McClellan, he was willing to plan offensives, but could never quite bring himself to accually do it.

It cannot be argued that Sickles move guaranteed Lee's failure, especially given the 13 points I listed in the neighboring thread about why it was a bad idea, not the least of which was the three open flanks it left, the fact that he actually left partly higher ground (i.e., LRT), the fact that his corps was terribly undersized (only 9,900 or so troops) for the longer line that he undertook, that his corps was not organizationally suited (only 2 divisions) to assume the new position, that he created a salient in the line (smack dab in the Peach Orchard with Graham's brigade), that he moved farther away from the intended rear support (Fifth Corps was in reserve at the time sitting at the Granite Schoolhouse Lane), and that his move forced troops elsewhere to try to reinforce his already crumbling line, thus weakening other parts of the fishhook. That's just a few of the problems associated with the move.

As to Meade and his plans for the AotP as soon as he took over assumed the aggressive. The whole fact that he moved forward the infantry away from Pipe Creek to be within reach of the forward cavalry locations in case there is better terrain than Pipe Creek shows a level of flexibility compared to other commanders of the AotP. Given that Sickles ruined any chance of Meade having a fresh force available by making his insubordinate advance, we cannot know for sure how much more aggressive Meade would have been post battle. I do know that Meade was about as aggressive as he could have been post battle according to historian Eric Wittenberg. In fact the plan to possibly counterattack the Rebs near Culp's Hill because Hunt, Slocum and Warren suggested against it. What was Meade going to do - make the ground easier to attack over?

If you are talking the Meade of autumn 1863, remember that he did not have his three most aggressive corps commanders (including Sickles). Third Corps and First Corps were used up. Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were in Tennessee. In fact, that the period was more costly to the Rebels in the aftermath of Bristoe Station.

 

[OpnCoronet]

From the record, because of Sickles, Lee's attack on Day3, , was an ad hoc plan, necessitated(and thus delayed) because, Longstreet believed he could not disengagge his corps to deliver the main attack. Instead two-thirds of the attacking force was Hill's(even while leaving Longstreet in command of the assault)
It is human nature to find many reason's to not do, what one does not want to do. In this respect there was little to choose between McClellan and Meade.(IF one is determined to do something, few reason's not to do so are recorded)

 

[TDMD]

From the record, because of Sickles, Lee's attack on Day3, , was an ad hoc plan, necessitated(and thus delayed) because, Longstreet believed he could not disengagge his corps to deliver the main attack. Instead two-thirds of the attacking force was Hill's(even while leaving Longstreet in command of the assault)
It is human nature to find many reason's to not do, what one does not want to do. In this respect there was little to choose between McClellan and Meade.(IF one is determined to do something, few reason's not to do so are recorded)

Whether Longstreet felt he could not disengage had little to do with Sickles. Third Corps was so badly hurt from Day 2, they had to be put in reserve north of LRT. In addition, Sixth Corps and Fifth Corps which could have been used as a reserve for a counterattack could not be used for that purpose. Although Sixth Corps was not heavily engaged, between the long forced march and the immediate entry into battle, they were not really fresh. Fifth Corps had a division pretty well beat up thanks to Sickles. And again, as I have pointed out several times, Longstreet suffered 2,000 fewer casualties than the Union did trying to prop up the crumbling line that Sickles created. Plus given the results of Pickett's Charge, perhaps not attacking was the wise thing to do.