Sickles Venture Forward

[TDMD]

But, of the other 'presumed' effects of Sickles' miovement, it is unlikely that a very good case can be made that it foiled any plan of Meade's to attack on Day 3.

No? What about the fact that two corps which were to be used in reserve now had to be engaged to try to shore up Sickles crumbling line? A division was wrecked in Fifth Corps and Sixth Corps had a division engaged after a forced march instead of getting the rest that Meade had intended.

Of what are "other presumed effects" are you speaking?

 

[OpnCoronet]

But, from where comes the idea those units were part of any plan of Meade's to attack on Day 3?
Sickles' movement, ends up with Longstreet, reluctantly, directing a major assault with only 1/3 of the assaulting force being from his own corps. .

 

[TDMD]

But, from where comes the idea those units were part of any plan of Meade's to attack on Day 3?
Sickles' movement, ends up with Longstreet, reluctantly, directing a major assault with only 1/3 of the assaulting force being from his own corps. .

There were articles in North And South that mention the possibility of a counterattack by Meade on his left (by Robert Himmer). The thing is even if he wasn't planning a counterattack, Sickles denied Meade the use of those troops by way of his advance on July 2.

I still don't see what you do about Sickles advance forcing Lee's hand on Day 3. Sickles had more to do with forcing the hand of his own commander by having his own corps and two other divisions wrecked and another prematurely engaged.

 

[OpnCoronet]

As I have noted before, Meade had many of the qualities of McClellan and one of them is talking of planning major attacks without ever quite coming to that decision. Although accurately discerning the point of Lee's attack on Day 3, but outside of warning the relevent commander, it is not apparent that he made any other especial plans for countering i. Again, much like, McClellan he let the battle fight itself.
Longstreets failure, confirmed Lee's determination that if Day 2 was unsuccessful, there would be a Day3 and that it would be without I Corps(except for Pickett's Div.)

 

[Dugger]

It remains, Tom, that Meade was the first to be not overly impressed with Lee's tactics. He got his high ground and held it. Against Lee. A first to be noted.

Now Meade was not that good except that he managed, on those three days, to make something different happen.

And I'm not worshipping Meade, but he stopped Lee and managed to take away his ability to wage war against the AotP. In a sense, he paved the way for Grant to come in and waste what remained of the AoNV.

However much he failed to put the finishing touches on it, he did get it started.

Agree. Meade was the first commander the AOTP had that did not scare. He had himself under control. He also ended up with good ground...that sure helped.

 

[TDMD]

As I have noted before, Meade had many of the qualities of McClellan and one of them is talking of planning major attacks without ever quite coming to that decision. Although accurately discerning the point of Lee's attack on Day 3, but outside of warning the relevent commander, it is not apparent that he made any other especial plans for countering i. Again, much like, McClellan he let the battle fight itself.
Longstreets failure, confirmed Lee's determination that if Day 2 was unsuccessful, there would be a Day3 and that it would be without I Corps(except for Pickett's Div.)

Actually, I believe you'll find that it was an overly optimistic assessment of what Longstreet accomplished that convinced Lee to go with Pickett's Charge. But that cannot be attributed to Sickles. It should be attributed to Meade, Warren, Vincent, Barnes, Caldwell, Hancock, McGilvery and the thousands of men who did what was needed to extricate Sickles' Corps from the trick bag he placed them in.

If Meade put the battle into autopilot as you suggest, how is it that reinforcements from all over the field came to prop up a crumbling line? Who correctly surmised that Day 3's fight would be in the center and aligned his men accordingly? The answer is George Meade.

It is quite obvious that Meade outgeneraled Lee on those two days (three, if you want to include the first, when he was marshaling his troops and moving them northward).

 

[TDMD]

Agree. Meade was the first commander the AOTP had that did not scare. He had himself under control. He also ended up with good ground...that sure helped.

The latter thanks to John Buford, Winfield Scott Hancock and O.O. Howard.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Outside predicting the point of attack on Day 3, how did Meade align accordingly? Did not the reinforcements come streaming in on the individual initiative of the local commanders?
Are we not still discussing how much Sickles' movement disrupted Meade's plans?(It certainly disrupted Lee's and Longstreet's)

 

[TDMD]

Outside predicting the point of attack on Day 3, how did Meade align accordingly? Did not the reinforcements come streaming in on the individual initiative of the local commanders?
Are we not still discussing how much Sickles' movement disrupted Meade's plans?(It certainly disrupted Lee's and Longstreet's)

Meade had repositioned the beat up Third Corps and placed units of the Fifth and Sixth Corps along Cemetery Ridge after the second day's fight and tweaked it more on July 3.

Yes, we are discussing the fact that Sickles disrupted Meade's defensive alignment. It did disrupt Lee's and Longstreet's plans in that it meant more Federals would be buried at Gettysburg or sent to hospital. Longstreet's biggest surprise was that he hardly expected the gift that Sickles gave him in the way of a glass jaw to hit.

 

[Dugger]

The latter thanks to John Buford, Winfield Scott Hancock and O.O. Howard.

No no no. Meade was never a cut and run. If any, Meade had the most balls of all ya name. Really...a tuff sob. He was freaked that Hooker folded...he was freaked that Burnside did not fight it out at Fred. The good ground...odd. Yes....the defeat of the AOTP on the 1st day oddly led to victory. AND MEADE BEAT LEE. Very badly...very badly.

O, by da way.........who gave Hancock his orders? MEADE. Yup.

Do not fall into the off repeated historical error, that Meade was a gee what? HE knew his s#it. Dang I mean it....LEE GOT A BUTT KICKING. Cause Meade simply knew how to frame troops of that era to best blow ya away. And...made sure that all flanks were secure. Real fundamental...simple. Brilliant? Maybe not. Competent, yes. And the first competent AOTP commander Lee ever fought. Lee never won a battle after that one. Meade kicked his azz. To be fair, Lee got real intense there. He rolled the dice. He lost. Longstreet was correct. I have belived that since I was 7! Yes.

 

[TDMD]

No no no. Meade was never a cut and run. If any, Meade had the most balls of all ya name. Really...a tuff sob. He was freaked that Hooker folded...he was freaked that Burnside did not fight it out at Fred. The good ground...odd. Yes....the defeat of the AOTP on the 1st day oddly led to victory. AND MEADE BEAT LEE. Very badly...very badly.

O, by da way.........who gave Hancock his orders? MEADE. Yup.

Do not fall into the off repeated historical error, that Meade was a gee what? HE knew his s#it. Dang I mean it....LEE GOT A BUTT KICKING. Cause Meade simply knew how to frame troops of that era to best blow ya away. And...made sure that all flanks were secure. Real fundamental...simple. Brilliant? Maybe not. Competent, yes. And the first competent AOTP commander Lee ever fought. Lee never won a battle after that one. Meade kicked his azz. To be fair, Lee got real intense there. He rolled the dice. He lost. Longstreet was correct. I have belived that since I was 7! Yes.

I was not referring to Meade cutting and running. I merely mentioned that the other general officers found the good ground and reported it to Meade when he got there. In no way am I knocking anything that Meade did at Gettysburg, or even in the aftermath of the battle.

Actually, Buford found it, Reynolds chose to maintain the fight there, Howard chose to use Cemetery Hill as rallying point and Hancock solidified the Cemetery Hill position. Meade used his general officers well at that battle as to gleaning what they knew of what was going on and proceeding from there.

BTW, where did you get the idea that I was dissing Meade?

 

[Mike Tomey]

I oddly enough agree as well. Had Sickles not had people at Devil's Den, the peach orchard, and the Wheatfield to check the echelon, I believe the lower ground north of little roundtop could have presented a weak point in the line. The time gained by his presence leading to darkness and the end of fighting just as the Confederates were about to pierce the Cemetery ridge line perhaps saved the day. General Longstreet's late attack also proved very beneficial to the Union cause as well. I normally do not enjoy speculation of historical events> However, in many of the Civil War battles I find them incredibly enjoyable.

 

[OpnCoronet]

It is doubtful, Longstreet's surprise by Sickles' movement was one of viewing it as a gift. Certainly Hood did not.
If Sickles' did not disrupt Meade's plans for the offensive, it surely cannot be described as disrupting his defense; since the defense held.

 

[TDMD]

It is doubtful, Longstreet's surprise by Sickles' movement was one of viewing it as a gift. Certainly Hood did not.
If Sickles' did not disrupt Meade's plans for the offensive, it surely cannot be described as disrupting his defense; since the defense held.

But the defense as rearranged by Sickles did not hold. It was crumbling and Meade had to weaken other parts of his line and use units intended for reserve to avoid having Third Corps be completely destroyed. The surprise element came from the mistaken opinion on the part of the Confederate high command that there were no Union troops that far south - not from any wise move by Sickles.

 

[TDMD]

I oddly enough agree as well. Had Sickles not had people at Devil's Den, the peach orchard, and the Wheatfield to check the echelon, I believe the lower ground north of little roundtop could have presented a weak point in the line. The time gained by his presence leading to darkness and the end of fighting just as the Confederates were about to pierce the Cemetery ridge line perhaps saved the day. General Longstreet's late attack also proved very beneficial to the Union cause as well. I normally do not enjoy speculation of historical events> However, in many of the Civil War battles I find them incredibly enjoyable.

But Sickles people were isolated from the rest of the army, with both flanks hanging, in a position too long for a 9,900 man corps to hold (400' gaps between some brigades), with the corps not ideally suited because it only had two divisions. Coddington disagreed with your conclusion as to the timing of Longstreet's attack. He stated, and I can only paraphrase for the moment, that 'Longstreet's attack couldn't have come at a worse time for George Meade.' The actual quote is on about page 445 of his book about the Gettysburg Campaign.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The defensive lines of Meade's plan, did hold. It is just as likely, as not, that without Sickles absorbing the impetus of Longstreet's attack, Meade's original line would not have survived as well as it did.

 

[TDMD]

The defensive lines of Meade's plan, did hold. It is just as likely, as not, that without Sickles absorbing the impetus of Longstreet's attack, Meade's original line would not have survived as well as it did.

Extremely difficult to buy your point, since, if Sickles stayed put, he would have had Fifth Corps behind him en masse fifteen minutes away. If needed, they would have been available as a concentrated block of troops instead of broken up trying to cover various gaping holes in Sickles line as they did. Plus, as things occurred, Sickles moved away from that rear support, so that Fifth Corps was forty five minutes away.

As you posted above, Meade's defensive line held, but no thanks go to Dan Sickles, for the line holding. I find it very difficult to believe that a compact position with immediate rear and flank support anchored on high ground (LRT) would suffer more than an exposed, isolated line in a salient and with gaps of 400' between some brigades and both flanks hanging.

Again the biggest surprise to Longstreet was that Federal troops were that far south, not that Sickles position was some sort of Gibraltar as it proved to be anything but stalwart.

 

[OpnCoronet]

If Sickles had V corps 15 min.s behind him in his old position, how far were they from his new? In fact though, V and VI (with elements of
II Corps) were indeed available to reinforce III Corps, the only question is why they were fed into the battle piecemeal?
Was it really Sickles fault that Longstreet's corps, minus 1/3 of his force(Pickett), almost outfought 3 Union corps?

 

[TDMD]

If Sickles had V corps 15 min.s behind him in his old position, how far were they from his new? In fact though, V and VI (with elements of
II Corps) were indeed available to reinforce III Corps, the only question is why they were fed into the battle piecemeal?
Was it really Sickles fault that Longstreet's corps, minus 1/3 of his force(Pickett), almost outfought 3 Union corps?

As I stated above, after Sickles' advance Fifth Corps was then 45 minutes away. As to why they were fed into battle piecemeal, it was because of the various holes created because of Sickles' advance. LRT had to be occupied; the Devil's Den area was falling apart; Graham's position at the salient (Sherfy's Peach Orchard) was caving in like a house of cards; infantry had to start plugging holes in the gaps between DeTrobriand and Ward (which heretofore were plugged by unsupported artillery batteries).

It was Sickles fault that he offered up his corps as a gift to Longstreet, needlessly, as he was already in an adequate position before the ill-advised advance. The advance was into what was rendered as a no-mans-land by virtue of the fact that the PO area was a prime target for artillery of both sides.

 

[wilber6150]

If Sickles had V corps 15 min.s behind him in his old position, how far were they from his new? In fact though, V and VI (with elements of
II Corps) were indeed available to reinforce III Corps, the only question is why they were fed into the battle piecemeal?
Was it really Sickles fault that Longstreet's corps, minus 1/3 of his force(Pickett), almost outfought 3 Union corps?

It was his fault because instead of a cohesive defensive line that reinforcements could easily support, he caused a disjointed unconnected line to be formed parts of which were easily flanked thus allowing Longstreet's men to do considerable damage to them..Union reinforcements then had to be fed into the grinder one unit at a time instead of in mass.. If Sickles stayed where he was and prepared a position, his flanks would have been supported and additional men would be ready to plug any holes in his line...