Sickles Venture Forward

The position that Sickles complained about was not really the position that Meade ordered him to. Dave Powell mentions that in his Gettysburg Magazine (issue #28). Sickles managed to convey that post-battle. His HQ on the night of July 1/2 was in the low swale that he complained about. Meade ordered him to be slightly east of that swale on higher ground.

I posted this about a year ago....

Much has been written about Sickles's advance to high ground from Cemetery Ridge on the 2nd day. Leaving an ordered position which seemed to put his Corps in a poor position were his artillery was ineffective and his infantry was vulnerable. Meade may have been toying with the idea of leaving the field altogether. Some say that Sickles's sacrifice of his Corps saved the Army and Gettysburg. Here is a good argument.

http://www.gettysburgdaily.com/?p=3864
 
I was up on the Peach Orchard yesterday for the n'th time and watching the cars moving through the trees I could trace the line of Cemetery Ridge through where Sickles was supposed to be pretty well. I was thinking about this thread. I just don't see how the Peach Orchard is that much better a place to be than back on Cemetery Ridge where he was supposed to be. Granted, I'm no artillery expert but the PO doesn't "command" the low point of the ridge that much to my eye, and with LRT at the flank, any assault toward the low point by the ANV would have been really nasty exposed.
 
I posted this about a year ago....

Much has been written about Sickles's advance to high ground from Cemetery Ridge on the 2nd day. Leaving an ordered position which seemed to put his Corps in a poor position were his artillery was ineffective and his infantry was vulnerable. Meade may have been toying with the idea of leaving the field altogether. Some say that Sickles's sacrifice of his Corps saved the Army and Gettysburg. Here is a good argument.

http://www.gettysburgdaily.com/?p=3864

I do not believe that Meade truly entertained the idea of leaving, especially after receiving Hancock's positive assessment of the terrain at Gettysburg. That was a thought that Sickles was trying to convey in his newspaper writings post-battle and postwar. I also do not believe that Sickles move accomplished anything more than getting his corps demolished along with two divisions in other corps. Also he badly disrupted Meade's defensive plan.

Others like Eric Campbell and Scott Hartwig, also GNMP guide/historians think Sickles' advance was a bad idea all around.
 
I was up on the Peach Orchard yesterday for the n'th time and watching the cars moving through the trees I could trace the line of Cemetery Ridge through where Sickles was supposed to be pretty well. I was thinking about this thread. I just don't see how the Peach Orchard is that much better a place to be than back on Cemetery Ridge where he was supposed to be. Granted, I'm no artillery expert but the PO doesn't "command" the low point of the ridge that much to my eye, and with LRT at the flank, any assault toward the low point by the ANV would have been really nasty exposed.

Agreed, plus the fact that the PO was a prime target for artillery from either Seminary Ridge or Cemetery Ridge.
 
Agreed, plus the fact that the PO was a prime target for artillery from either Seminary Ridge or Cemetery Ridge.

Yesterday Scott Hartwig said that Porter Alexander found the Peach Orchard not so great a platform for artillery to attack Cemetery Ridge. I think I'd take Alexander's opinion over Sickles (but of course, Sickles was looking at it from afar and with a definite fear of being shelled from any heights at all).
 
Agreed, plus the fact that the PO was a prime target for artillery from either Seminary Ridge or Cemetery Ridge.

Meade pointed this fact out to Sickles, calling it neutral ground, covered by artillery on both sides. Sickles agreed with Meade and said he would move back. Meade then pointed out that the imminent Rebel assault prevented the execution of this move.
 
Please let me know where I can find a copy of Lees' tactical plan for the battle of Gettysburg. You've referenced it twice now and I've been under the impression that no one is sure what his specific plan was. I've read several theories but haven't seen any two that agree or weren't written 20 years later by someone trying to poke a finger in someone elses face.

On page 113 of Pfanz's book about the the second day the author has this to say:

By this time General Lee must have formulated his plan of attack. This plan was not drawn up on paper by Lee or his staff, nor was it promulgated in any written orders that have survived. Rather it comes to us in fragments from reports and accounts of the battle prepared by officers who could write with assurance of those portions of the plan that applied only to their commands. Significantly, the plan was based on Confederate perceptions of the Federal situation at the time that the plan was imparted and not on the reality of enemy dispositions at the time of attack.

According to General Lee's reports, his immediate objective was to gain the high ground between Seminary and Cemetery ridges, that along the Emmitsburg Road described above and occupied in force a little later in the day by General Sickles Third Corps. Hood's and McLaws's divisions were to envelop the enemy left and drive it in; Hill's corps was to threaten the enemy center to prevent enemy reinforcement of his left and then cooperate with and continue Longstreet's effort. Ewell's corps on the left was to "make a simultaneous demonstration" against the Federal right and convert this feint into an all-out attack if warranted.

Trudeau has in his Gettysburg's book has maps (page 323) that detail Lee's original plan, Longstreet's adjustments and the adjustments that Hood wanted to make. A close look at them shows that Trudeau is in agreement with Pfanz's take on the plan.
 
Yesterday Scott Hartwig said that Porter Alexander found the Peach Orchard not so great a platform for artillery to attack Cemetery Ridge. I think I'd take Alexander's opinion over Sickles (but of course, Sickles was looking at it from afar and with a definite fear of being shelled from any heights at all).

Yes. I quoted comments by Alexander as mentioned in Hartwig's point-counterpoint article in an old North And South in a post several pages above.
 
Meade pointed this fact out to Sickles, calling it neutral ground, covered by artillery on both sides. Sickles agreed with Meade and said he would move back. Meade then pointed out that the imminent Rebel assault prevented the execution of this move.

Yes, and I believe that Henry Hunt also mentioned that to Sickles.
 
If LRT is not occupied and defended, it cannot serve as an anchor to Sickles(and the AoP) flank. III Corps was too small to effective occupy its assigned position on Cemetary Ridge and have a strong defensive force on LRT.
Without Sickles movement Hood falls III Corps flank on the slopes of LRT followed by McLaws and then Robertson(Hill's Corps)
Sickls' corps, in fact was crushed by Longstreets attack and it is not self-evfident that the same fate did not await the corps as a contiguous part of Meade's MLR, especiallu if the ANV continued to attack sequentially, by Div., from South to North, as is uswually assumed.
 
Yes, and I believe that Henry Hunt also mentioned that to Sickles.

But Hunt said he would check with Meade to see if the move forward was OK. Meade then sent his son/aide to tell Sickles to get back to his assigned position. I thought Sickles thought that Hunt agreed that the move forward was a good idea.
 
If LRT is not occupied and defended, it cannot serve as an anchor to Sickles(and the AoP) flank. III Corps was too small to effective occupy its assigned position on Cemetary Ridge and have a strong defensive force on LRT.
Without Sickles movement Hood falls III Corps flank on the slopes of LRT followed by McLaws and then Robertson(Hill's Corps)
Sickls' corps, in fact was crushed by Longstreets attack and it is not self-evfident that the same fate did not await the corps as a contiguous part of Meade's MLR, especiallu if the ANV continued to attack sequentially, by Div., from South to North, as is uswually assumed.

If Third Corps was too small to effectively hold the line that Meade ordered, then it would definitely be too small to hold the line that Sickles adopted. Sickles line was almost about 2x as long as that ordered by Meade. Plus, as I've posted several times in this thread, that was why Fifth Corps was there - to provide rear support and to occupy LRT if Sickles couldn't. Regarding Hood, if Sickles holds as ordered, his left is a lot safer from Hood than the position Sickles took up, as it was Sickles almost directly presented his left to Hood.

Given what the apparent orders to Longstreet were - that McLaws and Hood were to proceed up the Emmittsburg Road, Longstreet would have three choices rearrange the attack plans; not attack at all; or, proceed as ordered and present his right flank to Sickles. And again, should Longstreet choose to modify his plan, he'd have been coming across a compact line, with rear and flank support instead of an isolated corps with both flanks in the air and a line too long for it to hold.
 
But Hunt said he would check with Meade to see if the move forward was OK. Meade then sent his son/aide to tell Sickles to get back to his assigned position. I thought Sickles thought that Hunt agreed that the move forward was a good idea.

Hunt stated that the forward move was good if Meade chose to run his line along the Emmittsburg Road ridgeline and if Meade made clear an intention to counterattack. He also reminded him that Sherfy's PO was in a no-man's-land and would be a prime target for other artillery. He advised him that he (Hunt) did not have the authority to authorize such a move and Sickles would have to await Meade's assessment of the position.
 
Hunt stated that the forward move was good if Meade chose to run his line along the Emmittsburg Road ridgeline and if Meade made clear an intention to counterattack. He also reminded him that Sherfy's PO was in a no-man's-land and would be a prime target for other artillery. He advised him that he (Hunt) did not have the authority to authorize such a move and Sickles would have to await Meade's assessment of the position.

Wasn't the Emmitsburg road ridgeline where Lee actually thought the Union line was and not further back.. I thought I read that in Trudeau's book..
 
Wasn't the Emmitsburg road ridgeline where Lee actually thought the Union line was and not further back.. I thought I read that in Trudeau's book..

Yes. I read that too. Trudeau's map on page 323 indicates that. And therein lies the reason that Hunt told Sickles that his chosen spot would be good if Meade chose that ridgeline and to counterattack, because that ridgeline would place a hanging Federal left flank to the Confederates. It makes sense to use that ridgeline if you counterattack because then your position would only be temporary.
 
GettysburgMapPainting.jpg
 
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