Random Thoughts on Iuka

[SSVilla]

What does Castel mean that Cozzens source on the Rosecrans/Dickey/Lagow is "dubious?" It's based on Rosecrans's testimony to the Joint Committee. It's Rosecrans's own words.

Rosecrans's version of the meeting doesn't make sense, but I wouldn't call using Rosecrans as a source is "dubious." Am I misunderstanding Castel?

I assumed quickly that Castel referred to note 14 which is specifically provided to support the map consultation with Col. Mizner, and then the message delivered by Cols. Lagow and Dickey. It turns out, I assumed wrong. Castel cited page 126 of Cozzens, which reads:

The only reference there to Lagow and Dickey is Cozzens statement that when Ord handed his orders to postpone the attack to Rosecrans, that was the first time Rosecrans had learned of it.

Note 13:

Reference list:

————

This may be one of those times where Cozzens is confusing. Ch 6, which deals with the Mizner map consultation, Dickey and Lagow and the change of plans, has Cozzens appearing ambivalent. Trying to remain neutral Cozzens narrates different versions of events, but the effect is unclear.

For example he states that Dickey and Lagow carried a message that has not been found and which Rosecrans denied existed. He appears to discredit its existence, but leaves it open for the reader to think whatever. He doesn't elaborate about what was supposed to be on it, nor the purpose of Dickey and Lagow's errand. However, he quotes Rosecrans version of events verbatim, which is ambiguous and confusing in itself, and then writes in a paragraph further down, well at any rate Rosecrans decided to consolidate his columns and move up Jacinto.

He even indicated that Rosecrans, Dickiey and Lagow were still having a disagreement about whether to take the initiative and attack or not when Price took that option out of Rosecrans' hands, attacking him instead. That the discussion would have lasted that long strains credibility for me because I was left wondering how long that argument lasted before Rosecrans made up his mind in one direction or another. And how could he have just decided to consolidate and march up Jacinto without making a decision either way. They met at around 12:30 pm or so and the attack from Price was around 3:30? I mean I haven't looked into the timing in detail but Cozzens doesn't question the validity of Rosecrans statements at all.

Then in page 126, he appears to take the view that Dickey and Lagow didn't tell Rosecrans about the positive change of plans the day before, and that when Ord gave Rosecrans his orders from Grant, that was the first time Rosecrans learned of it.

… ! …

Looking to see what you think about the Rosecrans outburst.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I assumed quickly that Castel referred to note 14 which is specifically provided to support the map consultation with Col. Mizner, and then the message delivered by Cols. Lagow and Dickey. It turns out, I assumed wrong. Castel cited page 126 of Cozzens, which reads:

View attachment 518889

The only reference there to Lagow and Dickey is Cozzens statement that when Ord handed his orders to postpone the attack to Rosecrans, that was the first time Rosecrans had learned of it.

Note 13:
View attachment 518894
Reference list:
View attachment 518896

————

This may be one of those times where Cozzens is confusing. Ch 6, which deals with the Mizner map consultation, Dickey and Lagow and the change of plans, has Cozzens appearing ambivalent. Trying to remain neutral Cozzens narrates different versions of events, but the effect is unclear.

For example he states that Dickey and Lagow carried a message that has not been found and which Rosecrans denied existed. He appears to discredit its existence, but leaves it open for the reader to think whatever. He doesn't elaborate about what was supposed to be on it, nor the purpose of Dickey and Lagow's errand. However, he quotes Rosecrans version of events verbatim, which is ambiguous and confusing in itself, and then writes in a paragraph further down, well at any rate Rosecrans decided to consolidate his columns and move up Jacinto.

He even indicated that Rosecrans, Dickiey and Lagow were still having a disagreement about whether to take the initiative and attack or not when Price took that option out of Rosecrans' hands, attacking him instead. That the discussion would have lasted that long strains credibility for me because I was left wondering how long that argument lasted before Rosecrans made up his mind in one direction or another. And how could he have just decided to consolidate and march up Jacinto without making a decision either way. They met at around 12:30 pm or so and the attack from Price was around 3:30? I mean I haven't looked into the timing in detail but Cozzens doesn't question the validity of Rosecrans statements at all.

Then in page 126, he appears to take the view that Dickey and Lagow didn't tell Rosecrans about the positive change of plans the day before, and that when Ord gave Rosecrans his orders from Grant, that was the first time Rosecrans learned of it.

… ! …

Looking to see what you think about the Rosecrans outburst.

View attachment 518888

Thanks, that does sound like Cozzen's was being very unclear about what and when Rosecrans knew about the change of plans. It's very hard to believe that after the battle, Rosecrans would have been "shocked" to learn of Ord's orders from Grant. Especially when it was Rosecrans who was responsible for the timetable falling apart.

 

[breckod]

Thanks, that does sound like Cozzen's was being very unclear about what and when Rosecrans knew about the change of plans. It's very hard to believe that after the battle, Rosecrans would have been "shocked" to learn of Ord's orders from Grant. Especially when it was Rosecrans who was responsible for the timetable falling apart.

The description of Lagow "carping" at Rosecrans for hours on the march seems like a bit of rhetorical sleight-of-hand from Cozzens. If they weren't discussing the change in plans, what were they even talking about?

 

[Sid J.]

The lead elements in Rosecrans advance place the fight starting at 5pm or later.

William S Rosecrans and the Union Victory by David Moore | Wartime Politics, & Debates

The after action reports from the lead elements of Rosecrans force at Iuka place the start of the battle at some time after 5pm. See OR 1, Vol 17 part 1 pages 96-113. Sanborn, with the lead brigade, had cavalry out front skirmishing in the morning, at 1pm several cos from the 5th IA took over...

civilwartalk.com

 

[SSVilla]

Thanks, that does sound like Cozzen's was being very unclear about what and when Rosecrans knew about the change of plans. It's very hard to believe that after the battle, Rosecrans would have been "shocked" to learn of Ord's orders from Grant. Especially when it was Rosecrans who was responsible for the timetable falling apart.

I thought Rosecrans would have been angry simply because Ord didn't show up to support him. It's almost self evident. Even Grant's orders changing the plan contemplated cooperation and thus, as Rosecrans complied with his "amended" part of the plan, he would have been upset that Ord didn't comply with his. That almost needs no explanation.

That question "Why did you leave me in the lurch?" points to Ord failing to show up causing his anger.

Cozzens statement that Rosecrans instead raged because he hadn't seen the order (or knew about it) before is therefore perplexing. In fact, it is a kind of conclusion, involving some kind of interpretation from the writer about what Rosecrans was angry at.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The lead elements in Rosecrans advance place the fight starting at 5pm or later.

William S Rosecrans and the Union Victory by David Moore | Wartime Politics, & Debates

The after action reports from the lead elements of Rosecrans force at Iuka place the start of the battle at some time after 5pm. See OR 1, Vol 17 part 1 pages 96-113. Sanborn, with the lead brigade, had cavalry out front skirmishing in the morning, at 1pm several cos from the 5th IA took over...

civilwartalk.com

Thanks for that interesting old thread. Someone suggested that I have only recently been making an issue out of the Rosecrans/Bickham insulting of 2nd Division, but I see I was ranting about it back in 2015.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I

Do you want to share what he wrote about this particular spot in time? The midday conference where Rosecrans changed his march plan and the Lagow/Dickie conference? Is the writer easy to follow?

I haven't read it yet. I only read little bits of it one night. He seemed to have favorable views on Rosecrans actions, but I would need to read it in more depth. That type of thing doesn't concern me so much as long as authors try to be fair and judicious. Many of the judgements made in the historiography are definitely too facile though, for sure (not referring to Iuka specifically, just speaking generally).

You want to know about the meeting with Lagow and Dickey?

The whole thing was a very aggressive and bold plan devised in the days following the fighting on the 13th and was put hastily into motion in order to try to trap the Confederate force while the window was open, which it was likely it wouldn't be for too long, which was wholly accurate as Price intended to pull out regardless. They tried. The timetable was just a little too tight in which if anything went wrong, it could be thrown seriously off schedule, which it did via some early command confusion, the conditions of the roads relative to distances which had to be traversed and the insufficient mapping of the Army. Almost caught them.

Unfortunately, it very probably would not have been good enough, regardless though, as Price probably could have pulled his command back to the East over the river, albeit with the loss of the wounded and at least some of their guns and equipment.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Thanks for that interesting old thread. Someone suggested that I have only recently been making an issue out of the Rosecrans/Bickham insulting of 2nd Division, but I see I was ranting about it back in 2015.

That isn't accurate and not what I said, but okay. No worries.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I assumed quickly that Castel referred to note 14 which is specifically provided to support the map consultation with Col. Mizner, and then the message delivered by Cols. Lagow and Dickey. It turns out, I assumed wrong. Castel cited page 126 of Cozzens, which reads:

View attachment 518889

The only reference there to Lagow and Dickey is Cozzens statement that when Ord handed his orders to postpone the attack to Rosecrans, that was the first time Rosecrans had learned of it.

Note 13:
View attachment 518894
Reference list:
View attachment 518896

————

This may be one of those times where Cozzens is confusing. Ch 6, which deals with the Mizner map consultation, Dickey and Lagow and the change of plans, has Cozzens appearing ambivalent. Trying to remain neutral Cozzens narrates different versions of events, but the effect is unclear.

For example he states that Dickey and Lagow carried a message that has not been found and which Rosecrans denied existed. He appears to discredit its existence, but leaves it open for the reader to think whatever. He doesn't elaborate about what was supposed to be on it, nor the purpose of Dickey and Lagow's errand. However, he quotes Rosecrans version of events verbatim, which is ambiguous and confusing in itself, and then writes in a paragraph further down, well at any rate Rosecrans decided to consolidate his columns and move up Jacinto.

He even indicated that Rosecrans, Dickiey and Lagow were still having a disagreement about whether to take the initiative and attack or not when Price took that option out of Rosecrans' hands, attacking him instead. That the discussion would have lasted that long strains credibility for me because I was left wondering how long that argument lasted before Rosecrans made up his mind in one direction or another. And how could he have just decided to consolidate and march up Jacinto without making a decision either way. They met at around 12:30 pm or so and the attack from Price was around 3:30? I mean I haven't looked into the timing in detail but Cozzens doesn't question the validity of Rosecrans statements at all.

Then in page 126, he appears to take the view that Dickey and Lagow didn't tell Rosecrans about the positive change of plans the day before, and that when Ord gave Rosecrans his orders from Grant, that was the first time Rosecrans learned of it.

… ! …

Looking to see what you think about the Rosecrans outburst.

Here's the source with the "Our Kirby Smith" account. Nothing about Rosecrans being shocked or enraged, and nothing about Grant sending Dickey and Lagow to inform Rosecrans of the change.

Also, I have the impression that only those with a Rosecrans bias blame the failure of the Iuka plan with being the beginning of the rift between Rosecrans and Grant. I think the rift really began a little later.

 

[SSVilla]

I haven't read it yet. I only read little bits of it one night. He seemed to have favorable views on Rosecrans actions, but I would need to read it in more depth. That type of thing doesn't concern me so much as long as authors try to be fair and judicious. Many of the judgements made in the historiography are definitely too facile though, for sure (not referring to Iuka specifically, just speaking generally).

You want to know about the meeting with Lagow and Dickey?

The whole thing was a very aggressive and bold plan devised in the days following the fighting on the 13th and was put hastily into motion in order to try to trap the Confederate force while the window was open, which it was likely it wouldn't be for too long, which was wholly accurate as Price intended to pull out regardless. They tried. The timetable was just a little too tight in which if anything went wrong, it could be thrown seriously off schedule, which it did via some early command confusion, the conditions of the roads relative to distances which had to be traversed and the insufficient mapping of the Army. Almost caught them.

Unfortunately, it very probably would not have been good enough regardless as Price probably could have pulled his command back to the East over the river, albeit with the loss of the wounded and at least some of their guns and equipment.

I don't judge the plan harshly. I am merely trying to understand the controversial points, eventually to form my own opinion.

As far as the Union in general, they were in a difficult situation already because Halleck depleted their department to reinforce Buell, while at the same time he pressed Grant to do everything in his power to prevent Bragg from getting reinforcements. The irony of the entire thing isn't lost on me.

And I think Grant and Rosecrans didn't have all the time in the world to hatch a plan before Price slipped their noose. This wasn't like Hood patiently waiting for Thomas across Nashville while the latter got ready to attack when the stars aligned. In this case, either they did something bold or they would have faced an untrammeled confederate army somewhere else or Bragg would have gotten reinforced, and Grant didn't have overwhelming numbers or resources. Perhaps an enterprising confederate commander would have actually taken advantage of how vulnerable Grant and Rosecrans both were separated… but of course the confederacy in the region was led by Van Dorn…

Obviously I focus more on the thorny areas that are difficult to understand, because maybe there's something I am missing. If that author you picked has something to say about these thorns I'd be interested to see it.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Here's the source with the "Our Kirby Smith" account. Nothing about Rosecrans being shocked or enraged, and nothing about Grant sending Dickey and Lagow to inform Rosecrans of the change.

View attachment 518994

Also, I have the impression that only those with a Rosecrans bias blame the failure of the Iuka plan with being the beginning of the rift between Rosecrans and Grant. I think the rift really began a little later.

^There do appear to have been some issues between them already. We can glean this Rosecrans himself. This was covered in Lamers' biography, for instance. How serious? I don't know. Hard to say. That predated the Iuka operation.

I don't judge the plan harshly. I am merely trying to understand the controversial points, eventually to form my own opinion.

As far as the Union in general, they were in a difficult situation already because Halleck depleted their department to reinforce Buell, while at the same time he pressed Grant to do everything in his power to prevent Bragg from getting reinforcements. The irony of the entire thing isn't lost on me.

And I think Grant and Rosecrans didn't have all the time in the world to hatch a plan before Price slipped their noose. This wasn't like Hood patiently waiting for Thomas across Nashville while the latter got ready to attack when the stars aligned. In this case, either they did something bold or they would have faced an untrammeled confederate army somewhere else or Bragg would have gotten reinforced, and Grant didn't have overwhelming numbers or resources. Perhaps an enterprising confederate commander would have actually taken advantage of how vulnerable Grant and Rosecrans both were separated… but of course the confederacy in the region was led by Van Dorn…

Obviously I focus more on the thorny areas that are difficult to understand, because maybe there's something I am missing. If that author you picked has something to say about these thorns I'd be interested to see it.

I haven't really been intently following this thread.

Well, when more of a window subsequently emerged, they did try to take advantage via a rapid strike at Corinth, which was an extremely important strategic position from the Confederate perspective for the defense of Mississippi, Alabama and the Mississippi River.

I don't really have much skin in these fights, which is what these threads tend to be about with some, so I tend not to put much energy into them.

This is a topic which I know some about, but not one where thoughtful discussion seems possible on this site, tbh. There is a lot of emotion tied up in it for whatever reason and little reason from some. There is also another user on here who is a hardline Rosecrans advocate and wrote a short biography on him, which I own, who you will probably run into at some point, as well. He has certain entrenched views on things which are very problematic, as well, imo. It is just not worth the energy when there are productive discussions to be had.

 

[SSVilla]

^There do appear to have been some issues between them already. We can glean this Rosecrans himself. This was covered in Lamers' biography, for instance. How serious? I don't know. Hard to say. That predated the Iuka operation.


I haven't really been intently following this thread.

Well, when more of a window subsequently emerged, they did try to take advantage via a rapid strike at Corinth, which was an extremely important strategic position from the Confederate perspective for the defense of Mississippi, Alabama and the Mississippi River.

I don't really have much skin in these fights, which is what these threads tend to be about with some, so I tend not to put much energy into them.

This is a topic which I know some about, but not one where thoughtful discussion seems possible on this site, tbh. There is a lot of emotion tied up in it and little reason from some. There is also another user on here who is a hardline Rosecrans advocate and wrote a short biography on him, which I own, who you will probably run into at some point, as well. He has certain entrenched views on things which are very problematic, as well, imo. It is just not worth the energy when there are productive discussions to be had.

No problem. i understand that. I have also been dragged on occasions to arguments that I later regretted participating in. They went on longer than I had stamina for and I didn't learn anything from them.

I think I know who you mean. Peace.

 

[Lubliner]

These misunderstandings between any of us is no more than a reflection of what happened in real time back during this war. It does get magnified somewhat as we tend to glean it with a fine toothed comb. Cheers all.
Lubliner.

 

[SSVilla]

The lead elements in Rosecrans advance place the fight starting at 5pm or later.

William S Rosecrans and the Union Victory by David Moore | Wartime Politics, & Debates

The after action reports from the lead elements of Rosecrans force at Iuka place the start of the battle at some time after 5pm. See OR 1, Vol 17 part 1 pages 96-113. Sanborn, with the lead brigade, had cavalry out front skirmishing in the morning, at 1pm several cos from the 5th IA took over...

civilwartalk.com

thanks for sharing this link. I have some leisurely reading to do here. It should be interesting.

 

[DanSBHawk]

thanks for sharing this link. I have some leisurely reading to do here. It should be interesting.

It's a good read. Eric Calistri and Ned Baldwin really did an excellent job of bringing in the evidence from the sources and making coherent arguments about Iuka. Some of that is relevant to this discussion as well.

 

[Nathan Towne]

thanks for sharing this link. I have some leisurely reading to do here. It should be interesting.

Cozzens book is still the best of the modern books covering Iuka (it covers both Iuka and Corinth, of course), although I have not yet read Kitchens book. We certainly need something more though. Tim Smith's book doesn't cover Iuka.

The funny thing about it is that the more you know about the Iuka operation, the more you realize that we really don't know, frankly. I am not even convinced that anyone truly understands what the road network actually looked like. Cozzens pieced it together in his maps as well as anyone ever has, but there is plenty of interpretation there. So, it kind of bemused me to see people attempting to talk authoritatively on a subject in which there are so many issues. I can assure you, from my studying of the operation, that there is really a tremendous amount which remains unclear, frankly.

@SSVilla,

If I were you, my friend, I would ask the people whom you are discussing this topic with to explain to you exactly what the road network looked like south of Iuka. Just south of Iuka, I would inquire as to whether people can explain to you what they believe the road network actually looked like and support it via the historical record.

 

[Lubliner]

Cozzens pieced it together in his maps as well as anyone ever has, but there is plenty of interpretation there.

Would Sooy Smith's failed expedition into Mississippi from Tennessee help with the road network in that area?
Lubliner.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Would Sooy Smith's failed expedition into Mississippi from Tennessee help with the road network in that area?
Lubliner.

I doubt it, but you never know. The more sources, the better.

The point is, as is the case with other topics on here, we have people attempting to speak authoritatively on things, often without actually the grounds to be able to really do so and in an appropriate way. A lot of mistakes and highly dubious statements and conclusions come out of it.

 

[Lubliner]

I doubt it, but you never know. The more sources, the better.

I meant to propose Sturgis's attempt against Brice Crossroads in June of 1864.
Lubliner.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I meant to propose Sturgis's attempt against Brice Crossroads in June of 1864.
Lubliner.

Same answer.