Quote from Grants memoirs: "Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity." Now you can create hypotheticals all you want about what if Price built new bridges all of a sudden, but the fact remains that according to Grant it was a major obstacle to movement in that direction.
Before I respond, Ned, let me just say that I don't want to get into a rude spat with you. I respect you and your passion. I really honestly do. We agree on significantly more than we disagree on.
The trouble is and I say this constructively and with respect, you seem to come at
some things without putting in the same level of rigor and balance which you otherwise would. Again, I say that with respect to you. It is possible that my recollection on this is a bit off, but I recall you mentioning once that you had had interactions with historian Tim Smith online before and stated that while he is knowledgeable, they had been "testy" exchanges. If my recollection has not betrayed me, I would venture the guess that such
may have been an influencing factor in that.
As you know, memoirs, generally, are notoriously unreliable in terms of specifics, as they arise from someone's recollection of events, typically many years after the fact, from perceptions of others shaped by subsequent events and so on and should always be used with extreme care. Rosecrans post-war writings are equally as problematic. To be sure, some memoirs are more reliable than others. Some sections of one's writings may be reliable than in other areas. However, with regards to these things, they tend to pose serious problems that way. That doesn't mean that they do not have
any value. By no means. I own many. However, they need to be understood In terms of their serious limitations. Now, I recognize that Grant made statements in his reports on the operation which can be seen as to roughly correspond with his statement in his memoirs, but the larger point remains the same. Beginning with any account from someone's memoirs is problematic when we have a readily available contemporary record. Furthermore, we
know from the contemporary record that the prospect of the Confederate Army falling back to the east across Bear Creek was a fundamental consideration in the formulation of the plan.
The reality is that we know for a fact that the threat of the Confederates falling back to the east across Bear Creek was integral in the planning and formulation of the operation and was something which Rosecrans was fully cognizant of and had broached in the formulation of the plan. In fact, Rosecrans view at the time was that only by aggressively pushing on them immediately could movement via the defiles of Bear Creek be prevented. Furthermore, in the days following September 13th, it was
more than possible that Confederate forces at Iuka had thrown up at least temporary bridges in that time, or were in the process still of doing so, which could further aid such a movement. Prior to September 13th, Iuka had been garrisoned by a small force under the command of Robert Murphy, within Rosecrans' command. After Murphy had been fallen back on the 13th, the Confederates had held Iuka from that point forward. It wasn't until the 11th Missouri, under the command of Joe Mower, was ordered to press Iuka and discern what was there that it was discerned that Iuka was held by the Confederates in force. The plan was then rapidly formulated from there.
Rosecrans made this all explicitly clear as far as the concern of the Confederate force being able to pull back to the east was concerned, in his correspondence, as cited above. For instance, Rosecrans wrote to Grant:
"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment and all our cavalry, toward Barnett's on the Jacinto and Iuka Roads.
The only thing that we can do to prevent Price's passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."
It was the clearly stated view of Rosecrans in his communications at the time that the Confederate Army could pull back across Bear Creek, via the defiles of the creek, unless rapidly pressed, or, at least, that such was a very serious threat to the success of the operation. Being that he developed and formulated the plan, the area had been covered previously by forces in his command and that it was several days between the capture of Iuka and the knowledge of what was there being ascertained and the plan being formulated and put into motion, which was more than sufficient for bridges to be constructed which could
additionally aid in such a movement, there is absolutely no way in which such cannot be regarded as a integral element to the entire plan.
Here is Rosecrans to Grant, again:
"If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can tonight and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton Roads, massing heavily on the Fulton Road,
and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto from whence I will dispatch you by a line of vedettes to Burnsville."
If the scope of your understanding of the operation comes from Grant's Memoirs, then you are doing yourself a real disservice. This was my concern and why I was reticent in getting an intimate discussion on this subject. It begins with you being intimately familiar with the historical record, but right out of the gate, you stated something which is patently and demonstrably untrue based on the contemporary record. It makes things very problematic that way.
Bringing the