Random Thoughts on Iuka

[Nathan Towne]

The point about the road network was a good one. There are historical maps of Tishimingo County, but the earliest I can find is circa 1920.

If the roads in 1920 were anything like the roads in 1862, it's an extra five miles or so to get to Iuka by that route. If Rosecrans approaches on the Fulton Road, can he even get there by sundown?

Yes, this is a major issue and challenge that way in interpreting events, for sure.

The trouble, of course, with pushing the timetable back to the morning of the 20th was that the Confederate force could potentially slip out that night. In fact, Rosecrans forces had hit and contested Confederate skirmishers that day. This can be seen via Rosecrans correspondence to Grant from Barnett's Crossroads, which was time stamped at 12:40 P.M found at 17 OR 1:69 and is confirmed by a number of U.S. accounts. It wasn't just some hypothetical. The whole conception of the plan accounted for the fact that the Confederate force could pull back across Bear Creek to the east. Of course, if pressed, it would not be possible for them to do so though, or at least make it dramatically more difficult to do so, for the reason of Mr. @NedBaldwin's accordion/traffic conception when trying to move through passes, over bridges or via defiles of a river.

Beyond this, you have the obvious communication problem. These things would need to be sufficiently understood both ways between himself and Grant, lest Ord's attack go in alone and unsupported.

These were serious issues assisting in driving events as the day developed.

 

[Sid J.]

PUSG. Pesticide Usage Survey Group?

Well, I've only read about twelve volumes of the Papers of US Grant cover to cover, so I am certainly not qualified to answer.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Well, I've only read about twelve volumes of the Papers of US Grant cover to cover, so I am certainly not qualified to answer.

My point was solely about Ned's opening comment in which he showed that he isn't actually familiar with the pertinent facts or the record on this subject at all. Incontrovertibly so, to be honest. I obviously noted that that was a serious problem that way and demonstrated out of the gate a lack of understanding of the subject matter and of the record.

If you guys would like to have an illuminating and productive discussion on this topic somewhere, I would be willing. Just not with a certain other user involved, as it would then be a waste of time and energy that way.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I noticed before that you thought the fallout between Grant and Rosecrans started afterwards. I think for Grant that's obviously true. Immediately after, he was concerned about the next move, very characteristic for him. His first report was favorable to Rosecrans.

For Rosecrans however, I think it was different. Although comments made 20 years later can be tainted by the history of animosity that developed afterwards — I think this is maybe what you are saying. However, Rosecrans wrote to his wife that he couldn't shake the feeling that had the attack from the west been made, his trap would have succeeded. He just wouldn't let that go, and was completely blind to the reasons the attack from the west was postponed. This kind of "blindness" or lack of acknowledgment of his role in the postponement can help explain his confusing statements about the communication with Dickey and Lagow. He had a very formidable blind spot, where he was in denial that his delay caused a corresponding change. Like the saying goes: "There's none so blind as he who will not see." Cozzens added that Rosecrans never accepted the explanation of the acoustic shadow either.

I am citing this paragraph from Castel for the reference to the Rosecrans letter. You must have seen it before.

View attachment 519164

When isolated from Castel's opinions there ^ the letter and corresponding disappointment seem normal and not raging. However, Rosecrans was bitter about "the tardy justice" of getting his promotion to major general in September. That comment had nothing to do with Grant or Iuka and I think lies closer to the truth of all their problems… the quest for more rank, an independent command, etc.

It's true that I tend to look at the start of the "rift" as when Grant's attitude towards Rosecrans noticeably soured. It would be interesting to know more about what Rosecrans wrote at the time about Iuka. I believe the largest archive of Rosecrans papers is in California and has not been digitized and put online yet. That will make for some lively discussions when it's accessible.

One thing Henry Villard noted about spending time with Rosecrans is that he routinely spoke badly of his superiors. If that's the case, it might be hard to distinguish the start of the "rift" from his standpoint. He might have just been engaged in his usual bad-mouthing of a superior.

 

[danny]

Close! Papers of Ulysses S Grant.

Thank you

 

[Nathan Towne]

The point about the road network was a good one. There are historical maps of Tishimingo County, but the earliest I can find is circa 1920.

If the roads in 1920 were anything like the roads in 1862, it's an extra five miles or so to get to Iuka by that route. If Rosecrans approaches on the Fulton Road, can he even get there by sundown?

Thanks for the correction. That is now a very interesting topic for me to read on after I untangle this Iuka/Corinth thing (as well as I can anyway.)

Grant tended in his memoirs to make much about having to turn back when Van Dorn attacked the army depot at Holly Springs. Therefore my impression is that Grant was frustrated on his part.

Hey @SSVilla,

To be sure. However, there were other factors in play which induced that, aside from the Holly Springs raid, as well.

Hey @tony_gunter,

Would you be able/willing to provide that map?

At the Hatchie? I see this is after Van Dorn retreated from Corinth. I am still not there yet in the book. I might have to come back to this comment later.

————

I noticed before that you thought the fallout between Grant and Rosecrans started afterwards. I think for Grant that's obviously true. Immediately after, he was concerned about the next move, very characteristic for him. His first report was favorable to Rosecrans.

For Rosecrans however, I think it was different. Although comments made 20 years later can be tainted by the history of animosity that developed afterwards — I think this is maybe what you are saying. However, Rosecrans wrote to his wife that he couldn't shake the feeling that had the attack from the west been made, his trap would have succeeded. He just wouldn't let that go, and was completely blind to the reasons the attack from the west was postponed. This kind of "blindness" or lack of acknowledgment of his role in the postponement can help explain his confusing statements about the communication with Dickey and Lagow. He had a very formidable blind spot, where he was in denial that his delay caused a corresponding change. Like the saying goes: "There's none so blind as he who will not see." Cozzens added that Rosecrans never accepted the explanation of the acoustic shadow either.

I am citing this paragraph from Castel for the reference to the Rosecrans letter. You must have seen it before.

View attachment 519164

When isolated from Castel's opinions there ^ the letter and corresponding disappointment seem normal and not raging. However, Rosecrans was bitter about "the tardy justice" of getting his promotion to major general in September. That comment had nothing to do with Grant or Iuka and I think lies closer to the truth of all their problems… the quest for more rank, an independent command, etc.

—————

I also think that had this kind of unsatisfying battle result happened with someone else, it wouldn't have been a source of everlasting bitterness or angry feelings. Consider the disappointments Sherman and Grant had gone through. Shiloh, shocking battle, even in victory it was a source of much press criticism. Sherman and Grant could have blamed each other for the surprise but didn't. Grant almost quit and went home when Halleck placed him in a "time out" and Sherman convinced him to stay and wait things out, instead of ridding himself of Grant.

Then, it must have been a big disappointment for General Sherman to attack Chickasaw Bluffs in December and find it well defended, contrary to his plan with Grant. His attack was reported as a repulse, when it was one prong of a coordinated plan that failed on Grant's end. Again Sherman and Grant could have been at odds with each other, in some rivalry power play. Lucky for the U.S. they didn't play that game.

Meantime, this Iuka battle didn't accomplish all it intended, but it was not a repulse, a humiliation, or some shock, surely Rosecrans could still spin it to his advantage. Corinth was a battle with a favorable result for the Union, a victory. Rosecrans got the independent command he desired out of it. Yet it all ended poorly between Grant and Rosecrans?

The only explanation must be that the source of their problems was somewhere else. I am still trying to understand that. My impressions are still incomplete but my disposition is to think that the battles themselves aren't it.

There is no question that Rosecrans was very profoundly frustrated by what had happened. The issue relating to the altering of the plan on the 19th is a complicated one, but if Rosecrans understanding remained that Ord's attack was to go in first up through that night, the decision to move only via the Fulton Road is even further justified. On the basis that it was extremely difficult to be sure that Ord's attack would go forward at a specific pre-arranged time, in light of the fact that the timetable had had to be adjusted due to the confusion pertaining to Stanley's Division, the condition of the roads (at least prior to the 19th, in which the balance of the evidence does appear to indicate improvement as to the condition of the roads, at least to a degree) and the being resisted by Confederate pickets over the afternoon of the 19th, dividing his force was going to only be even more dangerous that way and it was highly problematic regardless. Forces moving along the Jacinto and Fulton roads could not mutually support one another and if the Confederate force were to come down either of those roads, in force, an isolated infantry Division (with cavalry support), could be driven in and possibly crushed. We also know from the record that Rosecrans was well aware of the existence of the Bay Springs Road, which he was feverishly trying to get to, obviously.

Again, the problem is that in terms of the plan which was formulated and the situation as it actually existed, there was always the real risk that the Confederate Army could pull back across Bear Creek to the east, unless pressed. We know that based on the actual conception of the plan and the contemporary correspondence relating to it, which didn't appear to have actually been read. So, the whole operation was a race against the clock that way.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The entire basis of the plan was to trap the confederates in a pincer, with no easy escape routes, and force them to fight. If splitting his forces to come up two roads was too risky, then Rosecrans' plan was a bad plan from the start.

I don't think Grant ever completely bought that "supporting distance" excuse. As Grant pointed out in his report, while it was true that the two roads began spread out from each other, they rapidly converged as they got closer to Iuka.

 

[Lubliner]

As Grant pointed out in his report, while it was true that the two roads began spread out from each other, they rapidly converged as they got closer to Iuka.

The problem was Rosecrans knew resistance would be met in moving on Iuka, thus delaying his men on one or the other, or both roads. This would preempt their ability to support one another. That was how I gleaned the argument.
Lubliner.

 

[tony_gunter]

Hey @SSVilla,

To be sure. However, there were other factors in play which induced that, aside from the Holly Springs raid, as well.

Hey @tony_gunter,

Would you be able/willing to provide that map?

There is no question that Rosecrans was very profoundly frustrated by what had happened. The issue relating to the altering of the plan on the 19th is a complicated one, but if Rosecrans understanding remained that Ord's attack was to go in first up through that night, the decision to move only via the Fulton Road is even further justified. On the basis that it was extremely difficult to be sure that Ord's attack would go forward at a specific pre-arranged time, in light of the fact that the timetable had had to be adjusted due to the confusion pertaining to Stanley's Division, the condition of the roads (at least prior to the 19th, in which the balance of the evidence does appear to indicate improvement as to the condition of the roads, at least to a degree) and the being resisted by Confederate pickets over the afternoon of the 19th, dividing his force was going to only be even more dangerous that way and it was highly problematic regardless. Forces moving along the Jacinto and Fulton roads could not mutually support one another and if the Confederate force were to come down either of those roads, in force, an isolated infantry Division (with cavalry support), could be driven in and possibly crushed. We also know from the record that Rosecrans was well aware of the existence of the Bay Springs Road, which he was feverishly trying to get to, obviously.

Again, the problem is that in terms of the plan which was formulated and the situation as it actually existed, there was always the real risk that the Confederate Army could pull back across Bear Creek to the east, unless pressed. We know that based on the actual conception of the plan and the contemporary correspondence relating to it, which didn't appear to have actually been read. So, the whole operation was a race against the clock that way.

Here's one from 1910, topological survey map no less! Approach Rosecrans took to Iuka is on the left, Fulton Road on the right.

What's interesting about the approach that Rosecrans took is that it descends into the bottom land of Cripple Deer Creek for what looks like a mile or more ... which explains why first-hand accounts stated that Rosecrans couldn't find dry land on which to deploy until he was virtually on top of the Confederate position.

The Fulton Road looks like a typical Mississippi ridge road, following the ridge tops with minimal creek crossings. If he were going to pick one road and throw his whole force in on that road, seems like it would have been better to approach up the Fulton Road ... but again, would he have gotten there before sunset? Sunset was at 6:30 IIRC, and the first of his forces didn't emerge from the Cripple Deer Creek bottoms until 4:30.

FWIW, the fact that Cripple Deer Creek was so swollen may impact your theory that the Confederates could have simply withdrawn across Bear Creek. Swollen creeks are a big deal in Mississippi, bridges wash out, fords become unfordable. Just ask Pemberton about Bakers Creek on May 15 and 16th, 1863.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The problem was Rosecrans knew resistance would be met in moving on Iuka, thus delaying his men on one or the other, or both roads. This would preempt their ability to support one another. That was how I gleaned the argument.
Lubliner.

If the plan depended on Ord attracting their attention first, before Rosecrans got close to Iuka on the two south roads, then why could not Rosecrans get his troops positioned on the two roads, and then ask Grant to have Ord attack at dawn?

The only reason the original arrangement was thrown in disarray was that Rosecrans insisted he would still be attacking on the 19th.

 

[tony_gunter]

If the plan depended on Ord attracting their attention first, before Rosecrans got close to Iuka on the two south roads, then why could not Rosecrans get his troops positioned on the two roads, and then ask Grant to have Ord attack at dawn?

The only reason the original arrangement was thrown in disarray was that Rosecrans insisted he would still be attacking on the 19th.

Because the Confederates had already detected Rosecrans' presence. They wouldn't stick around for another day, regardless.

 

[Nathan Towne]

If the plan depended on Ord attracting their attention first, before Rosecrans got close to Iuka on the two south roads, then why could not Rosecrans get his troops positioned on the two roads, and then ask Grant to have Ord attack at dawn?

The only reason the original arrangement was thrown in disarray was that Rosecrans insisted he would still be attacking on the 19th.

Because they had driven in Confederate pickets during the day in the approach to Iuka and hence knew that U.S. forces were coming (Ord's forces had also driven back less extensive pickets) and in the whole conception of Rosecrans plan as he conceived it and understood the situation, as has been shown to you above via the contemporary correspondence, there was a very real threat that the Confederate force could slip back across Bear Creek unless pressed and hence prevented from doing so. Being that they at that point knew that an operation had been set in motion against them, they could pull back across the creek that night.

We have the contemporary correspondence involving the commander with whom his forces had been previously covering this area, knew the ground best, formulated the plan and articulated it to his superior.

Additionally, if Rosecrans force is divided and covering both the Fulton and Jacinto road, from where they cannot support one another, the entire Confederate force could fall on one isolated half that evening, or at dawn.

 

[tony_gunter]

So here's the battlefield on that 1910 map, so we can understand the topological aspects that the 1876 Army Corps of Engineers map leaves out.

Here's the corps of engineers map, basically the Federal troops were attacking up hill.

Strange, though, that the Confederates didn't take advantage of the water-covered fields just south of here. They could have held off Rosecrans entire force with a fraction of the men. On this map, Rosecrans would have been emerging from the bottom left, Confederates would have had troops on the ridge at the top left and on the ridge to the right. Rosecrans' forces would have had to attack across water-covered fields, and either direction of attack would have resulted in being enfiladed from the other.

 

[Nathan Towne]

So here's the battlefield on that 1910 map, so we can understand the topological aspects that the 1876 Army Corps of Engineers map leaves out.

View attachment 519331

Here's the corps of engineers map, basically the Federal troops were attacking up hill.

View attachment 519332

Strange, though, that the Confederates didn't take advantage of the water-covered fields just south of here. They could have held off Rosecrans entire force with a fraction of the men. On this map, Rosecrans would have been emerging from the bottom left, Confederates would have had troops on the ridge at the top left and on the ridge to the right. Rosecrans' forces would have had to attack across water-covered fields, and either direction of attack would have resulted in being enfiladed from the other.
View attachment 519338

That is basically how Cozzens interpreted the road network at this point. He probably got it from these older maps, to be frank.

 

[tony_gunter]

So, here's the broader map to show Rosecrans' objective point. The battlefield is at the bottom left, the Fulton Road runs the length of the right side of the map, and the heights commanding the Fulton Road are in the center, the ridge labeled 618 . Basically, just inside the city of Iuka. Under the approach Rosecrans chose, he has to literally capture Iuka to prevent Price from escaping Iuka.

 

[Nathan Towne]

So, here's the broader map to show Rosecrans' objective point. The battlefield is at the bottom left, the Fulton Road runs the length of the right side of the map, and the heights commanding the Fulton Road are in the center, the ridge labeled 618 . Basically, just inside the city of Iuka. Under the approach Rosecrans chose, he has to literally capture Iuka to prevent Price from escaping Iuka.

View attachment 519346

Well, Rosecrans was well aware of the presence of the Bay Springs Road. He said so in his correspondence. That was the objective point which would permit cross support, from where the attack would roll in against the Confederate force wherever they were, or from where their component of the attack would roll in.

 

[tony_gunter]

Well, Rosecrans was well aware of the presence of the Bay Springs Road. He said so in his correspondence. That was the objective point which would permit cross support, from where the attack would roll in against the Confederate force wherever they were, or from where their component of the attack would roll in.

Yeah, I'm just pointing out all the houses on the Bay Springs Road southeast of downtown. Maybe they weren't present in 1862. They don't appear on the Corps of Engineers map, and the population of Iuka appears to have grown from 300 to 1200 between 1862 and 1910.

 

[tony_gunter]

Contrast: battlefield today. Wow. I used to drive through Iuka every week or two back in the 90's, I don't think any of this existed back then. Preservation = 0.

 

[tony_gunter]

Contrast: battlefield today. Wow. I used to drive through Iuka every week or two back in the 90's, I don't think any of this existed back then. Preservation = 0.

Am I reading that cemetery name correctly?

Goyem?

Edit: I am not, it's Goyer. *disappointed face*

 

[Nathan Towne]

So here's the battlefield on that 1910 map, so we can understand the topological aspects that the 1876 Army Corps of Engineers map leaves out.

View attachment 519331

Here's the corps of engineers map, basically the Federal troops were attacking up hill.

View attachment 519332

Strange, though, that the Confederates didn't take advantage of the water-covered fields just south of here. They could have held off Rosecrans entire force with a fraction of the men. On this map, Rosecrans would have been emerging from the bottom left, Confederates would have had troops on the ridge at the top left and on the ridge to the right. Rosecrans' forces would have had to attack across water-covered fields, and either direction of attack would have resulted in being enfiladed from the other.
View attachment 519338

That Army Corps of Engineers map is nice!