Random Thoughts on Iuka

[tony_gunter]

Where was Fulton at the time? I know of the Fulton of today, but not where Fulton was at the time. Why would the Conte de Paris have marked the roads as he did?

I think Fulton is the same location, but the road to it veered widely to the east for some bizarre reason. As far as Comte, it's prolly cuz he talk that OUI OUI instead of that YEE YEE.

 

[TallTallMan]

I'll find it odd if Rosey gets digitized when to this day there has never been a comprehensive publishing in any medium of Lee's papers, thus being the only major figure without an unabridged reprinting of his letters like Lincoln, Davis and Grant.

I can't imagine Rosecrans would say much to interest your average "farb" except scholars, Rosecrans fans or the Iuka/Corinth and Chickamauga people.

 

[breckod]

I'll find it odd if Rosey gets digitized when to this day there has never been a comprehensive publishing in any medium of Lee's papers, thus being the only major figure without an unabridged reprinting of his letters like Lincoln, Davis and Grant.

I can't imagine Rosecrans would say much to interest your average "farb" except scholars, Rosecrans fans or the Iuka/Corinth and Chickamauga people.

I believe the Lee descendants are responsible for that,

 

[TallTallMan]

I believe the Lee descendants are responsible for that,

Dang.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I think Fulton is the same location, but the road to it veered widely to the east for some bizarre reason. As far as Comte, it's prolly cuz he talk that OUI OUI instead of that YEE YEE.

The Fulton of today is almost as far south of Tupelo and is further south than Baldwyn and Saltillo, albeit to the East of them.

It is over twenty miles south of Marietta.

It would seem to me that the Fulton Road would then be the same road which Price's forces moved north on on the 13th and early on the 14th. They moved north on the road from Bald Springs beginning at around 3:00 A.M. on the 13th (or at least in the predawn hours) and reached Peyton's Mill early that evening, while Armstrong's cavalry brigade reached and hit Iuka beginning early that morning. Henry Little stated that that their wagons reached Peyton's Mill around 8:30 P.M. and they commenced the march again around 11:00 P.M., reaching several miles short of Iuka by dawn where they rested briefly and then continued on to Iuka early on the 14th.

 

[lelliott19]

From the 1876 Corps of Engineers Map, the roads cut through north of that farmstead/home which I can't precisely make out the name of (Dubins?).

Dubois. That farmstead is labeled Dubois

 

[Nathan Towne]

Dubois. That farmstead is labeled Dubois

I appreciate it. I couldn't read it.

 

[tony_gunter]

The Fulton of today is almost as far south of Tupelo and is further south than Baldwyn and Saltillo, albeit to the East of them.

It is over twenty miles south of Marietta.

It would seem to me that the Fulton Road would then be the same road which Price's forces moved north on on the 13th and early on the 14th. They moved north on the road from Bald Springs beginning at around 3:00 A.M. on the 13th (or at least in the predawn hours) and reached Peyton's Mill early that evening, while Armstrong's cavalry brigade reached and hit Iuka beginning early that morning. Henry Little stated that that their wagons reached Peyton's Mill around 8:30 P.M. and they commenced the march again around 11:00 P.M., reaching several miles short of Iuka by dawn where they rested briefly and then continued on to Iuka early on the 14th.

Yeah, Fulton was one of the first towns established after removal of the Chickasaw. An improved road was established from Eastport to Fulton, I'm assuming because both had access to steam transport for cotton and settlers?

So the Fulton Road predates Iuka by a decade or more.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yeah, Fulton was one of the first towns established after removal of the Chickasaw. An improved road was established from Eastport to Fulton, I'm assuming because both had access to steam transport for cotton and settlers?

So the Fulton Road predates Iuka by a decade or more.

It would seem that the Comte de Paris and Cozzens had it right then…….

 

[tony_gunter]

It would seem that the Comte de Paris and Cozzens had it right then…….

No, the road Comte labeled the Fulton Road is just a connection to the Fulton Road. The Fulton Road runs north / south.

So he's got the Fulton Road on here, but he doesn't have the northern section of it on the map for some reason, and the section with the label is just a connecting farm road running out of Iuka.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No, the road Comte labeled the Fulton Road is just a connection to the Fulton Road. The Fulton Road runs north / south.

So he's got the Fulton Road on here, but he doesn't have the northern section of it on the map for some reason, and the section with the label is just a connecting farm road running out of Iuka.

Can you prove that that road does not actually run south to Cartersville? That is how you will find which is the Fulton road. The Fulton road will be the road which runs north from Cartersville.

Where does that road go on the topographical map and where does the road to the east go?

 

[Nathan Towne]

The entire basis of the plan was to trap the confederates in a pincer, with no easy escape routes, and force them to fight. If splitting his forces to come up two roads was too risky, then Rosecrans' plan was a bad plan from the start.

I don't think Grant ever completely bought that "supporting distance" excuse. As Grant pointed out in his report, while it was true that the two roads began spread out from each other, they rapidly converged as they got closer to Iuka.

As compared to what? Doing nothing? The Army of the West had moved to Iuka in order to harass Rosecrans forces and prevent him from sending additional forces across the Tennessee river via Eastport and/or a Pittsburgh landing. They were never going to be able to be in a position to contest substantial elements of both the Army of the Mississippi and the Army of the Tennessee, nor did they have intention of doing so. Once sufficient information was provided from the September 16th operation against Iuka via Mower's brigade (what had been Murphy's brigade), it was clear that there was a real opportunity if U.S. forces could move fast enough and get a little bit of luck. It was always something of a long shot, but it was possible and if you never take shots, you will never hit one. There was a real opportunity here, again, even if something of a long shot.

When you understand the situation properly and in light of the size of Price's force, I think that it becomes pretty clear how difficult this was going to be and based on the situation as he confronted it, Rosecrans probably made the right decision in moving via the Jacinto road alone, but it was a difficult decision at that point. They were going to have to pitch into the Army of the West hard regardless and we have covered some of the basic nature of the situation as it actually existed here already. Had they moved via the two roads separately, they would have probably be hit in force, most likely with all of Little's Division, or possibly with both Little's and Maury's Divisions combined on one of the two roads. Had they pushed to get to the Army of the West that day/evening, they would have fallen back via Bear Creek that night. Had they been able to get to the Bay Springs Road and move laterally upon it and then pitch into them, especially if following the attack from Ord's men and could have turned the left of the Army of the West between them and Bear Creek, you never know. It is possible that they could have caught them. They then would have most likely still had to destroy them, but it was possible. Again, it was a long shot that way.

 

[DanSBHawk]

As compared to what? Doing nothing? The Army of the West had moved to Iuka in order to harass Rosecrans forces and prevent him from sending additional forces across the Tennessee river via Eastport and/or a Pittsburgh landing. They were never going to be able to be in a position to contest substantial elements of both the Army of the Mississippi and the Army of the Tennessee, nor did they have intention of doing so. Once sufficient information was provided from the September 16th operation against Iuka via Mower's brigade (what had been Murphy's brigade), it was clear that there was a real opportunity if U.S. forces could move fast enough and get a little bit of luck. It was always something of a long shot, but it was possible and if you never take shots, you will never hit one. There was a real opportunity here, again, even if something of a long shot.

When you understand the situation properly and in light of the size of Price's force, I think that it becomes pretty clear how difficult this was going to be and based on the situation as he confronted it, Rosecrans probably made the right decision in moving via the Jacinto road alone, but it was a difficult decision at that point. They were going to have to pitch into the Army of the West hard regardless and we have covered some of the basic nature of the situation as it actually existed here already. Had they moved via the two roads separately, they would have probably be hit in force, most likely with all of Little's Division, or possibly with both Little's and Maury's Divisions combined on one of the two roads. Had they pushed to get to the Army of the West that day/evening, they would have fallen back via Bear Creek that night. Had they been able to get to the Bay Springs Road and move laterally upon it and then pitch into them, especially if following the attack from Ord's men and could have turned the left of the Army of the West between them and Bear Creek, you never know. It is possible that they could have caught them. They then would have most likely still had to destroy them, but it was possible. Again, it was a long shot that way.

When did I suggest doing nothing?

Some points to keep in mind:
- If Rosecrans had decided to keep with the plan and send forces to both roads, it would have been evening before the two forces were in place on the two roads. The battle would have been delayed until the next morning.
- Even if Price decide to try to escape before a fight, he is not going to attempt a night march east through Bear Creek, unless he wants to lose his entire supply train and all his artillery.
- If Price does decide to try to escape before a fight, he is going to try to break out on one of the roads south. And if he attempts that, then he is going to have the same problem that Rosecrans had with bunching up all his troops on one road. Price would not be able to deploy all his troops in battle. He might be able to break through before dark, or maybe not. Not a good situation.

Everything that went wrong with this battle was because Rosecrans failed to keep to the timetable and then brought on the battle late in the day on the 19th without having the two roads blocked.

 

[Lubliner]

Everything that went wrong with this battle was because Rosecrans failed to keep to the timetable and then brought on the battle late in the day on the 19th without having the two roads blocked.

Please clear up my understanding on this attack. Wasn't Rosecrans waiting for Ord to attack first? The battle was supposed to begin there so Price's men would be less prepared for the Jacinto road movement, where the assault could be in force.
Lubliner.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Please clear up my understanding on this attack. Wasn't Rosecrans waiting for Ord to attack first? The battle was supposed to begin there so Price's men would be less prepared for the Jacinto road movement, where the assault could be in force.
Lubliner.

There was originally a plan for a coordinated attack in the morning of the 19th. But when Rosecrans fell behind schedule, the timetable was thrown up in the air.

Rosecrans sent messages that he would be in place by 2:00 in the afternoon. Grant looked at a map and thought that ETA was impossible, and so he told Ord to hold up until he heard a battle. The reason Grant thought that it was impossible is that he expected Rosecrans would be coming in on both roads.

Rosecrans was able to arrive and initiate the battle about 4:00 because he came in on the shortest route on one road, while leaving the other road open. He did not notify Grant that he was doing this.

So, in striving to have the battle before dark, Rosecrans decided to leave an escape route open.

I realize other posters have different theories on why Rosecrans left the Fulton road open for the confederates to escape, but my opinion it that he left it open because he was running so late and he was trying to make up time by coming in the shorter route. He thought wrongly that he could detach a force to the Fulton road once he got close to Iuka.

 

[Nathan Towne]

When did I suggest doing nothing?

Some points to keep in mind:
- If Rosecrans had decided to keep with the plan and send forces to both roads, it would have been evening before the two forces were in place on the two roads. The battle would have been delayed until the next morning.
- Even if Price decide to try to escape before a fight, he is not going to attempt a night march east through Bear Creek, unless he wants to lose his entire supply train and all his artillery.
- If Price does decide to try to escape before a fight, he is going to try to break out on one of the roads south. And if he attempts that, then he is going to have the same problem that Rosecrans had with bunching up all his troops on one road. Price would not be able to deploy all his troops in battle. He might be able to break through before dark, or maybe not. Not a good situation.

Everything that went wrong with this battle was because Rosecrans failed to keep to the timetable and then brought on the battle late in the day on the 19th without having the two roads blocked.

I don't think that these "points" have much basis in the record. It is important to move with the evidence, rather than to attempt to fight against it.

If not pressed, I the record indicates quite clearly that Price could have pulled back across Bear Creek to the east that night. At least such was the contemporary understanding of the relevant party and for good reason. We don't know whether that would have come with any consequent loss in trains or artillery, or not.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant's opinion at the time was that closing both roads south would have left Price with no good options. From Grant's report:

"This was the first I knew of the Fulton road being left open to the enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out."

I'll go with Grant's opinion.

 

[Lubliner]

So the crux of our argument revolves around Bear Creek, whether this avenue of escape was possible, on the one condition of the Fulton Road being covered by Rosecrans. We know it wasn't and the Bear Creek exit wasn't necessary.
We have two conflicting points of why the advance on Iuka was a failure. Grant theorizing it was Rosecrans' mistake, and Rosecrans' believing otherwise. Did I sum this up properly?
Lubliner.

 

[Nathan Towne]

So the crux of our argument revolves around Bear Creek, whether this avenue of escape was possible, on the one condition of the Fulton Road being covered by Rosecrans. We know it wasn't and the Bear Creek exit wasn't necessary.
We have two conflicting points of why the advance on Iuka was a failure. Grant theorizing it was Rosecrans' mistake, and Rosecrans' believing otherwise. Did I sum this up properly?
Lubliner.

Basically, a certain user believes that we take statements from an officers report, such as Grant's second report and his statements in his Memoirs, based in part on recollection, as being dispositive and end the inquiry there, which is okay. Mr. @DanSBHawk is free to engage in historical inquiry in the manner in which he sees fit, or he believes is appropriate. I think that others can see for themselves how obviously problematic that is.

Regarding the quote which he actually put up, it was an interesting choice, as no one ever stated that it wouldn't necessarily be a difficult crossing of Bear Creek. That isn't really the issue. The Army of the West would have had time to implement such a crossing on the night of the 19th-20th and whether they would have had to have abandoned any of their wagons, or artillery, is a question without a definite or clear-cut answer, frankly. Such would also be influenced by how events played out on the 19th, of course. He could have chosen other quotes from Grant's second report in order to make his case much more strongly that way.

Regarding Grant's criticisms, Grant endorsed the decision to move via the Jacinto road alone in his initial report, but was much less enamored with it by the time of his second report, as I am sure that you are aware. That is a whole other discussion that way, frankly.

@Lubliner,

If yourself, @NedBaldwin, @tony_gunter, @Eric Calistri and/or @SSVilla would like to engage in a more in-depth discussion on this topic, I would be happy to do so.

 

[DanSBHawk]

So the crux of our argument revolves around Bear Creek, whether this avenue of escape was possible, on the one condition of the Fulton Road being covered by Rosecrans. We know it wasn't and the Bear Creek exit wasn't necessary.
We have two conflicting points of why the advance on Iuka was a failure. Grant theorizing it was Rosecrans' mistake, and Rosecrans' believing otherwise. Did I sum this up properly?
Lubliner.

I think the possibility of confederates escaping east through Bear Creek is of very little relevance or importance to the Battle of Iuka. Price would have had to be pretty desperate to try it - especially at night - and as you said it wasn't necessary because the Fulton road was left open.

As far as the blame game for the failure of the plan, I don't think Grant made much of an issue about it. On the other hand, SSVilla provided a link earlier in the thread of Rosecrans writing to his wife which sounded like Rosecrans was stewing about it and blamed Grant and Ord for the failure of the plan.