Random Thoughts on Iuka

[DanSBHawk]

I recognize that you have expressed your unfounded view that the relevant record is to be ignored and disregarded though, per usual.

That's a lie. I've never said anything should be ignored or disregarded. I think the record should be understood.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That's a lie. I've never said anything should be ignored or disregarded. I think the record should be understood.

It is what you have effectively stated, repeatedly. Then again, to be honest, I don't think that you have shown much understanding of much of anything over virtually any area of the war.

We all need to know what we are talking about before we begin to make arguments. That is on this issue, as well as on every other. The other night, I noticed this, for instance, on a video sent to me by another user regarding the Vicksburg Campaign. I thought that it was quite an interesting depiction of Carter Stevenson. We all need to be accurate in what we say and be as careful and judicious as is possible.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It is what you have effectively stated, repeatedly. Then again, to be honest, I don't think that you have shown much understanding of much of anything over virtually any area of the war.

That's fine. Your understanding of these things certainly doesn't impress me either.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That's fine. Your understanding of these things certainly doesn't impress me either.

At least it is accurate and based on a comprehensive and judicious analysis of the record, rather than conjecture and innuendo.

 

[JackADriscoll]

I think it's time for a moderator to step in and turn this thread off.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I think it's time for a moderator to step in and turn this thread off.

Interacting with one particular user, who attempts to present themself as an authority, even when they know essentially nothing about a particular subject matter and is probably the rudest person I have heard of has not been a pleasant experience.

Lack of knowledge, coupled with concept, are not a good combination.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Interacting with one particular user, who attempts to present themself as an authority, even when they know essentially nothing about a particular subject matter and is probably the rudest person I have heard of has not been a pleasant experience.

Lack of knowledge, coupled with concept, are not a good combination.

I certainly haven't tried to present myself as an authority. That's a lie.

 

[JackADriscoll]

Interacting with one particular user, who attempts to present themself as an authority, even when they know essentially nothing about a particular subject matter and is probably the rudest person I have heard of has not been a pleasant experience.

Lack of knowledge, coupled with concept, are not a good combination.

Then stop doing it? I can't imagine a reason to prolong something on a message board that is unpleasant

 

[1SGDan]

For you analysis it adds nothing and I understand that, because you have a military focus, analyzing why military operations succeed or fail. For that focus all the other stuff is superfluous.

However, some of us are interested in the human factors and for those, things are always more complicated, like politics, rivalries, jealousies, motivations, repercussions, etc.

I can understand interest in every focus without being ridiculed and insulted for mine.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There is always more to learn which is why I am always so careful, or try to be. When we come in guns blazing on something, it is important that key relevant facts are known. That was unfortunately not attained in this case, as shown above.

 

[SSVilla]

Okay, let's try to put this Bear Creek nonsense to rest. Here is a modern terrain map of Iuka and the land to the east of Iuka. You can see how bad it gets as it descends into the Bear Creek bottomland. Bear Creek runs north-south along the border for at least 20 miles and empties into the Tennessee River. The closer you get to the Tennessee River, the more difficult the terrain. It's much easier terrain to navigate further south.
View attachment 522460
Now here's a historical map of the area. During this period of time, both sides worried that the other side would detach troops to aid either Buell or Bragg. The confederates worried that Rosecrans would cross the Tennessee River at Eastport and join Buell. The federals worried that Price would cross Bear Creek into Alabama and then cross the Tennessee River to join Bragg. That is the high-level worrying that's going on at the time. There really was a concern that Price would cross Bear Creek (somewhere) to go join Bragg.
View attachment 522462

But the actual battle plan for the Battle of Iuka was not really concerned about Price crossing Bear Creek. The possibility was acknowledged, but it was considered by the Union commanders as being a bad option for the confederates. The Union commanders considered that Ord attacking from the west while Rosecrans blocked the two southern roads would essentially "trap" Price and force him to fight. Both Grant and Rosecrans explicitly said that this was the plan:

Here's Grant in his official report: "This was the first I knew of the Fulton Road being left open to enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast, with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out"

Here's Rosecrans in his testimony to the Joint Committee: "...it would be probably be better that, with Stanley's division, I should join Hamilton's at Jacinto, and, moving with the two by the Tuscumbia road, should get possession of the rebels' line of retreat, south of Iuka, by seizing and holding both the Fulton and Jacinto roads, which at Iuka were only a mile and a half apart, and the ground there being highly favorable for the operation, while General Ord's entire force should attack Price in front, and thus put him completely in our power."

So you have Grant and Rosecrans, and every historian ever, all agreeing that the possibility of the confederates escaping directly due east from Iuka was of very little importance to the actual battle plan. Same with the possibility of the confederates escaping north from Iuka and being blocked by the Tennessee River.

This entire theory of Nathan's is more about this weird competitive vendetta he has against Ned Baldwin. It's all about posturing and claiming that he knows more than Ned. What Nathan has done here is simply gathered some sources that mention Bear Creek, and then tried to link them directly to the battle. But not one of them explicitly describes a specific route crossing Bear Creek directly east from Iuka. The easier crossings of Bear Creek would have been to the south of Iuka. And one of the sources Nathan repeatedly posts is from the 16th and has Grant writing of Price moving northeast from Bay Springs to cross Bear Creek. You can see by the map that this would not necessarily involve going anywhere near Iuka.

So the entire Bear Creek brouhaha is nonsense. Just a bunch of hot air and posturing and an out-of-control ego. Other posters, like 1SGDan, are much more informed on the Battle of Iuka. Nathan's theory flies in the face of the historical evidence and it lacks common sense.

Thanks for posting the maps. They help me understand what's being talked about here. I see Bear Creek referred to as the Big Bear Creek in the older map. I assume it's the same creek.

We know it had rained and conditions were bad even on roads. Taking "the defiles of Bear Creek" would have been an act of desperation, a need Price was not confronted with.

However, to escape via the creek, how do you get to it? It doesn't start from within Iuka. Presumably Price would still have to use some road to get to it, I don't understand that part. I suppose since he never had to use that Creek it's also irrelevant, but to escape via the creek Peice and men would have to leave Iuka through somewhere.

Thanks for clearing up the issue of the preexisting vendetta. It's a shame it swept up a few of us like me, who had no prior of knowledge of it, cared nothing about it, and were really talking about something else in this thread when Bear Creek as a subject came up.

 

[SSVilla]

I can understand interest in every focus without being ridiculed and insulted for mine.

Right you are on that.

 

[SSVilla]

There is always more to learn which is why I am always so careful, or try to be. When we come in guns blazing on something, it is important that key relevant facts are known. That was unfortunately not attained in this case, as shown above.

I mean this in a kind way Nathan, but the problem is the tone of your posts. They generate hostility simply because of that, and I've seen people get edgy here that are normally very polite with everyone n response to your own edginess.

Mostly I wanted to understand this battle, and Bear Creek proved a confusion. I ask you what's relevant about it?

@DanSBHawk provided maps and explained what he thought about its (lack of) relevance to what happened on September 19, and also how this Bear Creek issue relates to a prior disagreement — or as he terms it — a vendetta.

I didn't know anything about this vendetta. I thought you were trying to make some argument on behalf of Rosecrans, specifically about his urgency to push up on the 19. Maybe you have thoughts on why he did that, despite everything going wrong that day, why he felt he couldn't wait for the day after, etc.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I mean this in a kind way Nathan, but the problem is the tone of your posts. They generate hostility simply because of that, and I've seen people get edgy here that are normally very polite with everyone n response to your own edginess.

Mostly I wanted to understand this battle, and Bear Creek proved a confusion. I ask you what's relevant about it?

@DanSBHawk provided maps and explained what he thought about its (lack of) relevance to what happened on September 19, and also how this Bear Creek issue relates to a prior disagreement — or as he terms it — a vendetta.

I didn't know anything about this vendetta. I thought you were trying to make some argument on behalf of Rosecrans, specifically about his urgency to push up on the 19. Maybe you have thoughts on why he did that, despite everything going wrong that day, why he felt he couldn't wait for the day after, etc.

If you go and read the tone of the Post #483, you should be able to see some of the problem there. Coming in blazing with personal insults, coupled with inaccurate information, was not productive.

Yes, my basic view is that Rosecrans really had to push forward on the 19th in order to reach and strike the Confederate Army of the West on the 19th, if possible, because of the understanding that the Confederate Army could pull back to the east via Bear Creek that night under the cover of darkness and the Confederates already knew that they were coming due to their pickets being driven in that morning and over the course of the afternoon, so there was certainly immense risk that they would do so. Consequently, the clock was ticking and we know that the Army of the West could have moved via the road coming out of Iuka to the east, which was specifically mentioned elsewhere in the OR. Furthermore, the National attack from the west could not be left to hang out to dry. The basic conception of the plan was to move to cover the roads heading south out of Iuka, get up close to the Confederate position as rapidly and clandestinely as could be done and with the attack coming in from the west which would tie down the Confederate force and deprive them of their avenues to move out of Iuka to the north, attack from the south, attempting to crush in the left flank of the Army of the West in order to deprive them of the ability to pull out of Iuka to the east and move via Bear Creek. If all of that could be attained, then maybe, just maybe, the entire Confederate force could be destroyed. Obviously, once the Confederates recognized on the 19th that Federal forces were bearing down on them, they couldn't pull out as they were under such grave threat. It is the same situation as existed at Antietam in terms of the complication associated with having the enemy on top of you in superior force with a river to your back and narrow corridors of escape. So, they were going to have to survive the 19th and pull out that night.

The trouble was that amidst the movement it was discerned that the ground between the Jacinto and Fulton roads made mutually support between them wholly impossible for much of their length. In combination, the day was rapidly moving along and time was of the essence. Being that they were going to have to get to the connecting road, which would enable them to cover the Fulton anyways, in order to be in position to launch the attack, which was what was the intention regardless, Rosecrans' made the understandable decision to move solely via the Jacinto road in order to make it to the connecting road from where the Fulton could be covered (with the forces mutually supporting) and move to launch the attack, crushing in the Confederate left, if possible.

 

[Rebforever]

The trouble there is that the above is not a comprehensive map, as the Mill road and the connecting road and a litany of other roads which we know were present, just as we do regarding at least one road moving east out Iuka. This is known from the relevant correspondence in the OR, as well. Just more correspondence which certain users are not familiar with.

Which OR is that from?

 

[Rebforever]

That is certainly where I go, with the relevant contemporary record which lines up on one side against Dan Hawk on the other.

I recognize that you have expressed your unfounded view that the relevant record is to be ignored and disregarded though, per usual.

In order to preempt you putting up a selective quotation from Grant's second report, we already know what was stated in the relevant record at the time.

Can you show that relevant record?

 

[Nathan Towne]

Can you show that relevant record?

Regarding the conception of the plan?

Yes, please see Post #493.

 

[Rebforever]

Regarding the conception of the plan?

Yes, please see Post #493.

Repost it, please.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Repost it, please.

Hey,

So, I don't have access to a computer at the moment and am on my phone right now.

Here is where the Post number is. You want to go back to #493.

 

[SSVilla]

Yes, my basic view is that Rosecrans really had to push forward on the 19th in order to reach and strike the Confederate Army of the West on the 19th, if possible, because of the understanding that the Confederate Army could pull back to the east via Bear Creek that night under the cover of darkness and the Confederates already knew that they were coming due to their pickets being driven in that morning and over the course of the afternoon, so there was certainly immense risk that they would do so. Consequently, the clock was ticking and we know that the Army of the West could have moved via the road coming out of Iuka to the east, which was specifically mentioned elsewhere in the OR. Furthermore, the National attack from the west could not be left to hang out to dry. The basic conception of the plan was to move to cover the roads heading south out of Iuka, get up close to the Confederate position as rapidly and clandestinely as could be done and with the attack coming in from the west which would tie down the Confederate force and deprive them of their avenues to move out of Iuka to the north, attack from the south, attempting to crush in the left flank of the Army of the West in order to deprive them of the ability to pull out of Iuka to the east and move via Bear Creek. If all of that could be attained, then maybe, just maybe, the entire Confederate force could be destroyed. Obviously, once the Confederates recognized on the 19th that Federal forces were bearing down on them, they couldn't pull out as they were under such grave threat. It is the same situation as existed at Antietam in terms of the complication associated with having the enemy on top of you in superior force with a river to your back and narrow corridors of escape. So, they were going to have to survive the 19th and pull out that night.

The trouble was that amidst the movement it was discerned that the ground between the Jacinto and Fulton roads made mutually support between them wholly impossible for much of their length. In combination, the day was rapidly moving along and time was of the essence. Being that they were going to have to get to the connecting road, which would enable them to cover the Fulton anyways, in order to be in position to launch the attack, which was what was the intention regardless, Rosecrans' made the understandable decision to move solely via the Jacinto road in order to make it to the connecting road from where the Fulton could be covered (with the forces mutually supporting) and move to launch the attack, crushing in the Confederate left, if possible.

Ok I thank you for explaining your thoughts. I see some points where we'd disagree so I'll get them out of the way early. I recognize that you aren't compelled in any way to think like me and some issues are controversial, specifically made so by Rosecrans, for example, whether he knew that Ord would only attack in response to his own attack first. That issue is extremely debatable but we can move past it.

Getting to Bear Creek, how? What would it take to get there? I am using my imagination, Iuka is an open area, not fenced, not a fort, so they could leave in any direction, but obviously they must have some plan of escape… It's not just about walking out of the town, but to go where. Did getting to Bear Creek mean walking on marshy woods? Are there trails? Roads? How to move an army of over 10,000 men, horses, and artillery to that creek? I need to picture this, because in order to block that route Rosecrans let the best route of escape, the Fulton road uncovered. That was a huge change of operations IMO. I may be incorrect but you seem to be arguing that Rosecrans prioritized preventing an escape through some route (frankly unclear) that led to Bear Creek, over covering the Fulton Road.

I grant you that he had a plan concerning how to block Fulton eventually once he got to Iuka, but it was a difficult plan that required getting so close to Iuka that he would necessarily bring on a battle for access to that road. This is essentially what happened.

I think he judged when he was discovered that a battle was upon him anyway. No way the old woodpecker Price would allow himself to be cornered without some battle and the issue was whether it was going to be a battle with half of his army on some far column at Fulton, or to confront Price with all his army in a single column. He chose the latter. And I understand that choice. I think he should have let Grant know what he was doing and I suppose we can only speculate as to why he did not do so (and a I posted my own theories somewhere if someone wants to read them).

I think ultimately though what's key is that even though we disagree on some points you still come to this conclusion:

"If all of that could be attained, then maybe, just maybe, the entire Confederate force could be destroyed."
​

It was too tall a task, an impossible task. Some of the elements of the plan you list as necessary were no longer doable, like "get up close to the Confederate position as rapidly and clandestinely as could be done."

My biggest objection to all that Rosy did was really not notifying Grant that he had changed his plans, his approach, etc, and updating him that due to him consolidating his columns he'd arrive by that afternoon and a battle was imminent.

Potentially Rosy was disposed to bring on a battle on the 19 because he'd already been found out basically.