Random Thoughts on Iuka

[SSVilla]

I won't read anything else concerning Ned tbh. I just went back to a post referred to by Nathan here… and before I could get to the point, there were a bunch of personal attacks, Ned mentioned, and etc. About half the post wasn't about the topic here.

I have no interest on that. I don't know Ned but others speak highly of him here and regardless bashing of other users is not why we are here. I am actually disinclined to read old posts in so much as they contain further back and forth about that old vendetta.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I won't read anything else concerning Ned tbh. I just went back to a post referred to by Nathan here… and before I could get to the point, there were a bunch of personal attacks, Ned mentioned, and etc. About half the post wasn't about the topic here.

I have no interest on that. I don't know Ned but others speak highly of him here and regardless bashing of other users is not why we are here. I am actually disinclined to read old posts in so much as they contain further back and forth about that old vendetta.

I respect Ned and have nothing bad to say about him. I have no idea where that came from.

I will read through your message above and respond tomorrow morning.

 

[bdtex]

Reports are rolling in. Members are getting personal and uncivil. You know who you are. Dial it back now or threadbans are next.

 

[SSVilla]

It is telling that a certain user specifically only mentioned Grant's correspondence in their above comment. Notice that Rosecrans' correspondence was explicitly omitted.

*****As noted previously, Grant sent the following message to Halleck at 8:00 A.M. on September 16th:

"For ten days or more the enemy have been hovering in our front in reported large force. I have watched their moves closely until I could concentrate my forces. All are now in good shape. Hurlbut's division has come from Memphis to Bolivar and about 6,000 troops from Bolivar brought here. General Orice is southeast from us, near Bay Springs, moving northeast. It is reported that Van Dorn and Breckinridge are to join and attack. Form the best information they cannot reach here under four days. My view is they are covering a move to get General Price into East Tennessee. If I can I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent either the design to go north or to unite forces and attack here."

-17 OR 2:220

Of course, the results of Mower's reconnaissance were not known to Grant yet at the time in which this message was sent.

Rosecrans to Grant on the 17th (not timestamped):

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of infantry and all our cavalry, under Mizner, toward Barnett's, on the Jacinto and Iuka road. The only thing we can do to prevent Price passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

-17 OR 2: 222

Also on September 17th Rosecrans, concerned that they may have already missed their opportunity, wrote the following to Grant:

"Mizner's dispatch just in reports that the cannonading of our reconnoitering party ceased at 4.40 last evening, and that about 8 o'clock last evening a very large fire was seen in the direction of Iuka; the distance is 20 miles. Mizner has gone to feel of them since 4 a.m. My suspicions are that some houses and stores have been burned in Iuka, the place abandoned, and that Price has crossed the defiles of Bear Creek, and will pass the Tennessee before it rises- at the Shoals, if possible; if not, will proceed at once to above Decatur, near Whitesburg."

-17 OR 2: 222-223

After this message had been sent, Rosecrans messaged from Jacinto later on the 17th (not timestamped) stating that Hamilton was sure that Price was still at Iuka.

17 OR 2: 223

He then forwarded the message from Hamilton to Grant at 9:30 P.M.

-17 OR 2: 224

In yet another message, sent on the 17th, Rosecrans expressed his concern regarding a move from Price, stating that had he not been pursued via their reconnoitering force, he would have probably left Iuka destined for the Tennessee Valley.

-17 OR 2: 223-224

In another message to Grant on the 17th (also not timestamped), probably sent after the above message, but certainly after hearing from Hamilton, returned to the concern expressed above, albeit expressing his hope that Grant was covering against a move directly towards Eastport on his front, stating:

"As Price is an old woodpecker it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee, toward Eastport, in hopes to find the means of crossing. Have you any lookout toward Hamburg Landing?

-17 OR 2: 224

Of course, as noted above, it was imperative to prevent a move across Bear Creek to the east for the same reason.

Finally, from the Reports section of the Official Records, as it was reprinted in Grant's first report of the operation dated September 20th. The original copy is not contained in the correspondence, as is the case with many messages and orders, of course.

It was also not timestamped and is dated September 18th from Rosecrans to Grant. It read:

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Springs Road, tells of a continuous movement since last Friday of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, and Price to attack Iuka or to go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?"

-17 OR 1: 66

As can be seen, the Fulton road was just one way out. It was just one way out. Rosecrans and Grant has been in communication regarding the situation quite steadily and continuously, to that point.

Additionally, all of this makes perfect logical sense from the perspective that one has to account for the purpose of the movement to Iuka in the first place.

So, as far as the notion that the High Command were cognizant of the Army of the West being able to fall back to the east across Bear Creek and that such recognition was fundamental to the conception of the plan, it is really all but incontrovertible as far as that is concerned. One only need to read the relevant correspondence.

That was really my principal point that way and one only need look at the record that way. Whether that assessment was accurate, or not, is really something of a separate discussion, although I do believe that there is evidence to indicate that it probably was. That is a serious potential discussion though.*****

I will preface this by stating that how to weigh all this specifically involves invariably some interpretation, not in twisting words but understanding that it's a changing and developing situation. But the dispatches do show where Rosecrans mind was at.

The problem is that without knowing exactly how to get to Bear Creek from Iuka it is difficult to make sense of exactly what Rosecrans meant. It would appear that at first he doesn't know where Price is. He at one point thought he was a goner already, then has other ideas about Eastport until finally he formulates a plan with a tentative nature stating "If he's at Iuka…"

That's the plan that requires getting as close as possible "tonight," concealing the movements, and him to mass heavily on the Fulton road, crushing on his left. It's ironic that the plan rather emphasizes the importance of the Fulton road as one of such magnitude he intended to mass his forces there and crush Price from that road. I actually think that dispatch contemplated a battle, not just trapping someone. That's why Rosecrans wanted to mass on Fulton and "crush" Price from there.

 

[CWdiaryPA]

I assume Cozzens is just generally a very critical author who has a scathing writing style? I have never read any other book from him. I am watching a video from him on a presentation he made for this book:

Shenandoah 1862

In the spring of 1862, Federal troops under the command of General George B. McClellan launched what was to be a coordinated, two-pronged attack on Richmond in the hope of taking the Confederate capital and bringing a quick end to the Civil War. The Confe

books.google.com

I have never had any interest in Stonewall Jackson before in my life, but I might be interested in reading that book to see Cozzens pull him apart. lol Not really, I am being sarcastic, but I am looking at the book with interest because I feel like testing whether it's his writing style I don't like or something else.

Edit: this is my own opinion, not meant to offend Cozzens or his followers. His Shenandoah book looks interesting but I am wondering whether I'd have the stamina to finish it. I think one has to like a writing style to read an entire book and not just browse it or look quickly at a particular topic of interest within. This is out of topic so I felt like deleting it but I'll leave it … you may pm me if you have some feedbac

Hi SSVilla, fwiw, Cozzens: I took issue with some of Cozzens in Shenandoah 1862-- as @DanSBHawk so adroitly reminds us-- "No one here is an arbiter of truth." Cozzens holds that after Kernstown (3/23/62), "the ladies" ignored & refused to aid wounded Union men. Since Cozzens wasn't there & my grandfather was, I'll take my grandfather's word for it, who observed them working their tails off helping Yanks, & wrote so on 3/25,26,27. Furthermore, as Hospital Steward, he would know. (3/24 is the entry I noted the Cozzens discrepancy. I wonder if the belligerent attitude someone like Shields had toward the enemy led to his viewing Winchester women through a negative filter at the hotel/hospital. He thought he saw what he expected to. Confirmation Bias. Makes one wonder what's even true about the war sometimes these men put down on the page, no? And has me now thinking *I'm* the arbiter of truth that wounded Union were aided. So who's got the facts/reality right about that hospital on 3/23/62? I certainly wasn't there either.).

That said, I quoted Cozzens sparingly in my Valley overview. I found him wanderingly confusing at times, hard to get a grip on. However, it's a huge topic, so hats off to him. Everyone's bound to get things wrong sometimes. We can let that taint the whole work, or acknowledge mistakes are human. We all have the same 26 letters of the alphabet to go from, which de facto we run through our own filters. We get to have our own feelings, but not our own *facts.*

Relentless badgering, attempted character assassination, litigating knowledge levels of posters, & childish name-calling all transparently point to insecurity. Can you hear him, Grant, his whisper on the wind, at the banks of the river, through the timbers both fallen & still standing, Let us have peace.

 

[SSVilla]

Hi SSVilla, fwiw, Cozzens: I took issue with some of Cozzens in Shenandoah 1862-- as @DanSBHawk so adroitly reminds us-- "No one here is an arbiter of truth." Cozzens holds that after Kernstown (3/23/62), "the ladies" ignored & refused to aid wounded Union men. Since Cozzens wasn't there & my grandfather was, I'll take my grandfather's word for it, who observed them working their tails off helping Yanks, & wrote so on 3/25,26,27. Furthermore, as Hospital Steward, he would know. (3/24 is the entry I noted the Cozzens discrepancy. I wonder if the belligerent attitude someone like Shields had toward the enemy led to his viewing Winchester women through a negative filter at the hotel/hospital. He thought he saw what he expected to. Confirmation Bias. Makes one wonder what's even true about the war sometimes these men put down on the page, no? And has me now thinking *I'm* the arbiter of truth that wounded Union were aided. So who's got the facts/reality right about that hospital on 3/23/62? I certainly wasn't there either.).

That said, I quoted Cozzens sparingly in my Valley overview. I found him wanderingly confusing at times, hard to get a grip on. However, it's a huge topic, so hats off to him. Everyone's bound to get things wrong sometimes. We can let that taint the whole work, or acknowledge mistakes are human. We all have the same 26 letters of the alphabet to go from, which de facto we run through our own filters. We get to have our own feelings, but not our own *facts.*

Relentless badgering, attempted character assassination, litigating knowledge levels of posters, & childish name-calling all transparently point to insecurity. Can you hear him, Grant, his whisper on the wind, at the banks of the river, through the timbers both fallen & still standing, Let us have peace.

Thanks for posting and it's a pleasure to meet you. I think ultimately I don't like Cozzens as a writer. I don't want to write much more about that because I am now very sensitive and aware that I already critiqued him and the level of research he put into the book was massive. I am not attacking his research or knowledge, but I am struggling to finish this one book on a subject that I am very interested in. That probably reveals that I don't like this author.

Thanks for your reminder of that phrase: Let us have peace.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Thanks for posting the maps. They help me understand what's being talked about here. I see Bear Creek referred to as the Big Bear Creek in the older map. I assume it's the same creek.

We know it had rained and conditions were bad even on roads. Taking "the defiles of Bear Creek" would have been an act of desperation, a need Price was not confronted with.

However, to escape via the creek, how do you get to it? It doesn't start from within Iuka. Presumably Price would still have to use some road to get to it, I don't understand that part. I suppose since he never had to use that Creek it's also irrelevant, but to escape via the creek Peice and men would have to leave Iuka through somewhere.

I don't know of any route directly east from Iuka to cross Bear Creek. Especially one with an intact bridge. In his memoirs, Grant said that at that time all the bridges in the vicinity had been destroyed. And even the next spring, when Grenville Dodge was planning a movement from Corinth into north Alabama, he said that he would have to construct bridges first over Bear Creek.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There was a road running due east out of Iuka. That is known from the available record. Regarding the bridges, this remains an unclear point for me that way, but we do know of the scale of consideration regarding the potential of movement directly from Iuka to cross Bear Creek to the east. Such was fundamental to the conception of the plan, as we know from the correspondence. It is obviously unsatisfactory to point to correspondence from April of 1863 regarding the necessity for bridging to cross Bear Creek when we know from the contemporary correspondence what the basic plan was, as it was actually developed at the time, regarding the Iuka operation and what the threats were understood to be.

@SSVilla

If you be interested in carrying on this conversation via private thread, I would certainly be, as well.

 

[Rebforever]

There was a road running due east out of Iuka. That is known from the available record. Regarding the bridges, this remains an unclear point for me that way, but we do know of the scale of consideration regarding the potential of movement directly from Iuka to cross Bear Creek to the east. Such was fundamental to the conception of the plan, as we know from the correspondence.

@SSVilla

If you be interested in carrying on this conversation via private thread, I would certainly be, as well.

Would you post that available record?

 

[Nathan Towne]

Would you post that available record?

What are you looking for specifically? You mean regarding the conception of the plan being cognizant of the prospect of the Confederate Army moving via Bear Creek? Sure, I can repost that.

The problem with the above post is that it attempts to argue in the face of the available record which clearly repudiates it. You can't simultaneously recognize the prospect of the Confederate Army moving via Bear Creek, attempting to make the case that such could have only occurred south of Iuka and then turn around and attempt to make the claim that Bear Creek was considered impassable. Such is obviously not logical.

However, we also know of the presence of at least one road moving out of Iuka eastwards, regardless.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Would you post that available record?

Here is the relevant correspondence regarding the plan, if that is what you were looking for:

*****As noted previously, Grant sent the following message to Halleck at 8:00 A.M. on September 16th:

"For ten days or more the enemy have been hovering in our front in reported large force. I have watched their moves closely until I could concentrate my forces. All are now in good shape. Hurlbut's division has come from Memphis to Bolivar and about 6,000 troops from Bolivar brought here. General Orice is southeast from us, near Bay Springs, moving northeast. It is reported that Van Dorn and Breckinridge are to join and attack. Form the best information they cannot reach here under four days. My view is they are covering a move to get General Price into East Tennessee. If I can I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent either the design to go north or to unite forces and attack here."

-17 OR 2:220

Of course, the results of Mower's reconnaissance were not known to Grant yet at the time in which this message was sent.

Rosecrans to Grant on the 17th (not timestamped):

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of infantry and all our cavalry, under Mizner, toward Barnett's, on the Jacinto and Iuka road. The only thing we can do to prevent Price passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

-17 OR 2: 222

Also on September 17th Rosecrans, concerned that they may have already missed their opportunity, wrote the following to Grant:

"Mizner's dispatch just in reports that the cannonading of our reconnoitering party ceased at 4.40 last evening, and that about 8 o'clock last evening a very large fire was seen in the direction of Iuka; the distance is 20 miles. Mizner has gone to feel of them since 4 a.m. My suspicions are that some houses and stores have been burned in Iuka, the place abandoned, and that Price has crossed the defiles of Bear Creek, and will pass the Tennessee before it rises- at the Shoals, if possible; if not, will proceed at once to above Decatur, near Whitesburg."

-17 OR 2: 222-223

After this message had been sent, Rosecrans messaged from Jacinto later on the 17th (not timestamped) stating that Hamilton was sure that Price was still at Iuka.

17 OR 2: 223

He then forwarded the message from Hamilton to Grant at 9:30 P.M.

-17 OR 2: 224

In yet another message, sent on the 17th, Rosecrans expressed his concern regarding a move from Price, stating that had he not been pursued via their reconnoitering force, he would have probably left Iuka destined for the Tennessee Valley.

-17 OR 2: 223-224

In another message to Grant on the 17th (also not timestamped), probably sent after the above message, but certainly after hearing from Hamilton, returned to the concern expressed above, albeit expressing his hope that Grant was covering against a move directly towards Eastport on his front, stating:

"As Price is an old woodpecker it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee, toward Eastport, in hopes to find the means of crossing. Have you any lookout toward Hamburg Landing?

-17 OR 2: 224

Of course, as noted above, it was imperative to prevent a move across Bear Creek to the east for the same reason.

Finally, from the Reports section of the Official Records, as it was reprinted in Grant's first report of the operation dated September 20th. The original copy is not contained in the correspondence, as is the case with many messages and orders, of course.

It was also not timestamped and is dated September 18th from Rosecrans to Grant. It read:

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Springs Road, tells of a continuous movement since last Friday of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, and Price to attack Iuka or to go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?"

-17 OR 1: 66

As can be seen, the Fulton road was just one way out. It was just one way out. Rosecrans and Grant has been in communication regarding the situation quite steadily and continuously, to that point.*****

 

[DanSBHawk]

Here's more about Dodge's eastward crossing of Bear Creek in the spring of 1863. Floating bridges were used, so obviously there was not an intact bridge to use.

 

[Nathan Towne]

At which time, water levels could have been much different. The issue of where the crossings were occurring is not being covered. That doesn't speak to the situation relating to bridging in September of '62 and so and so forth. We also know that regardless of the bridging, the general understanding was that Bear Creek was crossable, as such was the conception of the plan. Beyond this, we also know that elements of the Army of the Mississippi had just crossed from the east with their wagons following the onset of the Confederate movement of the Army of the West which began on September 11th. Being that we know how the situation was understood at the time in which the Iuka plan was formulated, that is not a constructive point.

It is too bad. Would be really fun to have a serious conversation on this subject. I know quite a bit about it and would be happy to have a serious discussion. It can't be like that though with bizarre stuff being thrown out in order to see what sticks. We have to start with and accept the relevant contemporary record, rather than attempt to ignore it and build from there.

 

[CWdiaryPA]

Thanks for posting and it's a pleasure to meet you. I think ultimately I don't like Cozzens as a writer. I don't want to write much more about that because I am now very sensitive and aware that I already critiqued him and the level of research he put into the book was massive. I am not attacking his research or knowledge, but I am struggling to finish this one book on a subject that I am very interested in. That probably reveals that I don't like this author.

Thanks for your reminder of that phrase: Let us have peace.

Sure thing. Good to meet you, too.

"I could redo my entire three volumes on the Civil War without using one bit of source material I used the first time and probably come to very different conclusions" Shelby Foote wrote.

I mean, Christ, that's Shelby Foote, estimated 1.2 mill word count. All I did was relay info. with little analysis. Foote had to get it right as much as possible.

As years passed researching 1862, the more I got a felt sense of the times via art, poetry, sketches, newspapers, diaries kept on the field, proclamations tacked to trees, the O.R., court records. If there's a particular day you need more about, searching up everything anyone else put down on paper you can find about it helps. Comparing accounts, then arriving at your own conclusions.

Everyone has preferences for tone, style, all that, in writing. Some fall toward the meander while others want straight to the point. Others need creative license injected in the narrative, while others crave factual context.

I absolutely love, nay- would throw myself at- Bruce Catton, W.J. Cash, & James Baldwin. Edward Ayers is another. Gary Gallagher, Barbara Gannon, David Strother, Ambrose Bierce.

Historians disagree (to the extent they do still shocks me), & post-war Generals & others took to print to duke out battle specifics 20, 30 years after, still rabid about what went down, & that their account is the only true one. We're here 160+ years past doing the same?

Last, in case you haven't run across it: "historiography" is worth investigating as a concept. It's sort of an outline to the outlines of how history is considered then presented. A methodology that reasonably relates to the scope of the circumstances of any era, event, person, location etc. How to read history logically. It's hard to know next to nothing & approach 1862 cold. How do you know who to listen to? Where's the most likely veracity? Who's got it, & why? How?

 

[JackADriscoll]

Sure thing. Good to meet you, too.

"I could redo my entire three volumes on the Civil War without using one bit of source material I used the first time and probably come to very different conclusions" Shelby Foote wrote.

I mean, Christ, that's Shelby Foote, estimated 1.2 mill word count. All I did was relay info. with little analysis. Foote had to get it right as much as possible.

As years passed researching 1862, the more I got a felt sense of the times via art, poetry, sketches, newspapers, diaries kept on the field, proclamations tacked to trees, the O.R., court records. If there's a particular day you need more about, searching up everything anyone else put down on paper you can find about it helps. Comparing accounts, then arriving at your own conclusions.

Everyone has preferences for tone, style, all that, in writing. Some fall toward the meander while others want straight to the point. Others need creative license injected in the narrative, while others crave factual context.

I absolutely love, nay- would throw myself at- Bruce Catton, W.J. Cash, & James Baldwin. Edward Ayers is another. Gary Gallagher, Barbara Gannon, David Strother, Ambrose Bierce.

Historians disagree (to the extent they do still shocks me), & post-war Generals & others took to print to duke out battle specifics 20, 30 years after, still rabid about what went down, & that their account is the only true one. We're here 160+ years past doing the same?

Last, in case you haven't run across it: "historiography" is worth investigating as a concept. It's sort of an outline to the outlines of how history is considered then presented. A methodology that reasonably relates to the scope of the circumstances of any era, event, person, location etc. How to read history logically. It's hard to know next to nothing & approach 1862 cold. How do you know who to listen to? Where's the most likely veracity? Who's got it, & why? How?

These are interesting questions. I know I can be just as suspicious as contemporary reports as with ones after the fact. I cannot tell you how many times I've interviewed people in the moment and they lied to me to cover themselves only for them to come clean later. I've seen people honest in the moment only to lie later after they see the damage that the truth did. That's why you have to take all the evidence, eyewitness, physical, forensic, and get to a level of the truth you can accept. This would be an interesting separate thread.

 

[Nathan Towne]

These are interesting questions. I know I can be just as suspicious as contemporary reports as with ones after the fact. I cannot tell you how many times I've interviewed people in the moment and they lied to me to cover themselves only for them to come clean later. I've seen people honest in the moment only to lie later after they see the damage that the truth did. That's why you have to take all the evidence, eyewitness, physical, forensic, and get to a level of the truth you can accept. This would be an interesting separate thread.

To be sure.

Would you not agree that it is important to appreciate what was actually said in the formulation of a plan though and use that as a basis upon which we can build, whether their understanding of the situation at the time was accurate, or not? We can't just wish it away or pretend that such wasn't so.

 

[JackADriscoll]

Of course but as they say no plan survives first contact intact and the enemy gets a say

One of the things that can make a military great is that juniors are taught and expected to spot opportunities and seize them without asking for permission. More than plans I'm thinking knowledge of commanders intent is what matter most.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The purpose of showing the experience of Dodge in the spring of 1863 was to provide evidence supporting Grant's recollections of Iuka in his memoirs.

Here's Grant in his Memoirs: "Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity."

 

[Nathan Towne]

Of course but as they say no plan survives first contact intact and the enemy gets a say

One of the things that can make a military great is that juniors are taught and expected to spot opportunities and seize them without asking for permission. More than plans I'm thinking knowledge of commanders intent is what matter most.

Yes, I made this point in a number of posts early in this thread, such as in Post #112.

The trouble is that some are deliberately attempting to wash away the relevant contemporary record and pretend that it doesn't demonstrate what it clearly does, i.e. that the conception of the plan was to strike the Army of the West in order to try to deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek, among other potential means of escape, which, of course, it actually was, as we know from Post #531. That is obviously quite problematic.

Memoirs are often not the most reliable source that way and have to be weighed against and analyzed in light of the evidence.

 

[CWdiaryPA]

These are interesting questions. I know I can be just as suspicious as contemporary reports as with ones after the fact. I cannot tell you how many times I've interviewed people in the moment and they lied to me to cover themselves only for them to come clean later. I've seen people honest in the moment only to lie later after they see the damage that the truth did. That's why you have to take all the evidence, eyewitness, physical, forensic, and get to a level of the truth you can accept. This would be an interesting separate thread.

Right? Especially as brain study advances. Traumatic situations often-- if not the majority of the time-- cause humans to basically black out. Recollection later just isn't possible. The body goes into survival mode with adrenaline, etc. Exact sequence of events, say, after a drive-by shooting get muddied even immediately after the event.

Saw gang members ditch a gun in bushes at the back of my house. Didn't know what it was, just something small flung, but noted to myself to remember to search for what it was after they left. Then sirens, talking to 911, cops asking which way they ran, bloodhound with cops in the bushes later that night. Shockingly, everything combined *made me forget* I saw that ditching action at all. I had no story for police besides I saw the men. Wasn't till the next night, around 2am, when I saw one of the men out there with a flashlight going through shrubs that I remembered. Next day got a rake, gloves on, found his gun. Even the bloodhound missed it.

I had completely blacked out all memory of his arm out & dropping that handgun. Amazing. Even after making a mental note *in the moment* to remember it.

During the incident-- at the time, in real time-- sure, your brain picks up the surroundings, processes words spoken, all that (& even then, in *severe* circumstances someone can be saying something to you but you can't make out the words due to overwhelm, you get tunnel vision, or actually black out, fainting). Time elongates: "The ambulance took forever," but the record shows it arrived in 3 minutes.

And maybe months after, say in court, something triggers your memory, so you change your story. Because you remembered, right? Now you can relay what exactly happened. But then come the accusations: Why are you changing your story now, liar? Only the guilty change their story. You're making it up to save yourself.

Adding to the tricky nature of memory is how an interrogation gets run: leading questions, specific framing to elicit certain responses, threats off the record, all that. Even blood sugar plays a part, confessions likeliest when denied food & water.

Even when cops came to get the gun from me, they were rushed, & asked if I'd picked it up a certain way, modeling how as the cop had it in her hand, almost like I was pressured to agree with her, so I said yes, even though I'd solely used the handle to lift it off the ground, not the middle part. Then I felt like I couldn't correct my account later (ended up not mattering, bc they got good prints off it).

All this variancy from the true facts having to do with something that took about 3 seconds total (ditch) to questioned about that one thing by the cop (5 seconds).