Random Thoughts on Iuka

[SSVilla]

Nobody had Link.

Lincoln goes more with your name as the TallTallMan.

Very appropriate. I thought you'd changed it because it suited you better. I never asked you what you liked about Warren. I don't know him much. The hero of little Round top?

 

[SSVilla]

Let me provide that below.

The correspondence which begins with Hamilton having sent out Mizner was sent on September 17th and was not timestamped. It can be found at 17 OR 2:222. Yet again, it read:

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of infantry and all our cavalry, under Mizner, toward Barnett's, on the Jacinto and Iuka road. The only thing we can do to prevent Price passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

-17 OR 2: 222

The second message which I cited is found in the Reports section of the Official Records, as it was reprinted in Grant's first report of the operation dated September 20th. The original copy is not contained in the correspondence, as is the case with many messages and orders, of course. This is why it was the only correspondence which I cited which was mentioned in responses to my posts, as it is the only one which others were aware of as they hadn't read the correspondence contained in the Official Records.

It was also not timestamped and is dated September 18th from Rosecrans to Grant. It read, in full:

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Springs Road, tells of a continuous movement since last Friday of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, and Price to attack Iuka or to go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?"

-17 OR 1: 66

Remember, Grant had sent the following message to Halleck at 8:00 A.M. on September 16th, as well.

"For ten days or more the enemy have been hovering in our front in reported large force. I have watched their moves closely until I could concentrate my forces. All are now in good shape. Hurlbut's division has come from Memphis to Bolivar and about 6,000 troops from Bolivar brought here. General Orice is southeast from us, near Bay Springs, moving northeast. It is reported that Van Dorn and Breckinridge are to join and attack. Form the best information they cannot reach here under four days. My view is they are covering a move to get General Price into East Tennessee. If I can I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent either the design to go north or to unite forces and attack here."

-17 OR 2:220

The above was sent before it had been ascertained from Mower's reconnaissance that Price was already at Iuka with "a strong force," which was, of course, basically, the Army of the West, which was reported back later in the day on the 16th.

As can be seen, the Fulton road was one way out. You seem to have this notion embedded in your mind that it was "the best way out." It was just one way out. I have covered that all extensively in my previous comments. Rosecrans and Grant has been in communication regarding the situation fairly steadily and continuously, of course, to that point.

Further, amidst the beginning of the operation, on September 17th, Rosecrans sent this message to Grant, concerned that they may have already missed their window of opportunity.

"Mizner's dispatch just in reports that the cannonading of our reconnoitering party ceased at 4.40 last evening, and that about 8 o'clock last evening a very large fire was seen in the direction of Iuka; the distance is 20 miles. Mizner has gone to feel of them since 4 a.m. My suspicions are that some houses and stores have been burned in Iuka, the place abandoned, and that Price has crossed the defiles of Bear Creek, and will pass the Tennessee before it rises- at the Shoals, if possible; if not, will proceed at once to above Decatur, near Whitesburg."

-17 OR 2: 222-223

As we know, Stanley's Division was divided, with Mower's brigade having moved to Iuka conducting the reconnaissance and Fuller's brigade coming from the west (aside from the 39th Ohio, at least, which would be given another assignment amidst this process). (See 17 OR 2: 221)

It isn't intended as an insult, it is just the obvious truth in that it is absolutely clear that I was the only one here who had actually read the relevant correspondence. That may be why we haven't heard again from Ned and Eric and the like, as it is clear at this point that the positions which they were putting forward did not reflect a comprehensive understanding of this subject. Again, that is not an insult. It is just the obvious truth from this thread, the exchanges and comments, which is okay, but hopefully this has provided them with the incentive to now go do so that way and as stated, I would happily engage in a constructive discussion from here.

I have to ask you, and I don't want to revive this too much because both you and Dan exchanged a lot of messages about this already and must be tired of this topic. I am almost fried with Iuka myself but I want to finish going through the rest of the posts prior to moving on and I found this interesting.

There's a very lengthy back and forth with you over Bear Creek, yet this doesn't appear in Cozzens book at all.

Give me some leeway here, allow me a minute.

You have proven that Bear Creek was considered in the calculations as a possible escape route. That is, the risk was considered that Price could escape via "the defiles of Bear Creek" as Rosecrans puts it. I imagine that as anything but an acceptable road. However if someone is hemmed in on the three other lanes, it's like jumping off a two story building… you'll survive it but not whole. Am I right in that kind of analogy? Then, why jump off the roof if you can take the stairs?

I think because Price was never placed in the position of having to jump off a roof figuratively, then that option becomes irrelevant… What people don't understand is why worry about Bear Creek on September 19 if already Rosecrans is leaving the Fulton road open.

However, if I am not mistaken there's something else you are trying to convey with that.

Two things, this trap was not as airtight even if it worked perfectly. Bear Creek was not a desirable route, but if allowed all the leisure in the world some bad results could happen:

1. I think there was a concern that Van Dorn could come up. I believe I read that Grant thought Van Dorn couldn't come up within 4 days, still he was clearly worried and he had a tight schedule to operate, spring and effectuate the trap before it became too risky to stay exposed out there.
2. If not acting quickly, Price could get away anyway. He could push any one of the three columns that operated separately and without concert of the other two. Some coordination was required and acting swiftly on all sides was the best way to do that. There's also other things we have considered as militating in favor of swift action as surprise I believe was key.
3. The other risk is that even if Price was surrounded on all three sides, if they were all hanging back leisurely waiting fir the stars ti align and didn't act in aggressive fashion, Price could still escape via "the roof," which while poor and not desirable exists and nothing can be done about it.

I think I am with you there. You are I think trying to emphasize the need to act quickly and in a menacing fashion.

To my mind comes a similar civil war analogy — Ft. Donelson. Some men did escape through a road that was partly under icy water in the middle of the night in pure winter. It wasn't an airtight trap, but very few could use that road and most were captured. However, had McClernand not closed up and retaken his lines in the east end, the rebels could have just escaped down that road they had broken through. Then any discussion of the half underwater road that Forrest escaped through would be pointless. No one would use that icy waterway when they could use a proper road.

I think what's behind all this discussion is the need to hurry up, am I right?

I do think there was a need to hurry up. I don't think D&L were sent to twiddle thumbs. Although I don't credit the entirety of Rosecrans testimony to Congress, I do think there was urgency and they could very well have made the pointless advice as I said elsewhere of hurrying Rosecrans up.

I do think however, that leave the Fulton road open was such a monumental change that even if it was unavoidable, Rosecrans should have notified his commander. Then whatever happened would have been on him. Rosecrans took that choice out of his hands.

I also think even if Rosy acted using his best judgment because instant consultation wasn't possible, and he couldn't waste daylight waiting for confirmation of his recommendations he still needed to tell Grant what was up. Who knows what Grant might have done? He could have decided to push Ord through more menacingly, instead of hanging back 6 miles, to allow Rosy to attempt to grab the backroad he thought he could use to get to Fulton.

By not notifying his commander, Rosecrans took options away from him.

I am now keenly aware that Cozzens all throughout tried to push the narrative that Grant was strangely aloof, strangely detached, concerned about trivialities in Corinth (which were not fricking trivialities!) chatting up on parlays with Price, but all that narrative to me is a complete smokescreen to conceal the fact that Rosy didn't apprise his commander about what was going on and what he was doing. Had he done that, possibly Grant could have pushed up Ord anyway, or not, but it was his decision to make. OMG.

Only one sentence, a single sentence is given to that monumental decision from Rosy with no explanation of its significance while we are fed this strangely aloof story so as to bury it and present it as Grant negligence…

 

[Nathan Towne]

I have to ask you, and I don't want to revive this too much because both you and Dan exchanged a lot of messages about this already and must be tired of this topic. I am almost fried with Iuka myself but I want to finish going through the rest of the posts prior to moving on and I found this interesting.

There's a very lengthy back and forth with you over Bear Creek, yet this doesn't appear in Cozzens book at all.

Give me some leeway here, allow me a minute.

You have proven that Bear Creek was considered in the calculations as a possible escape route. That is, the risk was considered that Price could escape via "the defiles of Bear Creek" as Rosecrans puts it. I imagine that as anything but an acceptable road. However if someone is hemmed in on the three other lanes, it's like jumping off a two story building… you'll survive it but not whole. Am I right in that kind of analogy? Then, why jump off the roof if you can take the stairs?

I think because Price was never placed in the position of having to jump off a roof figuratively, then that option becomes irrelevant… What people don't understand is why worry about Bear Creek on September 19 if already Rosecrans is leaving the Fulton road open.

However, if I am not mistaken there's something else you are trying to convey with that.

Two things, this trap was not as airtight even if it worked perfectly. Bear Creek was not a desirable route, but if allowed all the leisure in the world some bad results could happen:

1. I think there was a concern that Van Dorn could come up. I believe I read that Grant thought Van Dorn couldn't come up within 4 days, still he was clearly worried and he had a tight schedule to operate, spring and effectuate the trap before it became too risky to stay exposed out there.
2. If not acting quickly, Price could get away anyway. He could push any one of the three columns that operated separately and without concert of the other two. Some coordination was required and acting swiftly on all sides was the best way to do that. There's also other things we have considered as militating in favor of swift action as surprise I believe was key.
3. The other risk is that even if Price was surrounded on all three sides, if they were all hanging back leisurely waiting fir the stars ti align and didn't act in aggressive fashion, Price could still escape via "the roof," which while poor and not desirable exists and nothing can be done about it.

I think I am with you there. You are I think trying to emphasize the need to act quickly and in a menacing fashion.

To my mind comes a similar civil war analogy — Ft. Donelson. Some men did escape through a road that was partly under icy water in the middle of the night in pure winter. It wasn't an airtight trap, but very few could use that road and most were captured. However, had McClernand not closed up and retaken his lines in the east end, the rebels could have just escaped down that road they had broken through. Then any discussion of the half underwater road that Forrest escaped through would be pointless. No one would use that icy waterway when they could use a proper road.

I think what's behind all this discussion is the need to hurry up, am I right?

I do think there was a need to hurry up. I don't think D&L were sent to twiddle thumbs. Although I don't credit the entirety of Rosecrans testimony to Congress, I do think there was urgency and they could very well have made the pointless advice as I said elsewhere of hurrying Rosecrans up.

I do think however, that leave the Fulton road open was such a monumental change that even if it was unavoidable, Rosecrans should have notified his commander. Then whatever happened would have been on him. Rosecrans took that choice out of his hands.

I also think even if Rosy acted using his best judgment because instant consultation wasn't possible, and he couldn't waste daylight waiting for confirmation of his recommendations he still needed to tell Grant what was up. Who knows what Grant might have done? He could have decided to push Ord through more menacingly, instead of hanging back 6 miles, to allow Rosy to attempt to grab the backroad he thought he could use to get to Fulton.

By not notifying his commander, Rosecrans took options away from him.

I am now keenly aware that Cozzens all throughout tried to push the narrative that Grant was strangely aloof, strangely detached, concerned about trivialities in Corinth (which were not fricking trivialities!) chatting up on parlays with Price, but all that narrative to me is a complete smokescreen to conceal the fact that Rosy didn't apprise his commander about what was going on and what he was doing. Had he done that, possibly Grant could have pushed up Ord anyway, or not, but it was his decision to make. OMG.

Only one sentence, a single sentence is given to that monumental decision from Rosy with no explanation of its significance while we are fed this strangely aloof story so as to bury it and present it as Grant negligence…
View attachment 522436

Hey,

Not tired of Iuka. I love this stuff. I was more just tired of certain exchanges.

Headed to sleep for the night. I will respond tomorrow.

 

[SSVilla]

Edit . Blanked for repeat.

 

[SSVilla]

Looking at the relevant evidence, my opinion is that Ned was clearly right. Again, here's Grant in his official report:

View attachment 519926

If the two southern roads had been blocked according to the plan, then Price would have been left with 3 options:

1. Escape east through the "difficult bottom of Bear Creek" with federals in pursuit.
2. Escape to the northeast to Eastport and have their path blocked by the Tennessee River, with the federals in pursuit.
3. Fight their way south on one of the two blocked roads.

The plan was not set up to block an escape attempt to the east or to the northeast, because those directions would have been extremely unfavorable for the confederates with the federals in close pursuit. And if Price wanted to escape before the fighting started, especially through the "difficult bottom" of Bear Creek, he would gotten his army moving during the day on the 19th. He did not.

The route east through Bear Creek was not an important factor in planning the battle because, very simply, once the fighting started that route would have been dangerous and difficult with federals in close pursuit. Grant was clearly right in his report, and the exaggerations in this thread are clearly wrong.

Since all this discussion predated me, when it started I had no idea what was being talked about. Moreover this whole thing of Bear Creek etc. Is not in Cozzens and as we know the confederates escaped via Fulton. I have no idea about the discussion with Ned or what's up with that. For a while I thought to let that just go, but before moving on to different topics I decided to take a look at what I missed and there are interesting discussions going on.

Can we find a map for this? It will help me understand what's being discussed if I know what we are talking about. I have this one, from Rosy's report. It doesn't show Bear Creek.

how about this one from Cozzens? Shows generally the area but no topography. Cozzens apparently didn't think a discussion of topography was necessary…

Maybe it's in the topographic maps shown by @tony_gunter?

I realize this is kind of like a rabbit hole but I'll stipulate here like an attorney would that Rosecrans acted on his own initiative without orders when he decided to push ahead single column and not notify his commander.

I think a discussion of this would have been very useful in Cozzens' book, which is why I keep coming back to that book being so unsatisfying. He dedicated just a single line to that momentum choice by Rosecrans, which essentially changed the plan.

Why is there a discussion about Bear Creek here? What's behind this?

 

[SSVilla]

So this has Ord ready to fall upon the retreating confederates, if the only way out was Bear Creek or to the East. It also shows that Grant was not fully familiar with the terrain until afterward, lending credence to Rosecrans' decision. That is how I read it, but from the start, I still have a problem as they must have too regarding the time for commitment. This lack of synchronization is what stands out as the highlight of the failure, as Rosecrans tripped up on covering both roads.
Lubliner.

The lack of synchronization was a catastrophic failure. It was impossible to synchronize in this case because of the bad roads and weather. On Sep. 17, Stanley was delayed due to bad roads and bad weather, on the following day a scout misdirected him.

Rosecrans should have been able to advance synchronized on his side much closer on the morning of the 19th but was 20 miles away. Halfway through the day he discovered his maps were incorrect. Price"s cavalry discovered him. Grant sent him a dispatch (much controversy from Rosy about it,) but he knew IMO telling him that Ord wouldn't be able to initiate the attack because they couldn't predict when he'd be in place to support Ord. Therefore due to his delay (involuntary but still) he had to initiate the festivities.

Catastrophic failure of the original plan made Rosecrans improvise an alteration with well known results. IMO he should have notified his commander. Even if he was acting on his own initiative because he couldn't consult he still should have told Grant about his adjustments. He had D& L with him. He could have sent one back with a dispatch,

 

[SSVilla]

The bottom line is the "plan" requires both of the southern roads to be blocked or it doesn't work.

With the Fulton road open, the confederates had a good road to move out on towards the east or the south. They could move out before the battle. They could move out after the battle. They could move out during the day. They could move out during the night. They could move out whenever they desired to move out.

So the entire "plan" is a failure if the Fulton road is left open. And relying on the connecting road close to Iuka to get to the Fulton road was a risky gamble. As Tony said earlier, they would have been almost in Iuka by the time they could use that connecting road.

I think ultimately this is the reason for the lack of complete discussion about this in Cozzens and Castel.

Bear Creek was considered as part of the original plan, but it never got into play. The original plan was scrapped midday on September 19, 1862 because it couldn't be executed as conceived.

 

[SSVilla]

Yes, I know.

Grant was not consistent from his first report to his second and subsequently to his Memoirs on this at all. His recollection on the details did not always accord with the available record on this (nor with his other accounts on it). The historian approaches every source with responsibility and care that way.

What we know from the contemporary correspondence is that if not hit on the 19th, the whole conception of the plan recognized that the Army of the West would/could simply pull back to the east via Bear Creek. That was the whole basis upon which the plan was built, which we know from the contemporary correspondence, as has been shown above.

You have chosen to just completely ignore the contemporary record, which is not surprising based on past experiences with you, but I don't think that you will convince many people of much doing that if they have the pertinent record at their disposal. If the final conclusion is just that we are going to accept a later account from a report or from someone's Memoirs, uncritically and without respect to the available record and the other historical actors involved, then we kind of miss the entire point in terms of historical inquiry is responsibly conducted and it is just an exercise in cherry-picking information in order to support one thing or another. Not to mention that in this case, Grant's two reports and his Memoirs are not consistent on the subject from one to the other to the other, regardless, so you ultimately have to pick one doing that, anyways.

I appreciate you mentioning these discrepancies and all, I truly do. However, here's my point to you. **** hit the fan on September 19 and the original plan can no longer be executed exactly as conceived.

I'd be able to follow some of your analysis better with a proper map, but it seems pretty much the original plan was a dream depending on perfect execution and perfect conditions and in the real world things went sideways quickly. As Stanley himself wrote it was one of those plans that required such unattainable precision in execution that it could therefore only lead to disappointment. **** hit the fan and the catastrophic failures mounted on top of each other forcing changes.

Grant made an adjustment to the changed circumstances and he let Rosecrans know. Rosecrans made his own adjustment, but he didn't let Grant know… Bad results followed.

 

[tony_gunter]

Since all this discussion predated me, when it started I had no idea what was being talked about. Moreover this whole thing of Bear Creek etc. Is not in Cozzens and as we know the confederates escaped via Fulton. I have no idea about the discussion with Ned or what's up with that. For a while I thought to let that just go, but before moving on to different topics I decided to take a look at what I missed and there are interesting discussions going on.

Can we find a map for this? It will help me understand what's being discussed if I know what we are talking about. I have this one, from Rosy's report. It doesn't show Bear Creek.
View attachment 522444
how about this one from Cozzens? Shows generally the area but no topography. Cozzens apparently didn't think a discussion of topography was necessary…
View attachment 522445
Maybe it's in the topographic maps shown by @tony_gunter?

I realize this is kind of like a rabbit hole but I'll stipulate here like an attorney would that Rosecrans acted on his own initiative without orders when he decided to push ahead single column and not notify his commander.

I think a discussion of this would have been very useful in Cozzens' book, which is why I keep coming back to that book being so unsatisfying. He dedicated just a single line to that momentum choice by Rosecrans, which essentially changed the plan.

Why is there a discussion about Bear Creek here? What's behind this?

To Grant and Rosecrans, Price moving into Iuka seemed to signal that he was preparing to travel east to join Bragg, so the idea was to cut off his escape east and south.

As the move was underway, in fact, Grant received an order from Halleck to prevent Price from joining Bragg. Meanwhile, Price received an order to withdraw to the south and west to join Van Dorn.

That map you included seems to have the north/south roads running through Iuka. In fact, the main north/south road was a mile or so to the east of Iuka. I *think* there was an east/west road that paralleled the railroad over Bear Creek that intersected that north/south road, so if Rosecrans interdicts the road from Fulton to Eastport, he interdicts retreat to the south or east.

Bear Creek is a substantial stream, bigger than a creek, smaller than a river. Crossing it under pursuit would have been non-trivial.

 

[Nathan Towne]

To Grant and Rosecrans, Price moving into Iuka seemed to signal that he was preparing to travel east to join Bragg, so the idea was to cut off his escape east and south.

As the move was underway, in fact, Grant received an order from Halleck to prevent Price from joining Bragg. Meanwhile, Price received an order to withdraw to the south and west to join Van Dorn.

That map you included seems to have the north/south roads running through Iuka. In fact, the main north/south road was a mile or so to the east of Iuka. I *think* there was an east/west road that paralleled the railroad over Bear Creek that intersected that north/south road, so if Rosecrans interdicts the road from Fulton to Eastport, he interdicts retreat to the south or east.

Bear Creek is a substantial stream, bigger than a creek, smaller than a river. Crossing it under pursuit would have been non-trivial.

Which is why they couldn't pull back during the day of the 19th once it was recognized that the U.S. National forces were coming. They would have had to pull back that night, unless prevented from being able to do so, which was the intent of the operation.

 

[1SGDan]

you over Bear Creek, yet this doesn't appear in Cozzens book at all.

Page 125 has the only mention but any hope to "drive the enemy toward the impassable defiles of Bear Creek" was pie in the sky fantasy as long as the Fulton road went uncovered.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Page 125 has the only mention but any hope to "drive the enemy toward the impassable defiles of Bear Creek" was pie in the sky fantasy as long as the Fulton road went uncovered.

No, that is from correspondence post-escape, in which Rosecrans proposed another turning movement in order to try to cut off the ongoing move to the south.

I read your little series of articles on the subject. I don't really think that you are actually familiar with the record and will leave it at that. In fact, that was shown out of the gate in your first comments on this thread in which you got basic facts completely wrong. I have very intimately studied this operation and so I see the mistakes which you and your friend make in virtually every post.

 

[1SGDan]

I was holding Cozzen's book as I wrote that it is a Cozzen's quote from page 125. And I also studied this battle quite closely and will stick to my assessment. I concern myself with military operations and why the succeed or fail. The Union plan failed because two of the three pre-operational requirements for success were not even attempted.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I was holding Cozzen's book as I wrote that it is a Cozzen's quote from page 125. And I also studied this battle quite closely and will stick to my assessment.

Look at the date please.

Yeah, you and your friend are free to do whatever you want to, of course.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I have to ask you, and I don't want to revive this too much because both you and Dan exchanged a lot of messages about this already and must be tired of this topic. I am almost fried with Iuka myself but I want to finish going through the rest of the posts prior to moving on and I found this interesting.

There's a very lengthy back and forth with you over Bear Creek, yet this doesn't appear in Cozzens book at all.

Give me some leeway here, allow me a minute.

You have proven that Bear Creek was considered in the calculations as a possible escape route. That is, the risk was considered that Price could escape via "the defiles of Bear Creek" as Rosecrans puts it. I imagine that as anything but an acceptable road. However if someone is hemmed in on the three other lanes, it's like jumping off a two story building… you'll survive it but not whole. Am I right in that kind of analogy? Then, why jump off the roof if you can take the stairs?

I think because Price was never placed in the position of having to jump off a roof figuratively, then that option becomes irrelevant… What people don't understand is why worry about Bear Creek on September 19 if already Rosecrans is leaving the Fulton road open.

However, if I am not mistaken there's something else you are trying to convey with that.

Two things, this trap was not as airtight even if it worked perfectly. Bear Creek was not a desirable route, but if allowed all the leisure in the world some bad results could happen:

1. I think there was a concern that Van Dorn could come up. I believe I read that Grant thought Van Dorn couldn't come up within 4 days, still he was clearly worried and he had a tight schedule to operate, spring and effectuate the trap before it became too risky to stay exposed out there.
2. If not acting quickly, Price could get away anyway. He could push any one of the three columns that operated separately and without concert of the other two. Some coordination was required and acting swiftly on all sides was the best way to do that. There's also other things we have considered as militating in favor of swift action as surprise I believe was key.
3. The other risk is that even if Price was surrounded on all three sides, if they were all hanging back leisurely waiting fir the stars ti align and didn't act in aggressive fashion, Price could still escape via "the roof," which while poor and not desirable exists and nothing can be done about it.

I think I am with you there. You are I think trying to emphasize the need to act quickly and in a menacing fashion.

To my mind comes a similar civil war analogy — Ft. Donelson. Some men did escape through a road that was partly under icy water in the middle of the night in pure winter. It wasn't an airtight trap, but very few could use that road and most were captured. However, had McClernand not closed up and retaken his lines in the east end, the rebels could have just escaped down that road they had broken through. Then any discussion of the half underwater road that Forrest escaped through would be pointless. No one would use that icy waterway when they could use a proper road.

I think what's behind all this discussion is the need to hurry up, am I right?

I do think there was a need to hurry up. I don't think D&L were sent to twiddle thumbs. Although I don't credit the entirety of Rosecrans testimony to Congress, I do think there was urgency and they could very well have made the pointless advice as I said elsewhere of hurrying Rosecrans up.

I do think however, that leave the Fulton road open was such a monumental change that even if it was unavoidable, Rosecrans should have notified his commander. Then whatever happened would have been on him. Rosecrans took that choice out of his hands.

I also think even if Rosy acted using his best judgment because instant consultation wasn't possible, and he couldn't waste daylight waiting for confirmation of his recommendations he still needed to tell Grant what was up. Who knows what Grant might have done? He could have decided to push Ord through more menacingly, instead of hanging back 6 miles, to allow Rosy to attempt to grab the backroad he thought he could use to get to Fulton.

By not notifying his commander, Rosecrans took options away from him.

I am now keenly aware that Cozzens all throughout tried to push the narrative that Grant was strangely aloof, strangely detached, concerned about trivialities in Corinth (which were not fricking trivialities!) chatting up on parlays with Price, but all that narrative to me is a complete smokescreen to conceal the fact that Rosy didn't apprise his commander about what was going on and what he was doing. Had he done that, possibly Grant could have pushed up Ord anyway, or not, but it was his decision to make. OMG.

Only one sentence, a single sentence is given to that monumental decision from Rosy with no explanation of its significance while we are fed this strangely aloof story so as to bury it and present it as Grant negligence…
View attachment 522436

Alright, so I addressed a number of these issues beginning at #184 and moving forward in the following Posts. See #184-#185, #195-#196 and beyond.

 

[1SGDan]

This is the bibliography for my work on this battle. You idea that I would write a history solely on a single reference is both rude and presumptive.

Bibliography
Books
Official Records Volume XVIIa
The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth; Peter Cozzens
Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans; William M. Lamers
Army of the Heartland; Thomas Connelly
Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant; U. S. Grant
Roster and Record of Iowa Troops in the Rebellion, Vol. I; Guy E. Logan
Unit Histories
History of the Fourth Regiment of Minnesota Infantry during the Great Rebellion 1861-1865; Alonzo L. Brown
With Fire and Sword; S. H. M. Byers
Bugle Echoes – The story of the 47th; B. C. Bryner
The Drums of the 47th; Robert J. Burdette
Lone Star Defenders – A Chronicle of the Third Texas Cavalry; S. B. Barron
A Southern Record: The History of the Third Regiment Louisiana Infantry; W. H. Tunnard
Articles
A Battery at Close Quarters; A paper read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion; Henry Neil and John Sanborn
The Battle of Iuka; C. S. Hamilton, taken from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume II

 

[Nathan Towne]

This is the bibliography for my work on this battle. You idea that I would write a history solely on a single reference is both rude and presumptive.

Bibliography
Books
Official Records Volume XVIIa
The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth; Peter Cozzens
Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans; William M. Lamers
Army of the Heartland; Thomas Connelly
Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant; U. S. Grant
Roster and Record of Iowa Troops in the Rebellion, Vol. I; Guy E. Logan
Unit Histories
History of the Fourth Regiment of Minnesota Infantry during the Great Rebellion 1861-1865; Alonzo L. Brown
With Fire and Sword; S. H. M. Byers
Bugle Echoes – The story of the 47th; B. C. Bryner
The Drums of the 47th; Robert J. Burdette
Lone Star Defenders – A Chronicle of the Third Texas Cavalry; S. B. Barron
A Southern Record: The History of the Third Regiment Louisiana Infantry; W. H. Tunnard
Articles
A Battery at Close Quarters; A paper read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion; Henry Neil and John Sanborn
The Battle of Iuka; C. S. Hamilton, taken from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume II

I stand by what I said. Your source is essentially Cozzens and you are basically operating off of his book and putting up his bibliography. I think that we established on your first comment that you were not familiar with the facts on this subject either, frankly. You made a massive blatant error in your first comment between us.

Go back to Lamers and read pages 105-106 of my copy, please.

 

[1SGDan]

I have been writing battle summaries here for nearly 15 years and have often been questioned about my assessments but never insulted in a such an open fashion. I'll not argue with an egotistical blowhard.

 

[tony_gunter]

Which is why they couldn't pull back during the day of the 19th once it was recognized that the U.S. National forces were coming. They would have had to pull back that night, unless prevented from being able to do so, which was the intent of the operation.

They could have, and risked Price withdrawing over Bear Creek in the night. The other suboptimal choice was for Rosecrans to attack unsupported on the Jacinto Road very late in the day.

Grant chalked up the confusion to fog of war, but was happy that Price had been bloodied. Rosecrans cast about for others to blame and, intended or not, that attitude pervaded his army and his fans.

 

[1SGDan]

Rosecrans cast about for others to blame

Post battle blathering adds nothing to the actual events. Generally it includes aggrandizing a victory or dismissing a failure with excuses and shifting of blame.