Question about Antietam

[soprismb]

Hey you sexy beasts. I am a guy who just now is starting to really read book after book about the war in general. Right now I have a question on Sharpsburg in general I was hoping you all could help a brother out with.

I have been trying to show my parents a very broad Civil War canvas so that they know why I like it. I put on Ken Burns. For Antietam, it says, "McLellan had Lee's battle plan. Still he did nothing for 18 crucial hours." Can you guys explain to me why or what that is all about? I hate Little Napoleon as much as the next dude but I thought his pursuit of Lee was actually quite good. He kept his interior lines, advanced along all the major routes to protect DC, swung his best corps commander south along the C&O Canal Road in case Lee tried to ford back to Virginia, swung Sideburns north on a long wide axis of advance in order to guard against a cavalry flank from Jebba The Hut (who had been a terror in the last three battles), and protecting against an invasion of Pennsylvania. He did all of this while basically just methodically hunting Lee down until Granny was forced to fight him en masse after the South Mountain battles. You can say all you want about where he stationed his CP during the battle, or the missed chance to destroy Lee after the breakthrough at Sunken Road, failing to actually command and make a decision between Franklin and Sumner, and I'd be inclined to agree with everything you just said. But I thought he did a B+ job hunting Lee down. If you stumbled on an enemy battle plan in a cigar box you'd be remiss if you didn't at first suspect the little sucker was a trap, right? Wouldn't we all hammer Boy George (who hasn't?) if it turned out to be a trap the way Spoons Butler walked into one? The whole key to destroying Lee's force was the speed with which Jackson could capture Harper's Ferry or how long it could hold out; and Dixon Miles surrendering it faster than a Frenchman on Bastille Day was really out of Mac's hands anyway, right? This made it sound like the initial deployment was Mac's fault--not his conduct once engaged in combat.

What waste of time are they referring to and was it really Mcclellan's fault? To my untrained and blurry eyes his speed didn't lose the battle (or, I should say: didn't completely win it to Abe's satisfaction) per se. The initial disposition of his troops was okay, but what are the actual factual facts?

Thoughts?

 

[Rob9641]

McClellan did not have any real movement going for 18 hours after he was aware of the Lost Order 191, which told him Lee had split up his army. He's usually compared with Lee in that regard, and it's thought if positions were reversed, Lee would have been moving much faster. I agree with that line of thinking.

McClellan was said to have "the slows" in the field. IMO he was marvelous at forming an army and getting it ready for battle, but when it came to actually carrying out battle, he was very deliberate and slow about it. That showed up again after the battle, when Lee was allowed to slip away without McClellan offering any real pursuit. McClellan did not move his army at all for weeks.

Some have thought McClellan moved slowly because he really did not want to defeat the Confederate army, that he might have had some political motive to keep the war going until some compromise preserving slavery in some way could happen. I have no opinion whether he had something like that at the back of his mind, but I don't think there is any evidence he was that traitorous intentionally. I think he was just very, very careful about "his" army and as a result, lacked the boldness and quickness necessary to counter Lee.

 

[cash]

You're best taking the Ken Burns series with a grain of salt. It was terrific television and did a great job awakening an interest in a lot of people, but there were a lot of problems with it.

Special Orders 191 was not Lee's battle plan. It showed where various parts of the Army of Northern Virginia were sent, but it was missing some information, the most important of which was how many troops were involved with each part.

As to McClellan's allegedly doing nothing, we have to remember his situation.

He had an army made up of some soldiers who had served with him before and others who had never served with him. Several regiments were green, having never been in battle before. The 13th New Jersey, for example, was still so new they hadn't been taught how to use their muskets yet. Add to that a significant portion of his army was made up of regiments that had been under John Pope at Second Manassas and had been routed and sent back to Washington in a demoralized condition. Little Mac was rebuilding a part of the army at the same time he was integrating new units into that army and putting together units that hadn't fought together before all while on the move chasing Lee.

A timeline will help to put into perspective what was happening:

http://www.nps.gov/anti/learn/historyculture/timeline.htm

He received Special Orders No. 191 by the early evening. Civil War armies usually didn't move at night due to the many problems of moving without being able to see too well. So "doing nothing for 18 hours" really ignores a great deal of information that needs to be understood to be able to assess McClellan's actions properly.

 

[Pat Answer]

Welcome from NJ, soprismb!

I just left the "Mystery of McClellan" thread which you might also find interesting. I only know general things about Antietam myself, but so far think there isn't terribly much to criticize about McClellan - giving him the benefit of the doubt about what information he thinks he is acting on in the fog of war. That Lee was the better poker player is, well, that's how it goes sometimes...

 

[brass napoleon]

Hey you sexy beasts.

Well met!

 

[ole]

With the news that the enemy army was scattered, a better general would have been ready to move at first light with detailed orders. The men would not sleep much that night. "When you're ready to march, then you can sleep."

 

[John Winn]

With the news that the enemy army was scattered, a better general would have been ready to move at first light with detailed orders. The men would not sleep much that night. "When you're ready to march, then you can sleep."

I'm not sure I quite agree. The same has been said of Meade at Gettysburg: why didn't he chase Lee.

While Antietam did end Lee's invasion he was able to put some hurt on McClellan and, as with Meade, I just don't think they were in good enough shape to make chase. Perhaps I'm wrong but that's my impression.

Anybody feel differently (other than Ole) ? Why ?

 

[ole]

I'm not sure I quite agree. The same has been said of Meade at Gettysburg: why didn't he chase Lee.

While Antietam did end Lee's invasion he was able to put some hurt on McClellan and, as with Meade, I just don't think they were in good enough shape to make chase. Perhaps I'm wrong but that's my impression.

Anybody feel differently (other than Ole) ? Why ?

Weren't talking about chasing. The subject is his delay in bringing Lee to battle.

 

[John Winn]

Weren't talking about chasing. The subject is his delay in bringing Lee to battle.

Sorry. Misinterpreted your post. I thought you were saying McClellan should have followed Lee and continued to attack him after he retreated. Manny do criticize Mac for that so I thought you were, too.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan did not have any real movement going for 18 hours after he was aware of the Lost Order 191, which told him Lee had split up his army. He's usually compared with Lee in that regard, and it's thought if positions were reversed, Lee would have been moving much faster. I agree with that line of thinking.

This is a myth first proposed by Jacob Cox and taken on by his detractors, and is entirely based upon a bizarre misreading of the evidence.

In fact within minutes of receiving it (shortly before 3pm on 13th Sept) he'd forwarded it to Pleasonton, but had already committed 9th Corps to strike South Mountain *before* receiving SO191. They filled the road to SM until well after nightfall, and 1st Corps followed at dawn.

 

[67th Tigers]

With the news that the enemy army was scattered, a better general would have been ready to move at first light with detailed orders. The men would not sleep much that night. "When you're ready to march, then you can sleep."

In fact McClellan's movements are as rapid as possible, and there is no delay because the movement is underway *before" SO191 arrives at his HQ sometime between 1430 and 1500 hrs on the 13th.

Around midday when SO191 was found (before working it's way up the chain of command for several hours) McClellan's advanced forces (both wings consisting of cavalry and a division of 9th Corps) were forcing the Braddock Pass in the Catoctin Mountains (seized 1300) and the Jefferson Pass (seized 1730, after reinforcements from 6th Corps come up).

As soon as the Braddock Pass is seized McClellan commits the whole of 9th Corps and 1st Corps to push up the national road and seized the gaps at South Mountain. Around 1400 hrs McClellan meets Cox leading his division out to SM.

Around 1430 McClellan goes to HQ, which was only established around 1400, and shortly after he reaches there SO191 reaches his HQ. At 1500 he forwards a copy to the cavalry, but does not immediate alter movements, as such a movement is already underway. His briefing of all his senior commanders except Franklin was verbal, so we don't know the contents.

Franklin was given written marching orders because he was so far away (time stamped 1820). He then committed to a 2 hour march (starting 2000) to get his corps over the Jefferson Pass and relieve the 9th Corps division there to rejoin their corps.

Meanwhile Hooker pushed forward in the evening to close up into Frederick and gave his troops a few hours rest whilst 9th Corps filled the road. Hooker sounded reveille at 0300 on the 14th to begin marching as soon as the last 9th Corps division clears the road.

At 0900 on the 14th, dissatisfied with Hooker's rate of advance McClellan tells Sumner to use the small Shookstown Road to try and overtake Hooker (it rejoins the National Road before reaching SM), but 2nd Corps struggles over such a small road and doesn't manage it.

6th Corps was ordered to march at dawn, and in fact delayed a while waiting for Couch to rejoin.

The main issue of why "the entire army wasn't in instant motion" is simply that most of the army had to go via a single road which crossed the Blue Ridge and so was slow going. McClellan moved as fast as was physically possible, with the physical circumstance of having to move his main body through a single mountain pass.

 

[rbasin]

Maybe Mac should have kept his mouth shut: "Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip Bobby Lee, I will be willing to go home. I will not show you the document now, but here is the signature, and it gives the movement of every division of Lee's army. Tomorrow we will pitch into his center and if you people will do two good, hard days' marching I will put Lee in a position he will find it hard to get out of."

 

[FahanParish]

What waste of time are they referring to and was it really Mcclellan's fault?

Somewhere it's been written as you said that one of his generals did suggest to him the Special Order 191 papers might well be a ploy -deliberately dropped with false information. While that doesn't seem to be true, I've also read that McClellan didn't respond to the information quickly or with determination.

Past that, so much has been written about McClellan and his reluctance/downright refusal to take the aggressive. He always claimed that he was facing far superior numbers to his own. Some analysts say in the end he was no risk taker but more often it's suggested that he was a person who couldn't take a loss and would only fight if he were certain of victory. (how often does that happen?)

I don't know who his definitive biographer is said to be but it could make interesting reading.

Antietam/Sharpsburg is often said to be a draw - there were huge losses on both sides but I don't understand why it's considered a draw for the simple reason that Lee turned around and recrossed the Potomac. The northern movement was stopped.
In the better world, McClellan would have chased Lee and ended the war 2 1/2 years earlier saving thousands of lives but in the real world, just stopping and turning an army headed your way is prevailing.

 

[Rebforever]

I'm not sure I quite agree. The same has been said of Meade at Gettysburg: why didn't he chase Lee.

While Antietam did end Lee's invasion he was able to put some hurt on McClellan and, as with Meade, I just don't think they were in good enough shape to make chase. Perhaps I'm wrong but that's my impression.

Anybody feel differently (other than Ole) ? Why ?

Meade did chase Lee all the way back to Mine Run.

 

[NedBaldwin]

While Antietam did end Lee's invasion he was able to put some hurt on McClellan and, as with Meade, I just don't think they were in good enough shape to make chase. Perhaps I'm wrong but that's my impression.

Lee withdrew the night of the 18th, crossing the Potomac near Shepardstown and then marching up the Virginia side to recross at Williamsport. Late on the 19th Confederate cavalry under Stuart did reenter Maryland at Williamsport.

The morning of the 19th the following happened:

- US cavalry pursued Lee as far as the Potomac River; some of the cavalry also went to Williamsport to check Stuart.

- 1st Corps was too beat up to do anything. It sat for 2 days then marched for Harpers Ferry.

- 2nd Corps also sat for 2 days then moved on Harpers Ferry.

- 5th Corps followed the cavalry pursuing Lee and crossed the river; result was battle of Sheperdstown.
- 6th Corps was initially sent to aid the 5th but was redirected up river to stop the confederate crossing at Williamsport.

- 9th Corps also pursued the enemy to the Potomac, but finding they had crossed, it stopped. Next day it was sent to Harpers Ferry

- 12th Corps moved out morning of the 19th to retake Harpers Ferry

- Couch's division was sent to Williamsport

 

[Cumpston1862]

When Lee took his army into Maryland he counted on McClellan taking his time reorganizing all the different Union Army elements and being cautious. When McClellan started to move towards Lee and his army it was considered uncharacteristic and unexpected by him. Lee realized his army as spread out as it was needed to reassemble quickly. McClellan made Lee change his plans because he was considering advancing into Pennsylvania. The debate of whether McClellan could have moved more rapidly will be debated by us and historians of the conflict for a very long time. The fact remains that Lee was not expecting McClellan to move as fast as he did and he was forced to stop his advance to reassemble his army.

The Battle of Antietam however is classic McClellan. With an army nearly twice the size of Lee's force he should have pitched into him with a more concentrated effort rather than the uncoordinated attacks all along the line. Having said this it must also be remembered that McClellan had a knack for believing unrealistic intelligence that he was always outnumbered. The army of Northern Virginia was less than 50,000 men by almost all accounts yet McClellan believed he was facing anywhere from 100-200,000 men.

At the end of the day the Army of Northern Virginia held their own and dared McClellan to come at them the next day. When no attack came they slipped back into Virginia and McClellan stayed where he was for the next several weeks. Lincoln of course took the opportunity to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and McClellan let his boys rest looking at their "trophies".

 

[67th Tigers]

The Battle of Antietam however is classic McClellan. With an army nearly twice the size of Lee's force he should have pitched into him with a more concentrated effort rather than the uncoordinated attacks all along the line. Having said this it must also be remembered that McClellan had a knack for believing unrealistic intelligence that he was always outnumbered. The army of Northern Virginia was less than 50,000 men by almost all accounts yet McClellan believed he was facing anywhere from 100-200,000 men.

McClellan's own estimates are in the OR. He reckoned about 100,000 PFD/ 120,000 aggregate present. The actual figures were 75-80,000 and 90-100,000 in those two categories. Lets not confuse the stripped down "musket strength" of Lee's forces along the creek after severe straggling with his actual campaign strength that McClellan was estimating. Yes, McClellan overestimated, but not hugely, and he was probably knowingly "safe-siding" and had a reasonable idea that the numbers in his official estimates were a moderate overestimate.

McClellan's own strength if reduced to the same measure the Confederates used in their writings is much less than supposed. In fact on the field the overall numbers were around 5:4-3:2 in favour of McClellan (rather than the often claimed 2:1 or greater), but if you exclude the new greenhorns in McClellan's army who weren't yet upto much the numbers become roughly parity. Yes, we shouldn't exclude them completely, but their low level of performance justifies some of McClellan's worries about the quality of his troops.

At the end of the day the Army of Northern Virginia held their own and dared McClellan to come at them the next day. When no attack came they slipped back into Virginia and McClellan stayed where he was for the next several weeks. Lincoln of course took the opportunity to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and McClellan let his boys rest looking at their "trophies".

However, even Grant never renewed an assault the next day - it always takes time to reorganise (see my argument here: http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2014/10/antietam-would-grant-have-attacked-on.html ).

McClellan in fact sought ways of continuing the campaign immediately, but getting across the river was a real problem, especially as Halleck denied McClellan the funding to rebuild the bridges at Harper's Ferry - probably because Halleck still believed there was a second rebel army on the Rappahanock and thought Lee was trying to pull McClellan away from Washington so that army could strike.

 

[MRB1863]

Welcome aboard!

 

[Cumpston1862]

McClellan's own estimates are in the OR. He reckoned about 100,000 PFD/ 120,000 aggregate present. The actual figures were 75-80,000 and 90-100,000 in those two categories. Lets not confuse the stripped down "musket strength" of Lee's forces along the creek after severe straggling with his actual campaign strength that McClellan was estimating. Yes, McClellan overestimated, but not hugely, and he was probably knowingly "safe-siding" and had a reasonable idea that the numbers in his official estimates were a moderate overestimate.

McClellan's own strength if reduced to the same measure the Confederates used in their writings is much less than supposed. In fact on the field the overall numbers were around 5:4-3:2 in favour of McClellan (rather than the often claimed 2:1 or greater), but if you exclude the new greenhorns in McClellan's army who weren't yet upto much the numbers become roughly parity. Yes, we shouldn't exclude them completely, but their low level of performance justifies some of McClellan's worries about the quality of his troops.



However, even Grant never renewed an assault the next day - it always takes time to reorganise (see my argument here: http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2014/10/antietam-would-grant-have-attacked-on.html ).

McClellan in fact sought ways of continuing the campaign immediately, but getting across the river was a real problem, especially as Halleck denied McClellan the funding to rebuild the bridges at Harper's Ferry - probably because Halleck still believed there was a second rebel army on the Rappahanock and thought Lee was trying to pull McClellan away from Washington so that army could strike.

We could debate the true numbers of McClellan or Lee's Army at Antietam/Sharpsburg or any battle in general and be hard pressed to agree on a number. It comes down to averages or who you feel may have more realistic counts. The OR while an interesting point of reference should not be taken as the most accurate in relation to soldier counts or on any particular subject during the war as it is tainted with many imperfections.

Some accounts give Lee's strength at less than 40,000 at Antietam. This could easily be disputed by factoring in other accounts either way. What can not be disputed is that Lee did not have A.P. Hill with him when the battle opened and had McClellan been more aggressive initially on a broader scale he could have carried the day handsomely before Hill's arrival. This is my contention primarily. The greenhorns McClellan had with him performed reasonably well and should not be discounted as ineffective. McClellan also had other troops he could have drawn from to carry the day and he chose not to use them, specifically the 6th Corps.

Your blog states the 6th Corps at Antietam had the following strength;

6th Corps
Official Strength: 12,300 (of which 75-80% were combatants, B&L II, pp 595)
Force engaged at Crampton's Gap (Slocum's Div and Brooks' and Irwin's Bdes of Smith's Div): ca. 6,500 (of which 533 were casualties)
Strength of Smith's Division: ca. 4,500 (B&L II, pp 596)
PFD of Hancock's Bde (not included in the 6,500 engaged above, but in the strength of Smith's Division): 2,114, or ca. 1,600 combatants
Irwin's brigade: 1,684 (Carman)
Infantry Strength of 6th Corps: 8,324 (75% of present minus 901 for the artillery (figure from Carman)

In relation to General Grant "never renewed an assault the next day". Shiloh was a counter attack on Monday April 7th. Agreed the primary component was Buell's reinforcements but the fact remains that Grant counter-attacked and it was a general advance including his men that had fought the previous day.

 

[67th Tigers]

We could debate the true numbers of McClellan or Lee's Army at Antietam/Sharpsburg or any battle in general and be hard pressed to agree on a number. It comes down to averages or who you feel may have more realistic counts. The OR while an interesting point of reference should not be taken as the most accurate in relation to soldier counts or on any particular subject during the war as it is tainted with many imperfections.

Aye. The rebs essentially gave a bunch of lowball estimates of musket strength (excluding sgts, officers, skirmishers etc.) which add upto about 42,000 of all arms. If one wants to make comparisons than do the same for the government troops.

Some accounts give Lee's strength at less than 40,000 at Antietam. This could easily be disputed by factoring in other accounts either way. What can not be disputed is that Lee did not have A.P. Hill with him when the battle opened and had McClellan been more aggressive initially on a broader scale he could have carried the day handsomely before Hill's arrival. This is my contention primarily. The greenhorns McClellan had with him performed reasonably well and should not be discounted as ineffective. McClellan also had other troops he could have drawn from to carry the day and he chose not to use them, specifically the 6th Corps.

Nor did McClellan have 6th Corps or Morell's Division at the beginning of the 17th. As it came onto the field 6th Corps was committed to replace the shattered 1st, 2nd and 12th Corps.

Your blog states the 6th Corps at Antietam had the following strength;

6th Corps
Official Strength: 12,300 (of which 75-80% were combatants, B&L II, pp 595)
Force engaged at Crampton's Gap (Slocum's Div and Brooks' and Irwin's Bdes of Smith's Div): ca. 6,500 (of which 533 were casualties)
Strength of Smith's Division: ca. 4,500 (B&L II, pp 596)
PFD of Hancock's Bde (not included in the 6,500 engaged above, but in the strength of Smith's Division): 2,114, or ca. 1,600 combatants
Irwin's brigade: 1,684 (Carman)
Infantry Strength of 6th Corps: 8,324 (75% of present minus 901 for the artillery (figure from Carman)

This turned out to be an overestimate. Very roughly the situation at nightfall (with strengths) was:

In relation to General Grant "never renewed an assault the next day". Shiloh was a counter attack on Monday April 7th. Agreed the primary component was Buell's reinforcements but the fact remains that Grant counter-attacked and it was a general advance including his men that had fought the previous day.

Indeed. The statement that General Grant never renewed an assault the next day stands because (a) he did not make any assault on the 1st day (and indeed was absent for most of the fighting) and (b) Buell initiated a counterattack off his own initiative.