Pickett's Charge, failed because?

Not to denigrate any of the great cavalrymen of the Napoleonic Wars, but I do not believe any 19th-century cavalry could have done much better than the rebel infantry on July 3, 1863.
The problem with comparing the two cavalry types which are only 50 years apart is, as I previously mentioned, that the mind set had changed. If you were to 'parachute' Nap cavalry into the Pickett situation, they were well used to and would have accepted as normal, to assault positions such as the Federals held and could've 'possibly' taken them. Compare for instance the French Cuirassiers charging the Raevsky redoubt at Borodino which they carried, but broadly speaking ACW cavalrymen were not used to and wouldn't have expected to execute those kind of tactics as the norm.

Unsupported ventures are usually doomed to failure (take Ney's cavalry charges at Waterloo, no close infantry support) but insufficient infantry numbers, lack of proper supporting artillery fire to cover the advancing infantry and no cavalry to exploit any gains made by them could've meant only one thing, Lee's plan was fatally flawed from the outset.
 
The problem with comparing the two cavalry types which are only 50 years apart is, as I previously mentioned, that the mind set had changed. If you were to 'parachute' Nap cavalry into the Pickett situation, they were well used to and would have accepted as normal, to assault positions such as the Federals held and could've 'possibly' taken them. Compare for instance the French Cuirassiers charging the Raevsky redoubt at Borodino which they carried, but broadly speaking ACW cavalrymen were not used to and wouldn't have expected to execute those kind of tactics as the norm.
Thanks for your response.
No doubt that the role expected of cavalry was much different in the ACW. That's why any discussion mixing elements, organization and strategy from different eras is futile.
 
Can anyone imagine walking slowly into this...
This was great to see for a lot of reasons beside the archaeological study which was interesting enough. Thanks to years of watching Time Team, I was able to understand what was being done. Thanks Tony and Phil!:D

I noticed that the gun barrel seemed quite depressed. Was this for the sake of the study, or would that be the normal way that the cannon would have been fired in Pickett's charge?

Thanks for posting this, Loo!
 
This was great to see for a lot of reasons beside the archaeological study which was interesting enough. Thanks to years of watching Time Team, I was able to understand what was being done. Thanks Tony and Phil!:D

I noticed that the gun barrel seemed quite depressed. Was this for the sake of the study, or would that be the normal way that the cannon would have been fired in Pickett's charge?

Thanks for posting this, Loo!
Hi, thanks.
You’d think that working out the elevation of the various cannons during Pickett’s charge would be a fairly straight foward exercise but it really isn’t. Would you mind if I pointed you in the direction of a handy piece of research carried by David Shultz and Richard Rollins, their research is incredible, they’ve measured and worked out elevations and depressions and how the topography would affect the cannon fire. Here’s a link. http://www.gdg.org/Gettysburg Magazine/measure.html :thumbsup:
 
Hi, thanks.
You’d think that working out the elevation of the various cannons during Pickett’s charge would be a fairly straight foward exercise but it really isn’t. Would you mind if I pointed you in the direction of a handy piece of research carried by David Shultz and Richard Rollins, their research is incredible, they’ve measured and worked out elevations and depressions and how the topography would affect the cannon fire. Here’s a link. http://www.gdg.org/Gettysburg Magazine/measure.html:thumbsup:
I don't mind at all! Thanks! I have not really delved into weapons too much as there are so many other interesting aspects of the war. I realize more and more, however, that without at least basic knowledge of how weapons work and what damage they can do, certain aspects of battles remain a mystery.
That is why the video you posted was so interesting. I am a visual learner and see details such as the pulling of the lanyard, the recoil of the carriage, the bounce of the cannon balls, the scatter of the cannister shot, etc., are all very helpful to me in visualizing what happens on the battlefield. I look forward to checking out this link.
 
Can anyone imagine walking slowly into this...
I counted at least 8 holes in that cardboard that would have likely caused at least a wounding. This doesn't include holes that may be hidden by the people in front of the cardboard. So that was 1 cannon with 8 wounds from one round. All of us, sitting in our climate controlled houses, on our machines that have all the worlds knowledge at our fingertips, can't even fathom walking into something like that. (To any modern day soldiers, this does not apply to you :smile: )
 
I counted at least 8 holes in that cardboard that would have likely caused at least a wounding. This doesn't include holes that may be hidden by the people in front of the cardboard. So that was 1 cannon with 8 wounds from one round. All of us, sitting in our climate controlled houses, on our machines that have all the worlds knowledge at our fingertips, can't even fathom walking into something like that. (To any modern day soldiers, this does not apply to you :smile: )
Here's a sample of what solid shot sounds like on the receiving end

 
The thought of facing that gives me the shivers and in the comfort of my armchair, I'm not facing that. However, next to me could be my father, brother or nephew all determined to do there duty, am I know going to let them down?
 
Those videos of cannon fire are very impressive - and they are only demonstrations! Suppose they meant it... :eek: That is why decades later when the old veterans returned to Gettysburg and re-enacted the charge, they ended up running to grab and hug each other.
 
I watched a short video today called ‘Picketts Charge, myth disproven, one of the things mentioned as a reason for the high number of confederate casualties was the smoke which hung over the battlefield, it’s alleged that it would have been impossible to see much further than 25ft. I thought the smoke was worth a quick mention because it seems it’s one of those important factors which often gets overlooked.
 
Artillery barrage more successful
Artillery moving forward to support the attack, protect the flanks
Support troops moving forward to take advantage of potential breach in union line
Destruction of as many fences as possible before the attack
Destruction of as many fences as possible before the attack - this would have been the key. A night recon to knock down the fences before the attack.
 
Destruction of as many fences as possible before the attack - this would have been the key. A night recon to knock down the fences before the attack.
Some of those fences were pretty solid. They weren't going to come down that easily, not like split rail fence. This older thread might shed some light on this. https://civilwartalk.com/threads/fences-at-gettysburg.14703/

PS. This thread caused me more than a little sadness, as so many of the contributors are no longer with us.
 
Destruction of as many fences as possible before the attack - this would have been the key. A night recon to knock down the fences before the attack.
Found this photo, a reconstruction of the fences along Emmittsburg Road, those fences posed a similar problem to artillery as the barbed wire entanglements did for the British guns during WW1, no matter how hard and often the wire was pounded it just didn’t break, I can imagine the fence along the Emmittsburg Road would have been as equally difficult to destroy. I’ve tried to imagine myself trying to climb that fence, under heavy fire and unable to see more than 25ft through the thick smoke whilst being both physically and mentally exhausted... and that’s just the first fence.
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True, which is why I’m asking the question, what could have been done differently. I appreciate that Lee would have weighed up his options but could there have been another tactic, was there something he missed or some elements of his force that he didn’t use that could have changed the outcome.

Sorry for the late reply. I don't believe he could have done anything different on the third day of the battle. His army was smashed up after two days of brutal fighting & the union has had 2 days & nights to reinforce the centre of their line.
 
Battle plans never work perfectly. But IF the attack had started early in the day before the troops had baked under the sun for hours and IF the hour-long artillery preparation had done the damage hoped for and IF the cavalry assault had worked out, there might have been a chance the attack would have succeeded. It seems to me that anything less than perfection would not have worked.
 
This was great to see for a lot of reasons beside the archaeological study which was interesting enough. Thanks to years of watching Time Team, I was able to understand what was being done. Thanks Tony and Phil!:D

I noticed that the gun barrel seemed quite depressed. Was this for the sake of the study, or would that be the normal way that the cannon would have been fired in Pickett's charge?

Thanks for posting this, Loo!

From my understanding gun barrels would be depressed as far as they could be when canister was being fired at advancing troops. This allowed the canister balls to ricochet off of the ground and have a wider spread.
 
Pickett's Charge failed because..

the distance was too great
the opposing firepower was too savage
the men sent to accomplish the mission were too few

We were standing at a departure point of one of the regiments looking across to the ridge. After a long silence, she said, "How could they think they could make it? Why did they even try?"

I remember standing with my Dad, many a year ago, near the Virginia monument looking across at the Angle. Dad had stepped off on attacks many a time in WWII, particularly on Okinawa. I asked him a question much like this.

He was silent a moment. Then he said, "You just do."

Another short silence followed. Dad looked around, scanning the approach the charge would have followed. He started talking to me about a memory, about a place in Okinawa called Kakazu Ridge. Another regiment in his division had hit it and failed, Dad's regiment had moved in to try again, and Dad went with the Captain to the briefing the night before the attack. Seared into his memory was the word that command delivered: "You have to take that ridge tomorrow even if it means 25% casualties."

They went off in the morning. A massive barrage by four battalions of the division artillery and naval gunfire preceded them -- men spoke of how the Japanese couldn't survive that! Three battalions advanced, nine rifle and three heavy weapons companies, moved up Kakazu East and Kakazu West -- fought all day, could not hold what they took, fell back and were counter-attacked by the Japanese in the darkness. The assault troops couldn't make it all the way back to the main US line and took cover in a gorge, the area behind them swept with mortar and artillery fire. Down in the gorge that night a man named Beauford T. Anderson performed the actions for which he was later awarded the Medal of Honor. Dad was about 20 yards from that; if Anderson had failed, Dad's position would probably have been over-run. But Dad didn't mention that as we stood there.

He looked around and I could see him gaze at where Pickett's men would have gone. He said again: "You just do."
 
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I remember standing with my Dad, many a year ago, near the Virginia monument looking across at the Angle. Dad had stepped off on attacks many a time in WWII, particularly on Okinawa. I asked him a question much like this.

He was silent a moment. Then he said, "You just do."

Another short silence followed. Dad looked around, scanning the approach the charge would have followed. He started talking to me about a memory, about a place in Okinawa called Kakazu Ridge. Another regiment in his division had hit it and failed, Dad's regiment had moved in to try again, and Dad went with the Captain to the briefing the night before the attack. Seared into his memory was the word that command delivered: "You have to take that ridge tomorrow even if it means 25% casualties."

They went off in the morning. A massive barrage by four battalions of the division artillery and naval gunfire preceded them -- men spoke of how the Japanese couldn't survive that! Three battalions advanced, nine rifle and three heavy weapons companies, moved up Kakazu East and Kakazu West -- fought all day, could not hold what they took, fell back and were counter-attacked by the Japanese in the darkness. The assault troops couldn't make it all the way back to the main US line and took cover in a gorge, the area behind them swept with mortar and artillery fire. Down in the gorge that night a man named Beauford T. Anderson performed the actions for which he was later awarded the Medal of Honor. Dad was about 20 yards from that; if Anderson had failed, Dad's position would probably have been over-run. But Dad didn't mention that as we stood there.

He looked around and I could see him gaze at where Pickett's men would have gone. He said again: "You just do."
What an excellent post, thanks for sharing with us that experience with your dad. I’ve heard many veterans say exactly the same thing ‘You just do’. The other day I was watching an interview with a British D-day veteran, he was asked about assaulting the beach under fire, his response was classic, ‘I was just doing as I was told’, it’s the same as your dads ‘you just do’ comment.
 
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