Pickett's Charge, failed because?

[War Horse]

I have always held the position that Lee thought his plans and orders for the conducting of battle at Gettysburg for all three days was sound and that his plan for Pickett's grand charge was no less so. Part of what convinced me of what Lee was thinking was a little known and not often cited published Memoranda of Conversations with General Robert E. Lee by William Allan (1868, 1870)
In these memoranda, dated in 1868 and 1870, William Allan recalls conversations with Robert E. Lee, then president of Washington College, in Lexington. A native of Winchester, Allan was a Confederate veteran and a member of the faculty who late authored one volume of a history of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.

Here, according to Allen is what Lee partly had to say years after Gettysburg. Mind you, Lee did not say much after the war if anything about the battle other than this series of interviews just before his death:

Allen's recollection (in part):

"Stuart's failure to carry out his instructions forced the battle of Gettysburg, & the imperfect, halting way in which his corps commanders (especially Ewell) fought battle, gave victory, (which as he says trembled for 3 days in the balance) finally to the foe. He says that one day, (I think the second) he consulted Ewell and told him that if he could not carry his part of the line, he would move the 2d Corps to the right of Longstreet and threaten their communications with Baltimore, but that Ed. Johnson and Ewell said the line then held could be carried. Johnston, Rodes, Early however attacked in succession and were not able to hold any advantage. Gen. Lee talked feelingly of the criticism to which he had been subjected, said 'critics' talked much of that they knew little about, said he had fought honestly and earnestly to the best of his knowledge and ability for the 'Cause' and had never allowed his own advantage or reputation to come into consideration. He cared nothing for these, success was the great matter. Instanced Gen. Joe. Johnston's sensitiveness on this score, and how wrong and unwise it was. He referred to a reported conversation of Longstreet, in which the latter stated that Gen. Lee was under a promise to the Leut. Generals not to fight a general battle in Pa. The Gen. said he did not believe this was ever said by Longstreet. That the idea was absurd. He had never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing any such thing."

https://www.encyclopediavirginia.or...ith_General_Robert_E_Lee_by_William_1868_1870

Fascinating stuff. Thanks for posting.

 

[diane]

It seems to me that Lee was expecting a fight in Pennsylvania, but expected to be able to pick his ground - he thought he was going to be fighting Mr F J Hooker. That general was good but Lee was better without doubt - he expected to whip the fight. Meade was the wild card, the random chance nobody could have anticipated, the cat in the best laid plans of mice and men.

 

[Northern Light]

It seems to me that Lee was expecting a fight in Pennsylvania, but expected to be able to pick his ground - he thought he was going to be fighting Mr F J Hooker. That general was good but Lee was better without doubt - he expected to whip the fight. Meade was the wild card, the random chance nobody could have anticipated, the cat in the best laid plans of mice and men.

Poor Meade, he gets no credit at all. No wonder he was grumpy. He did an excellent job, consider the time he had been in command, and had a few wild cards himself to deal with, like Sickles (ptuwwee!) and Barlow.

 

[TennCav63]

If the Cavalry Corps had been committed to support Pickett's division, would that have carried the day - or would the horsemen just have been all killed by canister fire?

 

[thomas aagaard]

If the Cavalry Corps had been committed to support Pickett's division, would that have carried the day - or would the horsemen just have been all killed by canister fire?

What?
Stuart was busy guarding the flank of the army.

 

[War Horse]

If the Cavalry Corps had been committed to support Pickett's division, would that have carried the day - or would the horsemen just have been all killed by canister fire?

It was a lot of open ground to cover. Not really ideal for Cavalry operations. There were Cavalry operations taking place to support Pickett's Charge. Stuart was off on the army's flank raising Cain in East Calvary Hill.

 

[Northern Light]

It was a lot of open ground to cover. Not really ideal for Cavalry operations. There were Cavalry operations taking place to support Pickett's Charge. Stuart was off on the army's flank raising Cain in East Calvary Hill.

Bear in mind that if Stuart was not at East Cavalry Field, neither would Custer, as Gregg asked him to stay and help, and Gregg would be freed up as well if needed.

 

[Waterloo50]

If the Cavalry Corps had been committed to support Pickett's division, would that have carried the day - or would the horsemen just have been all killed by canister fire?

Hello and welcome to the Pickett forum @TennCav63, nice to see you posting here.
If you're asking about cavalry rushing headlong at the Union lines, I believe that the canister shot would have made it impossible, plus those fences posed a real hurdle. (No pun intended).

 

[klongstreet]

Could there also be a connection between exactly where Gen Lee's viewpoint was and the end result, " line of sight etc"
Has Lee's movements been mapped?, sorry if this has been " done to death on another thread".

 

[Waterloo50]

Could there also be a connection between exactly where Gen Lee's viewpoint was and the end result, " line of sight etc"
Has Lee's movements been mapped?, sorry if this has been " done to death on another thread".

I'll chip in here but this is just my opinion, regardless of where Lee was, his intention was to smash the Union centre, he was intent on throwing everything he had at forcing the union to withdraw or break from the high ground. My understanding is that he had originally ordered the attack for sometime early morning but as we know those orders didn't get passed on until late morning and by the time the division had formed up the diversion at Culp's hill was pretty much over. Regardless of things going awry and despite the warnings from Longstreet, Lee was determined to push on with his plan, as others have posted here, Lee went for broke, I don't think anything, even an accurate visual report of Union strength and position would have persuaded Lee that the attack would be anything other than a success.

 

[Waterloo50]

Could there also be a connection between exactly where Gen Lee's viewpoint was and the end result, " line of sight etc"
Has Lee's movements been mapped?, sorry if this has been " done to death on another thread".

I don't know if Lee's movements have been mapped but if you feel so inclined and have the time, maybe it's something we could start a thread on.

 

[Irishtom29]

If you're asking about cavalry rushing headlong at the Union lines, I believe that the canister shot would have made it impossible, plus those fences posed a real hurdle. (No pun intended).

I think it would take Polish, French or British cavalry to carry such a position.

 

[Waterloo50]

I think it would take Polish, French or British cavalry to carry such a position.

I hate to admit it but I'd say German or French cavalry were better than the British in the 1800s, that reminds me of this little statement. 'In launching the charge at Waterloo the colonel of the King's Dragoon Guards had cried out to his men, "On to Paris !" His body was later found a short distance from where the charge began with a French musket ball in his head.

 

[Irishtom29]

I hate to admit it but I'd say German or French cavalry were better than the British in the 1800s...

A French character in the movie Waterloo is given a line about the British cavalry being the noblest in the world, and the worst led. Thus did the Light Brigade carry the guns at Balaclava though not intended to.

 

[Ian Peavot]

Staying within the original remit of the question and accepting the basic troop disbursements remain unchanged, then very little can be done to influence the potential outcome of the battle and as already been stated, Lee's mind was made up and he wouldn't be swayed.
However perhaps the only thing he might have been persuaded on would've been to shorten the line somewhat and use those troops as a reserve/2nd line and try to deploy skirmishers of sorts to protect the flanks.
One aspect that has been mentioned several times is the comparison to Napoleonic tactics and would a cavalry charge bringing up the rear made a difference. The answer to that point is possibly, if Stuart was available with most or all of his command it 'could' have made a difference on Picketts charge, that is presuming that most of the Union defenders could be kept occupied so Stuart wouldn't take to much fire and that is where the Confederate artillery would've needed to have been giving maximum covering fire, but anything less than a massive concentration would have been useless.
Yes French or Russian Nap cavalry possibly could've carried the positions on their own, but you have to understand that the mindset had changed significantly since 1815 and whereas cavalry of that period expected to make charges like that on a regular basis, during the ACW they generally did not. Infantry tactics whilst overtly looked similar between the two periods in reality they differed significantly, as we know this was mostly due to the improvement of weaponry that largely made Napoleonic tactics obsolete, even though Picketts charge was essentially just that, but without significant skirmish cover, light cavalry screens and heavy infantry reserves.
The other thing to bear in mind is that when making full frontal assaults, the attacking force needs to have a numerical superiority over the defenders, also taking into account distance traveled, otherwise it is usually doomed to failure.

 

[TennCav63]

As I understand it, when Lee returned to his tent around midnight of July 3rd, he expressed to a brother officer the opinion that the attack that he had ordered for that day had not been supported as he had intended. Did some divisions fail to support the attack as ordered? If so, which ones - and who commanded them?

 

[unicornforge]

Thanks, I was confused by not knowing the context. Using this context, .

The book/army manual, refers to "mass" as more than number of people. It includes all resources such as artillery, and anything else that can be used against an enemy. Since Lee did not have airplanes or tanks, etc. Mass would include his artillery which was used totally ineffectively. His artillery missed their targets, and he was heavily counting on his artillery to soften Union forces sufficiently for the attack to work. Thus he did not use Mass (artillery and men) effectively.

 

[Northern Light]

The book/army manual, refers to "mass" as more than number of people. It includes all resources such as artillery, and anything else that can be used against an enemy. Since Lee did not have airplanes or tanks, etc. Mass would include his artillery which was used totally ineffectively. His artillery missed their targets, and he was heavily counting on his artillery to soften Union forces sufficiently for the attack to work. Thus he did not use Mass (artillery and men) effectively.

Thank you!

 

[WJC]

he had fought honestly and earnestly to the best of his knowledge and ability for the 'Cause' and had never allowed his own advantage or reputation to come into consideration. He cared nothing for these, success was the great matter.

I am familiar with Mr. Allen's work and I certainly agree with this 'self-assessment'. As to the rest of Mr. Allen's recollections, they seem more his fantasy than Lee's fact.

 

[WJC]

French or Russian Nap cavalry possibly could've carried the positions on their own,

Not to denigrate any of the great cavalrymen of the Napoleonic Wars, but I do not believe any 19th-century cavalry could have done much better than the rebel infantry on July 3, 1863.