Pickett's Charge, failed because?

[PeterT]

... there was another general in the field, too!

And that General had Hancock and others around him to support him too!

 

[diane]

And that General had Hancock and others around him to support him too!

Pickett was right - the Yankees had something to do with it!

 

[Waterloo50]

While I agree with what you say, if Lee knew his July 3rd attack was doomed this was probably his best option. Obviously he didn't think it was doomed.

I just can't see how Lee could have withdrawn, I think time was of the essence and any delay in pushing foward would have allowed the Union to dig in deeper and strengthen their position, there's also the morale of his men to consider, walking away from the field of battle would have had a knock on effect for any future engagements.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Is it possible that Meade out thought Lee on day 3? In that Meade had enough streangth to stop an attack in the center and possibly enough streangth to stop an attack on either flack and could still keep enough reserves to use his interior lines to reinforce any threatened area?

]
Yes I think so. Whatever his flaws (which I think are often over-emphasized] Meade handled the Army of the Potomac more competently in battle than his predecessors and also benefited by excellent work by some of his subordinates, especially Hancock. Meade had enough troops at the point of attack so that Pickett's Charge could not succeed. It would seem,that the most obvious explanation is that Lee did not expect this to be the case, and so Meade did outgeneral Lee.

 

[Rio Bravo]

In fact, the Confederate attacking force was comfortably superior in numbers to the Union Troops defending-
15,000 to 8000. Nevertheless, this superiority would be reduced as the advance progressed, first by Artillery & then by massed volleys of rifle fire.
Why oh Why did Lee not learn from Fredericksburg ??? The Union defenders had NOT as they shouted out the word Fredericksburg to taunt the Confederate troops !

 

[Andy Cardinal]

In fact, the Confederate attacking force was comfortably superior in numbers to the Union Troops defending-
15,000 to 8000. Nevertheless, this superiority would be reduced as the advance progressed, first by Artillery & then by massed volleys of rifle fire.
Why oh Why did Lee not learn from Fredericksburg ??? The Union defenders had NOT as they shouted out the word Fredericksburg to taunt the Confederate troops !

If we assume 50% of the attackers never made it across the field (I've seen estimates that high but I have no idea if that's accurate) then at the point of attack the defenders outnumbered the attackers.

 

[Rio Bravo]

If we assume 50% of the attackers never made it across the field (I've seen estimates that high but I have no idea if that's accurate) then at the point of attack the defenders outnumbered the attackers.

The University Greys, Co A, 11th Mississippi suffered 100% Casualties in Pickett's Charge, but they reached the greatest penetration into Union lines reaching Bryan's Barn & the Stonewall behind it.

 

[Jamieva]

I think we all agree, a major factor is how far they had to go to get to the Union lines. That's just way too far to be subjected to artillery and then infantry fire. If you significantly cut down the distance they had to go to get to the Union lines, therefore reducing the amount of losses before they get there, then maybe it works

 

[Waterloo50]

I think we all agree, a major factor is how far they had to go to get to the Union lines. That's just way too far to be subjected to artillery and then infantry fire. If you significantly cut down the distance they had to go to get to the Union lines, therefore reducing the amount of losses before they get there, then maybe it works

I've heard that quite a few men walked away from the line rather than advance, nothing wrong with that considering that most of them understood that the charge was likely to fail. Does anyone know roughly how many decided that they'd leave whilst they still could?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

The University Greys, Co A, 11th Mississippi suffered 100% Casualties in Pickett's Charge, but they reached the greatest penetration into Union lines reaching Bryan's Barn & the Stonewall behind it.

They achieved an amazing accomplishment which is often overlooked because they were not part of Pickett's division.

 

[unicornforge]

Perhaps the real question is, how many of the principles of effective military operations did Lee
apply to the attack?

The book, "American Military History, Volume 1" by the Center of Military History, United States Army, identifies "the principles essential to the exercise of effective military operations."

Objective:.... a clearly defined decisive and attainable objective.
Offensive: ….. Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.
Maneuver: …... Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position.
Mass: ….. Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Mass is more important than numbers. … Mass is thus the concentration of military assets against a specific target.
Economy of Force: …... Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Use of Command: ….. For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.
Security: ….. Security is essential to the preservation of combat power and is achieved by measure taken to prevent surprise, preserve freedom o action and deny the enemy information of friendly forces.
Surprise: …. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which eh is unprepared.
Simplicity: …. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear concise order to ensure thorough understanding and minimize confusion.

Obtainable objective: No
Offensive: Not successfully
Maneuver: nope
Mass: Questionable, the artillery barrage missed.
Economy of force: Doesn't seem that way
Security: Nope
Surprise: no
Simplicity: Walk across the long open area and take the hill. Well, pretty simply stated.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Mass: ….. Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Mass is more important than numbers. … Mass is thus the concentration of military assets against a specific target.

Surprise: …. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which eh is unprepared.

It would seem Lee underestimated the mass necessary to succeed -- not enough troops made it to Cemetery Ridge for the attack to succeed. Second, Meade was fully prepared for an attack.

 

[Northern Light]

Perhaps the real question is, how many of the principles of effective military operations did Lee
apply to the attack?

The book, "American Military History, Volume 1" by the Center of Military History, United States Army, identifies "the principles essential to the exercise of effective military operations."

Objective:.... a clearly defined decisive and attainable objective.
Offensive: ….. Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.
Maneuver: …... Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position.
Mass: ….. Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Mass is more important than numbers. … Mass is thus the concentration of military assets against a specific target.
Economy of Force: …... Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Use of Command: ….. For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.
Security: ….. Security is essential to the preservation of combat power and is achieved by measure taken to prevent surprise, preserve freedom o action and deny the enemy information of friendly forces.
Surprise: …. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which eh is unprepared.
Simplicity: …. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear concise order to ensure thorough understanding and minimize confusion.

What does "Mass is more important than numbers" mean in this context? Does it mean how the soldiers are placed in order to give an impression of bulk, as opposed to having a long line. I would imagine that would look more intimidating than , especially if you could not see beyond the mass of men.

 

[Northern Light]

These are the findings from,
Pickett's Charge: What modern mathematics teaches us about Civil War battle


.The first factor we examined was the Confederate retreat. About half the charging infantry had become casualties before the rest pulled back. Should they have kept fighting instead? If they had, our model calculated that they all would have become casualties too. By contrast, the defending Union soldiers would have suffered only slightly higher losses. The charge simply didn't include enough Confederate soldiers to win. They were wise to retreat when they did.

.We next evaluated how many soldiers the Confederate charge would have needed to succeed. Lee put nine infantry brigades, more than 10,000 men, in the charge. He kept five more brigades back in reserve. If he had put most of those reserves into the charge, our model estimated it would have captured the Union position. But then Lee would have had insufficient fresh troops left to take advantage of that success.

.We also looked at the Confederate artillery barrage. Contrary to plans, their cannons ran short of ammunition due to a mix-up with their supply wagons. If their generals had better coordinated those supplies, the cannons could have fired twice as much. Our model calculated that this improved barrage would have been like adding one more infantry brigade to the charge. That is, the supply mix-up hurt the Confederate attack, but was not decisive by itself.

.Finally, we considered the Union Army. After the battle, critics complained that Meade had focused too much on preparing his defences. This made it harder to launch a counter-attack later. However, our model estimated that if he had put even one less infantry brigade in his defensive line, the Confederate charge probably would have succeeded. This suggests Meade was correct to emphasize his defense.


Source:https://theconversation.com/pickett...atics-teaches-us-about-civil-war-battle-78982


.

.

This is interesting, but leaves such factors as human reaction, effective damage of the barrage, etc. out of the equation. As well, to be effective, the majority of the forces would have needed to arrive at the wall at the same time, which of course didn't happen.

 

[Waterloo50]

What does "Mass is more important than numbers" mean in this context? Does it mean how the soldiers are placed in order to give an impression of bulk, as opposed to having a long line. I would imagine that would look more intimidating than , especially if you could not see beyond the mass of men.

I'm taking 'mass' to mean large numbers of men thrown at the objective, it's one of those things that's been tried and tested, during the Napoleonic wars and WW1 large numbers of men were pushed towards an objective, the downside being that casualty rates were often very high. The same thing happened during D-day, attack on mass and eventually the objective is overwhelmed, I think the term often used for those types of attacks is 'meat grinder'.

 

[Waterloo50]

This is interesting, but leaves such factors as human reaction, effective damage of the barrage, etc. out of the equation. As well, to be effective, the majority of the forces would have needed to arrive at the wall at the same time, which of course didn't happen.

The problem with the confederate barrage was that they had a habit of overshooting the intended target, again, softening up the target with artillery is a tried and tested method but there's was no real way to tell exactly how effective the barrage had been. You're right of course, how do you measure human reaction, I think the mathematical analysis looked at the distance that needed to be covered but what about the effect that the temperature (hot and humid) had on the men, would it have made any difference had the attack been carried out at a faster pace, we know it as Pickett's charge but in truth it was more of a slow steady walk.

 

[Northern Light]

I'm taking 'mass' to mean large numbers of men thrown at the objective, it's one of those things that's been tried and tested, during the Napoleonic wars and WW1 large numbers of men were pushed towards an objective, the downside being that casualty rates were often very high. The same thing happened during D-day, attack on mass and eventually the objective is overwhelmed, I think the term often used for those types of attacks is 'meat grinder'.

Thanks, I was confused by not knowing the context. Using this context, how do you think Lee could have more effectively used his 10,000+ men than he did? Should he have narrowed the line of approach? Should they have marched faster? It always seems to me that it is a rather leisurely stroll across the field, which of course would have given any Union general worth his salt plenty of time to prepare, bringing up more ammunition and rearranging his troops.

 

[connecticut yankee]

"General Lee did not return to his headquarters until 1 o'clock on the morning of July 4. Brigadier General John Imboden, commanding an irregular band of cavalry that had been liberally foraging the countryside to the west, was waiting there for him. Lee dismounted and, Imboden wrote, "threw his arm across the saddle to rest, and fixing his eyes upon the ground leaned in silence and almost motionless upon his equally weary horse." Imboden commiserated: "General, this has been a hard day for you."

"Yes, it has been a sad, sad day for us, " Lee replied, and then (Imboden recalled) "relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude." But suddenly he roused himself to speak vigorously of the battle just fought. "I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's division of Virginians did today in that charge," he said. But he went on, they were not supported as they were to have been - "for some reason not yet fully explained to me"-else "we would have held the position and the day would have been ours."

Thus if Generals Imboden's account can be accepted, some nine hours after the event Robert E. Lee had convinced himself that his plan for Pickett's Charge was perfectly sound. Only it's execution had been flawed.

Gettysburg pg 471
Stephen W. Sears

It would appear only General John Imboden was present to hear Lee make that statement.

I'll have a look at E.P Alexander's memoirs. I believe he speaks of the intended support that never materialized.

I have always held the position that Lee thought his plans and orders for the conducting of battle at Gettysburg for all three days was sound and that his plan for Pickett's grand charge was no less so. Part of what convinced me of what Lee was thinking was a little known and not often cited published Memoranda of Conversations with General Robert E. Lee by William Allan (1868, 1870)
In these memoranda, dated in 1868 and 1870, William Allan recalls conversations with Robert E. Lee, then president of Washington College, in Lexington. A native of Winchester, Allan was a Confederate veteran and a member of the faculty who late authored one volume of a history of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.

Here, according to Allen is what Lee partly had to say years after Gettysburg. Mind you, Lee did not say much after the war if anything about the battle other than this series of interviews just before his death:

Allen's recollection (in part):

"Stuart's failure to carry out his instructions forced the battle of Gettysburg, & the imperfect, halting way in which his corps commanders (especially Ewell) fought battle, gave victory, (which as he says trembled for 3 days in the balance) finally to the foe. He says that one day, (I think the second) he consulted Ewell and told him that if he could not carry his part of the line, he would move the 2d Corps to the right of Longstreet and threaten their communications with Baltimore, but that Ed. Johnson and Ewell said the line then held could be carried. Johnston, Rodes, Early however attacked in succession and were not able to hold any advantage. Gen. Lee talked feelingly of the criticism to which he had been subjected, said 'critics' talked much of that they knew little about, said he had fought honestly and earnestly to the best of his knowledge and ability for the 'Cause' and had never allowed his own advantage or reputation to come into consideration. He cared nothing for these, success was the great matter. Instanced Gen. Joe. Johnston's sensitiveness on this score, and how wrong and unwise it was. He referred to a reported conversation of Longstreet, in which the latter stated that Gen. Lee was under a promise to the Leut. Generals not to fight a general battle in Pa. The Gen. said he did not believe this was ever said by Longstreet. That the idea was absurd. He had never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing any such thing."

https://www.encyclopediavirginia.or...ith_General_Robert_E_Lee_by_William_1868_1870

 

[FarawayFriend]

if I could send you back in time and assuming that Lee would act on your advice, what would you have told him

Trust no one, especially not your enemy!

Sorry, I'm late and have only quickly glanced through these 7 pages, but I had intended to reply that Lee fell in the Union trap and trusted in his success too much. Alexanders artillery barrage had not silenced the Union guns... The Confederates were lured into a giant trap...
But then I saw that @War Horse had already made that point:

The Union wisely ceased their artillary fire early giving the Confederates the perception that they were low on ammunition and the time was right to launch before they could resupply their batteries.

It always amazes me that Lee did not think of the possibility that the ebbing Union fire could be a ruse...

So you really think that Lee gave direct orders to Alexander to place his guns where he did as he claims?

It would have been not like Lee to give that kind of exact orders! He would have given the general directions and expected that the minds of his subordinates worked the exact same way his own mind worked, so that his pretty woolly orders were carried out with accuracy...

 

[Waterloo50]

It always amazes me that Lee did not think of the possibility that the ebbing Union fire could be a ruse...

Absolutely, Lee was probably thinking that after two hours of firing on both sides that the union had also used up most of their ammunition.