Pickett's Charge, failed because?

[Waterloo50]

A massed formation infantry assault over 3/4 mile of open fields, slowed up by fences along the way, against an established enemy position pouring out heavy artillery and rifle fire, was doomed to failure, no matter how good was Lee's infantry. Longstreet always knew this.

It was no help that the preceding Southern cannonade was largely ineffective, due to over-firing and defective ammunition.

Lee's chances of success might have been improved (probably not by enough, on July 3), if better coordinated synchronized assaults were launched at multiple parts along the extended Union defensive line.

I don't know what Lee was thinking but I have heard others say that he overestimated the ability of his own troops and underestimated the ability of the Union infantry. On paper I guess it was a plan that could have worked but it was a big ask of his infantry given the distance needing to be covered. Some say his thinking was very Napoleonic but the same kind of decision process was used in WW1, pound the line with artillery and send in the troops to take the broken centre of the line. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't but it always came with a high attrition rate, the difference of course is that during WW1 and even during the Napoleonic wars there were always plenty of reserves available to bolster the line. In order to carry out an attack like Pickets charge you have to have the numbers to reinforce and plug the gaps.

 

[Woods-walker]

View attachment 293367

Mention the name George E Pickett and the first thing that springs to mind is the failed attack at Gettysburg.

Like many of us here I've examined that famous/infamous charge and I'm left wondering what could have been done differently to make it a success, was it even possible for the outcome to have been different. I'd like to know what others think, if I could send you back in time and assuming that Lee would act on your advice, what would you have told him was required to break through the Union defences...oh, by the way, telling Lee not to go ahead with an attack isn't an option.

For those who want a quick overview of how things originally played out here's a quick timeline, it's not exhaustive by any means but it gives a rough idea on how things unfolded.

1:00pm 152 Confederate cannons are pushed out of the tree line and fire on the Union centre, 122 Union cannons respond, the firing last for 2 hours.
3:00pm the cannon fire falls silent.
3:10pm 14000 Confederate troops step out of the tree line, the confederate line is almost a mile in length, the confederate line steps out in perfect order, it was 87 degrees and humid so the line moved slowly.
122 Union cannon open up on the confederate line.
The Confederate line has to cross open ground for about a mile to make it to the Union line, however, they have to cross the Emmitsburg road which is lined either side by two 5 foot tall fences.
At the Union line, approximately 6000 men are told to hold fire until the confederate line reaches the road, meanwhile, 25 Union cannon are being loaded with canister shot.
When the confederate line or what's left it reaches the road, all hell breaks lose and the confederate line starts to falter, so much so that they go to ground, the bodies are falling and the road becomes a scene of complete carnage, those that have managed to push on meet the first line of union defences at the West wall, the confederate line clashes with 1600 union soldiers, in this clash the Union suffers 500 casualties and approximately 1100 union men withdraw to the main union line, the confederate line loses momentum and on seeing this the union swing around and box in those that had made it to the west wall.
On seeing the line falter, brigadier general Armistead pushes through the line and try's to encourage the men to keep moving, again the confederate line is hammered by the union main line.
In total the confederate line took about 50 minutes to cross and withdraw across the field, they suffered a loss of 6,800 men.

I fail to see what could have been done differently, does anyone have any theories about what was needed to break the Union line?

A combination of what's already been added:
Start arrack earlier in the morning
Have artillery take out fences along Emmitsburg road
Have artillery blast stone wall to pebbles
Have artillery move forward to support the flanks
Have artillery continue to fire over troops moving forward until troops reach Emmitsburg road
Pray for success

 

[JerryD]

I think he'd have been more accurate if he had of said… 'our artillery barrage had something to do with it', especially because the Union artillery was not suppressed, and the Union infantry was not weakened as planned'.

I don't have my book with me, but didn't EPA say, after he was told what the plan was, that at no time during the war was CSA artillery able to drive off Union infantry, so Lee's assumption it could was fatally flawed?

 

[JerryD]

It was a successful charge. They made it to the rock wall angle. And then….?

As General Wright observed to EPA, it was easy to get there, the trick was stay there, as The whole federal army was there in a bunch. With the feds having interior lines, and with Lee spread out in a semicircle like he was, the feds could easily repulse an attack and Lee could not exploit an opening.

 

[JerryD]

I don't know what Lee was thinking but I have heard others say that he overestimated the ability of his own troops and underestimated the ability of the Union infantry. On paper I guess it was a plan that could have worked but it was a big ask of his infantry given the distance needing to be covered. Some say his thinking was very Napoleonic but the same kind of decision process was used in WW1, pound the line with artillery and send in the troops to take the broken centre of the line. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't but it always came with a high attrition rate, the difference of course is that during WW1 and even during the Napoleonic wars there were always plenty of reserves available to bolster the line. In order to carry out an attack like Pickets charge you have to have the numbers to reinforce and plug the gaps.

I don't remember the source, but didn't Lee himself say he had asked his troops to do too much? That his confidence in their ability was so great that he thought they could accomplish anything he asked of them?

 

[LibertyAndUnion]

"The Yankees had something to do with it," as Pickett would say. I suggest three regiments of Vermonters three weeks away from mustering out back home were a key to the repulse. Pickett's right flank was devastated by Stannard's Brigade.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Lee's habit of devising overall strategy and then leaving its execution in the hands of his subordinate officers was perhaps his most serious flaw. His reliance on his lieutenants may have worked out when dealing with a Stonewall Jackson (although even their, it failed during the Seven Days), but was seriously wanting when dealing with the likes of Ewell and Hill.

I agree, and I believe in the end that there were extenuating circumstances, that contributed to Lee's command debacle at Gettysburg.

Despite the belief of some of Lee's hagiographers, Lee after all was only human and like many of us in our later years are much more comfortable with just what we know and tend to ignore what is uncomfortably outside our experience.

 

[jackt62]

"The Yankees had something to do with it," as Pickett would say. I suggest three regiments of Vermonters three weeks away from mustering out back home were a key to the repulse. Pickett's right flank was devastated by Stannard's Brigade.

Yes, and that right flank was supposed to be supported by Wilcox and Lang, which for some reason didn't happen. That left an opening for the Vermonters to devastate the flank of Pickett's Virginians.

 

[Blessmag]

The buffet only accepts cash??

 

[Rebforever]

Yes, and that right flank was supposed to be supported by Wilcox and Lang, which for some reason didn't happen. That left an opening for the Vermonters to devastate the flank of Pickett's Virginians.

That statement is where my post was headed and you got it.

 

[Rebforever]

A combination of what's already been added:
Start arrack earlier in the morning
Have artillery take out fences along Emmitsburg road
Have artillery blast stone wall to pebbles
Have artillery move forward to support the flanks
Have artillery continue to fire over troops moving forward until troops reach Emmitsburg road
Pray for success

And who was the General responsible for that? besides General Lee?

 

[danny]

A combination of what's already been added:
Start arrack earlier in the morning
Have artillery take out fences along Emmitsburg road
Have artillery blast stone wall to pebbles
Have artillery move forward to support the flanks
Have artillery continue to fire over troops moving forward until troops reach Emmitsburg road
Pray for success

Improve the coordination among the cavalry's objective and flank demonstrations.
Closer examination of the troops selected for the assault. Heth's division was a wreck.
In the presence of the other corps commanders, make sure they all know that Longstreet is running the assault with other troops responding to any calls he might make. Confirm it with Longstreet as well.
Closer coordination with the artillery supports, and certainly an ammunition inventory
Secondary supporting objectives for all forces not directly involved in the assault. Focus of the entire army. No bystanders

 

[Woods-walker]

And who was the General responsible for that? besides General Lee?

I believe Massa Robert said "Its all my fault". (I disagree with the old gentleman's assent, but so be it).

 

[JerryD]

And who was the General responsible for that? besides General Lee?

Since you pointedly exclude Lee for responsibility for no apparent reason, it appears your question is on the manner of looking for a scapegoat to protect Lee's reputation. Is there a reason you want to exclude Lee?

 

[Rebforever]

Since you pointedly exclude Lee for responsibility for no apparent reason, it appears your question is on the manner of looking for a scapegoat to protect Lee's reputation. Is there a reason you want to exclude na

 

[thomas aagaard]

It could have been more than touch and go if other things had worked out. A more effective artillery bombardment by Alexander, a less robust reinforcement of the angle by Meade and Hancock, a coordinated and more successful assault by Johnson at Culps Hill, a truly vigorous support by Wilcox and Lang from Hill's Corp, a breakthrough by Stuart at the East Cavalry field. But all of these actions of course involved a level of communication, timing, and intelligence that were sorely lacking.

Since that was not his orders, that would never have happened.

 

[jackt62]

Since that was not his orders, that would never have happened.

From my reading of the literature on this subject, it does appear that there is no direct evidence to consider that Stuart's cavalry action was planned in coordination with Pickett's assault. Nevertheless, had Stuart succeeded in breaking through Gregg's lines, an opportunity for disrupting and/or cutting off the rear and flank of the AotP would have been another element that, had the other pieces of the "swiss watch" functioned properly, might have contributed to a different outcome for the ANV.

 

[Sheltowee]

Wow..... quite a thread. I've read many of the opinions, and admit to being somewhat hesitant to post my own reply. My knowledge of the battle's details are certainly lacking.

But here goes. Perhaps a better question is whether a successful assault by Pickett would have accomplished any real strategic value for the ANV. Were Lee's forces capable of exploiting a breakthrough? Would this likely have resulted in a rout of the Union army- or just a general withdrawal, followed by a fresh assault on the ANV? Certainly Lee's further advance would be hampered by overextended supply lines. Is this correct?

I'm just trying to understand how a successful Pickett's charge would have changed the grand outcome. IMO- Lee may try to move on Washington, but would still be outnumbered, ill-supplied, and over-stretched. End result, a fall-back to Virginia...... minus several thousand desperately needed infantrymen.

As always- please provide correction and missed insight.

 

[JerryD]

Wow..... quite a thread. I've read many of the opinions, and admit to being somewhat hesitant to post my own reply. My knowledge of the battle's details are certainly lacking.

But here goes. Perhaps a better question is whether a successful assault by Pickett would have accomplished any real strategic value for the ANV. Were Lee's forces capable of exploiting a breakthrough? Would this likely have resulted in a rout of the Union army- or just a general withdrawal, followed by a fresh assault on the ANV? Certainly Lee's further advance would be hampered by overextended supply lines. Is this correct?

I'm just trying to understand how a successful Pickett's charge would have changed the grand outcome. IMO- Lee may try to move on Washington, but would still be outnumbered, ill-supplied, and over-stretched. End result, a fall-back to Virginia...... minus several thousand desperately needed infantrymen.

As always- please provide correction and missed insight.

I think this is an excellent point. I doubt he could have achieved a Cannae like victory, and the end result would be he bought some worthless ground he could not hold at a terrible price in casualties. Some people think it could have led to foreign recognition, but at this point that was simply not going to happen short of him taking DC or some other kind of cataclysmic event. And I think that is really the biggest flaw in Lee as a strategist. He simply didnt know what it would take to win the war and couldn't see past his nose and the next battle. But he was always betting big with the lives of his precious few soldiers on the attempted knockout punch, instead of seeing the long term.

 

[jackt62]

Perhaps a better question is whether a successful assault by Pickett would have accomplished any real strategic value for the ANV.

Lee's Pennsylvania incursion was prompted by a number of factors (among them seek needed food and forage, forestall Union offensives in Virginia, damage northern morale, relieve pressure at Vicksburg). Many of these wants were being achieved by Lee and his army and a clear battlefield victory over the AotP would have served as the icing on the cake, by demonstrating the strength of southern arms and the durability of an independent Confederacy. That would have made the incursion a real strategic success for the cause of the Confederacy had the ANV withdrew in triumph to Virginia, rather than in anguish and disgust.