Move to Dillon's

[JohnG0609]

I've not seen much commentary on the decision to move on Dillon's on May 15. Pemberton says in his report that the "object is to cut the enemy's communications and to force him to attack me." Which drove the next question in my mind, "...and then what?"

Pemberton provided more context in "Compelled to Appear in Print," but never states how either of these objects were to be accomplished.

After some study, I've got some pretty solid thoughts on the "lurch" towards Dillon's but I'm curious to know what y'all's thoughts are on it.

Just so we don't get too wrapped around the axle of Johnston's orders and the Council of War, I was hoping to just keep the conversation to the operation itself, IOW, after the green light was given. But all thoughts are welcome and the conversation will go where it goes.

 

[alan polk]

It's hard not to get "wrapped around" Johnston's orders. It's part of the facts on the ground. But anyway, when Pemberton arrived at Edwards from Bovina around noon on the 14th, he immediately informed Loring of Johnston's order to move east and attack Sherman's four divisions in Clinton. Pemberton tells him to prepare to move.

Loring balks at this, informing Pemberton that his scouts had positively identified an enemy division—maybe even larger, perhaps two divisions—on his right-rear flank (maybe near Auburn or New Auburn, I can't remember which one).

These facts, if true, made the move east suicidal, or such was the general consensus.

The move to Dillon's was Loring's suggestion, per counsel of war. Pemberton agreed but felt it risky without proper cavalry.

Nonetheless, its intent was two-fold: to defeat this isolated portion of Grant's army (perhaps one or two divisions) with Pemberton's three divisions, while also complying with Johnston's order, i.e., Dillon's is "technically" in the rear of Sherman's four divisions in Clinton.

Dillon's is about 10 miles from Edwards. Clinton is about 20 miles from Edwards.
Attacking the isolated enemy at Dillon's would force Yankees near Jackson/Clinton to fall back to assist their comrades at Dillon's. This would reopen communications with Johnston in Jackson, allowing a junction of the forces. If the main body of enemy moved on Edwards instead, Pemberton would be closer to Edwards and could shift to meet the threat. The Dillon's move also secured communication with Pemberton's rear.

The bottom line is that the plan was just a legalistic way to avoid complying with Johnston's orders by making it technically appear that it was in compliance. Word that Pemberton had been ordered by Johnston to move to Clinton was inevitably going to be known by his men. His army was restless, with rumors spreading that Pemberton was unwilling to fight, or things even worse about him. This also probably played a role in the decision to move—to do something.

So, basically they were going to "wing it" and hope for the best. That decision, however poor it might have been, seemed better to them than committing suicide by moving 20 miles east with an enemy in their rear and/or flank.

Anyhow, that's my take on it.

 

[JohnG0609]

I would agree that this is the common narrative as I understand it and it generally comports with Pemberton in "Compelled...". But I don't think it stands up to critical analysis.

I would disagree on one point, that of Loring's influence. Which is not to say Loring didn't influence Pemberton, just not in this particular sequence of events.

5/13 Pemberton orders Loring to perform a reconnaissance to discover where the enemy is. Saying if they had gone to Jackson he anticipated attacking their communications. So Pemberton was already thinking about that. On the 14th, while moving from Bovina he receives Johnston's dispatch, ordering the move to Clinton. But in "Compelled" Pemberton states that he instantly wrote his reply, the move to Dillons, handed it to the courier and after that he ordered Loring to hold the army in readiness to move. Which leaves me with the conclusion that Pemberton had already decided to move to Dillons before receiving Johnston's dispatch. But he did say this 15 years after the fact too.

Its the whole move on Dillons that makes no sense. And without having done a deep critical analysis there are a couple things that bother me:

1. Pemberton had learned from J Adams on 5/13 that Sherman was now on "this side" (east) of Big Black River. Yet he made no accounting for them in his planning. Pemberton moved with no certainty where any enemy forces were.

2. Why Dillon's? Pemberton wrote Johnston that he was moving to Dillons with the object to cut enemy communications and compel him to attack him. But objects are not end states. Desired end state is the goal of any military plan, 1863 or 2025. notably, he says nothing about attacking an enemy force known to be there. A move to Dillons doesn't cut the enemy's communications. And how does cutting a dirt road sever communications? Its just not plausible. Which leaves the second stated reason for the move, compel the enemy to attack him. Ok, where and how? This implies Pemberton finding good ground for defense and awaiting attack. But that would be entirely illogical if Pemberton believed his duty was to hold Vicksburg. It just doesn't make sense.

3. If Pemberton did order the move to attack a detachment at Dillons then how would that have worked? That plan would mean he would fight a battle against at least a division, overwhelm it, and then post up in a favorable position and await counterattack? Or overwhelm the enemy and hustle back to BBR bridge before the enemy at Clinton got there? All with an army that by his own admission was fatigued from many days marching and he feared would straggle badly. Then the field order laying out the order of march. Each divisions wagons, following their respective division. Doesn't sound like a formation that was expecting combat. Not even slightly plausible.

Ultimately, I think it reflects Pemberton's utter incapacity for command. That he was overmatched, overwhelmed, and deluded.

 

[tony_gunter]

I would agree that this is the common narrative as I understand it and it generally comports with Pemberton in "Compelled...". But I don't think it stands up to critical analysis.

I would disagree on one point, that of Loring's influence. Which is not to say Loring didn't influence Pemberton, just not in this particular sequence of events.

5/13 Pemberton orders Loring to perform a reconnaissance to discover where the enemy is. Saying if they had gone to Jackson he anticipated attacking their communications. So Pemberton was already thinking about that. On the 14th, while moving from Bovina he receives Johnston's dispatch, ordering the move to Clinton. But in "Compelled" Pemberton states that he instantly wrote his reply, the move to Dillons, handed it to the courier and after that he ordered Loring to hold the army in readiness to move. Which leaves me with the conclusion that Pemberton had already decided to move to Dillons before receiving Johnston's dispatch. But he did say this 15 years after the fact too.

Its the whole move on Dillons that makes no sense. And without having done a deep critical analysis there are a couple things that bother me:

1. Pemberton had learned from J Adams on 5/13 that Sherman was now on "this side" (east) of Big Black River. Yet he made no accounting for them in his planning. Pemberton moved with no certainty where any enemy forces were.

2. Why Dillon's? Pemberton wrote Johnston that he was moving to Dillons with the object to cut enemy communications and compel him to attack him. But objects are not end states. Desired end state is the goal of any military plan, 1863 or 2025. notably, he says nothing about attacking an enemy force known to be there. A move to Dillons doesn't cut the enemy's communications. And how does cutting a dirt road sever communications? Its just not plausible. Which leaves the second stated reason for the move, compel the enemy to attack him. Ok, where and how? This implies Pemberton finding good ground for defense and awaiting attack. But that would be entirely illogical if Pemberton believed his duty was to hold Vicksburg. It just doesn't make sense.

3. If Pemberton did order the move to attack a detachment at Dillons then how would that have worked? That plan would mean he would fight a battle against at least a division, overwhelm it, and then post up in a favorable position and await counterattack? Or overwhelm the enemy and hustle back to BBR bridge before the enemy at Clinton got there? All with an army that by his own admission was fatigued from many days marching and he feared would straggle badly. Then the field order laying out the order of march. Each divisions wagons, following their respective division. Doesn't sound like a formation that was expecting combat. Not even slightly plausible.

Ultimately, I think it reflects Pemberton's utter incapacity for command. That he was overmatched, overwhelmed, and deluded.

AJ Smith's division was at Dillon's when the army started marching and remained there until the morning of the 16th when it passed through Raymond and then out the road to Edwards.

Johnston at some point had asked Pemberton could he not break the enemy's line of communications back to Grand Gulf so I'm guessing it was Pemberton's way of not complying with one of Johnston's orders by complying with another.

AJ Smith's division was small if I remember correctly (4,000?), so Pemberton would have overwhelming force. I'm guessing his hope was that routing the rearguard division would draw troops back down the road from Jackson and Raymond? Plus, Johnston never gave him a heads up that he was fleeing for Canton so he must have assumed that the troops at Jackson could not easily disengage and attack him.

 

[alan polk]

Johnston at some point had asked Pemberton could he not break the enemy's line of communications back to Grand Gulf

If I recall correctly, Pemberton did not receive that order until he was retreating from Champion Hill on the evening of the 16th. Unless, of course, you are referring to an earlier order that I'm not remembering.

 

[tony_gunter]

If I recall correctly, Pemberton did not receive that order until he was retreating from Champion Hill on the evening of the 16th. Unless, of course, you are referring to an earlier order that I'm not remembering.

Allegedly, although it seems fishy. Johnston wrote A on the morning of the 14th asking if Pemberton can cut Grant's communications. Pemberton then sends B that afternoon telling him he's moving to Dillon's. Then Johnston sends C on the morning of the 15th telling him Dillon's is no longer an option.

Pemberton receives C pre-dawn on May 16th, but doesn't receive A until the night of the 16th?

And this is all alleged by Johnston's chief of staff from recollection? I find it more likely that Pemberton received A then C, and B is a response to A.

 

[alan polk]

Allegedly, although it seems fishy. Johnston wrote A on the morning of the 14th asking if Pemberton can cut Grant's communications. Pemberton then sends B that afternoon telling him he's moving to Dillon's. Then Johnston sends C on the morning of the 15th telling him Dillon's is no longer an option.

Pemberton receives C pre-dawn on May 16th, but doesn't receive A until the night of the 16th?

And this is all alleged by Johnston's chief of staff from recollection? I find it more likely that Pemberton received A then C, and B is a response to A.

Possibly. But I have an eyewitness account of Pemberton receiving the message on his way to Edwards just after retreating across Bakers Creek.

 

[tony_gunter]

Possibly. But I have an eyewitness account of Pemberton receiving the message on his way to Edwards just after retreating across Bakers Creek.

You're right.

I thought it was Johnston's chief of staff that recorded the sequence of messages, but Pemberton himself is the one that reported receiving the May 14th message late on the 16th. The random time between sent / received is pretty wild, and highlights the main problem:

If Johnston wanted to direct the action, he should have hopped his happy *ss on a horse and rode to take command of the main body.

 

[tony_gunter]

Getting back to the question of "why Dillon's?" Pemberton had planned all along to strike Grant's trailing flank / rear if he passed in the direction of Jackson. Once Gregg was in place at Raymond, if a superior force appeared in his front he was supposed to warn Pemberton and then execute a delaying action back towards Jackson. Pemberton would then move out from Edwards and hit an isolated flank / rear. There were three problems with this plan:

1) Pemberton took entirely too long to come to the front, which rendered command and control fubar. He arrived at Edwards May 14th, the day McPherson and Sherman took Jackson. By that time, of course, a heavy rain had turned the roads into oatmeal.

2) Not being on the scene allowed Wirt Adams' orders to get crossed. Instead of scouting the road from Raymond to Utica, Adams was scouting the Old Port Gibson Road in the direction of Auburn.

3) McPherson hid his deployment outside Raymond, which convinced Gregg he was facing a cavalry brigade not an infantry division. Gregg pitched in and spent the remainder of the day extricating himself. No warning went to Pemberton until after Gregg was retreating through Raymond around 4-5 p.m. Message had to go to Clinton by courier, so earliest Pemberton would have received it would have been 8-10 pm, possibly as late as the next morning.

4) McClernand's change of face south of Edwards was brilliant; McClernand was across Fourteen Mile Creek and Baker's Creek before anyone was aware what was happening.

 

[alan polk]

I think this is a very good analysis, Tony. I will just make a few comments and observations.

Getting back to the question of "why Dillon's?" Pemberton had planned all along to strike Grant's trailing flank / rear if he passed in the direction of Jackson. Once Gregg was in place at Raymond, if a superior force appeared in his front he was supposed to warn Pemberton and then execute a delaying action back towards Jackson. Pemberton would then move out from Edwards and hit an isolated flank / rear.

I think this is correct, but I suspect that Pemberton was going to be very cautious executing it—which shouldn't come as much of a surprise. Honestly, I think the Yankees would have had to offer him something almost too good to be true. Again, it is just my intuition that it was merely an option he left open to himself and probably would have never pulled the trigger.

He knew better than anyone that, without sufficient cavalry, if he ever moved away from his line of communications he would essentially be moving blind. I believe that by May 11-13 he realized how inefficient his intelligence was and so any desire to move had dissipated by the 14th.

Thus, I'm not so sure that by May 14 he was entertaining any such move from Edwards. Meaning that—as you alluded in the below quote— it didn't much matter the he took too long to arrive in Edwards by the 14th.

Now, I'm not saying it didn't matter that he waited until the 14th, I'm just saying I don't think it mattered in terms of making an attack towards Dillon's or against any isolated segment of the enemy.

1) Pemberton took entirely too long to come to the front, which rendered command and control fubar. He arrived at Edwards May 14th, the day McPherson and Sherman took Jackson. By that time, of course, a heavy rain had turned the roads into oatmeal.

I've already expressed my thoughts about Pemberton getting to Edwards in time to render command and control for an operation beyond his base.

But I think it is worth mentioning that Pemberton likely expected to fight the decisive battle for Vicksburg in and around Edwards and/or the line of the Big Black. I think he was perfectly satisfied with the disposition of his forces there at Edwards — he had the high ground at Edwards, with Bakers and 14-Mile Creeks to his front and flank, respectively. From his position at Edwards, he also had the three major roads leading to crossings of the Big Black (The RR Bridge, Baldwin's, and Bridgeport) covered.

Thus, I don't think he felt any urgent need to be at Edwards.

But also, it should equally be noted that he was very concerned about the enemy still at Milliken's and Grand Gulf, along with reports of troop transports still on the Mississippi River. He was very concerned that the enemy at those locations would board transports and, backed by a few gunboats, launch beach-style assaults against Warrenton. Clearly, with his lack of reliable intelligence of what was going on across the river at Young's Point, Milliken's Bend, or near Grand Gulf, I think his caution was very warranted.

Additionally, he began receiving reports that Lauman's entire division had boarded transports at Memphis and was moving down to Vicksburg — offering further evidence that an attack against Warrenton might be imminent.

Again, with these potential problems lurking at his rear, and against Vicksburg no less, he was not keen to go off blind into the countryside of Hinds County and off his line of communication. Again, satisfied with his strong position at Edwards, I don't think he was too concerned with his presence at Edwards.

2) Not being on the scene allowed Wirt Adams' orders to get crossed. Instead of scouting the road from Raymond to Utica, Adams was scouting the Old Port Gibson Road in the direction of Auburn.

This is absolutely correct.

3) McPherson hid his deployment outside Raymond, which convinced Gregg he was facing a cavalry brigade not an infantry division.

I agree with this to a certain point. My only observation is that I truly don't think that the fact that McPherson hid his deployment on the battlefield played as big of a role in Gregg's estimation.

Rather, I think it was the fact that McPherson's cavalry had so brilliantly screened McPherson's entire movement from the Crossroads to Utica that Gregg became convinced. I suspect he was convinced well before the battle that he was facing a small force based on that circumstance alone. I don't think McPherson hiding his formation on the battlefield, alone, did the trick. Again, that's just my random thought or suspicion.

4) McClernand's change of face south of Edwards was brilliant; McClernand was across Fourteen Mile Creek and Baker's Creek before anyone was aware what was happening.

My goodness, Tony, I know typing that had to hurt you beyond description!!! That I would ever hear you use "McClernand" and "Brilliant" in the same context makes me wonder if Western Civilization is finally coming to an end!!!

 

[tony_gunter]

I think this is a very good analyses, Tony. I will just make a few comments and observations.



I think this is correct, but I suspect that Pemberton was going to be very cautious executing it—which shouldn't come as much of a surprise. Honestly, I think the Yankees would have had to offer him something almost too good to be true. Again, it is just my intuition that it was merely an option he left open to himself and probably would have never pulled the trigger.

He knew better than anyone that, without sufficient cavalry, if he ever moved away from his line of communications he would essentially be moving blind. I believe that by May 11-13 he realized how inefficient his intelligence was and so any desire to move had dissipated by the 14th.

Thus, I'm not so sure that by May 14 he was entertaining any such move from Edwards. Meaning that—as you alluded in the below quote— it didn't much matter the he took too long to arrive in Edwards by the 14th.

Now, I'm not saying it didn't matter that he waited until the 14th, I'm just saying I don't think it mattered in terms of making an attack towards Dillon's or against any isolated segment of the enemy.



I've already expressed my thoughts about Pemberton getting to Edwards in time to render command and control for an operation beyond his base.

But I think it is worth mentioning that Pemberton likely expected to fight the decisive battle for Vicksburg in and around Edwards and/or the line of the Big Black. I think he was perfectly satisfied with the disposition of his forces there at Edwards — he had the high ground at Edwards, with Bakers and 14-Mile Creeks to his front and flank, respectively. From his position at Edwards, he also had the three major roads leading to crossings of the Big Black (The RR Bridge, Baldwin's, and Bridgeport) covered.

Thus, I don't think he felt any urgent need to be at Edwards.

But also, it should equally be noted that he was very concerned about the enemy still at Milliken's and Grand Gulf, along with reports of troop transports still on the Mississippi River. He was very concerned that the enemy at those locations would board transports and, backed by a few gunboats, launch beach-style assaults against Warrenton. Clearly, with his lack of reliable intelligence of what was going on across the river at Young's Point, Milliken's Bend, or near Grand Gulf, I think his caution was very warranted.

Additionally, he began receiving reports that Lauman's entire division had boarded transports at Memphis and was moving down to Vicksburg — offering further evidence that an attack against Warrenton might be imminent.

Again, with these potential problems lurking at his rear, and against Vicksburg no less, he was not keen to go off blind into the countryside of Hinds County and off his line of communication. Again, satisfied with his strong position at Edwards, I don't think he was too concerned with his presence at Edwards.



This is absolutely correct.



I agree with this to a certain point. My only observation is that I truly don't think that the fact that McPherson hid his deployment on the battlefield played as big of a role in Gregg's estimation.

Rather, I think it was the fact that McPherson's cavalry had so brilliantly screened McPherson's entire movement from the Crossroads to Utica that Gregg became convinced. I suspect he was convinced well before the battle that he was facing a small force based on that circumstance alone. I don't think McPherson hiding his formation on the battlefield, alone, did the trick. Again, that's just my random thought or suspicion.



My goodness, Tony, I know typing that had to hurt you beyond description!!! That I would ever hear you use "McClernand" and "Brilliant" in the same context makes me wonder if Western Civilization is finally coming to an end!!!

I don't think his original intent had the army moving much out of Edwards. It would have been more in line with striking McClernand as he moved across Fourteen Mile Creek within easy striking distance of Edwards. Dillon's was just where the tail of the army sat when he arrived at Edwards.

It's hard to imagine him pulling the trigger on that especially since he would have been without Tilghman's Brigade. But it was Pemberton's only hope of luring Grant back towards Edwards if he turned on Jackson.

 

[alan polk]

But it was Pemberton's only hope of luring Grant back towards Edwards if he turned on Jackson.

I don't think Pemberton necessarily felt he needed to "lure" Grant back to Edwards. All he had to do was keep holding the high ground there. Unlike Johnston, who actually thought Grant's intent was to set up camp and fortify Jackson, Pemberton knew that Grant's intent was to immediately turn back west and thus likely move through Edwards in order to reach his goal of Snyder's and then Vicksburg.

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't think Pemberton necessarily felt he needed to "lure" Grant back to Edwards. All he had to do was keep holding the high ground there. Unlike Johnston, who actually thought Grant's intent was to set up camp and fortify Jackson, Pemberton knew that Grant's intent was to immediately turn back west and thus likely move through Edwards in order to reach his goal of Snyder's and then Vicksburg.

I think if that were true, he would have ordered Gregg to withdraw in the direction of Edwards or Bolton if confronted by a larger force. An extra division-sized brigade would have increased his force at Edwards by 17%. If Walker and Gist arrived in time, by 42%.

He knew he had to hold Jackson at least until reinforcements arrived.

 

[alan polk]

I think that's a fair point, but I think it is precisely because Pemberton wished to hold Jackson until reinforcements arrived that he preemptively ordered Gregg to fall back on Jackson as a response to unanticipated events or consequences. He is projecting into the future with that order. And with the future always full of contingencies, it probably offered the most conservative approach.

Again— and I think it important— he seemed very confident in his position at Edwards and his ability to repulse or to at least hold out against Grant's attacks there, even without Gregg. I suspect the order to Gregg was done to provide a delaying action so that as many reinforcements as possible might arrive in Jackson until the last moment.

Now, this is where we fall into opinions, interpretations or "what ifs"— which tend, often enough, to become circular in these sorts of back and forth debates. But I suspect Pemberton was willing to give up Jackson but also wanted to hold it at least as long as he could to allow as many reinforcements, and then whatever reinforcements had arrived there could move north of the RR and then march by road to Bolton and then to join him at Edwards or the Big Black.

Having Gregg act as a delaying force back to Jackson might provide the best means of getting as many men as possible from Jackson and then uniting them with his army for defense of Edwards and/or the line of Big Black.

But that's my opinion, and like all opinions regarding what ifs, is open to debate.

 

[JohnG0609]

Getting back to the question of "why Dillon's?" Pemberton had planned all along to strike Grant's trailing flank / rear if he passed in the direction of Jackson. Once Gregg was in place at Raymond, if a superior force appeared in his front he was supposed to warn Pemberton and then execute a delaying action back towards Jackson. Pemberton would then move out from Edwards and hit an isolated flank / rear. There were three problems with this plan:

1) Pemberton took entirely too long to come to the front, which rendered command and control fubar. He arrived at Edwards May 14th, the day McPherson and Sherman took Jackson. By that time, of course, a heavy rain had turned the roads into oatmeal.

2) Not being on the scene allowed Wirt Adams' orders to get crossed. Instead of scouting the road from Raymond to Utica, Adams was scouting the Old Port Gibson Road in the direction of Auburn.

3) McPherson hid his deployment outside Raymond, which convinced Gregg he was facing a cavalry brigade not an infantry division. Gregg pitched in and spent the remainder of the day extricating himself. No warning went to Pemberton until after Gregg was retreating through Raymond around 4-5 p.m. Message had to go to Clinton by courier, so earliest Pemberton would have received it would have been 8-10 pm, possibly as late as the next morning.

4) McClernand's change of face south of Edwards was brilliant; McClernand was across Fourteen Mile Creek and Baker's Creek before anyone was aware what was happening.

I don't think Pemberton had any notion to attack the enemy at Dillon's as he made no reference to an attack in either of his 5/14 dispatches to Johnston. I don't think he intended to strike Smith at Dillon's as I don't think he had any idea that Smith and Blair were lingering out there. Smith and Blair were moving from Auburn on the 15th and ended up north of Raymond on the night of the 15th If Pemberton was attempting to strike the enemy at Dillon's I think it more probable that he was going after what he thought was a force moving from Roach's to Auburn as they followed on with the rest of the enemy known to have moved off to Raymond. Adams had detected the enemy at Roach's and skirmished with 17th Corps Cavalry up the road to Auburn which induced him into thinking the enemy would move from Roach's to Auburn. He had not detected that his opponent was the 17th Corps. Loring's scout Capt Russell had also detected the enemy at Roach's, but had not lingered long enough to determine which road they took.
Adams moved away to front the enemy at Fourteen Mile Creek and lost visibility on the enemy force at Roach's. So Confederate commanders lost visibility and assumed they marched to Auburn and failed to detect that the 17th Corps moved up the Utica road to Raymond and went undetected until Hall's state troop company discovered them. Hall, who had been on the Port Gibson road, was pushed over to the Utica road after Adams reconstituted and covered Whitaker's Ford.

I still am not able to say why he chose Dillon's as his objective. Especially in light of ordering the march out the Raymond Road and not down the Port Gibson Road to Mt. Moriah.

I do think the records bear out two VERY faulty planning assumptions by Pemberton and the three division commanders:
1. That they were facing two Corps (not three) numbering about 20k. Bowen, on 5/1 and 5/2 reported 20k men on 5/1 and Grant, McClernand, and McPherson at Port Gibson on 5/2. This assumption persisted all through Confederate operations until 5/12 when the first intel came in that Sherman was present.
2. That the two Union corps were moving in a single column towards BBR bridge/Edwards Depot oriented parallel to BBR, instead of three corps moving in a two corps front perpendicular to BBR. I don't believe Confederate commanders ever understood until much too late that Sherman was present and they were facing 3 full Corps and not 2.

At least for me, acknowledging these two planning assumption faults makes understanding Confederate operations infinitely easier.

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't think Pemberton had any notion to attack the enemy at Dillon's as he made no reference to an attack in either of his 5/14 dispatches to Johnston. I don't think he intended to strike Smith at Dillon's as I don't think he had any idea that Smith and Blair were lingering out there. Smith and Blair were moving from Auburn on the 15th and ended up north of Raymond on the night of the 15th

Smith had been ordered, after the evacuation of Jackson, to push towards Edwards and determine if it was practicable to occupy it, and if not to move instead toward Bolton. By the night of the 15th, he was still in the Dillon's area and was the trailing division.

If Pemberton was attempting to strike the enemy at Dillon's I think it more probable that he was going after what he thought was a force moving from Roach's to Auburn as they followed on with the rest of the enemy known to have moved off to Raymond. Adams had detected the enemy at Roach's and skirmished with 17th Corps Cavalry up the road to Auburn which induced him into thinking the enemy would move from Roach's to Auburn. He had not detected that his opponent was the 17th Corps. Loring's scout Capt Russell had also detected the enemy at Roach's, but had not lingered long enough to determine which road they took.

Whoah. The only contact Wirt Adams had with XVII corps was with their cavalry south of Utica as he attempted to return north from Port Gibson. McPherson sent his cavalry after them with instructions to chase them off then break the railroad 25 miles away at Crystal Springs. Adams moved circuitously to Raymond, then Edwards, then skirmished with Sherman's cavalry on the Port Gibson Road in the direction of Auburn. The only mention of troops at Roach's by Russell was a body of cavalry camped there, which is interesting and it's too bad Russell didn't place a date on that observation. Because the message reached Pemberton on the 12th, XVII Corps cavalry returned from the Crystal Springs Raid on the 11th and rested (probably at Roach's) on the 11th & 12th ... so it's possible he stumbled onto XVII Corps cavalry resting in the rear and missed the main body which had marched several miles up the road.

I still am not able to say why he chose Dillon's as his objective. Especially in light of ordering the march out the Raymond Road and not down the Port Gibson Road to Mt. Moriah.

The Raymond Road is the shorter route by a couple of miles, and I haven't seen it explicitly acknowledged but surely Hovey burned the Mt. Moriah Road bridge when he crossed in the direction of Raymond.

I do think the records bear out two VERY faulty planning assumptions by Pemberton and the three division commanders:
1. That they were facing two Corps (not three) numbering about 20k. Bowen, on 5/1 and 5/2 reported 20k men on 5/1 and Grant, McClernand, and McPherson at Port Gibson on 5/2. This assumption persisted all through Confederate operations until 5/12 when the first intel came in that Sherman was present.
2. That the two Union corps were moving in a single column towards BBR bridge/Edwards Depot oriented parallel to BBR, instead of three corps moving in a two corps front perpendicular to BBR. I don't believe Confederate commanders ever understood until much too late that Sherman was present and they were facing 3 full Corps and not 2.

At least for me, acknowledging these two planning assumption faults makes understanding Confederate operations infinitely easier.

Maybe! But I do remember one scout reporting 40,000 infantry and artillery.

 

[JohnG0609]

Smith had been ordered, after the evacuation of Jackson, to push towards Edwards and determine if it was practicable to occupy it, and if not to move instead toward Bolton. By the night of the 15th, he was still in the Dillon's area and was the trailing division.

Fair. McClernands report and Grabau have Smith at Raymond. Grabau map shows west of Raymond on Edwards road by 2200h on 5/15. So Pemberton could absolutely be aiming at Smith. But the real question in my mind is did he have knowledge that Smith would be there waiting to be attacked. I presume Smith's route back from threatening Baldwin's Ferry would be to Auburn. So I just question Pemberton's ability to pin Smith at Dillon's. Sounds a lot like he was hoping he guessed correctly and he would find someone to attack at Dillon's. Hope is not much of a plan.

Whoah. The only contact Wirt Adams had with XVII corps was with their cavalry south of Utica as he attempted to return north from Port Gibson. McPherson sent his cavalry after them with instructions to chase them off then break the railroad 25 miles away at Crystal Springs. Adams moved circuitously to Raymond, then Edwards, then skirmished with Sherman's cavalry on the Port Gibson Road in the direction of Auburn. The only mention of troops at Roach's by Russell was a body of cavalry camped there, which is interesting and it's too bad Russell didn't place a date on that observation. Because the message reached Pemberton on the 12th, XVII Corps cavalry returned from the Crystal Springs Raid on the 11th and rested (probably at Roach's) on the 11th & 12th ... so it's possible he stumbled onto XVII Corps cavalry resting in the rear and missed the main body which had marched several miles up the road.

Adams detected the enemy at Roach's on the morning of 05/11, he just wasn't strong enough to identify who they were:

He skirmished with them up the Auburn road which induced him into thinking they were moving on Auburn from Utica and reported so at 0100, 05/12:

Foster's report confirms skirmishing up the Auburn road on 5/10 and 5/11.

I don't believe Adams ever got close enough to identify the infantry as 17th Corps and that he made the assumption that the route the infantry would take would be to Auburn. That was the assumption of the generals.

The Raymond Road is the shorter route by a couple of miles, and I haven't seen it explicitly acknowledged but surely Hovey burned the Mt. Moriah Road bridge when he crossed in the direction of Raymond.

Fair point. IIRC, McClernand reported the bridge burned, but they created ford and he crossed Hovey in that way.

Maybe! But I do remember one scout reporting 40,000 infantry and artillery.

As I read the correspondence between the Confederate leaders it bears that out to my mind. But I also submit that you ought not to look further than their own march out of Edwards Depot. Three divisions, in column, with division wagons following each division. They would not have expected their adversary to move in a way that they themselves would not.

I keep coming back to my inability to reconcile the assertion that Pemberton was moving to attack the enemy at Dillon's with the knowledge of Loring's reconnaissance which reported all clear, and the enemy moved to Raymond. He knew from intel that the enemy were on the route thru Dillon's, but it's not rational to believe they would still be there two days later. Especially with an army that by his own admission was fatigued and he expected to straggle badly.

Nor can I reconcile the notion that Pemberton gave no account for Sherman's appearance. J. Adams had reported Sherman on the east side of BBR on 5/13. But Pemberton seemed not to consider this new information in his planning.

 

[tony_gunter]

I

Fair. McClernands report and Grabau have Smith at Raymond. Grabau map shows west of Raymond on Edwards road by 2200h on 5/15. So Pemberton could absolutely be aiming at Smith. But the real question in my mind is did he have knowledge that Smith would be there waiting to be attacked. I presume Smith's route back from threatening Baldwin's Ferry would be to Auburn. So I just question Pemberton's ability to pin Smith at Dillon's. Sounds a lot like he was hoping he guessed correctly and he would find someone to attack at Dillon's. Hope is not much of a plan.



Adams detected the enemy at Roach's on the morning of 05/11, he just wasn't strong enough to identify who they were:

View attachment 553088

He skirmished with them up the Auburn road which induced him into thinking they were moving on Auburn from Utica and reported so at 0100, 05/12:


View attachment 553089

Foster's report confirms skirmishing up the Auburn road on 5/10 and 5/11.

View attachment 553090

I don't believe Adams ever got close enough to identify the infantry as 17th Corps and that he made the assumption that the route the infantry would take would be to Auburn. That was the assumption of the generals.

Fair point. IIRC, McClernand reported the bridge burned, but they created ford and he crossed Hovey in that way.


As I read the correspondence between the Confederate leaders it bears that out to my mind. But I also submit that you ought not to look further than their own march out of Edwards Depot. Three divisions, in column, with division wagons following each division. They would not have expected their adversary to move in a way that they themselves would not.

I keep coming back to my inability to reconcile the assertion that Pemberton was moving to attack the enemy at Dillon's with the knowledge of Loring's reconnaissance which reported all clear, and the enemy moved to Raymond. He knew from intel that the enemy were on the route thru Dillon's, but it's not rational to believe they would still be there two days later. Especially with an army that by his own admission was fatigued and he expected to straggle badly.

Nor can I reconcile the notion that Pemberton gave no account for Sherman's appearance. J. Adams had reported Sherman on the east side of BBR on 5/13. But Pemberton seemed not to consider this new information in his plan.

I think you're reading too much into the cavalry actions on the 10th.

McPherson was west of Utica and sent his cavalry away to break the railroad. To screen his advance through Utica he utilized the separate escort companies of his corps & divisions well out on his flanks. Foster reported "considerable" skirmishing near Auburn 5 miles north of McPherson's main body, but were talking about a single company. It could have been anyone: 14th Mississippi, 20th Mississippi, Home Guards, State Troops,

I don't *think* it was Adams who I believe was just arriving in Raymond. Adams that night received a message from Bowen to move to Edwards with his command.

When Adams arrived in Edwards, he realized that Bowen's orders conflicted with Pemberton's and asked for clarification. Pemberton basically told him to split the difference and watch the roads to Raymond AND Edwards.

It's on the 11th that Sherman's cavalry push from Cayuga thorough Auburn toward Dillon's, are met by Adams who drives them back several miles without running into infantry.

It's not until the 12th that Sherman rushes forward to 14 Mile Creek with his infantry, fighting Adams for the crossing. On that day Russell reports seeing a body of cavalry at Roach's, possibly Wright's cavalry resting after their Crystal Springs raid.

 

[JohnG0609]

Fair. McClernands report and Grabau have Smith at Raymond. Grabau map shows west of Raymond on Edwards road by 2200h on 5/15. So Pemberton could absolutely be aiming at Smith. But the real question in my mind is did he have knowledge that Smith would be there waiting to be attacked. I presume Smith's route back from threatening Baldwin's Ferry would be to Auburn. So I just question Pemberton's ability to pin Smith at Dillon's. Sounds a lot like he was hoping he guessed correctly and he would find someone to attack at Dillon's. Hope is not much of a plan.



Adams detected the enemy at Roach's on the morning of 05/11, he just wasn't strong enough to identify who they were:

View attachment 553088

He skirmished with them up the Auburn road which induced him into thinking they were moving on Auburn from Utica and reported so at 0100, 05/12:


View attachment 553089

Foster's report confirms skirmishing up the Auburn road on 5/10 and 5/11.

View attachment 553090

I don't believe Adams ever got close enough to identify the infantry as 17th Corps and that he made the assumption that the route the infantry would take would be to Auburn. That was the assumption of the generals.

Fair point. IIRC, McClernand reported the bridge burned, but they created ford and he crossed Hovey in that way.


As I read the correspondence between the Confederate leaders it bears that out to my mind. But I also submit that you ought not to look further than their own march out of Edwards Depot. Three divisions, in column, with division wagons following each division. They would not have expected their adversary to move in a way that they themselves would not.

I keep coming back to my inability to reconcile the assertion that Pemberton was moving to attack the enemy at Dillon's with the knowledge of Loring's reconnaissance which reported all clear, and the enemy moved to Raymond. He knew from intel that the enemy were on the route thru Dillon's, but it's not rational to believe they would still be there two days later. Especially with an army that by his own admission was fatigued and he expected to straggle badly.

Nor can I reconcile the notion that Pemberton gave no account for Sherman's appearance. J. Adams had reported Sherman on the east side of BBR on 5/13. But Pemberton seemed not to consider this new information in his planning.

I left off one point. You are right, Bowen reported on 5/11 that an officer, Russell I think, as Loring reported to Pemberton on 5/12 that Russell returned "last night by the way of General Bowen." Bowen reported, "an officer (Russell)...reports about 40,000 infantry and artillery..." This was a material change in reported enemy numbers. That, taken with the report the next day that Sherman was east of BBR ought to have created some re-assessment of the operational environment by Pemberton. It did prompt in Pemberton a request for an sitrep from Forney, which I interpret as he was thinking that way. Forney replied on 5/13 with:

While Forney does tell him that there are enemy troops still opposite Vicksburg, he does not quantify how many. It would have been up to Pemberton on how to interpret this intel. The implication being that could have re-assessed his current troop dispositions and rebalanced his force posture to reinforce the east with whatever force he thought he could safely remove from Vicksburg. Obviously, that risk was too much for Pemberton and he went to battle with his 9 brigades. Under these circumstances a case could be made that two more brigades from Vicksburg could have been added to the mobile army.

 

[JohnG0609]

I

I think you're reading too much into the cavalry actions on the 10th.

McPherson was west of Utica and sent his cavalry away to break the railroad. To screen his advance through Utica he utilized the separate escort companies of his corps & divisions well out on his flanks. Foster reported "considerable" skirmishing near Auburn 5 miles north of McPherson's main body, but were talking about a single company. It could have been anyone: 14th Mississippi, 20th Mississippi, Home Guards, State Troops,

I don't *think* it was Adams who I believe was just arriving in Raymond. Adams that night received a message from Bowen to move to Edwards with his command.

When Adams arrived in Edwards, he realized that Bowen's orders conflicted with Pemberton's and asked for clarification. Pemberton basically told him to split the difference and watch the roads to Raymond AND Edwards.

It's on the 11th that Sherman's cavalry push from Cayuga thorough Auburn toward Dillon's, are met by Adams who drives them back several miles without running into infantry.

It's not until the 12th that Sherman rushes forward to 14 Mile Creek with his infantry, fighting Adams for the crossing. On that day Russell reports seeing a body of cavalry at Roach's, possibly Wright's cavalry resting after their Crystal Springs raid.

Fair assessment. We will dive back in and nugg out the answers. I feel like we have consensus though that the 5/11-5/14 Confederate operations need better interpretation.