Move to Dillon's

[alan polk]

Without deviating too far away from my question what and where was the college south of Edwards north of Big Sandy creek?

That's exactly one of the examples that popped into my head. It seems that at one point I tried to use ChroniclingAmerica.com to see if it would appear in old newspapers. I never found any evidence. However, I am not good at properly using the search engine on that site. But you'd think it and the others would be mentioned in newspapers.

 

[JohnG0609]

that his move "to Dillon's" was aimed at the rear of Grant's army

I agree. To re-frame my question what drove the change from a movement down the military road to a movement down the Turkey Creek road? I haven't seen anything that stated the military road was unsuitable for carrying an army so why the turn toward the east and Ellison's? Was it intended that Loring cover the crossing so Bowen and Stevenson could move to the military road? Or was the entire column to be directed to the Turkey Creek Road and if so, why? Or was the Confederate high command and staffs confused, disoriented, and/or incompetent?

 

[tony_gunter]

I agree. To re-frame my question what drove the change from a movement down the military road to a movement down the Turkey Creek road? I haven't seen anything that stated the military road was unsuitable for carrying an army so why the turn toward the east and Ellison's? Was it intended that Loring cover the crossing so Bowen and Stevenson could move to the military road? Or was the entire column to be directed to the Turkey Creek Road and if so, why? Or was the Confederate high command and staffs confused, disoriented, and/or incompetent?

Did Loring happen to mention when the order from Lockett arrived? AJ Smith had to have been well out on the Edwards-Raymond Road early right? If Pemberton planned to pitch into AJ Smith, maybe sending Loring down the road was simply to make room for Bowen to deploy to the left of the road?

 

[JohnG0609]

Did Loring happen to mention when the order from Lockett arrived? AJ Smith had to have been well out on the Edwards-Raymond Road early right? If Pemberton planned to pitch into AJ Smith, maybe sending Loring down the road was simply to make room for Bowen to deploy to the left of the road?

Excerpts from Loring's report:

Whatever caused the deviation in routes is probably related to the disagreement between Loring and Pemberton as reported by Drennen on the morning of 16 May.

 

[alan polk]

I haven't seen anything that stated the military road was unsuitable for carrying an army so why the turn toward the east and Ellison's?

I suppose it is possible that the Military Road did not connect to Mt. Moriah as it does today and they didn't realize that until later.

But more than likely, if you look at a map, one can see that you probably don't want to move down that road to a point where maneuverability gets constricted. Turkey Creek would suddenly be on your left flank as the column moved toward Mt. Moriah. If a force suddenly appeared on your right, coming down Mt . Moriah from the west or from roads coming up from Old Port Gibson Rd, and before you got across Turkey Creek, you would suddenly find yourself in a cul-de-sac, with the Turkey Creek to your back with little room to maneuver.

By using modern Bill Downing, you get across Turkey Creek easily and into more open ground for maneuver and a chance to catch the enemy with both Turkey and 14-Mile to its back, giving the enemy limited means of maneuver.

Just my speculation.

 

[JohnG0609]

From previous discussions recall that I am not a fan of the move to Dillon's for a number of reasons. Foremost because I see no plan. The move to Dillon's to cut enemy communications and force the enemy to attack him is a Course of Action, not a plan. COA decision initiates detailed planning.

I see a number of issues with an approach to Dillion's by the Turkey Creek Road. Just to list a couple of them, a movement to Dillon's would require the element of surprise. If I were Pemberton I could not see myself moving closer to Raymond, where I know the enemy to be, then turning south, presenting them my rear and risking detection. If Pemberton believed there were a division or corps (his words) at Dillon's and he knew large enemy forces were at Raymond a movement down the Bill Downing Road would risk his entire force being plugged in a jug. An enemy division moved west from Raymond down Edwards road would cut off Pemberton entirely. Assuming that if he did contact an enemy division (Smith or Blair) at Dillon's that enemy force could get over to the south bank of Fourteen Mile Creek and then the Battle of Dillon's Plantation would just be Second Raymond with the roles reversed: a smaller Union force holds off three divisions of Confederates.

Grabau's maps are inconclusive as to the continuity of the Military Road but Map 44 does show Confederate Cavalry pickets advancing from that road. I haven't tried to validate it against the Ors.

BLUF: Of the two routes to execute a very bad plan the Military Road route gives the best prospects for success.

On further reflection, I don't see anything that indicates that Pemberton intended to continue the march forward to Turkey Creek Road. All Loring says in his report is the map was wrong and we ended up at Ellison's.

 

[JohnG0609]

Jackson's Military Road is is much further east, passing between Forest and Meridian.

Oh my, The sacred scrolls held by the elders of my hometown of Raymond have always told me that Andy Jackson camped nearby on his way to New Orleans via the Natchez Trace.

 

[JohnG0609]

That's exactly one of the examples that popped into my head. It seems that at one point I tried to use ChroniclingAmerica.com to see if it would appear in old newspapers. I never found any evidence. However, I am not good at properly using the search engine on that site. But you'd think it and the others would be mentioned in newspapers.

IIRC that site became the African American Southern Christian Institute which later moved to Hwy 80 in Edwards some decades later. Ultimately absorbed by Tougaloo College. Still don't know exactly where it is.

 

[Mississippian1861]

Oh my, The sacred scrolls held by the elders of my hometown of Raymond have always told me that Andy Jackson camped nearby on his way to New Orleans via the Natchez Trace.

There was a "General Caroll's Road" that branched off at the old Choctaw Agency heading south and ran parallel of and west of the Pearl River.

 

[JohnG0609]

Just to put a point on this, both Pemberton and Thompson stated in their reports that on first contact and deployment into line of battle Loring displaced to the rear and according to Pemberton was, "thrown back so as to cover the military road," while Thompson reported Loring "fell back then a half mile, and formed in the rear of the entrance of the military road with the Raymond Road."

Clearly indicating they knew the location of the military road. Which was the subject of the 05/14 order.

More subjective but still noteworthy, in his report Pemberton stated that he, "did not issue orders to continue the movement at an early hour the following morning." The point being, if he didn't issue any orders during the night then "the movement" in the original 05/14 order was in place.

I have seen nothing that indicates the intent of Pemberton's order was to move east to the Turkey Creek Road when they clearly knew where the Military road was. I believe it's the common assumption that Loring moving to Ellison's must mean the route intended was the Turkey Creek road. And it is plausible based solely on the change made by Capt Lockett, whether in error or by some territorial anomaly requiring a change in the route. But its just as plausible that Loring was moved in advance to block the Edwards-Raymond road, while Bowen and Stevenson passed behind down the Military road.

 

[tony_gunter]

Just to put a point on this, both Pemberton and Thompson stated in their reports that on first contact and deployment into line of battle Loring displaced to the rear and according to Pemberton was, "thrown back so as to cover the military road," while Thompson reported Loring "fell back then a half mile, and formed in the rear of the entrance of the military road with the Raymond Road."

Clearly indicating they knew the location of the military road. Which was the subject of the 05/14 order.

More subjective but still noteworthy, in his report Pemberton stated that he, "did not issue orders to continue the movement at an early hour the following morning." The point being, if he didn't issue any orders during the night then "the movement" in the original 05/14 order was in place.

I have seen nothing that indicates the intent of Pemberton's order was to move east to the Turkey Creek Road when they clearly knew where the Military road was. I believe it's the common assumption that Loring moving to Ellison's must mean the route intended was the Turkey Creek road. And it is plausible based solely on the change made by Capt Lockett, whether in error or by some territorial anomaly requiring a change in the route. But its just as plausible that Loring was moved in advance to block the Edwards-Raymond road, while Bowen and Stevenson passed behind down the Military road.

I was just double checking Bearss' take on this in Decisions in Mississippi, and he doesn't really cover it. He does, however, claim that Wirt Adams cavalry was sent down the Raymond road a mile beyond Ellison's, and two infantry regiments were sent to join them.

Are we absolutely sure he hadn't changed the plan to aim directly at Raymond?

 

[JohnG0609]

I was just double checking Bearss' take on this

I did a lit review and they all treat it a little differently. But 100% of them pass right over the plainly written order "on the military road."

Are we absolutely sure he hadn't changed the plan to aim directly at Raymond?

The only thing I'm sure of is that there is a published order to move on the military road and I've seen nothing to supersede or countermand that order. There could have been a verbal order but I would think that would have come out in the reports.

The

 

[JohnG0609]

I did a lit review and they all treat it a little differently. But 100% of them pass right over the plainly written order "on the military road."


The only thing I'm sure of is that there is a published order to move on the military road and I've seen nothing to supersede or countermand that order. There could have been a verbal order but I would think that would have come out in the reports.

The

I forgot my own post. Pemberton reported he made no order to continue at an early hour. Which I interpret as no new order to supersede the 05/14 order.

 

[tony_gunter]

I forgot my own post. Pemberton reported he made no order to continue at an early hour. Which I interpret as no new order to supersede the 05/14 order.

Vicksburg reports are notorious for gaps and errors because they were filed weeks after the battle. Loring's in particular was filed 3 months after the battle.

Pemberton's first report (if you can call it that) was filed the day after the battle, and seems to indicate that he was aiming for the rear of Grant's army as the intel became more solid (I camped at a crossroad where I could move on Dillon's or Raymond).

I think his inactivity on the morning of the 16th was due to the fact that he realized he had found Grant's rear moving to attack him and he was in a strong position to receive them. Unfortunately for him, he quickly came to the realization that it was not Grant's rear but his front.

 

[JohnG0609]

Pemberton's first report (if you can call it that) was filed the day after the battle, and seems to indicate that he was aiming for the rear of Grant's army as the intel became more solid (I camped at a crossroad where I could move on Dillon's or Raymond).

That's a good catch! I hadn't included this and it sure adds some context to what he was trying to do.
But that still doesn't change the cold hard fact that he ordered a march down the Military road and nothing I've seen explains this very significant deviation from the published order. The only way I can square it is if Loring was pushed out to block the road for the divisions to pass behind. I've seen nothing that says the march was intended to go to Turkey Creek road, except as an extrapolation by historians of the move to Ellison's.

If I were leading the team conducting the AAR I would focus less on divining Pemberton's intent and I would put tremendous focus on the obvious command dysfunction that I believe this deviation in a published order represents. I would see that deviation in the order and start working backwards in the decision making process that got this army in such a bind. BLUF: it just boils down to the fundamentals, the blocking and tackling. Success in command is 75% technical competence, if you can't do your job it doesn't matter how great your command presence is and John Pemberton was technically incompetent at this operational level of war and his division commanders had come to realize it.

But I don't mean to imply that Pemberton was incompetent in general. He just was untrained and unable to manage a campaign of maneuver by large land forces. Smith did a good job of describing how as the pace of operations increased, Pemberton's ability to react couldn't keep up. Grant got inside his OODA loop and the rest is history.

 

[alan polk]

In regard to the Military Road: I think one thing that is being dismissed is Pemberton's inability to discover whether more enemy troops might be moving up from Grand Gulf. Without sufficient cavalry, he had no way to find this out with any reasonable confidence.

Based on that, I think it very possible that they determined that the Military Road proved too risky to try and attack an enemy near Dillon's. An unexpected enemy force coming up from Grand Gulf might use connecting roads and catch him against Turkey Creek before he got across that creek or while in the process of moving across that creek to attack the enemy at Dillon's.

A move down Turkey Creek Road might've be deemed more secure because there are no intersecting roads that would threaten his flank as he moved. Just my thoughts.

 

[tony_gunter]

That's a good catch! I hadn't included this and it sure adds some context to what he was trying to do.
But that still doesn't change the cold hard fact that he ordered a march down the Military road and nothing I've seen explains this very significant deviation from the published order. The only way I can square it is if Loring was pushed out to block the road for the divisions to pass behind. I've seen nothing that says the march was intended to go to Turkey Creek road, except as an extrapolation by historians of the move to Ellison's.

If I were leading the team conducting the AAR I would focus less on divining Pemberton's intent and I would put tremendous focus on the obvious command dysfunction that I believe this deviation in a published order represents. I would see that deviation in the order and start working backwards in the decision making process that got this army in such a bind. BLUF: it just boils down to the fundamentals, the blocking and tackling. Success in command is 75% technical competence, if you can't do your job it doesn't matter how great your command presence is and John Pemberton was technically incompetent at this operational level of war and his division commanders had come to realize it.

But I don't mean to imply that Pemberton was incompetent in general. He just was untrained and unable to manage a campaign of maneuver by large land forces. Smith did a good job of describing how as the pace of operations increased, Pemberton's ability to react couldn't keep up. Grant got inside his OODA loop and the rest is history.

It's kinda interesting that Pemberton's command style mirrors the Soviet top-down doctrine and Grant the distributed U.S. doctrine.

Communicate general expectations and trust your subordinates with the details. Pemberton issued commands like the regiments were pieces on a board game.

 

[JohnG0609]

An unexpected enemy force coming up from Grand Gulf

Was there any reason to expect an enemy force from Grand Gulf? Maneuvering to within 5 miles of a large force of the enemy known to be at Raymond to avoid a possible force approaching from Grand Gulf? The force at Raymond would be on the left rear of the confederate force when on the Turkey Creek road.

A move down Turkey Creek Road might've be deemed more secure because there are no intersecting roads that would threaten his flank as he moved. Just my thoughts.

So how many brigades would be sufficient to hold the intersection of Edwards-Raymond and Turkey Creek roads? One? Two? That would be the only route of retreat in case of a defeat for the Confederates and the only protection Edwards Depot would have. The fact that there are no intersecting roads is why the Turkey Creek road ought to be ruled out as a route.

The order plainly states the military road. Pemberton reported he issued no new orders during the night. So I see nothing that supersedes, alters, or countermands that order.

 

[alan polk]

I don't necessarily disagree with your analysis, I'm just trying to offer alternative scenarios. I know you are working from a pre-formed conclusion and trying to get the facts to confirm/conform to it. Just trying to throw out thoughts to help.

As I read your posts—which are very good and reasoned— I keep thinking of Occam's Razor as well: "the simplest explanation is usually the one closest to the truth."

I think that potentially applies with the following —when Loring declared that Lockett told him "that the road which it was intended the entire force should follow was wrongly laid down upon the map furnished."

And then: Pemberton plainly reports that the head of his army was encamped at the Raymond-Edwards/Turkey Creek crossroads, and that that specific crossroads offered him the option of moving on Raymond or Dillon's.

That, combined with Loring's testimony, would seem to be the simplest and thus closest to the truth that Military Road was simply laid down wrongly on the map.

Just a thought.

Was there any reason to expect an enemy force from Grand Gulf?

He had little to no cavalry. How could he know for sure that troops were not coming up? He didn't even know two enemy corps were about to pounce from the east. He never even knew that McPherson had passed through Utica to Raymond, or that supply trains were coming up from Grand Gulf/Rocky Springs. What he did know was that there were plenty of infantry still along the Mississippi, potentially poised to strike somewhere. His lack of cavalry and his uncertainty of the enemy's location was the very reason he did not want to move out from Edwards. The fact that he was skittish and overly cautious to begin with ought to be taken into consideration. He admitted that he would be advancing blind and road networks coming up from Rocky Springs likely made folks nervous.

But, again, just offering some thoughts.

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't necessarily disagree with your analysis, I'm just trying to offer alternative scenarios. I know you are working from a pre-formed conclusion and trying to get the facts to confirm/conform to it. Just trying to throw out thoughts to help.

As I read your posts—which are very good and reasoned— I keep thinking of Occam's Razor as well: "the simplest explanation is usually the one closest to the truth."

I think that potentially applies with the following —when Loring declared that Lockett told him "that the road which it was intended the entire force should follow was wrongly laid down upon the map furnished."

And then: Pemberton plainly reports that the head of his army was encamped at the Raymond-Edwards/Turkey Creek crossroads, and that that specific crossroads offered him the option of moving on Raymond or Dillon's.

That, combined with Loring's testimony, would seem to be the simplest and thus closest to the truth that Military Road was simply laid down wrongly on the map.

Just a thought.



He had little to no cavalry. How could he know for sure that troops were not coming up? He didn't even know two enemy corps were about to pounce from the east. He never even knew that McPherson had passed through Utica to Raymond, or that supply trains were coming up from Grand Gulf/Rocky Springs. What he did know was that there were plenty of infantry still along the Mississippi, potentially poised to strike somewhere. His lack of cavalry and his uncertainty of the enemy's location was the very reason he did not want to move out from Edwards. The fact that he was skittish and overly cautious to begin with ought to be taken into consideration. He admitted that he would be advancing blind and road networks coming up from Rocky Springs likely made folks nervous.

But, again, just offering some thoughts.

Pemberton had nearly the mounted troops that Grant had, the question was quality and how he utilized them.

Grant had one battalion each for his three army corps. Pemberton had one regiment, but he also had some hastily mounted Franken-cavalry: one battalion of mounted infantry each from the 20th Mississippi and 14th Mississippi. Too late to prevent Raymond but in time to cover the retreat from Raymond he had the franken-cavalry 3rd Kentucky.

I believe he was in the process of mounting some Alabama infantry when the chaos broke.

He was able to detect the movement of Blair and AJ Smith and knew the supply train was moving with them IIRC, but hadn't detected Ewing moving up from Grand Gulf.

The critical moment was after the wires got crossed with Bowen ordering Wirt Adams to Edwards. After that, Pemberton kinda threw his hands up and allowed Adams to direct the movements of the 20th Mississippi instead of specifically assigning cavalry to cover the various approaches.

Adams really should have sent the 20th Mississippi to Raymond to report to Gregg.