Good move or not

Was this a good move or should they have stayed in Tupelo reconstituting.
Respectfully, reconstituting for what?

Remnants of the AoT were put to productive use under Joe Johnston to counter Sherman's advance, after transferring to the Carolinas. (The remnants of the AoT for this purpose totalled about 6,600 men - see 'OR': Vol. 47, Part 2, @ p. 1271).

(And in early April '65, Johnston reorganized his entire available force, and renamed it the 'Army of Tennessee' consisting of three infantry corps under Hardee, Stewart and S.D. Lee, with Hampton commanding the cavalry).
 
Last edited:
Great post! My great-grandfather, Isaac Mason, fought with the AoT. At Nashville, the Yankees "run'm off and took their guns." So they sent him to Spanish Fort, to guard Mobile Bay. So, he wasn't with "Fightin' Joe" Johnston when he went to North Carolina. It was a forlorn mission. My heart goes out to those poor soldiers at Bentonville both North and South. Sherman's men had been through hell and wanted to go home. The once proud AoT has a shambles, it is a testament to the leadership of Johnston that he had an army at all.

1781868486039.webp
 
Elements of the AoT were sent from Tupelo to North Carolina in 65 for a last-ditch effort to stop Sherman. Was this a good move or should they have stayed in Tupelo reconstituting.
Considering the desperate state of the CSA at the time, I think it was the only good move they could make with those troops.
 
The once proud AoT has a shambles, it is a testament to the leadership of Johnston that he had an army at all.
When most of what remained of the AoT (after the rout at Nashville) left Tupelo in Jan. '65 and made the difficult trek eastwards over approximately 500 miles to Augusta, it was described by observers as more of a disorganized mob, than an army, of demoralized soldiers. After reaching Augusta, the majority of them then headed north to Raleigh, staying west of Sherman's northwards push through SC.

However, when Joe Johnston took over army command in late Feb. and was ordered by Lee to concentrate his scattered forces to drive back Sherman's advance, his return was enthusiastically welcomed by these AoT veterans - morale improved and discipline was restored significantly among them.

By mid-Mar., Johnston had a little more than around 20,000 men in the field and he formed the 'Army of the South' from the four distinct forces now under his immediate command. One of those distinct forces included the remnants of the AoT (of about 6,000 effectives), which constituted a sizeable portion of his assembled small army.

But when re-appointed to this high command role, Johnston knew (and he told Lee such) that his small army was too weak to stop Sherman's vastly superior numbers of toughened veterans rolling forward. 'Old Joe' believed that his only hope throughout this period was to delay Sherman's advance long enough to try and force peace negotiations on more favorable terms.
 
When most of what remained of the AoT (after the rout at Nashville) left Tupelo in Jan. '65 and made the difficult trek eastwards over approximately 500 miles to Augusta, it was described by observers as more of a disorganized mob, than an army, of demoralized soldiers. After reaching Augusta, the majority of them then headed north to Raleigh, staying west of Sherman's northwards push through SC.

However, when Joe Johnston took over army command in late Feb. and was ordered by Lee to concentrate his scattered forces to drive back Sherman's advance, his return was enthusiastically welcomed by these AoT veterans - morale improved and discipline was restored significantly among them.

By mid-Mar., Johnston had a little more than around 20,000 men in the field and he formed the 'Army of the South' from the four distinct forces now under his immediate command. One of those distinct forces included the remnants of the AoT (of about 6,000 effectives), which constituted a sizeable portion of his assembled small army.

But when re-appointed to this high command role, Johnston knew (and he told Lee such) that his small army was too weak to stop Sherman's vastly superior numbers of toughened veterans rolling forward. 'Old Joe' believed that his only hope throughout this period was to delay Sherman's advance long enough to try and force peace negotiations on more favorable terms.

Considering the situation, it's frankly astonishing that Johnston was able to achieve as much as he did. I doubt anyone else could have done as much.
 
Considering the situation, it's frankly astonishing that Johnston was able to achieve as much as he did. I doubt anyone else could have done as much.
Agree. Joe Johnston's leadership role in the final month or two of the CW cannot be underestimated. After assuming command in Feb. '65, he rapidly assembled his scattered diverse forces of mixed experience in a very brief period, and with his much inferior military resources available, attacked (untypically) Sherman's vastly superior army (being outnumbered by about 3:1) of seasoned and aggressive veterans. But perhaps more importantly, 'Old Joe' managed to maintain intact his small army against a much larger force over this period to obtain fair peace terms when surrendering to Sherman at Bennett Place the many remaining active Confederate troops (about 90,000) stationed across the Carolinas, Georgia and Florida - the largest surrender of the entire CW.
 
What good would they have done at Tupelo? Most of the men would likely have simply deserted and gone home.
Quite a few engineering units stacked... well, probably shovels and pickaxes in Mississippi at the end of the war. Also, with consolidation of regiments, a lot of officers were out of jobs. Even one of my relatives.

If you think about it, being as nmoble as that last campaign was, well entrenched artilly wasn't needed in the east. Richard Taylor's army was very armed up. If you drive through back roads Mississippi, you'll find some interesting road signs.
 
Quite a few engineering units stacked... well, probably shovels and pickaxes in Mississippi at the end of the war. Also, with consolidation of regiments, a lot of officers were out of jobs. Even one of my relatives.

If you think about it, being as nmoble as that last campaign was, well entrenched artilly wasn't needed in the east. Richard Taylor's army was very armed up. If you drive through back roads Mississippi, you'll find some interesting road signs.
When you think about what would have been required of engineering regiments to move large units of either side, it's amazing
 
When you think about what would have been required of engineering regiments to move large units of either side, it's amazing
And imagine trying to put up a full set of trenches, for three days and then moving on. I know the army does things to keep you busy.

Oh, I didn't think. They shoves. Different kind of trenches.

(Wow, that turned dark fast)
 
Considering the situation, it's frankly astonishing that Johnston was able to achieve as much as he did. I doubt anyone else could have done as much.
It makes one wonder what Joe Johnston could have done in command of the Army of the Tennessee if Jefferson Davis had stayed the course instead of replacing him with John B. Hood. Johnston actually had an army to work with before Hood wrecked it instead of the hodge podge force he was working with in the Carolinas.
 
It makes one wonder what Joe Johnston could have done in command of the Army of the Tennessee if Jefferson Davis had stayed the course instead of replacing him with John B. Hood. Johnston actually had an army to work with before Hood wrecked it instead of the hodge podge force he was working with in the Carolinas.
Inhale tye same kind of thoughts. As early as the winter/spring of 1863 Lee had been completely disgusted with Hood and his men. Not that Hood wouldn't fight: we all know he did. But the way his camp was set up. A filthy, disorganized, and generally a mess. Lee didn't really think Hood was a good fit to lead an army.

Johnston was angry at Davis, Davis was angry at Johnston, reasons innumerable practically. Had Richmond been run with less honor and hurt feelings, and had been runs dishonesty, backbiting, and chicanery like every country shoukd be, I wonder how things would have turned out.
 
It makes one wonder what Joe Johnston could have done in command of the Army of the Tennessee if Jefferson Davis had stayed the course instead of replacing him with John B. Hood. Johnston actually had an army to work with before Hood wrecked it instead of the hodge podge force he was working with in the Carolinas.
Inhale tye same kind of thoughts. As early as the winter/spring of 1863 Lee had been completely disgusted with Hood and his men. Not that Hood wouldn't fight: we all know he did. But the way his camp was set up. A filthy, disorganized, and generally a mess. Lee didn't really think Hood was a good fit to lead an army.

Johnston was angry at Davis, Davis was angry at Johnston, reasons innumerable practically. Had Richmond been run with less honor and hurt feelings, and had been runs dishonesty, backbiting, and chicanery like every country shoukd be, I wonder how things would have turned out.

Some deluded idiot once wrote an alternate history novel about this question. It's total rubbish, though.
 

Learn About Us
About CivilWarTalk
Contact the Webmaster
Meet the Staff
Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
Register
Browse Forums
View Today's Discussions
Search the Forum
Get Help
FAQ
Student Guide
Forum Rules & Etiquette
Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top