1. 05/13 order for Loring to recon with an eye towards a move on enemy communications. So that shows he was considering a movement and could be considered to invalidate his claim that he opposed any forward movement.
I think this is a very good point and certainly refutes any categorical claim that Pemberton was opposed to any movement, such as the one contemplated toward Dillon's. I don't disagree with that observation.
His movement's across the Big Black itself proves he was willing to shift forces, even with limited cavalry. He did so to keep open his line of communication to Jackson and for the reinforcements from Jackson. But it also provided him the opportunity to get nearer the enemy's line of communication in Hinds County.
Again, it seems everybody forgets that Pemberton actually understood Grant's ultimate objective: Vicksburg. And to get at Vicksburg he had to get to Snyder's. To get to Snyder's he had to cross the Big Black. But it was precisely because of his lack of cavalry that he was not disposed to make hasty movements which would take him too far away from the high ground at Edwards or the ferries along the Big Black.
In fact, his May 13 recon message to Loring, which you cite, was accompanied by narrow conditions that had to be met before Pemberton even considered such a move. Without sufficient cavalry, the conditions placed on Loring to justify any move were going to be difficult to meet.
Any movements he was willing to make from Edwards (for example, his May 13 recon message to Loring as well as the Dillon move) were always going to be limited toward Grant's line of communication, not further eastward from his base at Edwards.
2. 05/14 first reply to Johnston, from Bovina, is notable because it does not denote an objective. It just says, "I move at once with whole available force..." Then he lays out his current dispositions and concludes with the men are fatigued and expected to straggle. He also says he composed this dispatch immediately upon receipt of Johnstson's. This indicates to me that he had already decided to move.
But you leave out the part that says: "In directing this move, I do not think you fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg will be left in, but I comply at once with your order."
This does not indicate to me that Pemberton had "already decided to move." Rather, it reveals a commander who is increasingly recognizing the risks and that his intelligence was even worse than he had thought and that Johnston's interpretation of events was possibly even worse.
Feeling that Grant would inevitably return to maneuver against the Big Black (Johnston thinks Grant is going to fortify Jackson) probably reinforced Pemberton's instincts to remain at Edwards or to retreat back across the Big Black and defend that line.
3. The second 05/14 dispatch, after the Council of War, is when he specified the move to Dillon's. IIRC one present at the Council noted that both Loring and Stevenson advocated for the move on the communications, so maybe they are the ones that urged Dillon's as the objective.
I agree with this. But it also reveals that everyone there likely viewed Johnston's order as suicidal. But for whatever reason, most apparently felt they were under the compulsion to comply.
The eyewitness you cite also stated to Pemberton, after the fact, that his recollection of the counsel was that there was a feeling that if he did not move or do something he would lose the confidence of the men in the army. His recollection was that Pemberton had no choice— or risk losing all confidence.
The move on Dillon's, then, (or anywhere else for that matter) was not something "already" underway — at least underway in Pemberton's mind —on the morning of the 14th, as you imply in #2 above. Or at least that is how I am interpreting the situation.
Isn't that the point of offensive operations: don't leave your enemy with choices, leave them with dilemmas. That forces them to make mistakes.
I think this is exactly what Pemberton realized and was trying to avoid. And is why he understood his best course was to hold near Edwards or fall back to the Big Black. Johnston's May 13 order played right into Grant's hand.
Had Pemberton remained at Edwards or at line of the Big Black, the ensuing battle would have likely resembled the slaughter seen in the eastern theater. The casualties Grant received later on the 19th and 22nd tends to strengthen that claim.
Pemberton's greatest failure was to be influenced to move against his better judgement. He probably should've risked losing the confidence of the army by disobeying Johnston's order. But instead, it appears Pemberton had finally lost confidence in himself.
My point in all this is not that Pemberton was a genius. My point is that he was not necessarily "incompetent." That word is too strong and overused in my opinion. One must always consider who Pemberton was facing. That Pemberton was incompetent is a narrative that has been carried forth successfully by historians who relied on narratives supplied largely by factions opposed to Pemberton during the war. Interestingly enough, it has also been used to discredit Grant's abilities.
These things end up as footnotes. And footnotes, if unexamined, become like original sin. It just carries forward to future generations.
But to sustain this over the decades, historians have —sometimes unconsciously— had to make facts, especially newly discovered facts, conform to the narrative instead of new facts changing the narrative. What this inevitably leads to are facts being ignored altogether, or the continued creation of narratives where conclusions are already hidden in the premises.
As I reread this thread, watching it evolve, there seems to be the risk of a narrative developing which already had an imbedded conclusion from the get-go in the premises— that of: "Pemberton was incompetent. Therefore, premises considered, Pemberton was incompetent."
But I've certainly enjoyed the back and forth. And I have certainly learned a lot.
Bringing the