Move to Dillon's

[tony_gunter]

None of this negates the central points I made, though it goes a long way in wishing away potential complexities in order to maintain your position.

I'm not trying to wish away Grant's complexities. I'm just pointing out that Pemberton had complexities of his own.

Pemberton couldn't prevent Grant from crossing the Big Black by remaining in fixed positions.

If Johnston had bothered to inform Pemberton on the 13th that he intended to evacuate Jackson and move to Calhoun Station, Pemberton could have prevented Grant from crossing the Big Black by splitting his force between Edwards, Queen's Hill, and Brownsville. This holds open a corridor to Calhoun Station and the possibility of Johnston joining the army with 6,000 but it also means Sherman joins Grant with 10,000.

Pemberton can withdraw across the Big Black, but that also requires him to split his force, impossibly thin if he wants to deny a crossing.

He can fall back upon his reinforcements at Vicksburg and take up a position between Snyder's and Vicksburg. Doing so would allow Pemberton to call up two more divisions during a general engagement, but failure would guarantee an investment and Grant could move to capture Warrenton if he ran out of provisions.

Lastly, he could just run.

Pemberton didn't have options, he had a dilemma.

 

[alan polk]

I'm not trying to wish away Grant's complexities. I'm just pointing out that Pemberton had complexities of his own.

Pemberton couldn't prevent Grant from crossing the Big Black by remaining in fixed positions.

If Johnston had bothered to inform Pemberton on the 13th that he intended to evacuate Jackson and move to Calhoun Station, Pemberton could have prevented Grant from crossing the Big Black by splitting his force between Edwards, Queen's Hill, and Brownsville. This holds open a corridor to Calhoun Station and the possibility of Johnston joining the army with 6,000 but it also means Sherman joins Grant with 10,000.

Pemberton can withdraw across the Big Black, but that also requires him to split his force, impossibly thin if he wants to deny a crossing.

He can fall back upon his reinforcements at Vicksburg and take up a position between Snyder's and Vicksburg. Doing so would allow Pemberton to call up two more divisions during a general engagement, but failure would guarantee an investment and Grant could move to capture Warrenton if he ran out of provisions.

Lastly, he could just run.

Pemberton didn't have options, he had a dilemma.

I hate to clog up John's thread here. We've already broached this topic on other threads to no avail. I will just note something that seems to repeat in all our discussions.

For example, you opened your above response with:

"I'm not trying to wish away Grant's complexities."

Then, you proceed to do exactly that with the rest of your post.

Now, I congratulate you on expounding more on Pemberton's "dilemma"— forced to think things through much further than you initially desired in order to try and reach a reasonable conclusion (even if you want that conclusion to look a certain way—which is fine.) In fact, it probably enhanced your understanding of the campaign even more.

But you are also exhibiting a severe blind spot when it comes to analyzing potential dilemmas adhering to Grant's army, especially as it maneuvered east of the Big Black. Thus, your counterfactual involving Pemberton above, though reasonable enough, is actually a negation.

I don't know whether you are fearful of somehow tarnishing an already conceived narrative in your mind or whether you believe in a sort of Iron Law of History— i.e., that events in History are already determined and no amount of counterfactuals or exertions of any individual human will could've changed the outcome anyway.

I sometimes suspect you are thinking about writing and publishing your own work regarding some aspect of the campaign. I hope you do. You do a splendid job in gathering overlooked information and bring fresh eyes in interpreting that information and how it might apply to a deeper understanding of the campaign. I, personally, have learned a lot from you. But if my suspicions are correct then I respectfully suggest that you try and refrain from unintentionally opening the door to counterfactuals (as you did here on this thread and have done on other threads) without at least honing your skills in recognizing the full range of potential counterfactuals—even those that run the risk of disrupting the overall narrative you are trying to establish.

If you do, you might just be surprised. Instead of tarnishing the preconceived notions you have in this drama, you might just uncover how risky and deadly those critical days actually were— and walk away with even a deeper appreciation of what your personal heroes faced and overcame.

Personally, I don't think this should even be considered a risk to begin with —I think that's how history ought to be done. But if you're desperate for certain conclusions adhering to your heroes and you don't want to risk losing that (and, at this point, I can't help but think that is partially the case, whether consciously or unconsciously) at least try and avoid counterfactuals altogether. Go the whole hog or not at all. But doing the latter just makes for boring history—at least in my mind.

I do enjoy the back and forth with you — and I have learned new things and new ways of looking at the facts. In that, I do appreciate. But I just feel like we are at the typical impasse and everything that comes after this is like arguing religion. But I do hope you take my critiques as coming from a sincere place, and not from cynicism, and that I still do look forward to discussions regarding the campaign. Despite my critiques, I think you do good work and are deserving of being recognized for that!

 

[tony_gunter]

I hate to clog up John's thread here. We've already broached this topic on other threads to no avail. I will just note something that seems to repeat in all our discussions.

For example, you opened your above response with:

"I'm not trying to wish away Grant's complexities."

Then, you proceed to do exactly that with the rest of your post.

Now, I congratulate you on expounding more on Pemberton's "dilemma"— forced to think things through much further than you initially desired in order to try and reach a reasonable conclusion (even if you want that conclusion to look a certain way—which is fine.) In fact, it probably enhanced your understanding of the campaign even more.

But you are also exhibiting a severe blind spot when it comes to analyzing potential dilemmas adhering to Grant's army, especially as it maneuvered east of the Big Black. Thus, your counterfactual involving Pemberton above, though reasonable enough, is actually a negation.

I don't know whether you are fearful of somehow tarnishing an already conceived narrative in your mind or whether you believe in a sort of Iron Law of History— i.e., that events in History are already determined and no amount of counterfactuals or exertions of any individual human will could've changed the outcome anyway.

I sometimes suspect you are thinking about writing and publishing your own work regarding some aspect of the campaign. I hope you do. You do a splendid job in gathering overlooked information and bring fresh eyes in interpreting that information and how it might apply to a deeper understanding of the campaign. I, personally, have learned a lot from you. But if my suspicions are correct then I respectfully suggest that you try and refrain from unintentionally opening the door to counterfactuals (as you did here on this thread and have done on other threads) without at least honing your skills in recognizing the full range of potential counterfactuals—even those that run the risk of disrupting the overall narrative you are trying to establish.

If you do, you might just be surprised. Instead of tarnishing the preconceived notions you have in this drama, you might just uncover how risky and deadly those critical days actually were— and walk away with even a deeper appreciation of what your personal heroes faced and overcame.

Personally, I don't think this should even be considered a risk to begin with —I think that's how history ought to be done. But if you're desperate for certain conclusions adhering to your heroes and you don't want to risk losing that (and, at this point, I can't help but think that is partially the case, whether consciously or unconsciously) at least try and avoid counterfactuals altogether. Go the whole hog or not at all. But doing the latter just makes for boring history—at least in my mind.

I do enjoy the back and forth with you — and I have learned new things and new ways of looking at the facts. In that, I do appreciate. But I just feel like we are at the typical impasse and everything that comes after this is like arguing religion. But I do hope you take my critiques as coming from a sincere place, and not from cynicism, and that I still do look forward to discussions regarding the campaign. Despite my critiques, I think you do good work and are deserving of being recognized for that!

I don't think this is clogging up John's thread, or is it @JohnG0609?

Apologies if it is, I thought we were doing identification and evaluation of Pemberton's courses of action.

 

[JohnG0609]

Gents,
1. Let me say I am awed and amazed at the knowledge y'all possess about the Vicksburg campaign. It's like reading Bearss, Grabau, Smith, and Winchel all at the same time.

2. This excellent conversation has left me happily surprised at the level at which you both grasp higher level concepts of military operations. Discussions like these are had every day in War College classrooms every day. Both of you could walk into any senior service school and hold your own.

I am going to make a new post as an extension of this conversations. I think my original post was a bit too narrow so I'm going to widen the aperture on it a little. Also, another new post on a separate question.

I very much enjoy the collaboration! Let's keep it up! This is an open invitation for anyone else to join in the conversation. None of us know everything and I know I learn best from other's POVs.

 

[JohnG0609]

This is a continuation of the post I made last week regarding the Confederate move to Dillon's Plantation. We had a lot of great conversation around that. I know I learned a lot. So if you are just walking into this movie check out episode 1 post below.

The 05.14.63 Council of War is analogous to COA decision step in modern planning doctrine. So if we play the roles of the attendees of the Council the 4 COAs (3+1) are:

COA 1: Remain in prepared defensive positions around Edwards Depot and receive attack from enemy forces.

COA 2: Move due east and attack enemy at Clinton, in compliance with HHQ order.

COA 3: Move southeast to Dillon's to cut enemy communications and compel him to attack us.

COA 4: Major General @tony_gunter has offered a plan for a defense North of the railroad on a line from Edwards Depot to Brownsville to deny the enemy access to the crossings of the BBR.

Which one would you choose and why?

**My hope is this will be a fun exercise and we all are able to learn something new.**

 

[tony_gunter]

This is a continuation of the post I made last week regarding the Confederate move to Dillon's Plantation. We had a lot of great conversation around that. I know I learned a lot. So if you are just walking into this movie check out episode 1 post below.

The 05.14.63 Council of War is analogous to COA decision step in modern planning doctrine. So if we play the roles of the attendees of the Council the 4 COAs (3+1) are:

COA 1: Remain in prepared defensive positions around Edwards Depot and receive attack from enemy forces.

COA 2: Move due east and attack enemy at Clinton, in compliance with HHQ order.

COA 3: Move southeast to Dillon's to cut enemy communications and compel him to attack us.

COA 4: Major General @tony_gunter has offered a plan for a defense North of the railroad on a line from Edwards Depot to Brownsville to deny the enemy access to the crossings of the BBR.

Which one would you choose and why?

**My hope is this will be a fun exercise and we all are able to learn something new.**

It's probably worth noting that Pemberton and Johnston had two different concepts of the mission.

Pemberton's mission would be to prevent Grant from establishing a base at either Snyder's Bluff or Warrenton, and force Grant to return to Grand Gulf.

Johnston's mission would be to concentrate against Grant and defeat him in the field.

Johnston has not communicated that he intends to evacuate Jackson.

The threat to Jackson temporarily limits the forces available to Pemberton's mobile force of 22,000, 6,000 in Vicksburg and Snyder's, and Johnston's 6,000 assumed to be in Jackson, total 34,000. Pemberton knows there are four divisions near Jackson, and four divisions that passed him on the way to Raymond, estimated 40,000. There is a force of unknown size across the river from Vicksburg, and a force of unknown size somewhere south of the city.

Pemberton knows Grant has a brigade of veteran cavalry, while he has 12 companies of freshly mounted infantry and one veteran cavalry regiment. Johnston has an additional 6 companies of freshly mounted infantry.

To beat Grant in the field, Johnston needs at least a 1:1 force ratio or some sdvantage. Instead, he has a cavalry disadvantage and insecure lines of communication. In addition, the rains on the 14th have reduced the speed of the roads, and Grant has somewhat denuded the number of slaves that can be enlisted as pioneers, while Grant can be assumed to have pioneers organic to his units. So concentrating to beat Grant in the field is a fever dream.

Pemberton assumes that Grant is limited to his supply line from Grand Gulf. However, the maximum distance Grant can sustain himself with a traditional supply line is ~45 miles, which Grant exceeds by moving past Raymond. Pemberton therefore assumes that Grant must return to Raymond.

The mobility demonstrated by Grant's army can be estimated by the troops that pushed Wirt Adams aside on the 12th and are now threatening Jackson. That's about 15 miles per day, about the distance from Jackson to Raymond. If Pemberton moves on Raymond, there's a very real risk that he may find himself facing Grant's main body arriving from two directions (Bolton and Raymond).

I think that leaves COA 1, but given Grant's advantages in cavalry and mobility, Pemberton runs the very real risk of being turned by the crossings north of Edwards.

I think you're missing a COA:

5: cross the Big Black River and protect each crossing with a brigade at Cox, Birdsong, Bush, Messinger's, Bridgeport, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Big Black River Bridge, with one brigade in reserve. Concentrate on whichever crossing gets attacked. Alternate COA: have Forney temporarily move to Oak Ridge in supporting distance of Snyder's, Bush, and Birdsong.

 

[Mississippian1861]

It's probably worth noting that Pemberton and Johnston had two different concepts of the mission.

Pemberton's mission would be to prevent Grant from establishing a base at either Snyder's Bluff or Warrenton, and force Grant to return to Grand Gulf.

Johnston's mission would be to concentrate against Grant and defeat him in the field.

Johnston has not communicated that he intends to evacuate Jackson.

The threat to Jackson temporarily limits the forces available to Pemberton's mobile force of 22,000, 6,000 in Vicksburg and Snyder's, and Johnston's 6,000 assumed to be in Jackson, total 34,000. Pemberton knows there are four divisions near Jackson, and four divisions that passed him on the way to Raymond, estimated 40,000. There is a force of unknown size across the river from Vicksburg, and a force of unknown size somewhere south of the city.

Pemberton knows Grant has a brigade of veteran cavalry, while he has 12 companies of freshly mounted infantry and one veteran cavalry regiment. Johnston has an additional 6 companies of freshly mounted infantry.

To beat Grant in the field, Johnston needs at least a 1:1 force ratio or some sdvantage. Instead, he has a cavalry disadvantage and insecure lines of communication. In addition, the rains on the 14th have reduced the speed of the roads, and Grant has somewhat denuded the number of slaves that can be enlisted as pioneers, while Grant can be assumed to have pioneers organic to his units. So concentrating to beat Grant in the field is a fever dream.

Pemberton assumes that Grant is limited to his supply line from Grand Gulf. However, the maximum distance Grant can sustain himself with a traditional supply line is ~45 miles, which Grant exceeds by moving past Raymond. Pemberton therefore assumes that Grant must return to Raymond.

The mobility demonstrated by Grant's army can be estimated by the troops that pushed Wirt Adams aside on the 12th and are now threatening Jackson. That's about 15 miles per day, about the distance from Jackson to Raymond. If Pemberton moves on Raymond, there's a very real risk that he may find himself facing Grant's main body arriving from two directions (Bolton and Raymond).

I think that leaves COA 1, but given Grant's advantages in cavalry and mobility, Pemberton runs the very real risk of being turned by the crossings north of Edwards.

I think you're missing a COA:

5: cross the Big Black River and protect each crossing with a brigade at Cox, Birdsong, Bush, Messinger's, Bridgeport, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Big Black River Bridge, with one brigade in reserve. Concentrate on whichever crossing gets attacked. Alternate COA: have Forney temporarily move to Oak Ridge in supporting distance of Snyder's, Bush, and Birdsong.

I think Pemberton staying west of the Big Black and defending the crossings was probably his best course of action considering his lack of mounted force. The question then being which crossings Grant tries to force.

 

[tony_gunter]

So which is your choice?

If we are going with Johnston's understanding of the mission, extending out to Brownsville would be the best bet. It satisfies the order to move out towards Clinton, and connects with Johnston by the 17th of May. But it risks defeat in detail and places Pemberton's back against the Big Black River.

If we are going with Pemberton's understanding of the mission, falling back across the Big Black seems the correct choice, especially since Forney could be called up into a reserve position.

 

[JohnG0609]

It's probably worth noting that Pemberton and Johnston had two different concepts of the mission.

Pemberton's mission would be to prevent Grant from establishing a base at either Snyder's Bluff or Warrenton, and force Grant to return to Grand Gulf.

Johnston's mission would be to concentrate against Grant and defeat him in the field.

Johnston has not communicated that he intends to evacuate Jackson.

The threat to Jackson temporarily limits the forces available to Pemberton's mobile force of 22,000, 6,000 in Vicksburg and Snyder's, and Johnston's 6,000 assumed to be in Jackson, total 34,000. Pemberton knows there are four divisions near Jackson, and four divisions that passed him on the way to Raymond, estimated 40,000. There is a force of unknown size across the river from Vicksburg, and a force of unknown size somewhere south of the city.

Pemberton knows Grant has a brigade of veteran cavalry, while he has 12 companies of freshly mounted infantry and one veteran cavalry regiment. Johnston has an additional 6 companies of freshly mounted infantry.

To beat Grant in the field, Johnston needs at least a 1:1 force ratio or some sdvantage. Instead, he has a cavalry disadvantage and insecure lines of communication. In addition, the rains on the 14th have reduced the speed of the roads, and Grant has somewhat denuded the number of slaves that can be enlisted as pioneers, while Grant can be assumed to have pioneers organic to his units. So concentrating to beat Grant in the field is a fever dream.

Pemberton assumes that Grant is limited to his supply line from Grand Gulf. However, the maximum distance Grant can sustain himself with a traditional supply line is ~45 miles, which Grant exceeds by moving past Raymond. Pemberton therefore assumes that Grant must return to Raymond.

The mobility demonstrated by Grant's army can be estimated by the troops that pushed Wirt Adams aside on the 12th and are now threatening Jackson. That's about 15 miles per day, about the distance from Jackson to Raymond. If Pemberton moves on Raymond, there's a very real risk that he may find himself facing Grant's main body arriving from two directions (Bolton and Raymond).

I think that leaves COA 1, but given Grant's advantages in cavalry and mobility, Pemberton runs the very real risk of being turned by the crossings north of Edwards.

I think you're missing a COA:

5: cross the Big Black River and protect each crossing with a brigade at Cox, Birdsong, Bush, Messinger's, Bridgeport, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Big Black River Bridge, with one brigade in reserve. Concentrate on whichever crossing gets attacked. Alternate COA: have Forney temporarily move to Oak Ridge in supporting distance of Snyder's, Bush, and Birdsong.

It's important to understand that COAs are not plans. A COA is like deciding whether you go to the mountains or the beach for your vacation but it doesn't tell you how to do it. The COA decision initiates detailed planning. I think that's my biggest struggle with this episode. I am not able to plug the information into any planning analytic tool and come up with a COA that works.

Theoretically, COAs could be added ad finitum but they must be "suitable, acceptable, and feasible." A mnemonic often used is S.M.A.R.T. (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and timely). Just a superficial look at the 3 COAs placed in front of the Council I don't see any of those three meeting that threshold of suitable, acceptable, and feasible.

Generally, since planning is now a staff function a commander would only consider 3 COAs that best meet these criteria. But he could reject them and select another or send the planners back to the drawing board. Which is to say that Pemberton ought not to have felt compelled to adopt a COA that he didn't approve. That says to me its hard to argue competence in a general that has lost control of his army.

 

[JohnG0609]

So which is your choice?

If we are going with Johnston's understanding of the mission, extending out to Brownsville would be the best bet. It satisfies the order to move out towards Clinton, and connects with Johnston by the 17th of May. But it risks defeat in detail and places Pemberton's back against the Big Black River.

If we are going with Pemberton's understanding of the mission, falling back across the Big Black seems the correct choice, especially since Forney could be called up into a reserve position.

COA #1 is not feasible. Friendly forces are oriented south/southeast which would have put enemy forces fully of the right flank in overwhelming strength.
COA #2 is not feasible, the move to Clinton is like sticking your head in a 250hp wood chipper
COA #3 is not feasible, the move to Dillon's is like sticking your head in a 125hp wood chipper.

If Pemberton could not keep his hold on the army I don't see how any COA moving back over the BBR, which is at least suitable and feasible, if not acceptable.

It occurred to me that Pemberton could have resigned, turned the army over to Loring and ridden his horse all the way back to Philadelphia. He had lost the confidence of Davis and the government. They sent Johnston to supersede him. And he had lost the confidence of the men. Thompson noted in his report that he didn't see how Pemberton could have retained control over the army if Pemberton refused a forward movement. other Confederate commanders had tendered resignations under flimsier circumstances than this.

 

[tony_gunter]

COA #1 is not feasible. Friendly forces are oriented south/southeast which would have put enemy forces fully of the right flank in overwhelming strength.
COA #2 is not feasible, the move to Clinton is like sticking your head in a 250hp wood chipper
COA #3 is not feasible, the move to Dillon's is like sticking your head in a 125hp wood chipper.

If Pemberton could not keep his hold on the army I don't see how any COA moving back over the BBR, which is at least suitable and feasible, if not acceptable.

It occurred to me that Pemberton could have resigned, turned the army over to Loring and ridden his horse all the way back to Philadelphia. He had lost the confidence of Davis and the government. They sent Johnston to supersede him. And he had lost the confidence of the men. Thompson noted in his report that he didn't see how Pemberton could have retained control over the army if Pemberton refused a forward movement. other Confederate commanders had tendered resignations under flimsier circumstances than this.

That's why I feel like Raymond was the point of no return for Pemberton. The instant Gregg gets lured into attacking a force twice his size, has to spend a day extracting himself, and fails to notify Pemberton that Jackson not Edwards is the true target, Vicksburg is all but a done deal.

Speaking of getting lured into an attack, I have first hand accounts of XVII corps musicians being ordered to stow their instruments and rejoin their companies under arms. Compare with Charles Dana's account of camping with McClernand's men:

The decision to manage the Battle of Raymond with only verbal commands deranged command and control a bit, but payed big dividends with the element of surprise.

 

[JohnG0609]

I think it's generally accepted that the Confederate move to Ellison's was in furtherance of a move to the "Turkey Creek Road," so named by Grabau, Lockett only refers to it as the road "To Dillon's" on his map.

On 14 May, Pemberton issued Special Orders, No.____ ordering the forward movement of the army "in the direction of Raymond, on the military road..."

Loring, leading the march, traversed Baker's Creek via the Clinton road and ultimately reacquired the Edwards-Raymond road if not directly at then in the vicinity of the military road named in the order. He fully intended to continue on this route until Engineer Lockett appeared and "directed the column to take a cross-road leading to Mrs. Ellison's house, on the middle Raymond Road."

What drove this deviation from the published order?

Only Loring commented on it in his report by stating, "that the road which it was intended the entire force should follow was wrongly laid down upon the map furnished." But, at least to me, falls short of a true and complete explanation as the map Lockett published with his report shows the military road and the road "To Dillon's" correctly located.

 

[tony_gunter]

Where was Mrs Ellison's house?

 

[JohnG0609]

Where was Mrs Ellison's house?

just west of the road to Dillon's and east of the military road. Grabau has it somewhat further west that the Lockett map.

 

[alan polk]

Where was Mrs Ellison's house?

If you are coming from Edwards and heading to Raymond on 467, you will pass Coker house on your right. As you come off that ridge, Ellison's house would have been on the next ridge top just after you cross Jackson Creek.

 

[JohnG0609]

If you are coming from Edwards and heading to Raymond on 467, you will pass Coker house on your right. As you come off that ridge, Ellison's house would have been on the next ridge top just after you cross Jackson Creek.

Are you aware of how military road? I've never heard one. I speculate that maybe Andy Jackson and his army passed thru on his way to New Orleans.

 

[alan polk]

Are you aware of how military road? I've never heard one. I speculate that maybe Andy Jackson and his army passed thru on his way to New Orleans.

I've often wondered about that myself but have never got a definitive answer to it. I have heard people speculate about Andrew Jackson. Not sure there is any evidence of it. I've also wondered whether there was a military school established there at some point. After all, it's rather amazing how many so-called military schools were located in the countryside between Jackson and Port Gibson. One often comes across those schools as you read the OR's. It's kind of like the mystery of "Telegraph Road" south of Edwards.

 

[JohnG0609]

One often comes across those schools as you read the OR's. It's kind of like the mystery of "Telegraph Road" south of Edwards.

Without deviating too far away from my question what and where was the college south of Edwards north of Big Sandy creek?

 

[tony_gunter]

just west of the road to Dillon's and east of the military road. Grabau has it somewhat further west that the Lockett map.View attachment 556245

I *think* Pemberton downplayed this in his apologia (and I still can't figure out where I misplaced my copy), but he told Gregg that his plan was to strike Grant's flank or rear if he passed in the direction of Jackson … so I've always assumed that his move "to Dillon's" was aimed at the rear of Grant's army, which was now at Raymond with increasing certainty.

 

[Mississippian1861]

Are you aware of how military road? I've never heard one. I speculate that maybe Andy Jackson and his army passed thru on his way to New Orleans.

Jackson's Military Road is is much further east, passing between Forest and Meridian.